

Liberty Requires Accountability:

All Federal and State Financial Reporting are Fraudulent and Violate the Appropriations and Statement and Account Clauses of the United States Constitution (Including FASAB's "Insurance Programs" Exposure Draft)

“A Nation cannot plunder its own treasury without putting its Constitution and its survival in peril.” *Justice Anthony M. Kennedy*

Memorandum to:

*Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board,
Legislative Branch*

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House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi,
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell,
Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid,
Senator Charles Schumer,
Senator Elizabeth Warren,
All other Members of Congress,
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General Counsel and Outside Counsel of All Ratings Agencies*

Joseph H. Marren, J.D., MBA, CPA (Inactive),
Concerned Citizen, and aka “Fordham Publius”
March 28, 2016

Notes: The views expressed by Mr. Marren do not represent the views of KStone Partners LLC or any of its other Members. The approach and discussion in this memorandum supersedes all prior publications by the author. End notes for this “working draft” document have not been completed.

This memorandum is dedicated

To my brother David Stack Marren

In 2007 Dave was diagnosed with a rare neurological disease

Primary Lateral Sclerosis (“PLS”)

Readers that find this memorandum helpful or informative are urged to make a tax-deductible donation to fund PLS research at Columbia University Medical Center Please make checks payable to “The Trustees of Columbia University” and indicate “David S. Marren PLS Research Fund” in the check’s memo line and mail to:

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100 Haven Avenue, Suite 29D

New York, NY 10032

And

To the memory of my father

Bernard Dominic Marren, JD, CPA,

a former Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

a graduate of Fordham University and

Fordham University School of Law

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The federal government's and all fifty state's budget deficits and debt are exponentially higher than what the federal and state governments say that they are. None of the headline figures used as the basis of public discourse have any relevance to the true state of the federal or state government's finances. The upcoming presidential election continues a lifetime tradition for citizens of casting their votes without the benefit of having access to an accurate and complete published account of the total receipts and expenditures of the United States Government. The purpose of this memorandum is to describe the **frauds on their electorates that have been perpetrated by the federal and state governments with substantial assistance from the accounting profession.**

The federal and state governments have controlled financial reporting and thereby public opinion to minimize their accountability for spending. Our federal and state politicians do not want to be held accountable for the full extent of their spending and, generally, wish to make re-election easier for incumbents. Hence, they collude to underreport appropriations and expenses. Proper reporting would lead to spending cutbacks, tax increases and/or recriminations for overspending, all of which are likely to cause voter dissatisfaction and changes at the polls. The failure to publish a complete and truthful statement and account of the nation's finances has made our republic dysfunctional, plagued by successive budget-deficit and debt-ceiling crisis. Their frauds have brought the federal and state governments to the **brink of bankruptcy.**

Article I, section 9, clause 7 of the United States Constitution states: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time," The first part is called the **Appropriations Clause** and the second part is called the **Statement and Account Clause**. Since the nation's founding, the Supreme Court has not opined on the meaning of the Statement and Account Clause, including how it interacts with the Appropriations Clause.

None of the Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays and Balances, The President's Budget or the Financial Report of the U. Government complies with constitutional requirements. As a result, several private **rights protected by our Constitution have been violated including the right to vote, freedom of speech, due process, equal protection, the right to financial information and political accountability.** These rights have also been violated by the states since their reporting violates the antifraud provisions and constitutional requirements. States have violated the right to vote under the Fifteenth Amendment and the other rights have been violated pursuant to their incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Citizens can sue the federal or state governments for violation of these rights. Finally, the fraudulent financial reporting creates a perpetual fraud on the federal and state judiciaries.

Primary responsibility for the fraudulent and unconstitutional financial reporting by the federal government lies with the leadership on both sides of the aisle in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Therefore, a large number of our current and former politicians and senior finance officials have **violated their oath¹** to uphold the Constitution and, arguably, they have **committed "high crimes" providing a basis for their impeachment.** The implications for the accounting profession and its rule-making bodies may be much more serious. The memorandum will raise the question as to whether current arrangements for accounting standards setting and auditing for the federal and/or state governments or any related entities rise to the level of being a **"criminal enterprise"** and a **"Political Protection Racket"** under the **RICO Act.**

The federal government has known for a very long time that its accounting standards setting process is unconstitutional and states know that their accounting standards setting process is also unlawful. Both the federal and state governments have actively worked to **cover up their frauds.** Not surprisingly, current arrangements permit federal and state politicians to disclaim any responsibility for federal and state financial reporting.

How could this happen? Where is Congress? Where is the people's financial champion in the United States Senate – Elizabeth Warren? Where is the SEC? Where are the Federal Reserve's Governors? This memorandum will answer these and many other related questions.

Introduction

An informed electorate is the cornerstone of our democracy. Liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people of the character and conduct of their rulers. Their use of public money is central to this general knowledge. This memorandum's purpose is to describe how and why liberty has been sacrificed for almost a century as the federal and state government's financial reporting practices do not comply with the United States Constitution and violate the antifraud provisions of the nation's securities laws.

The fact that the United States Government's finances are in dire shape is not a new or novel concept. Politicians and senior finance professionals in the federal government have known that current policies are "unsustainable" for a very long time. In economic parlance this is described as the nation having a "structural deficit", which is a deficit that will widen no matter how the U.S. economy performs. This includes any faster Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") growth scenario for the nation or any scenario that attempts to eliminate all the government fraud, abuse and waste in its various programs.

In 1994 President Clinton's Commission on Entitlement Reform (Kerrey-Danforth Commission) found unanimously that the cost of entitlement programs and interest on the national debt would consume all federal spending by 2030 and stated that these programs were "unsustainable."

In 2004 the International Monetary Fund pointed towards a huge and growing imbalance between what the federal government is likely to record in revenues and what it has promised to pay in future benefits.

That America's fiscal policies are "unsustainable" from an economic point of view is important for the electorate to know. The Constitution requires that our government publish an accurate and complete Statement and Account of the nation's finances.

"Over and over again, good accounting practices have produced the level of trust necessary to found stable governments and vital capitalist societies, and poor accounting and its attendant lack of accountability have led to financial chaos, economic crimes, civil unrest, and worse."²

Given that the Framers wanted voters to have accurate information about federal spending at what point does the government's publication of false and misleading financial information render a citizen's vote meaningless? When the government is spending at twice the level that it reports to its citizens? Three times? Four times?

No politician will ever believe that financial disaster will hit on his or her watch. That is why they will always opt to kick the can down the road. Furthermore, no national politician who focuses on the cost of entitlements being "a problem" has any chance of winning an election. Therefore, not surprisingly, no politician has the required political will to fix the problem. The electorate is also not inclined to have the problem addressed as the government's promises to pay social insurance and Medicaid benefits are assets on their personal balance sheets.

Over the years numerous good faith and half-hearted attempts have been made to address the federal government's structural deficit and accounting problems. These attempts include Congress enacting various spending limitations measures, Presidential Commissions being appointed to make recommendations regarding solving the problem and efforts by private citizens to inform the electorate and provide grass roots support for addressing the issue. In the 1950s Congress passed legislation requiring that the President's Budget be prepared using accrual accounting. The

executive branch ignored the law. It is fair to say that these efforts have been a colossal failure and the nation continues on its path towards financial Armageddon.

The Supreme Court of the United States ("SCOTUS") knows that the nation has a "spending problem." Justices live for a substantial part of the year in Washington D.C. so they are very aware of the state of the fight between the two political parties over government spending. Furthermore, they have had several cases that dealt directly with Congressional attempts to reign in federal spending. Finally, the "unsustainable" nature of the federal government's spending is mentioned in numerous prominent government documents such as the President's Budget and the Financial Report of the United States Government ("Financial Report"). It is reasonable to assume that the leaders of a co-equal branch of government have some familiarity with these documents. The truly ironic part of the story is that with both the executive and legislative branches hopelessly corrupted over the issue of proper accounting for government spending, the judicial branch is the only branch capable of fixing the nation's financial dilemma.

In the last fifty years the problem has actually become much worse and more widespread as all fifty states, Washington D.C. and other cities, Puerto Rico and other U.S. territories and local governments have structural deficits and fraudulent accounting. These have been swept under the rug for the same reasons that the federal government's structural deficit and fraudulent accounting problems have been hidden. This fact appears to be lost on all those politicians and private citizens clamoring for a balanced budget amendment. The only thing that a balanced budget amendment would produce is more creative fraudulent accounting. The balanced state budgets touted by proponents are economic fiction.

Historically, it has not been unusual for merchants to keep two sets of books. There was a *libro segreto*, a secret set of books for their eyes only and a plausible set of public books for the tax collectors. The federal government extends this concept further....there are two sets of public books – one cash-based and the other accrual based. However, neither is the *libro segreto*. This memorandum outlines what this very scary set of books looks like in Chapter 13.

This memorandum advocates what some will describe as a radical approach to solving the problem of structural deficits and bad accounting. It involves shining a bright light on the federal and state governments' failures to publish what the Constitution mandates that they must publish for their electorates. Hopefully, this leads to the federal and state governments telling the complete truth about how much they have been spending.

SCOTUS will, at some point, likely consider the arguments contained herein. It is important to know that the author assumes that the Legislative or the Executive branches WILL NEVER be willing to adhere to our Constitution's financial reporting requirements....unless the Court requires them to return the nation to the rule of law. However, the author is optimistic about the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), an independent agency, taking action with respect to financial reporting by the states.

Please note that Mr. Marren has had numerous conversations with several former senior finance officials about how a hypothetical lawsuit to compel the federal government to produce financial reports that comply with the United States Constitution would be received by the Supreme Court. All of these former senior finance officials believe that the Supreme Court will never take a case premised upon federal financial reporting being fraudulent or unconstitutional. However, the author believes that these former senior finance officials and their legal advisors are very wrong in this thinking.

The author is well aware that there will be no happy ending to the problem that is being addressed. Furthermore, the author is not likely to be popular in most quarters for illuminating the problem. There is a story that Jacob Soll recounted in his recent book "The Reckoning" which accurately

portrays the authors' view on how this memorandum will likely be received by many, particularly those in government and in the accounting professions rules setting organizations for government accounting.

“...Cicero complained of bad accounts in his attacks on Mark Anthony, known for his debts and shady dealings. He claimed Mark Anthony had kept bad account books and, in doing so, had “squandered a countless sum of moneys” stolen from Caesar and even forged accounts and signatures. ...later that year...Mark Anthony hunted down Cicero and had his head and hands chopped off and displayed in the Forum. This grimly illustrates a constant maxim: The powerful don't respond well to those who call for their books to be opened.”³

The ***Great Debaters*** was a movie released in 2007 directed and starring Denzel Washington, a Fordham University alumnus. It was a drama based on a true story of Melvin Tolson, a professor at Wiley College in Texas. In 1935 he inspired students to form the school's first debate team which went on to challenge Harvard in the National Championship. There is a line delivered by Jurnee Smollett as Samantha Boone during a debate that rings true for the topic at hand. She says “the time for justice, the time for freedom and the time for equality is always, is always right now.”

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's admonition which appears on the cover of this memorandum is true.

“A Nation cannot plunder its own treasury without putting its Constitution and its survival in peril.”

Furthermore, the author would like to acknowledge that part of the title for this memorandum was inspired by a sentence in Justice Alito's concurring opinion in *Department of Transportation et al v. Association of American Railroads* (2015).

The author hopes that readers view this memorandum as being in keeping with the Jesuit tradition of searching for the truth in the world....even if that truth is not what you want to find.

Key Assumptions and Acknowledgements

In this memorandum the federal government's constitutional authority to suppress financial information related to national security matters is not being questioned. Also, Congress' authority to determine the amount of detail associated with its financial results is not being questioned. What is being asserted is that the federal government is falsely reporting total receipts, total expenditures and the resulting deficit calculated by subtracting the second figure from the first. These three figures, it is asserted, are not subject to the plenary power of Congress.

This memorandum is not intended to support either policy option (raising taxes or cutting spending) that are required to stabilize the nation's finances. Furthermore, no commentary is made or intended about the validity or need for any government program. The author believes that once all members of Congress and the Administration must deal with the same set of facts with respect to the nation's financial results and financial position, they will navigate their way to an acceptable outcome for the electorate. This should also hold true for each state, city and local government. Finally, this memorandum does not attempt to assign blame for the current state of financial reporting. There is more than enough for both political parties.

The author has learned numerous truths in the course of studying federal and state financial reporting. One is that almost all politicians and many senior finance officials have little interest in having the electorate understand the government's spending or its accounting practices. Another is that given the immense size and scope of the government's activities it is easy to get lost in the details. Hence, he has attempted to simplify matters in analyzing the government's financial reporting by following the Pareto principle also known as the 80-20 rule. This rule essentially states that for many things, 80% of the effects come from 20% of the causes. This memorandum focuses on the twenty percent that really matters for proper accounting for the government. Realistically, this means focusing on the federal government's few multi-trillion dollar issues and ignoring the many "billion dollar" issues. All figures that you will see in this memorandum are taken or calculated from the government's financial reports and all figures are in trillions of dollars except where noted.

The basic framework for the analysis contained in this memorandum was created for a first-of-its-kind conference "Representation Without Accountability" which was held at Fordham Law School on January 23, 2012. The conference addressed the federal government's actual expenditures, its current financial reporting and questions surrounding the Statement and Account Clause including whether financial reporting by the federal government comports with Constitutional requirements. A nonpartisan panel of speakers included Hon. David Walker, former Comptroller General, David Mosso, former Chairman of the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board ("FASAB"), Professor Brian Fitzpatrick, a constitutional law professor at Vanderbilt Law School and Joseph Marren, President and CEO of KStone Partners. Professor Sean Griffith, Director of the Fordham Law Corporate Center and the T.J. Maloney Chair in Business Law delivered opening remarks and acted as moderator for the conference. The conference was presented by the Fordham Corporate Law Center and sponsored by Joseph and Joan Marren and KStone Partners LLC.

The author is deeply appreciative of the support given over many years by Professor Sean Griffith. In addition, Mr. Marren is indebted to his fellow panelists at the "Representation Without Accountability" conference particularly David Mosso.

Liberty Requires Accountability - Executive Summary

This memorandum will describe how the federal and state governments are **“cooking their books”** as well as the legal and accounting arguments that describe why financial reporting by the federal and state governments does not comply with constitutional requirements or the antifraud provisions of the nation’s securities laws. The two **largest financial frauds** in the history of the world have been perpetrated with the active involvement of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”), Financial Accounting Foundation (“FAF”), Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (“FASAB”) and Governmental Accounting Standards Board (“GASB”).

Congress has enacted financial reporting laws that violate the Constitution based on existing SCOTUS precedents. These laws have been designed to achieve financial obfuscation and to diffuse required political accountability. The accounting standards setting processes utilized by the federal and state governments do not comply with the Constitution and, therefore, the accounting standards promulgated using these processes are themselves illegal.

The legislative and executive branches and state governments have controlled financial reporting and thereby public opinion to minimize their accountability for spending. Congress and the states have spent enormous sums of taxed and borrowed money to endear themselves to their electorates, but they do not want to be held accountable for the full extent of their spending. Hence, they collude to underreport appropriations and expenses. The executive and legislative branches and state governments have violated the trust placed in them by their electorates, acted in a self-serving manner to the detriment of the ideals on which America was founded and subverted the democratic process all in an effort to make re-election easier for incumbents. This has brought the federal government and the states to the **brink of bankruptcy**.

Proper financial reporting would lead to spending cutbacks, tax increases and/or recriminations for overspending, all of which are likely to cause voter dissatisfaction and changes at the polls. The failure to publish a complete and truthful statement and account of the nation’s finances has made our republic dysfunctional, **plagued by successive budget-deficit and debt-ceiling crisis**.

Just as fear and greed are the primary motivators on Wall Street, they heavily influence actions of our political leaders. To date, there have been no downside implications for the legislative and executive branches and state governments for unconstitutional and fraudulent financial reporting. Fear of severe negative career consequences needs to be introduced into our leader’s political calculus.

Primary responsibility for the fraudulent and unconstitutional financial reporting by the federal government lies with the leadership on both sides of the aisle in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Thus, a large number of politicians and senior finance officials have violated their oath⁴ to uphold the Constitution and, arguably, they have committed **“high crimes”** providing a basis for their impeachment. This concept should not be lost on those in positions of authority. The frauds implications for the accounting profession and its designated rule-making bodies may be much more serious. Chapter 8 will explore the notion of whether current arrangements for accounting standards setting and auditing for the federal and/or state governments or any related entities rise to the level of being a **“criminal enterprise”** and a **“Political Protection Racket.”** The arrangements will be viewed in light of the **Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO Act”)**.

The term **“fraud”** is generally defined in the law as an intentional misrepresentation of material existing facts by one party to another with knowledge of its falsity. The misrepresentation is made for the purpose of inducing the other party to act, and upon which the other party relies with

resulting injury or damage. The frauds by the federal and state governments fit the textbook definition.

The Federal Government's Fraud is Enormous!

The federal government's budget deficit and debt are exponentially higher than what the executive and legislative branches say that they are. None of the headline figures used as the basis of public discourse have any relevance to the true state of the United States' finances. The upcoming presidential election continues a lifetime tradition for most citizens of casting their votes without the benefit of having access to an accurate and complete published account of the total receipts and expenditures of the U.S. Government.

The simplest way to think about our government's recent financial results is to add up all the expenditures and revenues over the last decade and divide the total expenditures by total revenues. This produces a "dollar spent per dollar of revenue" figure which everyone that manages a household can understand.

Exhibit 1 displays **The President's Budget** for the years 2006 through 2015. Over the last decade, under budget accounting, the federal government has outlays of \$33.13 trillion while recording receipts of \$25.57 trillion. Thus, under budget accounting the Federal government has spent \$1.30 for every \$1 of revenue it has received.

Exhibit 2 displays **The Financial Report** for the years 2006 through 2015. Over the last decade, under accrual accounting used in preparing the Financial Report the federal government has spent \$35.38 trillion while recording revenues of \$25.57 trillion. Thus, using this accounting approach the Federal government has spent \$1.38 for every \$1 of revenue it has received.

Exhibit 3 depicts Social Insurance and Medicaid obligations that are fully funded with appropriations from 2006 through 2015. Please note that the full measure of Medicare obligations cannot be calculated because the Federal Government does not publish Infinite Horizon figures for the Alternate Scenario. In addition, the full measure of the Medicaid obligations cannot be calculated as the federal government has not published 1) Alternative Scenario, 2) Infinite Horizon or 3) Alternative Scenario Infinite Horizon figures for Medicaid for any period.

Exhibit 4 displays The Financial Report's Net Operating Cost figures adjusted to account for the annual changes in the net present value cost of the Social Insurance and Medicaid obligations that are fully funded with appropriations. These adjusted figures come much closer to reflecting the federal government's economic reality.

Over the last decade, after adjusting the Federal Government's accrual accounting used in the Financial Report to include the net change in the present value cost of legal obligations with appropriations it has spent \$62.89 trillion while recording revenues of \$25.57 trillion. Thus, the Federal government has spent \$2.46 for every \$1 of revenue it has received.

Just to be clear about the size of the problem, over the last decade, using the reported figures which are understated, incomplete estimates, the federal government spent almost \$63 trillion while it took in a little less than \$26 trillion. The government pretends that obligated money is not spent until the future arrives; a legally correct accounting must accrue for those future payments.

Exhibit 5 shows that the federal government's calculated legal obligations based on "reported" figures are almost \$92 trillion, which is far above the carefully defined debt-ceiling limit of \$18.1 trillion (currently suspended until March 2017) and are over five times the size of the gross domestic product and almost twenty-eight times the size of the government's revenues in fiscal 2015.

However, the \$92 trillion figure is substantially understated. The author has calculated a more realistic figure including estimates for "unreported" amounts associated with Medicare and Medicaid that are fully funded (i.e., "have appropriations"). The Federal Government's legal obligations for 2015 for Social Insurance and Medicaid are estimated to be \$35.5 trillion higher than the \$73.6 trillion for 2015 reported on **Exhibit 3**. Thus, the estimated Total Net Obligation is \$127.3 trillion. This amount is significantly larger than the \$86.8 trillion net worth of U.S. households and nonprofits reported on March 10, 2016 the Federal Reserve. Although there is an "apples to oranges" aspect of this comparison it makes the point that **arguably the federal government is already bankrupt**.

Congress Has Abdicated its Financial Reporting Responsibility

Over the last 100 years, Congress has abdicated its financial reporting responsibility. Today the executive branch dominates all financial reporting with little to no input from Congress. The President's Budget is prepared by the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") without input from Congress, and the Financial Report of the United States Government is prepared by Treasury and OMB based on principles promulgated by FASAB. Practically speaking, the executive branch has effective veto power over any proposed accounting principle it does not like. The end result is that financial reporting by the federal government does not reflect economic reality.

SCOTUS has Not Defined the Meaning of the Statement and Account Clause

Article I, section 9, clause 7 of the United States Constitution states:

"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time,"

The first part is called the **Appropriations Clause** and the second part is called the **Statement and Account Clause**.

Since no report published by the federal government complies with the Appropriations and Statement and Account Clauses several private rights protected by our Constitution have been violated. **The rights violated include the right to vote, freedom of speech, due process, equal protection, the right to financial information and political accountability.** In addition, these rights have been violated by the states. States have violated the right to vote under the Fifteenth Amendment and the other rights have been violated pursuant to their incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Federal and state officials can be sued by private citizens for violations of their constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Since the nation's founding, SCOTUS has not opined on the meaning of the Statement and Account Clause including how it interacts with the Appropriations Clause. As Chief Justice Roberts observed in *National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius* "[S]ometimes 'the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem...is the lack of historical precedent....'" While the Chief Justice's remark was directed at Congressional action the sentiment also applies to the Supreme Court's duty to interpret the Constitution.

The author believes that when faced with the question of interpreting the Statement and Account Clause the Supreme Court is likely to rule that there are no exceptions permitted by the Constitution for entities or programs funded with public money that our politicians want to avoid accountability for by excluding them, putting them off balance sheet or describing them only in footnotes. In addition, the author believes that the Supreme Court will determine that the antifraud provisions are inherent in the Statement and Account Clause.

The fact that the Supreme Court has not decided the meaning of the Statement and Account Clause has not stopped the federal government from relying on the Court's dicta in the only case involving the clause to reach the Court to justify to the electorate its unconstitutional accounting practices.

The Feds Fraud: "Money" is Not "Money"

"Money" is not "Money" when the Executive and Legislative branches are interpreting Article I, section 9, clause 7. The federal government's fraud is two-fold.

- 1) Congress and the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") effectively define permanent appropriations to be an ongoing series of one-year appropriations wherein the appropriations beyond one-year do not rise to the level of an unmatured commitment. As such they do not have to be recorded as obligations under appropriations law.
- 2) They "divide and conquer" by defining the concept of a "liability," a key component of public "Money," differently for financial reporting purposes than for purposes of appropriations law.

Practically speaking this means taking certain programs that are funded with permanent appropriations such as Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security which are clearly legal liabilities/obligations under "appropriations law" and redefining them for financial reporting purposes as not being legal liabilities/obligations of the United States Government. This approach means that the legally enacted expenses and obligations of the United States Government are significantly understated in all of its financial reports.

The congressional power of the purse refers to the power to appropriate funds and to prescribe the conditions governing the use of those funds. The Appropriations Clause has often been characterized as "the most important single curb in the Constitution on Presidential power." The Supreme Court in *Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States (1937)* indicated that the Appropriations Clause means that "no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress."

It is also well established that Congress can determine the terms and conditions under which an appropriation may be used. Thus, Congress can determine what will be required to make the appropriation "legally available" for any expenditure. However, courts have invalidated congressional funding restrictions when they found that the restrictions violated some independent constitutional bar. This is a critical concept and one that the author wants to make clear to the reader. Congress cannot create legislation with "permanent appropriations" and then define the "permanent" part out of existence for purposes of recording the appropriation or for financial reporting purposes under the Statement and Account clause. Both are clearly intended to do one thing: mask the Legislature's accountability for spending, which the Constitution does not permit.

The two basic authorities conferred by an appropriation law are the authority to incur obligations and the authority to make expenditures. An obligation results from some action that creates a liability or definite commitment on the part of the government to make an expenditure. The

expenditure is the disbursement of funds to pay the obligation. Generally, appropriated funds are first obligated and then expended. In 1963 the Comptroller General (“CG”) defined an obligation as “A legal duty on the part of the United States which constitutes a legal liability or which could mature into a legal liability by virtue of actions on the part of the other party beyond the control of the United States.”

What action is necessary or sufficient to create an obligation? The CG has determined that an obligation arises when the definite commitment is made, even though the actual payment may not take place until a future fiscal year, and that the term “obligation” includes both matured and unmatured commitments. A matured commitment is a legal liability that is currently payable. An unmatured commitment is a liability which is not yet payable but for which a definite commitment nevertheless exists. The fact that an unmatured liability may be subject to a right of cancellation does not negate the obligation.

When must an obligation be recorded? In 1953 the CG indicated “In order to determine the status of appropriations, both from the viewpoint of management and the Congress, it is essential that obligations be recorded in the accounting records on a factual and consistent basis throughout the Government. Only by the following of sound practices in this regard can data on existing obligations serve to indicate program accomplishments and be related to the amount of additional appropriations required.” The standards for the proper recording of obligations are found in 31 U.S.C. sec. 1501(a) which prescribes specific criteria for recording obligations. It indicates that “[a]n amount shall be recorded as an obligation of the United States Government only when supported by documentary evidence” and then goes on to specify nine criteria for recording obligations. Once one of the criteria is met, the agency must record the transaction as an obligation.

Sec. 1501(a)(1) establishes the criteria for recording contracts. Essentially, a contract must be recorded if there is a binding agreement, in writing, for an authorized purpose, executed in a period of obligational availability and it calls for specific goods or services.

The recording of grants and subsidies (i.e., entitlement programs) is governed by Sec. 1501(a)(5). It indicates that the grant must be supported by documentary evidence and that in order to properly obligate an appropriation for an assistance program, some action creating a definite liability against the appropriation must occur during the period of obligational availability of the appropriation. In some situations, the obligating action under section 1501(a)(5) involves a discretionary action by an agency of awarding a grant that is evidenced by a grant agreement. In other situations, the obligating action for purposes of 31 U.S.C. sec. 1501(a)(5)(A) may take place by operation of law under a statutory formula grant or by virtue of actions authorized by law to be taken by others that are beyond the control of the agency (even when the precise amount of the obligation is not determined until a later time).

The above description of when an appropriation for a grant or subsidy should be recorded as an obligation for appropriations purposes shows the lengths to which Congress and the GAO will go to obscure spending. Conceptually, we have an appropriation that is “permanent” and automatic (“no vote by Congress is required”). Yet according to Congress and the GAO the government’s obligation does not arise until a statutory formula for paying out benefits is met. Hence, there is no need to record any appropriation beyond one year or a long term obligation in the Statement and Account. The only reason for having a “permanent” appropriation be recorded only when a statutory formula

is met is to attempt to control the recording of the appropriation for both appropriations and statement and account clause purposes.

Why have Congress and the GAO created an alternate universe for recording permanent appropriations? The answer is that the numbers associated with permanent appropriations are staggering in size so no Congress wants to enact these programs and have the electorate know the full cost of the programs.

The federal government has admitted that it uses a different definition of a “liability” for financial reporting purposes. The GAO’s September 2005 “*A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process*” (“GAO’s Glossary of Terms”) defines “Liability” as follows:

“Liability - Defined differently for obligation (or budgetary) and proprietary (or financial) accounting purposes.

Obligational (or budgetary) accounting, designed to ensure compliance with fiscal laws, is based on the concept of **legal** liability. A legal liability is a claim that may be legally enforced against the government. It may be created in a variety of ways, such as by signing a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement or by operation of law.

Proprietary (or financial) accounting, designed to generate data for financial statement purposes, is based on the concept of **accounting** liability. For federal financial statement purposes, a liability is a probable future outflow or other sacrifice of resources as a result of past transactions or events. Generally, liabilities are thought of as amounts owed for items or services received, assets acquired, construction performed (regardless of whether invoices have been received), an amount received but not yet earned, or other expenses incurred.”

The Statement and Account Clause and Appropriations Clause are yoked together in the Constitution in Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 for a reason. Legislation that has been legally enacted and fully or partially funded with permanent appropriations must be reflected in the Statement and Account and other financial statements to the full extent of that funded obligation. Accounting principles governing federal financial reporting declare that legally enacted legislation that is fully or partially funded with permanent appropriations **ARE NOT** legal obligations for accounting purposes that need to be recorded in the Statement and Account or any of the nation’s annual financial statements. The government uses the “Due and Payable” approach to record obligations associated with the entitlement programs.

The above discussion lays out the federal government’s fraud. For financial reporting purposes it will disclose “accounting liabilities” as opposed to the U.S. Government’s actual legal obligations/liabilities pursuant to Appropriations law. Once Congress/GAO created different definitions they cannot put spending side-by-side with appropriations because of the definitional difference. THAT is why the President’s Budget and the Financial Report do not include appropriations.

The Supreme Court has indicated that Congress has the plenary power to decide the rules governing appropriations. However, Congress does not have the plenary power to enact appropriations with restrictions attached that prevent the proper recording of those appropriations. This violates one of the restrictions outlined by SCOTUS in *South Dakota v. Dole* which indicated that spending legislation must not be prohibited by an independent constitutional bar.

The Supreme Court has no alternative but to weigh in on Congress' appropriations law and financial reporting practices as it did in *Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. (1995)* and *Department of Transportation et al v. Association of American Railroads (2015)*. In those cases the Supreme Court held that even when Congress has been quite specific in declaring that a corporation is not a federal instrumentality, it may still take on that status for constitutional purposes. See section 6.6.

The State Governments' Fraud Involves Accounting for Medicaid

Since the inception of the Medicaid program all fifty states have published financial statements that fail to disclose material information relating to it. Based on disclosure in the 2010 Financial Report of the U.S. Government the states aggregate net present value obligation for Medicaid as of September 30, 2010 is no less than \$18.3 trillion. Therefore, Medicaid in total was a \$42.6 trillion program (\$24.3 trillion federal net present value cost and \$18.3 trillion state's total net present value cost). By September 30, 2015 this obligation is estimated by the author to be \$34.1 trillion based on the author's estimates of reported and unreported appropriations for Medicaid.

No state records their portion of this obligation in its balance sheet or properly reports the annual increase or decrease in the net present value obligation in its income statement. Disclosure regarding the size of each state's obligation for the largest program that each administers is non-existent. Any reasonable investor or citizen/voter in the average state would believe that not reporting \$682 billion of obligations (\$34.1 trillion divided by 50 states) omits a material fact that they would consider important.

It is important to note that the states' estimated \$34.1 trillion aggregate obligation for Medicaid in 2015 is over nine times the size of the entire \$3.7 trillion municipal securities market and over eight times the size of the \$4 trillion pension underfunding issue. Based on the states spending for the Medicaid program in 2015 a REVISED "ballpark estimate" indicates that there are eight states that have a net present value cost obligation for Medicaid that exceeds \$1 trillion – California, Ohio, New York, Texas, Pennsylvania, Florida, Illinois and Massachusetts. See **Exhibit 6**. California leads the way with a net present value obligation of \$3.9 trillion.

States' Accounting for Medicaid Clearly Violates the Antifraud Provisions

State accounting for the Medicaid program clearly violates the antifraud provisions of the nation's securities laws. The securities laws governing municipal securities did not give the SEC authority to prescribe accounting standards in the municipal securities market. They were enacted with broad exemptions for municipal securities from all their provisions, except for the antifraud provisions of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. Generally, these prohibit fraudulent or deceptive practices by issuers including making any untrue statement of a material fact or omitting to state a material fact necessary in order to make statements made not misleading.

SEC Commissioner Mary Jo White has stated "SEC Commissioners...become upon appointment...duty-bound to uphold the Constitution." However, the SEC has never published any interpretation of the Constitution's Appropriations and Statement and Account clauses which is remarkable given its mandate to police the municipal securities market for antifraud violations. The author suggests that the SEC publish a formal position on the meaning and impact that the appropriations and statement and account clauses have on municipal securities....and enforce that position. If the five Commissioners disagree on the meaning of the Constitution as it relates to municipal securities that fact is important for the electorate to know. If their positions differ, each of their respective positions should be disclosed.

Although SCOTUS has never opined on the issue, state financial reporting should also be held by the Court and the SEC to violate the Statement and Account clause. SCOTUS and the SEC should apply the right to financial information to the states by interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating the Statement and Account Clause. The right to financial information is no different than other textually enumerated rights contained in the Bill of Rights.

If the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating the right to financial information, all states, cities and local governments would have to comply with the Statement and Account Clause which requires proper reporting of total receipts, total expenditures and the resulting surplus or deficit in a single Statement and Account. These figures must include "all public money." The off-balance sheet vehicles that are extensively used by state, city and local governments to mislead their respective electorates would need to be consolidated into one set of financial statements at each level of government.

Feds and States Have Created a Perpetual Fraud on the Judiciary

The federal and state government's fraudulent financial reporting creates a perpetual fraud on the state and federal judiciaries. The impact of the fraudulent reporting can be most easily seen by reviewing two Obamacare decisions. SCOTUS' decisions in the Obamacare litigations were based on fraudulent state financial information that did not reveal the extent of state expenditures or the net present value of future legal obligations related to the Medicaid program. It should be noted that the current Obamacare case before the Supreme Court, *Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell* would not exist if the Court had properly been presented with all the relevant financial facts in the prior Obamacare cases.

It can be argued that the SEC determined the outcome of recent Supreme Court decisions relating to the Affordable Care Act including *NFIB v. Sebelius*⁵ and *King v. Burwell* due to its decision not to go after improper state accounting for Medicaid. The SEC's decision not to prosecute improper state accounting for Medicaid stands in stark contrast to its prosecution of the states of New Jersey, Illinois and Kansas for the publication of fraudulent financial information related to pension obligations. Not surprisingly, the SEC's decision to pursue those investigations came at the behest of a Congress that did not want the pension underfunding issue to end up on its doorstep.

The nation needs the Supreme Court most when the other two branches of government have clearly failed to fulfill their Constitutional duties. Unless the judiciary restores the rule of law the lack of proper financial reporting ensures that our electorate remains uninformed and that the nation will go off the proverbial "financial cliff" with the concomitant severe economic disruption and civil unrest.

Supreme Court deference is wholly inappropriate to a Legislative branch that has abdicated its financial reporting responsibility in an effort to diminish its political accountability. This effort has significantly degraded the electoral process as citizens must vote without the benefit of financial information required to be published by the Constitution. In addition, the Supreme Court might want to dodge the issue entirely as it did in *United States v. Richardson*. However, this problem is impossible to correct through the normal democratic process because the government's promises to pay which should be reflected as liabilities on its financial statements are assets on the electorate's individual balance sheets. Hence, this is not a problem that the electorate is willing or looking to solve because it will have bad financial implications for them.

Where is Senator Elizabeth Warren?

The reason why Senator Warren is being singled out among members of Congress for failure to act should be obvious. Here is an incredibly knowledgeable person that has been all over the SEC about its actions or lack thereof that has turned a blind eye to the fact that the all fifty states (including her own State of Massachusetts with its \$1.3 trillion net present value legal obligation for Medicaid) are publishing fraudulent and unconstitutional financial statements. She has never focused on or publicly commented on the SEC's finding three states (New Jersey, Illinois and Kansas) guilty of violating the antifraud provisions of the nation's securities laws. In those cases not even a slap on the wrist was administered by the SEC. Where is her outrage about those frauds on the American people or the lack of punishment of public officials?

Given that Senator Warren is arguably one of, if not the most knowledgeable senator about financial matters that is serving in Congress, she needs to take a good hard look in the mirror. She has always been a strong advocate of accountability. As a member of Congress she bears direct responsibility for the unlawful state of financial reporting by the federal government and the state governments. She demands that everyone "play by the same rules." As a longstanding teacher she knows when someone **warrants an "F" as a grade**. To date Senator Warren has earned that grade with respect to the issues of federal and state financial reporting.

Where are the Federal Reserve's Governors?

The Federal Reserve's Governors have kept quiet because they cannot point out that the federal and state governments are failing to adhere to the Constitution if the Governors do not want to follow its requirements.

The Feds Process is Unconstitutional

Over the last century federal financial reporting grew increasingly dysfunctional as the Executive and Legislative branches were at odds over proper accounting standards. One reason for the dysfunction is that the process by which the federal government promulgates accounting principles and standards is unconstitutional. The United States Congress has unlawfully delegated responsibility for determining and defining the accounting principles and policies to be used by the federal government to the Comptroller General, the highest ranking officer of the General Accountability Office ("GAO"), an agency controlled by Congress.

In 1990 the Comptroller General, Treasury Secretary and Director of OMB established FASAB as an advisory committee to develop accounting standards and principles for the federal government. There is absolutely no discussion in the FASAB literature explaining how the accounting principles it has promulgated comply with the Statement and Account clause's "all public money" requirement or the Appropriations clause. **And no matter how much AICPA GAAP-compliant lipstick are put on FASAB's accounting principles this does not overcome their lack of compliance with the Constitution.**

The federal government has known for a very long time that its accounting standards setting process is unlawful under the Constitution. In *Bowsher v. Synar* the Supreme Court made it crystal clear that Congress cannot delegate lawmaking authority to a delegate of the Legislative branch. From the time that the *Budget and Accounting Act of 1921* was passed the Executive branch has appropriately refused to acknowledge the authority of the Comptroller General to set accounting principles and standards for the federal government. Therefore, FASAB is an unconstitutional entity

that violates separation of powers principles and does not have the authority to promulgate accounting principles and standards. Why? Because the foundational premise underlying FASAB is that the Comptroller General has legal authority to set accounting principles and standards for the federal government.

About two years ago the author asked former Comptroller General Charles Bowsher and former Comptroller General David Walker whether they believed that the Comptroller General has the legal authority to set accounting principles and standards for the federal government. One referred the author to the current administration for an answer and the other indicated that the Comptroller General does not have legal authority to set accounting principles and standards for the federal government.

The Feds Cover-up

The federal government has attempted to cover-up its unconstitutional accounting practices by having FASAB promulgate accounting principles and standards that justify the accounting treatment it uses. These accounting principles and standards severely understate expenditures and obligations/liabilities of the U.S. Government according to Appropriations law.

The fiction that the FASAB has concocted to effectively eliminate the federal government's enormous legal obligations for entitlement programs for financial reporting purposes is to define a category of transactions in such a manner that the federal government's obligation for those transactions will only be recognized at the last possible moment when funds are being disbursed. The transaction classification that FASAB came up with is called "*Nonexchange Transactions*."

Process by which GAAP is Set for State Governments is Unconstitutional

The process by which GAAP is set for state and local governments is unconstitutional for several reasons detailed below.

The primary reason that the process is unconstitutional is that none of the AICPA, FAF or GASB has been properly delegated legal authority by either the federal or state governments to establish laws that govern the preparation of financial statements by state or local governments. The electorate has a fundamental right to financial information under our Constitution and the determination as to how these financial scorecards are prepared cannot be determined by unelected accounting industry professionals that are not subject to substantial oversight and direction by either the federal or state governments. The arrangements that exist today for GAAP standards setting is "legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form."⁶ This delegation has provided Congress and the states with the perfect outcome for each to escape all responsibility for the content of state and local government financial statements.

A second reason why the process is unconstitutional is that the Congress' current funding of GASB provided for under Dodd-Frank Section 978 coupled with the AICPA's Code of Professional Conduct enables the federal government to force the states to implement a federal program.

Third, the current arrangement whereby private entities are wielding power in a manner that is unfair to both investors and the electorate can be challenged in federal and state courts as violations of several private rights including Due Process, Equal Protection, Right to Financial Information, Political Accountability, Right to Vote and Freedom of Speech. The suits in federal court may be

brought under section 1983 of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts and the Administrative Procedures Act.

Department of Transportation et al v. Association of American Railroads

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court on March 9, 2015, in which Justices Roberts, Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, a portion of which appears below. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Justice Alito's concurring opinion sheds light on the issues described in this chapter.

“Liberty requires accountability. When citizens cannot readily identify the source of legislation or regulation that affects their lives, Government officials can wield power without owning up to the consequences.

When it comes to private entities, however, there is not even a fig leaf of constitutional justification. Private entities are not vested with “legislative Powers.” Art. I, §1. Nor are they vested with the “executive Power,” Art. II, §1, cl. 1, which belongs to the President.... By any measure, handing off regulatory power to a private entity is **“legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form.”** *Carter v. Carter Coal Co.*, 298 U. S. 238, 311 (1936).

The State Governments' Cover-up

The state governments have attempted to cover-up their fraudulent and unconstitutional accounting by having GASB promulgate accounting principles and standards that justify the accounting treatment that the states utilize.

State accounting for Medicaid is governed by Statement No. 33 – Accounting and Financial Reporting for Nonexchange Transactions which GASB promulgated in December 1998 and which took effect for periods beginning after June 15, 2000. The fiction that the GASB has concocted to effectively eliminate states' enormous legal obligations for the Medicaid program for financial reporting purposes is to define a category of transactions for states in such a manner that the state's obligation for those transactions will only be recognized at the last possible moment when funds are literally being disbursed by the states. The transaction classification that GASB came up with is called *“Nonexchange Transactions.”*

Is the Accounting Industry Complicit in a Political Protection Racket?

This memorandum raises the question of whether the federal and state governments, the AICPA, FASAB, FAF and GASB are operating a **“criminal enterprise”** as defined under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (**“RICO Act or RICO”**).⁷ Even if the answer to the question is a clear “no,” going through the exercise of considering this outcome reveals just how shady the current arrangements are today.

It can be argued that the fundamental premise underlying this **“association-in-fact”** among the federal and state governments, the AICPA, FASAB, FAF and GASB is that the parties have operated and will continue to operate a **“Political Protection Racket.”** Generally, a protection racket is a scheme whereby a group provides protection to other groups using behavior that is outside the law.

Since the early 1970s thirty-three states have adopted RICO laws to be able to prosecute similar conduct. The meaning of racketeering activity as set out in 18 U.S.C. sec. 1961 includes securities fraud, bribery, extortion, fraud and robbery among many other acts.

The presumptive bargain struck for operating this criminal enterprise is that in return for

a) Federal and state governments:

- (1) Permitting the accounting industry to provide federal, state and local government entities assurance services ("audits"), and
- (2) Funding the FAF, FASB and GASB, and
- (3) Not pointing out that the AICPA has no legal authority to designate any accounting standards setting body for the federal or state governments which has a significant benefit to the AICPA in terms of assisting in growing its membership, and
- (4) Not pointing out that FAF and GASB have no legal authority to set GAAP for state and local governments;

b) The accounting industry will:

- (1) Promulgate generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") that substantially understate spending by the federal, state and local governments, and
- (2) Prosecute AICPA members under its Code of Professional Conduct that do not conform to these GAAP standards; and

c) FASAB and GASB will coordinate their rule-making so as to minimize any possible difficulties associated with differing accounting rules for the federal and state governments.

The end result of this presumptive bargain is that politicians at both the federal and state level will be largely shielded from the negative consequences of their spending.

Why the Federal and State Governments Think They Can Get Away with It

There are a number of reasons why the federal and state governments think that they can get away with their fraudulent financial reporting. Most importantly, they believe that the Supreme Court will not determine the meaning of the appropriations and statement and account clauses. A corollary to this thinking is that the issue of financial reporting should be left to the Legislative and Executive branches. These branches of government have employed accounting experts to advise them on proper accounting for the federal government so it would be entirely inappropriate for the Supreme Court to weigh in on the topic of proper accounting.

Most government officials believe that Congress has the plenary power to determine the appropriate financial reporting for the electorate. In addition, most believe that current financial reporting practices fulfill any Constitutional requirement under the Statement and Account clause. The government publishes the Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays and Balances and provides substantial additional disclosure in its annual Financial Report of the United States Government.

The federal government has been explicit in its annual Financial Report that current policies are unsustainable. This should be more than an adequate warning for the citizenry.

A little known fact is that two of the federal government's arguments against recording any entitlement obligations for future payments include that these obligations are so large that they can never be paid. Hence, recording these liabilities might hinder reforms. Finally, because these obligations cannot possibly be paid they are not really estimable.

FASAB's Insurance Programs Exposure Draft

In the inside cover of the "Insurance Programs" exposure draft (hereafter "Exposure Draft") is a summary description of the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board. As described in this memorandum FASAB is an unconstitutional entity. In addition, FASAB's process for promulgating accounting standards does not follow constitutional requirements for making policy that binds the nation. Even if FASAB is deemed to be a constitutionally approved entity the Exposure Draft's description is materially misleading as FASAB does not set accounting principles and standards. Under the current law, the Comptroller General sets accounting principles and standards. Hence, FASAB's pronouncements represent nothing more than a recommendation to the Comptroller General.

The Exposure Draft perpetuates the definition of a liability that is different from the definition of a liability that is used for appropriations purposes. This memorandum describes those different definitions in detail. In addition, the Exposure Draft perpetuates the notion of *Nonexchange Transactions*, an accounting fiction that has no basis in appropriations law.

Financial Status of Federal and State Governments

Chapters 11 and 12 of this memorandum describe the financial results and financial position on the United States federal government as well as the financial status of Medicaid for the fifty states pre- and post enactment of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA"). Chapter 13 provides an estimate of the financial results of the federal government for the last decade as well as two estimates of its financial position as of September 30, 2015.

The first estimate of its financial position is based solely on amounts calculated from figures published by the federal government. The second estimate makes some reasonable assumptions about the Medicare and Medicaid obligations under the Infinite Horizon assumption that are fully funded that the federal government should have published even under its remarkably lacking financial reporting.

Overview of the Federal Government's Financial Reporting Practices

David Mosso, former Chair of FASAB summarized the requirements for federal, state, city and local financial statements that provide true accountability at the “*Representation Without Accountability*” conference held at Fordham Law School in January 2012. He captured the spirit and intent of the Founders’ Statement and Account clause.

“To be effective communicators of accountability, an organization’s financial statements -- should be complete and transparent. That calls for a single consolidated balance sheet with all assets and liabilities controlled by an organization – the federal government in this case – no matter how many separate entities make up that controlling organization. Likewise it calls for a consolidated income statement showing all receipts and expenditures. And it calls further for an absence of netting assets against liabilities and receipts against expenditures.”

The comment about the absence of netting assets against liabilities and receipts against expenditures is particularly apt as the government’s existing reporting practices regularly permit this on a widespread basis. The obvious reason to follow this practice is to control the electorate’s perception of the size of the government.

Three Reports are Key

One must be familiar with three reports in order to understand the federal government’s financial reporting practices. These include the Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays, and Balances⁸ (the “Combined Statement”) which is the “official” Statement and Account, the President’s Budget⁹ and the Financial Report.¹⁰

The government maintains two sets of books which, individually and in the aggregate, are grossly misleading. The most well-known is the President’s budget, which is cash-based. Unfortunately, it has little to do with economic reality. Under budget accounting rules, outlays are recorded only when bills are paid. Americans know that real expense is incurred when one makes spending commitments. This is the reason why every publicly traded company is required to use accrual accounting. The little-known alternative is the Financial Report, which is seriously flawed as it does not consolidate numerous material government controlled entities and it does not include the full costs of the entitlement programs.

Collectively and individually, the federal government’s Combined Statement, the President’s Budget and the Financial Report make untrue statements about material facts, omit to state numerous material facts and hide material facts in footnotes.

The three major items that are fraudulently reported by the federal government include:

- The Federal Reserve System, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, with total assets of \$4.5 trillion (as of March 4, 2016), \$3.2 trillion (as of 12/31/2015) and \$2 trillion (as of 12/31/2015), respectively, are not consolidated into the federal government’s financial statements.
- The federal government’s \$24.2 trillion net present value obligation for Medicaid was reported for the first time in the 2010 Financial Report and was buried in this and subsequent reports. Omitting the disclosure of material information, as was done from the creation of Medicaid through 2009, violates the laws against fraud, and the Supreme Court’s

“buried facts” doctrine which appears in its securities law decisions suggests that even current reporting is unlawful. The amount reported in the 2015 Financial Report was \$27.3 trillion.

-- The total adjusted obligation for Medicare and Social Security that are fully funded with appropriations reported in the Statement of Social Insurance (“SOSI”) and in related footnotes in the 2015 Financial Report of the United States Government is \$46.3 trillion. But the SOSI does not interrelate with the other financial statements and no current expenses are recorded for required future payments.

Combined Statement ¹¹

When the plaintiff in *United States v. Richardson* wrote to the Government Printing Office in 1967 and requested that he be provided with the documents published by the Government in compliance with Article I, section 9, clause (7) of the United States Constitution the Fiscal Service of the Bureau of Accounts of the Department of the Treasury replied, explaining that it published the document known as the *Combined Statement of Receipts, Expenditures, and Balances of the United States Government* (this was the document’s previous name).¹²

The Combined Statement is virtually unknown by the general public. It is not referred to by any recent Congress or Administration with respect to the financial condition or results of the U.S. Government. It is not mentioned by any third party analysts that examine the government’s finances.

The Transmittal letter of the Commissioner of the Treasury’s Bureau of the Fiscal Service dated December 15, 2015 indicates “In accordance with the provisions of Section 114(a) of the Act of September 12, 1950 (31 U.S.C. 3513(a)), I am transmitting herewith the Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays, and Balances of the United States Government for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2015. This statement presents **budget results and the cash-related assets and liabilities of the Federal Government** with supporting details.”

The Preface states “The Bureau of the Fiscal Service (Fiscal Service), which is a bureau of the Department of the Treasury, performs a critical role in fulfilling the Treasury’s mission as the Government’s financial manager.... In its role as Federal financial agent, Fiscal Service publishes the “*Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays, and Balances of the United States Government*.”

The Preface indicates under the heading “Legislative Requirement – The Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 9, clause 7, outlines requirements for a report on the receipts and outlays of the Government. It provides, in part, that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

31 U.S.C. 3513(a) provides in part, “The Secretary of the Treasury shall prepare reports that will inform the President, Congress, and the public on the financial operations of the United States Government.

This statement is recognized as the official publication of receipts and outlays. Several major Government bodies rely on data found in this report. The Congressional Budget Office uses it to serve the needs of Congress; the Office of Management and Budget uses the data to review the

President's Budget programs; the Governmental Accountability Office uses it to perform audit services; the various departments and agencies of the Government use it to reconcile their accounts; and the public uses it to review the operations of their Government."

President's Budget

The President's Budget is the only financial report that politicians discuss and the Budget Deficit is the single most important figure discussed with respect to the government's finances.

A summary description of the President's Budget is found on page 2 of "A Citizens Guide to the 2015 Financial Report of the U.S. Government" which is contained in the 2015 Financial Report of the United States Government.¹³ It states "The Budget is the Government's primary financial planning and control tool. It accounts for past Government receipts and spending, and presents the President's proposed receipt and spending plan. The Budget focuses on receipts, or cash received by the Government (Government), and outlays, or payments made by the Government to the public. An excess of receipts over outlays is called a budget surplus; an excess of outlays over receipts is called a budget deficit."

David Mosso, who was Chairman of FASAB for the ten years ending in 2006, made the following remarks about the President's Budget and by implication the Combined Statement at the "Representation Without Accountability" conference held at Fordham Law School in 2012.

"[T]he Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") and the Congressional appropriations committees have been unwilling to change the accounting basis of the federal budget to the accrual basis....The Budget's cash basis accounting, selectively applied, hollows out the fiscal body of the federal government...The accounting underlying the President's Budget...obfuscates federal financial accountability..... [It] understates[s] ...the headline numbers that dominate Congressional and public discussion and that form perceptions of the government's financial health. It seems to be an incontrovertible conclusion that the ship of state is being steered with a severely broken compass.....That false picture nurtures financial profligacy....Cash basis accounting in the President's Budget is the spearhead of reckless fiscal policy, whether intentionally reckless or just bumbling along with inadequate and misunderstood information about federal financial health....As an accountability report, the President's Budget woefully shortchanges the American public."¹⁴

Financial Report

David Mosso also commented about the Financial Report at the conference at Fordham Law School.

"The US Financial Report is the off-budget vehicle for reporting more fully, with business type accounting, on federal financial accountability but it suffers from the syndrome "out of Budget, out of mind." Nobody pays attention to the US Financial Report in political discourse and decision making because its accruals are not integrated into the budget process."¹⁵

"Treasury generally prepares the financial statements in the Financial Report on an "accrual basis" of accounting as prescribed by U.S. GAAP for federal entities.¹⁶ A summary description of the Financial Report is found on page 2 of "A Citizens Guide to the 2015 Financial Report of the U.S. Government."¹⁷ It states "The Financial Report focuses on the Government's costs and revenues (what went out and what came in), assets and liabilities (what it owns and owes), and other

important financial information. The Financial Report compares the Government's revenues (amounts earned but not necessarily collected), with its costs (amounts incurred, but not necessarily paid) to derive net operating cost.

Management's Discussion and Analysis – Introduction - The fiscal year (FY) 2015 Financial Report of the United States Government (Report) provides the President, Congress and the American people with a comprehensive view of the Federal Government's finances, i.e., its financial position and condition its revenues and costs, assets and liabilities, and other obligations and commitments. The Financial Report also discusses important financial issues and significant conditions that may affect future operations, including the need to achieve fiscal sustainability over the medium and long-term.¹⁸

Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. sec 331 (e)(1), the Department of the Treasury ("Treasury") in cooperation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), must submit an audited (by the Government Accountability Office or GAO) financial statement for the preceding fiscal year, covering all accounts and associated activities of the executive branch of the United States Government – the central component of the Financial Report - to the President and Congress no later than six months after the September 30 fiscal year end. To encourage timely and relevant reporting, OMB accelerated both individual agency and government-wide reporting deadlines.

The Report is prepared from audited financial statements of specifically designated Federal agencies, including the Cabinet departments and many smaller, independent agencies.

1 All Federal and State Financial Reporting are “Pure Applesauce”

“A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both.”¹⁹ We have reached the stage where federal and state financial reporting is both a farce and a tragedy. The legislation enacted by Congress that authorizes fraudulent reporting, as well as the actions by the executive branch usurping Congress financial reporting responsibilities, are clearly unconstitutional.

The federal and state government’s accounting practices are designed to deceive the people. The primary reason why citizen’s rights have been infringed upon is that the legislative and executive branches have controlled financial reporting and thereby public opinion to minimize their accountability for spending. Congress has spent enormous sums of taxed and borrowed money to endear themselves to the electorate, but the Legislative branch and the states do not want to be held accountable for the full extent of their spending. Hence, the legislative and executive branches and state governments collude to underreport expenses. The executive and legislative branches and state governments have violated the trust placed in them by the electorate, acted in a self-serving manner to the detriment of the ideals on which America was founded and subverted the democratic process all in an effort to make re-election easier for incumbents. This has brought the nation to the brink of bankruptcy.

Proper reporting would lead to spending cutbacks, tax increases and/or recriminations for overspending, all of which are likely to cause voter dissatisfaction and changes at the polls. The failure to publish a complete and truthful statement and account of the nation’s finances has made our republic dysfunctional, plagued by successive budget-deficit and debt-ceiling crisis. To accomplish their goal the executive and legislative branches have enlisted the support of the accounting profession and they have managed to keep the media silenced on the issue.

Since no report published by the federal government complies with the Appropriations and Statement and Account clauses several private rights protected by our Constitution have been violated. The rights violated include the right to vote, freedom of speech, due process, equal protection, the right to financial information and political accountability. In addition, these rights have been violated by the states. States have violated the right to vote under the Fifteenth Amendment and the other rights have been violated pursuant to their incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment.

It is critical to note that reporting requirements have changed since the nation’s founding. The combination of the amendment permitting income taxes and the passage of legislation creating massive social insurance programs with permanent appropriations have completely changed the size and complexity of the federal government’s operations. Most importantly, Congress changed the nature of appropriations from just single year appropriations. In light of these changes it is not a reasonable interpretation of the Statement and Account clause’s “all public Money” requirement that Congress can have the treasury department publish a cash disbursements ledger broken down by annual appropriations only, while the executive branch publishes two other sets of financial statements that have no references to appropriations anywhere and that cannot pass antifraud provision scrutiny.

James Madison was prescient with the following remark. “I believe that there are more instances of the abridgement of the freedom of the people by gradual and silent encroachments of those in power than by violent and sudden usurpations.”²⁰ Over the last 100 years, Congress has abdicated its financial reporting responsibility. Today the executive branch dominates all financial reporting with little to no input from Congress. The President’s Budget is prepared by OMB without input from Congress, and the Financial Report is prepared by Treasury and OMB based on principles promulgated by FASAB. Practically speaking, the executive branch has effective veto power over any

proposed accounting principle it does not like. The end result is that financial reporting by the federal government does not reflect economic reality.

In 1990 the Comptroller General, Treasury Secretary and Director of OMB established FASAB as an advisory committee to develop accounting standards and principles for the federal government. There is absolutely no discussion in the FASAB literature explaining how the accounting principles it has promulgated comply with the Statement and Account clause's "all public money" requirement. And no matter how much AICPA GAAP-compliant lipstick are put on FASAB's accounting principles this does not overcome their lack of compliance with the Constitution.

The Supreme Court has not decided the meaning of the Statement and Account Clause. However, this has not stopped the federal government from relying on the Court's dicta in the only case involving the clause to reach the Supreme Court to justify to the electorate their unconstitutional accounting practices.

The author believes that when faced with the question of interpreting the Statement and Account clause the Supreme Court is likely to rule that there are no exceptions permitted by the Constitution for entities or programs funded with public money that our politicians want to avoid accountability for by excluding them, putting them off balance sheet or describing them only in footnotes. In addition, the author believes that the Supreme Court will determine that the antifraud provisions are inherent in the Statement and Account Clause.

After careful consideration the Court is likely to conclude that the information that is required to be provided to citizen/voters is no different than the information to be provided to investors. Both have a significant economic interest in the actions of their government. A government "of the people, by the people and for the people" with an explicit provision in its constitution requiring the publication of a Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money does not need an antifraud amendment to that constitution requiring the federal government publish truthful figures. To a certain extent Congress recognized the importance of the antifraud provisions by making the issuance of municipal securities subject to them.

1.1 The Federal Government's Fraud

Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution enumerates a number, but not all, of Congress' legislative powers. Article I, section 9 obligates Congress to expend public funds only on authorized activities and to report that authorized spending to the electorate.

Article I, section 9, clause 7 of the United States Constitution states

"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time,"

The first part of the clause is called the Appropriations Clause and the second part is called the Statement and Account Clause. Together, they shall be hereafter called the "two clauses."

One of the important aspects of the Statement and Account clause is that the obligation runs to the legislature not to the executive branch to publish the Statement and Account. However, early State of the Union messages reveal that presidents routinely reported national budgets as well as statements and accounts of receipts and expenditures. President Washington concluded his first State of the Union Message by stating, "I have directed the proper officers to lay before you, respectively, such papers and estimates as regard the affairs particularly recommended to your consideration, and necessary to convey to you that information of the state of the union which it is

my duty to afford. Thomas Jefferson stated in his fourth annual message “Accounts of the receipts and expenditures of the last year, with estimates for the ensuing one, will as usual be laid before you.”

By the second session of the 1st Congress, the Secretary of the Treasury was providing quarterly accounts of public expenditures. As early as 1791, the House provided by resolution:

RESOLVED: that it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to lay before the House of Representatives...an accurate statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public moneys...in which statement shall also be distinguished the expenditures which fall under each head of appropriation, and shall show the sums, if any, which remain unexpended, and to be accounted for the next statement of each and every of such appropriations.

It is a key fact that unexpended appropriations should be clearly identified within the Statement and Account. The linkage between appropriations and expenditures is made clear by Hamilton. He noted in Federalist No. 72 that the executive’s functions included “the application and disbursement of the public moneys in conformity to the general appropriations of the legislature.” Hamilton also explained, “no money can be expended, but for an object, to an extent, and out of a fund, which the laws have prescribed.” The “extent” or amount of funding modifies and shapes the “object” funded.

The term “fraud” is generally defined in the law as an intentional misrepresentation of material existing facts by one party to another with knowledge of its falsity. The misrepresentation is made for the purpose of inducing the other party to act, and upon which the other party relies with resulting injury or damage. The fraud by the federal government fits the textbook definition.

1.1.1 When is “Money” Not “Money”?

“Money” is not “Money” when the Executive and Legislative branches are interpreting Article I, section 9, clause 7. The federal government’s fraud is two-fold.

- 1) Congress and the GAO effectively define permanent appropriations to be an ongoing series of one-year appropriations wherein the appropriations beyond one-year do not rise to the level of an unmatured commitment. As such they do not have to be recorded as obligations.
- 2) They “divide and conquer” by defining the concept of a “liability,” a key component of public “Money,” differently for financial reporting purposes than for purposes of appropriations law.

Practically speaking this means taking certain programs that are funded with permanent appropriations such as Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security which are clearly legal liabilities/obligations under “appropriations law” and redefining them for financial reporting purposes as not being legal liabilities/obligations of the United States Government. This approach means that the legally enacted expenses and obligations of the United States Government are significantly understated in all of its financial reports.

The federal government publishes the President’s Budget and the Financial Report without including appropriations because of the definitional difference. Publishing financial statements that intentionally do not include all of the legal liabilities/obligations of the federal government

constitutes a fraud on the American people and violates their right to an accounting from the government under the Statement and Account Clause.

The Federal Government acknowledges in a key GAO publication that it uses different definitions of a “liability” for appropriations law and financial reporting purposes. However, before we review the government’s admission we must review the concept of “obligation” under the Appropriations Clause. Please note that appropriations law is also referred to by the government as “Budgetary Accounting” or “Obligational Accounting” and financial reporting is also described as “Proprietary Accounting.”

1.1.2 “Obligations” and “Liabilities” Defined Under the Appropriations Clause

The congressional power of the purse refers to the power to appropriate funds and to prescribe the conditions governing the use of those funds. It is derived from several Constitutional provisions. Article I, section 8 empowers Congress to “pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States” and to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers [listed in art. I, sec 8], and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”

The Appropriations Clause has often been characterized as “the most important single curb in the Constitution on Presidential power.” The Supreme Court in *Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States* (1937) indicated that the Appropriations Clause means that “no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress.” In *Reeside v. Walker* (1850) the Supreme Court stated “However much money may be in the Treasury at any one time, not a dollar of it can be used in the payment of any thing not....previously sanctioned by a congressional appropriation.” In *Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond* (1990) the Supreme Court reiterated that any exercise of power by a government agency “is limited by a valid reservation of congressional control over funds in the Treasury.”

It is also well established that Congress can determine the terms and conditions under which an appropriation may be used. Thus, Congress can determine what will be required to make the appropriation “legally available” for any expenditure. However, courts have invalidated congressional funding restrictions when they found that the restrictions violated some independent constitutional bar. See *Legal Services Corp. v. Velasquez*²¹ and *American Civil Liberties Union v. Moneta*.²² This is a critical concept and one that the author wants to make clear to the reader. Congress cannot create legislation with “permanent appropriations” and then define the “permanent” part out of existence for purposes of recording the appropriation or for financial reporting purposes under the Statement and Account clause. Both are clearly intended to do one thing: mask the Legislature’s accountability for spending, which the Constitution does not permit.

The power of the purse is very broad yet does have limitations. In *South Dakota v. Dole* (1987) the Supreme Court addressed Congress’s use of the spending power to impose conditions on the use of federal grants. “[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution. Thus, objectives not thought to be within Article I’s enumerated legislative fields....may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds.” However, “[t]he spending power is of course not unlimited.” The Court outlined four general restrictions including that the intent of Congress to impose conditions must be authoritative and unambiguous and that the action in question must not be prohibited by an independent constitutional bar.

Furthermore, it added that “Our decisions have [also] recognized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’ The Supreme Court’s decision finding a financial inducement that was coercive is discussed later in this memorandum in section 2.2.

The Constitution does not provide instructions with respect to how Congress is to implement its appropriation power. As one court has put it: “[The Appropriations Clause] is not self-defining and Congress has plenary power to give meaning to the provision.” Congress has done this through the annual budget and appropriations process and through a series of permanent “funding statutes.”

Congress exercises its control over the power of the purse through several statutory directives including: 1) a statute will not be construed as making an appropriation unless it expressly so states 31 U.S.C. sec 1301(d); 2) agencies may not spend, or commit themselves to spend, in advance of or in excess of appropriations. 31 U.S.C. sec 1341 (Antideficiency Act); 3) appropriations may be used only for their intended purpose. 31 U.S.C. sec 1301 (a) (“purpose statute”); and 4) unless authorized by law, an agency may not keep money it receives from sources other than congressional appropriations, but must deposit the money in the Treasury. 31 U.S.C. sec 3302(b)(“Miscellaneous Receipts” Statute).

What constitutes an appropriation? 31 U.S.C. sec 1301(d) provides: “A law may be construed to make an appropriation out of the Treasury or to authorize making a contract for the payment of money in excess of an appropriation only if the law specifically states that an appropriation is made or that a contract may be made.” Thus the rule is that the making of an appropriation must be expressly stated and it cannot be inferred or made by implication.

The two basic authorities conferred by an appropriation law are the authority to incur obligations and the authority to make expenditures. An obligation results from some action that creates a liability or definite commitment on the part of the government to make an expenditure. The expenditure is the disbursement of funds to pay the obligation. Generally, appropriated funds are first obligated and then expended. The subsequent disbursement “liquidates” the obligation. Thus an agency “uses” appropriations in two basic ways – direct expenditures (disbursements) and obligations. Not surprisingly, the concept of “obligation” is central to appropriations law. This is because of the principle that an obligation must be charged against the relevant appropriation in accordance with the rules relating to purpose, time and amount. The term “available for obligation” refers to availability as to purpose, time and amount.

Whether appropriated funds are legally available requires that 1) the purpose of the obligation or expenditure must be authorized; 2) the obligation must occur within the time limits applicable to the appropriation, and 3) the obligation and the expenditure must be within the amounts Congress has established. All three must be observed for the obligation or expenditure to be legal.

The Comptroller General (“CG”) has indicated that the obligating of appropriations must be “definite and certain.” The CG has also stated that an obligation is “a definite commitment which creates a legal liability of the Government for the payment of appropriated funds for goods and services ordered or received.” In 1963 the CG defined an obligation as “A legal duty on the part of the United States which constitutes a legal liability or which could mature into a legal liability by virtue of actions on the part of the other party beyond the control of the United States.”

What action is necessary or sufficient to create an obligation? The CG has determined that an obligation arises when the definite commitment is made, even though the actual payment may not take place until a future fiscal year, and that the term “obligation” includes both matured and unmatured commitments. A matured commitment is a legal liability that is currently payable. An unmatured commitment is a liability which is not yet payable but for which a definite commitment nevertheless exists. The fact that an unmatured liability may be subject to a right of cancellation does not negate the obligation.

In 1996 the General Accountability Office (“GAO”) prepared a report, *“Budget Issues: Inventory of Accounts With Spending Authority and Permanent Appropriations, 1996”* (“GAO’s 1996 Report”), in response to the Senate’s Committee on the Budget’s request to update the 1987 inventory of accounts with spending authority and permanent appropriations, commonly referred to as “backdoor authority.” Backdoor authority is authority to obligate federal funds that is not controlled through the appropriations process. Basically, it represents mandatory spending that is provided and controlled indirectly through other forms of legislation.

The Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended, defines spending authority as authority provided in laws other than appropriations acts to obligate the U.S. government to make payment. A permanent appropriation is an appropriation that is available as a result of previously enacted legislation, remains so until repealed, and does not require current appropriations by the Congress. In *Atlantic Fish Spotters Ass’n v. Evans* (1st Cir. 2003), the court cautioned: “Congress may create permanent, substantive law through an appropriations bill only if it is clear about its intentions. Put another way, Congress cannot rebut the presumption against permanence by sounding an uncertain trumpet.”

The GAO’s 1996 Report indicates that Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid have spending authority and permanent appropriations in the following accounts – Social Security (Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund Account #20-8006-0-7-651, Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund Account #20-8007-0-7-651, Payments to Social Security Trust Funds Account #28-0404-0-1-651 and Supplemental Security Income Program Account #28-0406-0-1-609), Medicare (Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund Account #20-8005-0-7-571 and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund Account #20-8004-0-7-571) and Medicaid (Grants to States for Medicaid Account #75-0512-0-1-551).

Entitlement Authority is defined at 2 U.S.C. sec 622(9)(A) as statutory authority whether temporary or permanent., “to make payments (including loans and grants), the budget authority for which is not provided for in advance by appropriation Acts, to any person or government if, under the provisions of the law containing that authority, the United States is obligated to make such payments to persons or governments who meet the requirements established by that law. Entitlement authority is treated as spending authority during congressional consideration of the budget.”

When must an obligation be recorded? In 1953 the CG indicated “In order to determine the status of appropriations, both from the viewpoint of management and the Congress, it is essential that obligations be recorded in the accounting records on a factual and consistent basis throughout the Government. Only by the following of sound practices in this regard can data on existing obligations serve to indicate program accomplishments and be related to the amount of additional appropriations required.” The standards for the proper recording of obligations are found in 31

U.S.C. sec. 1501(a) which prescribes specific criteria for recording obligations. It indicates that “[a]n amount shall be recorded as an obligation of the United States Government only when supported by documentary evidence” and then goes on to specify nine criteria for recording obligations. Once one of the criteria is met, the agency must record the transaction as an obligation.

Sec. 1501(a)(1) establishes the criteria for recording contracts. Essentially, a contract must be recorded if there is a binding agreement, in writing, for an authorized purpose, executed in a period of obligational availability and it calls for specific goods or services.

1.1.3 Congress/GAO Create Alternate Universe for Permanent Appropriations

The recording of grants and subsidies is governed by Sec. 1501(a)(5). It indicates that the grant must be supported by documentary evidence and that in order to properly obligate an appropriation for an assistance program, some action creating a definite liability against the appropriation must occur during the period of obligational availability of the appropriation. In some situations, the obligating action under section 1501(a)(5) involves a discretionary action by an agency of awarding a grant that is evidenced by a grant agreement. In other situations, the obligating action for purposes of 31 U.S.C. sec. 1501(a)(5)(A) may take place by operation of law under a statutory formula grant or by virtue of actions authorized by law to be taken by others that are beyond the control of the agency (even when the precise amount of the obligation is not determined until a later time).

The above description of when an appropriation should be recorded as an obligation shows the lengths to which Congress and the GAO will go to obscure spending. Conceptually, we have spending that is “permanent” and automatic (“no vote by Congress is required”). Yet according to Congress and the GAO the government’s obligation does not arise until a statutory formula for paying out benefits is met. Hence, there is no need to record any appropriation beyond the current year’s appropriation or any long term obligation in the Statement and Account. One must recall, as previously discussed, the two basic authorities conferred by an appropriation: the authority to incur obligations and the authority to make expenditures. Permanent appropriations include both authorities with the disbursement tied to the statutory formula.

Effectively, what Congress’ and the GAO’s interpretation does is require there to be a binding two-way legal obligation before the government records any expense or liability. This for Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid benefits that flow one-way from the government to the electorate. The only reason for having a “permanent” appropriation arise based on a statutory formula is to attempt to control the recording of the appropriation for both appropriations and statement and account clause purposes.

Later in the memorandum (See section 9.2.2) we will discuss the disagreement among FASAB members over accounting for social insurance programs. However, at this juncture it is important to point out that during that disagreement the Treasury representative, Ed Reid, indicated that “social insurance was more of a contractual obligation than a recordable liability.” This reveals that the government agrees that permanent appropriations create a legal obligation.....they just want to interpret that obligation in a way that doesn’t require any expense beyond the current year to be recorded for either appropriations law or Statement and Account clause purposes.

The fact that, absent Congressional action, the federal government has made a legal commitment to fund the permanent appropriation is ignored. Arguably, this approach is at odds with the government's practice with respect to recording contracts."

This fraudulent accounting allows a Congress to completely mask enormous government commitments and control all future Congresses. According to SCOTUS any Congress is not permitted to control a future Congress. Yet this is exactly what has happened. Why? From a purely practical perspective the Congress that enacted the permanent legislation is not charged any amount on the nation's books for the enormous future obligations that must be paid yet gets the goodwill benefit from the electorate for enacting that legislation. The electorate understands the implication to their personal financial well being of the government's largesse. Furthermore, future Congresses are faced with the political nightmare of having to affirmatively vote to stop the government spending which will cost them dearly at the polls. It is inconceivable that the proper accounting for permanent appropriations under the two clauses involves recording the expense for the current year only and not recording any amount for future expenditures. This accounting approach completely destroys political accountability.

Why have Congress and the GAO created an alternate universe for recording permanent appropriations? The answer is that the numbers associated with permanent appropriations are staggering in size so no Congress wants to enact these programs and have the electorate know the full cost of the programs. Congress and its CG have defined and interpreted the requirements for recording these permanent appropriations in such a way that it achieves permanent appropriations and a minimal amount recorded as an appropriation. Congress wants to have it both ways and under current accounting practices it achieves the desired result. And since no liability past the immediate year is recorded by the GAO for appropriations purposes there can't be one to record for accounting purposes. This is the primary vehicle utilized to perpetrate the massive fraud on the American people.

1.1.4 "Liability" Redefined for Financial Reporting Purposes

We will now return to the federal government's admission that it uses a different definition of a "liability" for financial reporting purposes. The GAO's September 2005 *"A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process"* ("GAO's Glossary of Terms") defines "Liability" as follows:

"Liability - Defined differently for obligation (or budgetary) and proprietary (or financial) accounting purposes.

Obligational (or budgetary) accounting, designed to ensure compliance with fiscal laws, is based on the concept of *legal* liability. A legal liability is a claim that may be legally enforced against the government. It may be created in a variety of ways, such as by signing a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement or by operation of law.

Proprietary (or financial) accounting, designed to generate data for financial statement purposes, is based on the concept of *accounting* liability. For federal financial statement purposes, a liability is a probable future outflow or other sacrifice of resources as a result of past transactions or events. Generally, liabilities are thought of as amounts owed for items or services received, assets acquired, construction performed (regardless of whether invoices have been received), an amount received but not yet earned, or other expenses incurred."

In Appendix III of the Glossary the GAO explains further the different methods for tracking funds.

“The federal government uses two different but overlapping methods for tracking funds. This reflects the fact that the federal government is made up of many different entities and serves multiple constituencies.For example, Congress seeks to monitor the obligation and expenditure of federal funds it appropriates and evaluates the need for additional funds; managers of federal entities seek to control the cost of operations....Although the budget and budget process largely use obligational accounting, users of this glossary should recognize that the terms used in obligational accounting might have different meanings when used in proprietary accounting.”

The Statement and Account Clause and Appropriations Clause are yoked together in the Constitution in Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 for a reason. Legislation that has been legally enacted and fully or partially funded with permanent appropriations must be reflected in the Statement and Account and other financial statements to the full extent of that funded obligation. Accounting principles governing federal financial reporting declare that legally enacted legislation that is fully or partially funded with permanent appropriations ARE NOT legal obligations for accounting purposes that need to be recorded in the Statement and Account or any of the nation’s annual financial statements. The government uses the “Due and Payable” approach to record obligations associated with the entitlement programs.

The above discussion lays out another aspect of the federal government’s fraud. For financial reporting purposes it will disclose “accounting liabilities” as opposed to the U.S. Government’s actual legal obligations/liabilities pursuant to Appropriations law. Once the GAO has created different definitions they cannot put spending side-by-side with appropriations because it would be comparing apples to oranges. THAT is why the President’s Budget and the Financial Report do not include appropriations.

The Supreme Court has indicated that Congress has the plenary power to decide the rules governing appropriations. However, Congress does not have the plenary power to enact appropriations with restrictions attached that prevent the proper recording of those appropriations. This violates one of the restrictions outlined by SCOTUS in *South Dakota v. Dole* which indicated that spending legislation must not be prohibited by an independent constitutional bar. In this case the independent constitutional bars are the Appropriations and Statement and Account clauses. In addition, Congress does not have plenary power to enact or have the GAO enact accounting rules for the Statement and Account that are contrary to its rules under the Appropriations Clause. In essence, the rules Congress has enacted under the Appropriations Clause require the federal government to use accrual accounting to accurately portray its financial results and financial position pursuant to the Statement and Account Clause yet Congress clings to using cash-based accounting for financial reporting. The cash-based accounting rules that Congress has enacted eliminate or materially obscure Congress accountability for spending, to the detriment of several rights of the nation’s citizens/voters.

The federal government’s accounting rules and gimmickry regarding permanent appropriations as well as off-balance sheet agencies and corporations cannot be reconciled with the Statement and Account clause’s “all public Money” requirement. The clause has no exceptions for entities (e.g., Federal Reserve, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) or programs (e.g., Social Security, Medicare and

Medicaid) that our politicians want to put off-budget, off-balance sheet, describe only in footnotes or eliminate entirely from its financial statements.

1.1.5 SCOTUS Must Determine the Meaning of the Two Clauses

The Supreme Court has no alternative but to weigh in on Congress' appropriations law and financial reporting practices as it did in *Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. (1995)* and *Department of Transportation ET AL v. Association of American Railroads (2015)*. In those cases the Supreme Court held that even when Congress has been quite specific in declaring that a corporation is not a federal instrumentality, it may still take on that status for constitutional purposes. In that case, Amtrak claimed that it was not a federal entity for First Amendment purposes since its statutory charter declared that it "will not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government." The Court indicated that Amtrak's reliance on the statutory disclaimer language was "misplaced" and that "it is not for the Congress to make the final determination of Amtrak's status as a Government entity for purposes of determining the constitutional rights of citizens affected by its actions."

1.1.6 Antifraud Provisions are Inherent in the Statement and Account Clause

There is a crucial parallel between federal financial disclosures and those by corporations issuing securities. Federal securities laws consist of six separate statutes and corresponding implementing regulations enacted between 1933 and 1940.²³ The broad goal of securities regulation and the Statement and Account Clause is the same, to ensure full and fair disclosure. Louis Brandeis, whose ideas were a major influence on disclosure philosophy of securities regulation, stated "publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."²⁴

The essence of the disclosure philosophy of securities regulation and the Statement and Account Clause is that, when armed with information, investors or voters are well-positioned to evaluate investment opportunities or candidates for public office and to allocate their capital or vote as they see fit. The crux of our federal securities laws and the Statement and Account Clause is that all material information must be disclosed. What other reasonable interpretation can there be for the Clause, particularly the "all Public Money" language? Furthermore, as mentioned previously, a government "of the people, by the people and for the people" with an explicit provision in its constitution requiring the publication of a Statement and Account does not need an antifraud amendment requiring that the government publish truthful figures.

1.1.7 Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano

On March 22, 2011, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision written by Justice Sotomayor in the matter of *Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano (2011)*²⁵. The importance of the case is that the Court reaffirmed the traditional tests it laid out in *Basic, Inc. v. Levinson*²⁶ and *TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.*²⁷

"Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act makes it unlawful for any person to "use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security...any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."²⁸ Sec Rule 10b-5 implements this provision by making it unlawful to, among other things, "make any

untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”²⁹

To prevail on a section 10(b) claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant made a statement that was “misleading as to a material fact.”³⁰ In *Basic*, the Supreme Court held that this materiality requirement is satisfied when there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of information made available.”³¹ The Court was “careful not to set too low a standard of materiality,” for fear that management would “bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information.”³²

Moreover, it bears emphasis that sec 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) do not create an affirmative duty to disclose any and all material information. Disclosure is required under these provisions only when necessary “to make...statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”³³³⁴

In *TSC Industries* the Court considered a claim of fraud in connection with a proxy solicitation and concluded that “[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”³⁵ The Court does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. What the standard requires is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.

The Supreme Court has been quite clear and consistent in its use of the reasonable investor standard in the materiality context.³⁶ Furthermore, materiality is a mixed question of law and fact, ordinarily determined by the fact finder.³⁷ It would seem that a reasonable citizen/voter standard and a fact-based approach to materiality with respect to meeting the Clause’s “all Public Money” reporting requirement are necessary.

When discussing financial reporting, a government’s financial statements are the critical item. If the numbers in the financial statements cannot be trusted to provide relevant and reliable financial information about the government, citizens have no basis for making voting decisions. In the private sector a defendant cannot rebut a charge of having omitted a necessary material fact by pointing to facts that, while disclosed and technically sufficient to alert the investor to the truth, are buried or hidden within the relevant document as to be practically non-disclosed. ³⁸ Under the “buried facts” doctrine, a disclosure is deemed inadequate if it is presented in a way that conceals or obscures the information sought to be disclosed. The doctrine applies when the fact in question is hidden in a voluminous document or is disclosed in a piecemeal fashion which prevents a reasonable shareholder from realizing the “correlation and overall import of the various facts interspersed throughout” the document.³⁹

It is in this context that one needs to examine the federal government’s financial reporting. Prior to 2010 the government did not release any estimate of the net present value cost of Medicaid. In 2010 it released a figure as a single line item in the Required Supplementary Information in the back of a roughly two hundred fifty page Financial Report. In 2015 this information was included in the Statement of Long-Term Fiscal Projections of the U.S. Government.

The net present value cost of Medicare and Social Security are included in a required financial statement, the Statements of Social Insurance (“SOSI”), but the SOSI and the Statement of Long-Term Fiscal Responsibilities do not inter-relate with the government’s consolidated financial statements. In addition, both statements which are required by the federal government’s generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) as promulgated by FASAB **violate the Antideficiency Act because they illustrate future expenditures under the Medicare and Social Security programs in excess of appropriated amounts.** Nowhere in the SOSI or the Financial Report is there any adequate discussion relating appropriated amounts to the projected figures. Furthermore, the government did not and does not consolidate material government-controlled entities.

Only if the established omissions are “so obviously important to an investor, that reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of materiality” is the ultimate issue of materiality appropriately resolved “as a matter of law” by summary judgment.⁴⁰ Given the facts if the federal government were an entity subject to SEC rules there can be no doubt that it’s financial reporting would be materially deficient as a matter of law.

1.1.8 Congress Does Not Have Plenary Power with Respect to the Statement and Account Clause

The *Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, Third Edition* contains the following passage:

“The second part of article I, section 9, clause 7 requires “a regular statement and account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.” Implementation of this provision, as a logical corollary of the appropriation power, is also wholly within the congressional province, and the courts have so held. *Washington Post Co. v. United States Department of State*, 685 F2d 698, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“the plenary authority of Congress in this area will be respected”), vacated as moot, 464 U.S. 979 (1983); *United States v. Richardson*, 418 U.S. 166, 178 n. 11 (1974)(it is clear that Congress has plenary power to exact any reporting and accounting it considers appropriate in the public interest”); *Harrington v. Bush*, 553 F2d at 195; *Hart’s Case*, 16 Ct. Cl. 459, 484 (1880), aff’d *Hart v. United States*, 118 U.S. 62 (1886)(“[a]uditing and accounting are but parts of a scheme of payment”). See also B-300192, n. 10, Nov. 13, 2002.”

In its 1974 5-4 decision in *United States v. Richardson*,⁴¹ the Court declined to opine on the meaning of the Statement and Account Clause as it found that the plaintiff lacked standing. Chief Justice Burger’s opinion included dictum that appears to have become the gospel for the Court to ignore the provision.

“[I]t is clear that Congress has plenary power to exact any reporting and accounting it considers appropriate in the public interest.”⁴² “Not controlling, but surely not unimportant, are nearly two centuries of acceptance of a reading of cl 7 as vesting in Congress plenary power to spell out the details of precisely when and with what specificity Executive agencies must report the expenditure of appropriated funds and to exempt certain secret activities from comprehensive public reporting.”⁴³

While these statements are clearly true as they relate to details associated with the nation’s financial reports and most assuredly information related to national security matters, Congress has a Constitutional obligation to report truthful and complete information with respect to total receipts, total expenditures and the resulting surplus or deficit. Justice Douglas focused on this fact in his dissent in *Richardson*. He thought that Chief Justice Burger’s interpretation effectively read the

Statement and Account Clause out of the Constitution. Whether Congress is complying with the Statement and Account Clause is a matter for the Supreme Court to decide, not Congress.

Furthermore, the reference to “two centuries of acceptance” is hollow. Over the last two hundred years the Statement and Account Clause requirements have increased as the federal government’s finances have become exponentially more complex. Arguably, a cash-based statement of receipts and expenditures was acceptable to fulfill the Statement and Account’s Clause’s required accounting when the government was small. However, once the government’s finances grew in complexity and especially after the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified and Congress enacted social insurance programs and the Medicaid program funded with permanent appropriations, Congress was required by the Statement and Account and Appropriations Clauses to begin publishing accrual-based financial statements.

If we apply the Court’s logic in the *Matrixx*, *Basic* and *TSC* cases to the Statement and Account Clause the information that a reasonable citizen/voter would want/require the government to produce are financial statements that consolidate all material entities and accrue for all costs associated with legally enacted programs for which Congress has appropriated funds. What facts give rise to this conclusion? First, these statements are the only information that will provide a voter with an accurate account of the financial results and financial position of the United States Government. Second, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002⁴⁴ requires registered companies to disclose “all material off-balance sheet transactions.”⁴⁵ A reasonable voter would require the government to follow this requirement because to not comply would render the financial statements misleading.

1.2 The State Government’s Fraud

It is highly probable that if states properly accounted for their spending the capital markets would require meaningfully higher rates of return on debt instruments issued by the states and, furthermore, several states might be considered to be bankrupt entities such that the capital markets would deny them access to additional borrowing. Therefore, state legislatures and the governors of each state have a substantial incentive in not having their legal expenditures and legal obligations reported correctly. Proper financial reporting would lead to spending cutbacks, tax increases and/or recriminations for overspending, all of which are likely to cause voter dissatisfaction and changes at the polls.

This section will shine a bright light on how state accounting for the Medicaid program clearly violates the antifraud provisions of the nation’s securities laws. First, it is important to note that the securities laws governing municipal securities did not give the SEC authority to prescribe accounting standards in the municipal securities market. They were enacted with broad exemptions for municipal securities from all their provisions, except for the antifraud provisions of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. Generally, these prohibit fraudulent or deceptive practices by issuers including making any untrue statement of a material fact or omitting to state a material fact necessary in order to make statements made not misleading.

In addition, although they have never opined on the issue, state financial reporting should also be held by SCOTUS and the SEC to violate the Statement and Account clause. SCOTUS and the SEC should apply the right to financial information described later in this memorandum to the states by interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating the Statement and Account Clause.

The right to financial information is no different than other textually enumerated rights contained in the Bill of Rights. If the Supreme Court incorporated the right to financial information, all states, cities and local governments would have to comply with the Statement and Account Clause which requires proper reporting of total receipts, total expenditures and the resulting surplus or deficit in a

single Statement and Account. These figures must include “all public money.” The off-balance sheet vehicles that are extensively used by state, city and local governments to mislead their respective electorates would need to be consolidated into one set of financial statements at each level of government. Assuming that the Constitution is interpreted in this manner many of the rules promulgated by the accounting profession for state, city and local financial reporting would be unconstitutional.

1.2.1 States Accounting for Medicaid Violates the Antifraud Provisions

State financial reporting is fraudulent based on reporting for its largest single program – Medicaid. Since the inception of the Medicaid program all fifty states have published financial statements that fail to disclose material information relating to it. Based on disclosure in the 2010 Financial Report of the U.S. Government the states aggregate net present value obligation for Medicaid as of September 30, 2010 is no less than \$18.3 trillion. By September 30, 2015 based on a reported obligation for the federal government the obligation for the states had fallen to \$16.8 trillion. Yet the states have not disclosed in any way their proportionate share of the net present value cost of Medicaid in any financial statement.

No state records their portion of this obligation in its balance sheet or properly records the annual increase or decrease in the net present value obligation in its income statement. Disclosure regarding the size of each state’s obligation is non-existent. Any reasonable investor or citizen/voter in the average state would believe that not reporting \$682 billion of obligations (\$34.1 trillion (the author’s estimate of the net present value cost as of 2015) divided by 50 states) omits a material fact that they would consider important. Furthermore, states also have other material off balance-sheet operations that obfuscate their spending and liabilities in violation of the United States Constitution.

Basically, the states fraudulent financial reporting involves redefining for financial reporting purposes each state’s legal obligation associated with the Medicaid program to be a fictional obligation that is a small fraction of the state’s legal obligation. This redefinition for accounting purposes completely eliminates political accountability.

The fact that the states comply with an accounting pronouncement by the GASB regarding non-exchange transaction accounting is irrelevant as these rules are designed to obfuscate political accountability for spending. GASB’s accounting rule was enacted to mislead investors, citizens and voters with respect to the financial consequences of legally enacted legislation in an effort to protect politicians from voter dissatisfaction associated with excessive spending. Furthermore, following the GASB rules does not absolve states from having to comply with the antifraud provisions and it does not prevent the SEC from prosecuting this crystal clear violation.

1.2.2 SEC Has Found Three States Violated the Antifraud Provisions

Before addressing the states’ inadequate financial disclosure for Medicaid it is important to understand that states have been hiding other massive financial obligations and the SEC is beginning to catch up with them. Government pension funding obligations are front page news as Detroit’s bankruptcy has focused the nation on the importance of this issue. The issue is huge as underfunding for state and other municipal government pension benefits may exceed \$4 trillion according to a U.S. Senate Committee on Finance 2012 publication “*State and Local Government Defined Benefit Plans: The Pension Crisis that Threatens America.*” Congress has focused on this issue and introduced legislation in 2011 “*Public Pension Transparency Act*” clearly intended to put

pressure on states to clean up their pension issues so that they do not end up on Congress' doorstep. Meanwhile the SEC formed a specialized group within its Division of Enforcement to focus on public pension accounting and disclosure violations. The SEC has brought actions against three states. We will review each case.

In 2010 the SEC found that the State of New Jersey violated Section 17(a) in connection with the sale of over \$26 billion in bonds from 2001 through 2007. The State made material misrepresentations and omissions that created the fiscal illusion that its pension plans were being adequately funded and masked the fact that New Jersey was unable to contribute to the plans without raising taxes or cutting other services, or otherwise impacting the budget. As of June 30, 2009, the two largest pension funds had an unfunded actuarial accrued liability ("UAAL") of approximately \$27 billion. The SEC found that information regarding the State's underfunding of the pension plans and their financial health was important to investors in evaluating New Jersey's overall financial condition and financial prospects.

In 2013 the SEC found that in connection with multiple bond offerings raising over \$2.2 billion from 2005 through 2009 the State of Illinois misled bond investors about the adequacy of the statutory plan to fund its pension obligations and the risks created by the State's underfunding of its pension systems. As of 2011 Illinois' Pension Systems were unfunded by \$83 billion. In April 2012, the State acknowledged that "[u]nsustainable pension costs are squeezing core programs in education, public safety, and human services in addition to, limiting [the State's] ability to pay [its] bills." The SEC determined that reasonable investors would have considered information regarding the underfunding of Illinois' pensions, the risks created by that underfunding, and the financial condition of the pension plans to be important factors in the investment decision-making process. Reasonable investors would have viewed such information as significantly altering the total mix of information available regarding the State's future financial prospects.

In August, 2014 the SEC found that in connection with eight series of bond offerings in 2009 and 2010 by the Kansas Development Finance Authority ("KDFA") raising \$273 million the State and its agencies misled bond investors about the significant unfunded liability in the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System ("KPERs"). As of December 31, 2008 KPERs had an UAAL of \$8.3 billion and a 59% funded ratio. The Kansas Legislature must annually appropriate money to pay the principal and interest on the debt. Bond holders are at risk that it may not choose to appropriate funds. Issuers of municipal securities must ensure that information contained in their disclosure documents is not materially misleading. Proper disclosure allows investors to understand and evaluate the financial health of the municipality in which they invest. The SEC determined that the State's bond offering documents ("Official Statements") did not disclose the significant unfunded liability in the State's pension system.

1.2.3 State's Medicaid Obligation is Nine Times the Size of the Municipal Securities Market

Returning to the topic of accounting for the Medicaid program - no state, Puerto Rico, other territories or the District of Columbia records the full cost of its share of Medicaid costs in its income statement or balance sheet. The fact that none of these governments are recording any expense or liability for the increase in the net present value cost of the program in their financial statements or have any relevant disclosure regarding their enormous financial obligations means that all of the states' financial statements are fraudulent under the standards recently endorsed by the Supreme

Court and used by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the States of Illinois, New Jersey and Kansas in their respective settlements.

A **REVISED** estimate that includes an estimate of unreported obligations that are funded with appropriations is described in Chapter 13 and appears in **Exhibit 6**. It indicates that the state's aggregate Medicaid obligation in 2015 is \$34.1 trillion.

2 Why it Matters to All Americans

Truthful financial reporting by our government is critical for the operation of our democracy as an informed electorate is its cornerstone. Liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people of the character and conduct of their rulers. Their use of public money is central to this general knowledge. As Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas said in a dissent in 1974, "The Framers of our Constitution deemed fiscal information essential if the electorate was to exercise any control over its representatives and meet their new responsibilities as citizens of the Republic."

The government's accounting rules are designed to mislead voters about the consequences of their votes. The rules make a mockery of the idea of political accountability. Financial reporting leaves voters with no idea how large federal government expenditures are. They cannot send the responsible representatives packing because they retired from Congress years ago. Their current representatives say that their hands are tied on mandatory spending and that they cannot be held accountable.

The right to financial information must exist if our democracy is to work properly. If we assume that citizens have no right to receive reasonably correct information about the nation's finances this would limit or abrogate entirely citizens' right to vote,⁴⁶ and freedom of speech and also violate their due process and equal protection⁴⁷ rights. In addition, it eliminates required political accountability. Finally, the fraud hampers our political leaders. The decisions being made by our political leaders are based in large part upon fraudulent financial information.

It can be argued that the SEC determined the outcome of recent Supreme Court decisions relating to the Affordable Care Act including *NFIB v. Sebeilius*⁴⁸ and *King v. Burwell* due to its decision not to go after improper state accounting for Medicaid. The SEC's decision not to prosecute improper state accounting for Medicaid stands in stark contrast to its prosecution of the states of New Jersey, Illinois and Kansas for the publication of fraudulent financial information related to pension obligations. Not surprisingly, the SEC's decision to pursue those investigations came at the behest of a Congress that did not want the pension underfunding issue to end up on its doorstep.

SCOTUS' decisions in the Obamacare litigations were based on fraudulent state financial information that did not reveal the extent of state expenditures or the net present value of future legal obligations related to the Medicaid program. The SEC's conscious decision not to enforce the antifraud provisions as they relate to financial reporting by state governments regarding their participation in the Medicaid program causes a perpetual fraud on the federal and state judiciaries. Existing state financial reporting for their Medicaid expenditures and obligations violates the antifraud provisions as a matter of law.

Currently, there are cases winding its way through the federal courts involving Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Treasury Department. In addition, the Supreme Court is dealing with the *Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell*. The concepts contained in this memorandum have a direct bearing on the outcome of these cases.

The nation needs the Supreme Court most when the other two branches of government have clearly failed to fulfill their Constitutional duties. Unless the judiciary restores the rule of law the lack of proper financial reporting ensures that our electorate remains uninformed and that the nation will go off the proverbial "financial cliff" with the concomitant severe economic disruption and civil unrest. If the Supreme Court continues to refuse to address the meaning of the Appropriations and

Statement and Account clause, as was required in the prior Obamacare cases, it will get an opportunity in the not too distant future to contemplate the role that it played in aiding and abetting the largest frauds in history and resulting financial Armageddon.

2.1 Accounting Violates Constitutionally Protected Rights

2.1.1 Right to Financial Information

The Constitution guarantees citizen/voters the right to financial information, which at a minimum includes total receipts, total expenditures and the resulting surplus or deficit. These figures are not subject to the plenary power of Congress. The right to financial information is a textually enumerated right. There is no other meaning that one, at any point in time, could ascribe to the text of second part of Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 then it creates a right for the public to receive revenue and expense information and imposes a concurrent affirmative duty on the government's part to publish this financial information.

“As we have explained, “the framers of the Constitution were not mere visionaries, toying with speculations or theories, but practical men, dealing with the facts of political life as they understood them, putting into form the government they were creating, and prescribing in language clear and intelligible the powers that government was to take.” *South Carolina v. United States*, 199 U. S. 437, 449 (1905).”⁴⁹

Both the majority and dissenting Court of Appeals judges in the *Richardson* case referred to the right to financial information.⁵⁰ The right does not override the government's right to suppress financial information related to national security matters nor does it go to the issue of how much detailed financial information Congress is required to provide.

2.1.1.1 Historical Background

2.1.1.1.1 Impact of French and English Accounting on the Framers

France's support for the Americans in the Revolutionary War increased its debts and caused it great difficulties in borrowing. In 1777 Louis XVI named a Swiss banker Jacques Necker as Director General of French Finances. His appointment threatened the status quo and led to significant resistance to his suggested changes. In 1781, in an effort to restore confidence and enable the nation to access additional funding, Necker published his *Compte Rendu au Roi* (Accounts Rendered to the King). This publication explained the nation's finances for the year. This was the first time that the French citizenry had ever received any information about its government's spending.

This publication made the government's priorities clear to the populace and became an overnight bestseller with foreign editions and translations published. The *Compte rendu* indicated that total revenues were 264 million livres and that expenditures were 65 million livres for the military, 26 million for the court and his household, 8 million for the comte d'Artois's household, 5 million for roads and bridges, 1.5 million for the Paris police and cleaning, 0.9 million for the homeless poor. Necker omitted 50 million livres in this accounting for military and debt-related spending. This became public later.

Necker published a royal declaration of accountability at the same time as *Compte rendu*. The impact of the publication was that it permitted political debates to focus on numbers and not just concepts. French nobles did not react well to the accounting calling the revelation of state secrets a subversive act. The King dismissed Necker after the publication. Necker went on to write another bestseller “*Treatise on the Administration of Finances*” in 1784.

For the decade after the publication of *Compte rendu* Necker had ongoing public battles in the press with his political opponents. In 1788 Necker returned to power due to public acclaim. On July 11, 1789 the King fired Necker once more. By the end of that day the French Revolution was in motion.

Necker’s *Compte rendu*, his writings and accounting reforms had a significant impact in the United States. It should be noted that Benjamin Franklin was ambassador to France for the period from 1776 to 1785. He corresponded with Necker around the time of the publication of *Compte rendu* but he negotiated the \$8 million in loans the U.S. secured with Pierre-Augustin de Beaumarchais. Alexander Hamilton admired the centralized financial administration of the French and sought to emulate their practices in the United States.

Many of the delegates to the Constitutional convention were well versed in accounting including, but not limited to, George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Robert Morris and Alexander Hamilton. In 1736, John Mair wrote an influential English-language accounting manual “*Book-keeping methodiz’d*” It became the most prominent accounting manual in 18th century North America. Mair’s book was widely distributed in the U.S. and George Washington had a personal copy in his library.

In 1783 George Washington handed over his Revolutionary War expense accounts to auditors for publication to counteract charges that he profited from the war. These indicated that his receipts fell well short of his expenditures.

2.1.1.1.2 Congress Had Bankrupted the Nation

The Revolutionary War caused the states and Continental Congress to incur large debts. Repayment of this debt was one of the major issues that led to the Constitutional Convention. Furthermore, it is important to note that the Continental Congress had already bankrupted the nation during the war. In 1781 the \$241.5 million in paper currency issued by Congress had a value of two cents on the dollar. On February 7, 1781 Congress appointed Robert Morris as the first American superintendent of finances. Morris had studied Necker’s reforms and how he attempted to centralize tax collections. He wrote to Necker asking for advice. In 1782 Morris published “*A general View of Receipts and Expenditures of Public Monies, by Authority from the Superintendent of Finance, from the Time of his entering on the Administration of the Finances to the 31st December, 1781.* (Philadelphia: Register’s Office, 1782).

2.1.1.1.3 Constitutional Convention

The United States Constitution is the contract underlying the largest merger in history. Thirteen sovereign states entered into this agreement to create the United States of America. Like all merger documents the two most important issues were governance and money.

During the Convention, in order to appease larger states an agreement was reached that the power of originating taxation and appropriations measures would be vested in the House alone. However,

this agreement for the strong version of the Origination Clause did not hold and a committee to consider all unresolved issues proposed a weaker version which was reworked and adopted on September 5, 1787.

“The Statement and Account Clause was first proposed in the final week of the Constitutional Convention, when George Mason moved on 14 September 1787 that a clause be adopted requiring “that an Account of the public expenditures should be annually published.” George Mason’s timing for his proposal was not accidental. Mason’s fervor for the strong version of the Origination Clause, his lack of success in achieving its inclusion and his views on the need for direct accountability to the people on tax and spending matters all clearly impacted his desire for the Clause. The fact that the provision was adopted given that all at the Convention knew Mason’s strongly held views on accountability needs to be taken into consideration when considering the meaning of the Clause. The important change to Mason’s proposal that added all receipts to the Clause clearly reflects a desire to have the Statement and Account be complete and encompass the Government’s entire economic reality.

2.1.1.1.4 Commentary Regarding Statement and Account Clause

During the debates at the Virginia ratifying convention in June 1788 James Madison praised the Clause. “What should be published should include “all receipts and expenditures of public money...This is a security not enjoyed under the then existing system of government.” James Madison thought “this provision went farther than the constitution of any state in the union, or perhaps in the world.”

St. George Tucker’s comments are instructive with respect to the Statement and Account Clause. “These provisions form a salutary check, not only upon the extravagance, and profusion, in which the executive department might otherwise indulge itself, and its adherents and dependents; but also against misappropriation, which a rapacious, ambitious or otherwise untruthful executive might be disposed to make.”

Justice Joseph Story averred that “[t]he object is . . . to secure regularity, punctuality, and fidelity, in the disbursements of the public money . . . Congress is made the guardian of this treasure; and to make their responsibility complete and perfect, a regular account of the receipts and expenditures is required to be published, that the people may know, what money is expended, for what purposes, and by what authority.”

2.1.1.1.5 Statements by Early Presidents

A review of statements made by three of our early Presidents conveys the importance of information to the operation of our democracy.

“A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”⁵¹

“If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be.”⁵²

“Liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people, who have a right, from the frame of their nature, to knowledge, as their great Creator, who does nothing in vain, has given

them understandings, and a desire to know; but besides this, they have a right, an indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible, divine right to that most dreaded and envied kind of knowledge; I mean, of the characters and conduct of their rulers.⁵³

The Right to Financial Information is consistent with the importance of information in our democracy and the principles upon which our nation was founded. The distinction between cash-based accounting versus accrual accounting is irrelevant for purposes of the right. The public is entitled to an accounting that reflects the economic reality of the government's finances under the Constitution. If accrual accounting more accurately reflects economic reality then this is what is required.

2.1.1.2 The Right is Not a Matter for Legislative/Executive Discretion

The judiciary has sometimes indicated that public access is a matter for executive and legislative discretion. The Court averred in *Houchins v. KQED, Inc.* that “[t]he Constitution itself,” in Justice Stewart’s words, “is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.” The two reasons typically given to deny an affirmative right to information are that the judiciary lacks easily ascertainable standards for specifying the content of any access guarantee and that alternative methods are available for the public to access the information. However, the Court has already determined the relevant standard which is the antifraud provisions. With respect to the second reason the concept that a citizen/voter can piece together consolidated financial information from the data that is published today is laughable as sophisticated financial executives who pore over the data for years can only get a sense for what these figures would actually be. Furthermore, in addressing the argument denying an affirmative right to financial information the Court must confront the Supremacy Clause and the words of the Appropriations and Statement and Account clauses.

It is the duty of the Judiciary to interpret the legal meaning of the Constitution. If the Court does not acknowledge the right of financial information it is effectively saying that the Constitution does not permit anyone to challenge Congress with respect to its self-proclaimed adherence to a Constitutional requirement. This is so even when Congress’ non-adherence benefits its incumbents to the detriment of the electorate. Furthermore, as previously noted, the lack of an interpretation of the Statement and Account Clause has dire implications for several other constitutionally protected rights. In addition, the Court should not invoke the political question doctrine as this would nullify an important check on power that the Framers explicitly made a part of the Constitution. Finally, if the Court refuses to interpret the Clause it will remain susceptible to making errant decisions based on false and incomplete economic data as it did with its ACA decision last summer.

2.1.2 Freedom of Speech⁵⁴

It is important to review what a lower court judge and a Supreme Court justice said in *U.S. v. Richardson (1974)*, the single Statement and Account Clause case to reach the Court. Justice William Douglas’ dissent in the case in which the Court declined by a 5-4 majority to opine on the meaning of the Statement and Account Clause because the plaintiff lacked standing, describes the importance of the Clause:

“The Framers of the Constitution deemed financial information essential if the electorate was to exercise any control over its representatives and meet their new responsibilities as

citizens of the Republic...From the history of the clause it is apparent that the Framers inserted it in the Constitution to give the public knowledge of the way public funds are expended... The sovereign in this Nation is the People, not the bureaucracy. The statement of accounts of public expenditures goes to the heart of the problem of sovereignty. If taxpayers may not ask that rudimentary question, their sovereignty becomes an empty symbol and a secret bureaucracy is allowed to run our affairs....Secrecy was the evil at which Art. I, Sec. 9, cl 7, was aimed."

Judge Max Rosenn of the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated the following in the *Richardson* case:

"The debates at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 and the state ratifying conventions reveal that ... the citizenry should receive some form of accounting from the Government... Article II, section 3 requires the President "from time to time [to] give the Congress Information on the State of the Union," and presumably the Framers could have utilized the same informal procedure with regard to the accounting if they had so wished. Instead, they chose to have the statement "published," indicating that they wanted it to be more permanent and widely-circulated than the President's message. The connotation must be that the statement was for the benefit and education of the public as well as coordinate branches of government."

2.1.2.1 FEC v. Citizens United

On January 21, 2010, in *Federal Election Commission (FEC) v. Citizens United*⁵⁵, the Supreme Court resolved a First Amendment challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. In a 5-4 decision, the Court "rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not 'natural persons.'" The Court held that political speech is "indispensable to decision-making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual." Furthermore, "[s]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people [P]olitical speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it whether by design or inadvertence." Laws burdening political speech are "subject to strict scrutiny," which requires the Government to prove that the restriction "furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."

In 2008, Citizens United released a documentary about Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton and produced television ads for video-on-demand of the film scheduled to be available within 30 days of the election. The non-profit corporation was concerned about possible civil and criminal penalties for violating Section 441b which prohibits corporations and unions from making independent expenditures for speech that is an "electioneering communication" ("any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication" that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office") or for speech that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate. Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that 441b is unconstitutional as applied to its documentary. The District Court denied Citizens United a preliminary injunction and granted the FEC summary judgment.

The Supreme Court overruled the District Court stating that Section 441b's prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on speech. As a 'restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign,' that statute 'necessarily reduces

the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.” Were the Court to uphold these restrictions, the Government could repress speech by silencing certain voices at any of the various points in the speech process.

The Court noted that “[i]n a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential.” The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it. The First Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent application” to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.” Furthermore, “[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution.”

“Under the Constitution it is ‘We The People’ who are sovereign. The people have the final say. The legislators are their spokesmen. The people determine through their votes the destiny of the nation. It is therefore important –vitaly important-that all channels of communication be open to them during every election, that no point of view be restrained or barred, and that the people have access to the views of every group in the community.” The worth of speech “does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union or individual.” [T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”

The Statement and Account is clearly “political speech” that is equal to or greater in importance than the requirement that the president deliver to Congress information regarding the State of the Union. The ideas that Congress has established appropriations rules that eliminate the need to record “permanent appropriations” beyond one year or that it has established one set of rules regarding appropriations and a different set of rules regarding reporting spending under those appropriations to the electorate cannot withstand strict scrutiny.

As Justice Kennedy stated “The Constitution... confers upon voters, not Congress, the power to choose the Members of the House of Representatives, Art I, sec 2, and it is a dangerous business for Congress to use election laws to influence the voters’ choices”. The fact that Congress is using the laws governing appropriations and the publication of the Statement and Account to influence voters’ choices as well as state decision-making regarding federal grants (e.g., the Affordable Care Act and Medicaid) does not make it any less dangerous. The First Amendment is premised on a mistrust of governmental power and provides that “Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech. The laws that Congress has put in place that have led to current federal financial reporting clearly violate the people’s freedom of speech.

The several laws enacted by Congress that have led to the publication of a false and misleading statement and account must be viewed in essentially the same manner as the FEC rules in *Citizens United* that the Court struck down. The publication of a false and incomplete statement and account interferes with the right of free speech as it is a required political document for the electorate.

2.1.3 Right to Vote

In *Federal Election Commission (FEC) v. Akins (1998)*⁵⁶, the Court was dealing with an attempt on the part of a group of voters to compel the FEC to regulate the American Israel Public Affairs

Committee (AIPAC) as a “political committee” within the meaning of federal election law.⁵⁷ The voters sought information that AIPAC would have to disclose (lists of donors, contributions, and expenditures) if it were so regulated. The FEC opposed regulation, and argued that the voters lacked standing. In analyzing the issue, the Court found that the plaintiffs had satisfied the injury requirement by showing that a decision to regulate would produce information valuable to their roles as informed citizens and voters.⁵⁸

In *Akins*, the plaintiffs identified concrete injury because they claimed “informational injury” that directly affected voting rights. The court explained that the plaintiffs had suffered injury because they were deprived of information and, without the sought information, they were less able, “to evaluate candidates for public office” and “to evaluate the role” that the financial assistance to candidates “might play in a specific election.”⁵⁹

Given that the framers wanted voters to have accurate information about government spending at what point does the government’s publication of false and misleading financial information render a citizen’s vote meaningless? Based on the *Akins* decision, the lack of a complete and accurate Statement and Account is an informational injury directly affecting voting rights.

2.1.4 Political Accountability

Politicians have subverted the democratic process to protect their self interests. Congress cannot enact legislation and related permanent appropriations and then have these obligations largely defined out of existence for purposes of recording the appropriation or for financial reporting purposes. When Congress enacts permanent appropriations for legally enacted legislation it must record the appropriation and accrue for the funded obligation in the Statement and Account. It cannot continue to use cash-based accounting as it is completely misleading and contrary to Appropriations law. The full costs associated with the permanent appropriation needs to be recognized in the Statement and Account at the time of the appropriation. Not recognizing those costs destroys political accountability entirely and effectively binds all future Congresses. It is a political windfall for the Congress that enacted the legislation and puts an insurmountable burden on a future Congress that might otherwise be inclined to stop this spending.

The federal and state government’s fraudulent and unconstitutional accounting is substantially worse than the facts the Supreme Court faced in *New York v. United States (1992)* wherein the Court indicated that if Congress’ scheme was permitted state and federal officials could engage in a political shell game wherein each could disclaim responsibility. In the case of financial reporting the electorate has no idea what the true amount of expenditures and obligations are at either the federal or state level. Hence, responsibility cannot be pinned on any politician.

2.1.4.1 New York v. United States

The Court in *New York v. United States*,⁶⁰ sought to protect “the accountability of both state and federal officials” to their electorate.⁶¹ Employing this rationale, the Court held unconstitutional a federal statute that commanded the states either to remove radioactive nuclear waste or to take title to it. If Congress’ scheme were permitted state and federal officials could engage in a kind of political shell game where each level of government might disclaim responsibility by pointing fingers at the other. There was a danger, then, that accountability would wither. Arguably, this case introduced the accountability rationale into the jurisprudence supporting constitutional federalism.

In key language explaining why the State could not consent to being commandeered by Congress, Justice O'Connor relied on the accountability rationale:

“[I]t is likely to be in the political interest of each individual official to avoid being held accountable to the voters for the choice of location. If a federal official is faced with the alternatives of choosing a location or directing the States to do it, the official may well prefer the latter, as a means of shifting responsibility for the eventual decision. If a state official is faced with the same set of alternatives-choosing a location or having Congress direct the choice of a location-the state official may also prefer the latter, as it may permit the avoidance of personal responsibility....[F]ederalism is hardly being advanced.”

The federal and state governments did not publish any financial results with respect to Medicaid other than current year cash outlays until 2010. At that time the federal government indicated that the net present value obligation related to its portion was \$24.2 trillion. The states have still not acknowledged their legal obligation's net present value cost of \$18.3 trillion as of 2010 in their financial statements. What aspect of this fact pattern meets the accountability requirement set forth by Justice O'Connor? It would appear that accounting for Medicaid is a political shell game.

2.1.4.2 SCOTUS Should Not Show Any Deference to Congress

The dissent in *Citizens United* (Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor) believes that Congress' "careful legislative adjustment of the federal election laws...warrants considerable deference,.." and that "we should instead start by acknowledging that "Congress surely has both wisdom and experience in these matters that is far superior to ours." However, "[t]his is not to say that deference would be appropriate if there was a solid basis for believing that a legislative action was motivated by the desire to protect incumbents or that it will degrade the competitiveness of the electoral process."⁶² This approach appears warranted for examining financial reporting laws.

Over the last one hundred years Congress has abdicated its financial reporting responsibility. Today, the Executive branch dominates federal financial reporting and this reporting is completely politically motivated. The President's Budget is prepared by OMB without input from Congress. Congress enacted legislation in the 1950s requiring the Executive branch to complete the President's Budget using cost-based accrual accounting.⁶³ The Executive branch refused to comply with this legislation. The Financial Report is prepared by Treasury and OMB without input from Congress other than through the agreed directives of the FASAB.

An example of the irrelevance of Congressional input today is the treatment of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. After the U.S. government assumed control in 2008 of these two federally chartered institutions the CBO concluded that the institutions had effectively become government entities whose operation should be included in the federal budget. However, OMB felt differently, and the Combined Statement reflected the Budget's approach.⁶⁴

The bottom line is that Supreme Court deference is wholly inappropriate to a Legislative branch that has abdicated its financial reporting responsibility in an effort to diminish its political accountability. This effort has significantly degraded the electoral process as citizens must vote without the benefit of financial information required to be published by the Constitution.

There are two other critical facts with respect to financial reporting and political accountability. The first is that the Legislative and Executive branches have a direct conflict of interest in not having expenditures reported correctly as they have been elected by promising to maintain or increase spending levels. Proper financial reporting would lead to spending cutbacks, tax increases and/or recriminations for overspending, all of which are likely to cause voter dissatisfaction and changes at the polls. The second is that Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid have permanent appropriations.⁶⁵

2.1.4.3 NFIB v. Sebelius

Chief Justice Roberts in questioning General Verrilli in oral argument in this Obamacare case came the closest to understanding the likely outcome of the under-reporting of expenses by both the federal and state governments with the following exchange.

Chief Justice Roberts: Well, the Secretary has the discretion. We're talking about something else. We're talking about fiscal realities and whether or not the Federal Government is going to say we need to lower our contribution to Medicaid and leave it up to the States because we want the people to be mad at the States when they have to have all these budget cuts to keep it up, and not at the Federal Government.

General Verrilli: But that would be true, Mr. Chief Justice, whether this Medicaid expansion occurred or not. So –

Chief Justice Roberts: I know, but you've been emphasizing that the Federal Government is going to pay 90 percent of this, 90 percent of this. And it's not something you can take to the bank, because the next day or the next fiscal year, they can decide we're going to pay a lot less, and you, States, are still on the hook, because you don't – you say it's not an easy choice. We can say – ask whether it's coercion. You're not going to be able to bail out of Medicaid. You just have to pay more because we're going to pay less.

The Supreme Court's dissenters (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito) in the *National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius* case put forth the following argument about accountability.

"Taxes have never been popular, see, *e.g.*, Stamp Act of 1765, and in part for that reason, the Constitution requires tax increases to originate in the House of Representatives. See Art. I, §7, cl. 1. That is to say, they must originate in the legislative body most accountable to the people, where legislators must weigh the need for the tax against the terrible price they might pay at their next election, which is never more than two years off. The Federalist No. 58 "defend[ed] the decision to give the origination power to the House on the ground that the Chamber that is more accountable to the people should have the primary role in raising revenue." *United States v. Munoz-Flores*, 495 U. S. 385, 395 (1990)."

Under-reporting expenses by Congress is directly related to the desire by members of Congress to get re-elected. The under-reporting is aimed at putting off the day of reckoning regarding spending until some other politician is in office, presumably long after the present politician is gone.

Medicaid has mandatory authorizing legislation. A distinctive feature of authorizing legislation for mandatory spending is that it provides agencies with the authority or requirement to spend money

without first requiring committees to enact funding. This is critical in the context of accountability because current members of Congress can and do wash their hands of any responsibility with respect to mandatory spending.⁶⁶

When you couple permanent appropriations with inadequate financial disclosure political accountability disappears altogether. Voters have no idea what the level of expenditures are and they cannot send the responsible representatives packing because they have retired years ago. Their current representatives' stance is that their hands are tied and they have nothing to do with mandatory spending.

2.1.5 Equal Protection⁶⁷

Financial reporting by the federal government, on which states rely, effectively forces a state to participate in action that violates the equal protection clause. For the Medicaid program the government reports no costs in any of its financial statements for the legal obligations that must be paid in the future. This has the effect of disguising a very substantial wealth transfer from future generations to pay for the current generation's health care. This wealth transfer is an equal protection violation as it is unlikely that funds will exist to cover future generation's same costs. An accurate statement and account of the nations finances would reveal this violation.

The Supreme Court in *South Dakota v. Dole*,⁶⁸ indicated that this spending power is of course not unlimited but is instead subject to several restrictions. The fourth restriction by *Dole* is that "other constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds."⁶⁹ The Court used the example of a grant of federal funds conditioned on a state's infliction of cruel and unusual punishment to clarify the types of conditions that would be unacceptable under the restriction.⁷⁰

The Comptroller General recently stated "the federal government continues to face an unsustainable fiscal path."⁷¹ The *Citizens Guide to the 2011 Financial Report* states "The Nation must bring social insurance expenses and resources into balance before the deficit and debt reach unprecedented heights. Delays will only increase the magnitude of the reforms needed and will place more of the burden on future generations."⁷²

2.1.6 Due Process⁷³

Congress cannot enact legislation regarding financial reporting that impinges on citizens' right to a true and correct accounting of the government's financial results and financial position.

2.1.6.1 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.

On June 8, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision found that campaign expenditures made in support of West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Brent Benjamin violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.*⁷⁴, a case that inspired a best-selling novel and two editorials in the New York Times, started in 1998 when Caperton filed suit against Massey in the circuit court of Boone County, West Virginia. After the jury found Massey liable for fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, and tortuous interference with existing contractual relations and awarded Caperton \$50 million in damages, West Virginia held its 2004 judicial elections. Massey CEO Don Blankenship contributed \$3 million to Brent Benjamin's campaign knowing that the State Supreme Court of Appeals would consider the appeal.

Before Massey filed its appeal, Caperton moved to disqualify Justice Benjamin under the Due Process Clause and the State's Code of Judicial Conduct, based on the conflict caused by Blankenship's campaign contributions. Justice Benjamin denied the motion, indicating that he found nothing showing bias for or against any litigant. Ultimately, Benjamin cast the deciding vote to overturn the \$50 million verdict. During the rehearing process, Justice Benjamin refused twice more to recuse himself, and the court once again reversed the verdict. Several months later, Justice Benjamin filed a concurring opinion, defending the court's opinion and his recusal decision.

On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the \$3 million spent on Benjamin's behalf created a risk of actual bias sufficient to violate Caperton's Fourteenth Amendment right to an impartial adjudicator. In doing so, the Court recognized for the first time that campaign expenditures could create a due process violation.

Justice Kennedy in his Opinion of the Court cited several cases including *Tumey v. Ohio*⁷⁵. "The Tumey Court concluded that the Due Process Clause incorporated the common-law rule that a judge must recuse himself when he has "a direct, substantial, pecuniary interest" in the case. This rule reflects the maxim that "[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity."⁷⁶

In *Tumey*, "the mayor of a village had the authority to sit as a judge (with no jury) to try those accused of violating a state law prohibiting the possession of alcoholic beverages. Inherent in this structure were two potential conflicts. First, the mayor received a salary supplement for performing judicial duties, and the funds for that compensation derived from the fines assessed in a case. No fines were assessed upon acquittal. The mayor-judge thus received a salary supplement only if he convicted the defendant.⁷⁷ Second, sums from the criminal fines were deposited in the village's general treasury fund for village improvements and repairs.⁷⁸

The Court held that the Due Process Clause required disqualification "both because of [the mayor-judge's] direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village."⁷⁹ The Court articulated the controlling principle: "Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law."⁸⁰

If we apply the Court's logic to Congress' responsibility to publish the Statement and Account several notions become obvious. First, while the Constitution is clear that Congress is responsible for publishing the Statement and Account, it cannot unilaterally determine whether it is complying with the Clause. This would violate the maxim cited by the Court that no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause. James Madison in Federalist No. 10 extended this concept beyond a single judge, "With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time". Second, it can be argued that Congress has "a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest" in the determination of whether it is complying with Constitution as it is in their interest to under-report expenses in an effort to endear themselves with the electorate, protect incumbents and degrade the competitiveness of the electoral process. Furthermore, if we apply the Court's logic to the Appropriations clause it is clear that Congress cannot determine whether its' defining permanent appropriations out of existence for financial reporting purposes or its using different definitions of "liability" complies with the Appropriations and Statement and Account clauses.

If the Court were to determine that Congress did not have “a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest” the Court would then proceed to its analysis of the more general concepts of bias. Justice Kennedy stated that the *Tumey* Court was also concerned with a more general concept of interests that tempt adjudicators to disregard neutrality. ... As new problems have emerged that were not discussed at common law...., the Court has identified additional instances which, as an objective matter, require recusal. There are circumstances “in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”⁸¹

This concern was discussed in *Ward v. Monroeville*⁸², which invalidated a conviction in another mayor’s court. In *Monroeville* the mayor received no money. The fines the mayor assessed went to the town’s general fisc. The Court held that “[t]he fact that the mayor [in *Tumey*] shared directly in the fees and costs did not define the limits of the principle.”⁸³ The principle, instead, turned on the “possible temptation” the mayor might face; the mayor’s executive responsibilities for village finances might make him partisan to maintain a high level of contribution [to those finances] from the mayor’s court.”⁸⁴ As the Court reiterated in *Gibson v. Berryhill*, another case that Term, “the [judge’s] financial stake need not be as direct or positive as it appeared to be in *Tumey*.”⁸⁵

The Court in *Caperton* stated that the facts of the case were “exceptional,” “extreme,” “rare” and “extraordinary.” If \$3 million in campaign contributions to a state supreme court’s judge’s campaign is critical to the Court’s analysis of whether due process has been violated then what would the Court consider Congress keeping over \$73.6 trillion of legal entitlement obligations that are fully funded with appropriations and numerous multi-trillion enterprises that the federal government controls off the governments’ books as its members seek re-election.

It is significant to note that the Supreme Court does not have to conclude that the Congress intentionally published misleading or fraudulent financial statements. The Court merely has to conclude that there would be a possible temptation for the average Congress to not hold the balance nice, clear and true in determining the methodology of compiling the Statement and Account and its content. If it so concluded, the probability of actual bias on the part of Congress is too high to be constitutionally tolerable as the arbiter of whether it is complying with the Constitution.

The Supreme Court in *Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.* asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is “likely” to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional “potential for bias.”....”In defining these standards the Court has asked whether “under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,” the interest “poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.”⁸⁶

2.1.6.2 Psychological Factors Affecting Financial Reporting

There are several important psychological factors that have influenced and continue to influence financial reporting for the federal and state governments. This section attempts to explain how and why Congress and the states have put the nation into a situation where financial reporting is so distorted from economic reality? This analysis suggests that there are very significant, some would say insurmountable barriers, to changing our current circumstance through the legislative process and therefore, the only resolution is through the judiciary. The framework for the analysis is inspired by a talk given by Charlie Munger, *The Psychology of Human Misjudgment*.⁸⁷ Mr. Munger is the long time business partner of Warren Buffett.

Congress and the Executive have created a set of circumstances that takes advantage of multiple psychological tendencies that affects all parties interested in the electoral process. These psychological factors, which are generally well documented in psychology literature, ensure that political accountability is significantly diminished and that the competitiveness of the electoral process is materially degraded. It is hard not to view the creation and alignment of these psychological factors as “corruption”. Mr. Munger calls the alignment of multiple psychological tendencies all working in the same direction as the “Lollapalooza Tendency”.

Let’s begin with “incentives”. B.F. Skinner, the famous Harvard psychology professor, proved that incentives could cause significant behavioral change.⁸⁸ His experiments proved that bad behavior is intensely habit-forming when it is rewarded. When choosing between different outcomes, elected representatives can be expected to consider which course of action is most likely to contribute to their own reelection and, which course of action is most consistent with the ideological commitments and policy goals of their constituents.

As Hamilton famously wrote when explaining the benefits of a public official making decisions with an eye toward reelection, “the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct...[and] the best security for the fidelity of mankind is to make their interest coincide with their duty.”⁸⁹ In Pennsylvania, elected trial court judges sentence criminal defendants to longer and longer prison sentences as an impending election gets closer and closer. In Chicago, criminal defendants convicted of murder are 15% more likely to receive the death penalty if their trial occurs during an election year for the presiding judge. And across the nation, in cases between one in-state party and one out-of-state party, elected state court judges are more likely to decide cases in favor of the in-state litigant than appointed judges.⁹⁰

Since entitlement programs were first created, Democrats and Republicans have had a significant incentive to be less than forthright with respect to their cost. They get elected by promising that benefits are guaranteed and that additional entitlements are possible. Yet, they do not permit any expense or liability associated with promises that must be paid in the future included in any financial statement to which they could be held accountable. Doing so would reveal massive deficits far exceeding our current Budget Deficit that would be impossible to justify and would likely lead to many elected officials losing their “jobs”.

Punishments strongly influence behavior which is why politicians are very familiar with the Persian Messenger Syndrome. In ancient times Persians killed some messengers whose sole transgression was that they brought home truthful bad news. This is why no politician at any level wants to take the lead on informing the electorate as to the true state of the nation’s finances. George Washington hanged deserters forty feet high as an example to others.⁹¹ Unfortunately, over the years there have never been any negative repercussions for any of the politicians responsible for the federal or state government’s deficient financial reporting.

The population’s tendency to reciprocate favors and disfavours is well known to politicians. They know that their constituents want to hear about better benefits and nothing about increased costs. Politicians fully understand how the world works. You enact legislation that provides better benefits for me or lowers taxes and I will vote for you. You take away my benefits or raise my taxes and I will vote you out of office. This reciprocation tendency has stopped wars for considerable periods of time. It is also the reason why there are periods when no prisoners are taken. It is why purchasing agents at most large commercial establishments are not allowed to take anything from a vendor. The

reciprocation tendency coupled with other tendencies discussed below ensures that a political candidate for office challenging an incumbent cannot use the fraudulent financial reporting issue to win over the electorate. It is a losing political strategy in all cases. One may inform voters but the candidate will never get elected.

Successful politicians are very good at voter psychology and pursue strategies to take advantage of the Liking/Loving Tendency and the Disliking/Hating Tendency. It will surprise no one that politicians prefer being liked by their constituents. Hence, they exhibit behavior to maintain this state of affection which involves ignoring the facts as they relate to the federal and state government's financial results and financial condition and making sure that the true status of their finances are not made public. Similarly, the electorate likes getting additional benefits especially if it does not cost them anything.

"Politics is the art of marshalling hatreds."⁹² One of the most important factors that has led to a significantly distorted electoral process is that the electorate does not want to know the truth about the poor condition of the nation's finances. Everyone likes a "free lunch" but as economics texts instruct, there are no "free lunches". Not surprisingly, the people do not want to know any bad facts associated with the cost of their benefits. Politicians have used and continue to use people's dislike for any negative facts associated with any of the nation's social insurance programs to their advantage, particularly in negative advertising. The electorate hates being told bad news especially if it entails a possible bill for them.

The Social-Proof Tendency is the tendency for a person to think and act as others around him are thinking and acting. It tends to be triggered in periods of stress. Given that no one in Congress, the Administration, the SEC or the states is pointing out the fact that the federal or state government's financial reports fail to reflect economic reality this is social proof that the federal and state governments' financial statements must be correct. If a politician dared to raise the issue his reception among his colleagues and the electorate would be similar to the reception that the corrupt New York police division gave to Frank Serpico.⁹³ The corruption in the New York police was driven by social proof plus incentives.

It is highly likely that the dysfunctional behavior surrounding financial reporting by Congress, the Executive and the states will continue as significant stress causes dysfunction (the "Stress Influence Tendency"). The noted researcher, Pavlov realized that extreme stress created unanticipated extreme changes in behavior. During the great Leningrad Flood of the 1920s, Pavlov had many dogs in cages. As the waters rose many dogs reached a point where they had almost no airspace at the top of their cage they were subjected to maximum stress. This changed the behavior of many dogs.⁹⁴ To a certain extent this explains some of the dysfunctional behaviors that our politicians exhibited in dealing with the fiscal cliff crisis and it is a precursor of more dysfunctional behavior to come with the ongoing budget deficit and debt ceiling debates.

Politicians know that rational or reasonable explanations increase compliance with orders/requests. The Reason-Respecting Tendency is the reason that there is an enormous bureaucracy associated with the President's Budget. This bureaucracy ensures that there will always be reasons supporting the figures presented.

When confronted with the federal government's and state's fiscal distress most politicians talk about our ability to deal with the issue by growing our economy. This displays man's excessive optimism

(the “Overoptimism Tendency”). The right approach is to focus on the hard numbers, something that Congress, the Executive and state governments are loath to do.

Politicians know that if reality is too painful to bear, they should distort the facts until they become bearable. This “psychological denial” could explain at least one of the arguments for maintaining the current accounting for social insurance. “Recognition of future social insurance benefits on the financial statements would diminish significantly the relative size and importance of other expenses and liabilities shown on the financial statements”⁹⁵

When’s steps are taken towards disaster but each of these steps are small and barely discernible, a person’s Contrast-Misreaction Tendency will often let the person go too far. The reason is that each step is such a small contrast from the person’s current position. Ben Franklin said “A small leak will sink a great ship.”⁹⁶ In the case of financial reporting it is so because over the last 75 years politicians and the electorate have intentionally hidden or ignored the “leak.”

The Authority-Misinfluence Tendency explains how authority figures (the “Executive”) can lead ordinary people into gross misbehavior. Stanley Milgram conducted experiments to show how far authority figures could lead people into such misbehavior.⁹⁷ The Framers of the Constitution distrusted the Executive. Distrust of the Executive is what led the Framers to put financial responsibility solely in Congress’ hands.

One of the truths about the electorate is that, on the whole, they exhibit the Excessive Self-Regard Tendency (the “Endowment Effect”). Once owned, or thought to be owned, social insurance benefits become worth more to a citizen than if they were offered for sale to the person and the person didn’t own them. The Excessive Self-Regard Tendency is illustrated by a Tolstoy passage: “According to Tolstoy, the worst criminals don’t appraise themselves as all that bad. They come to believe either (1) that they didn’t commit their crimes or (2) that, considering the pressures and disadvantages of their lives, it is understandable and forgivable that they behaved as they did and became what they became.”⁹⁸ One could easily substitute our politicians into this story in place of criminals.

A final truth about the electorate is that loss seems to hurt much more than gain adds to man’s pleasure (the “Deprivation-Supprereaction Tendency”). Therefore, it is not surprising that the electorate will react with almost irrational intensity to any loss or threatened loss, however small, of social insurance or Medicaid benefits.

2.1.6.3 The Lesson of Caperton

Using the Court’s analysis in *Caperton* it is impossible to conclude that either Congress including the GAO, CBO or the Comptroller General or the Executive branch including the Treasury or OMB is the appropriate body to determine whether Congress or the Executive is complying with the Appropriations and Statement and Account clauses. This conclusion flies in the face of Chief Justice Burger’s dictum in *United States v. Richardson* that “it is clear that Congress has plenary power to exact any reporting and accounting it considers appropriate in the public interest.” This is so unless one reads the Justice’s remarks to be targeted solely to the amount of detail that Congress must publish.

2.2 Perpetual Fraud on the Federal and State Judiciaries

The federal and state government's fraudulent financial reporting creates a perpetual fraud on the state and federal judiciaries. The impact of the fraudulent reporting can be most easily seen by reviewing two Obamacare decisions. The decisions point to an important question. Did the litigants in the case adequately represent the interests of the sovereign or did the legislative and executive branches and the states direct conflict of interest in not having expenditures reported correctly bias their approach in both cases?

2.2.1 Medicaid Expansion Issue in NFIB v. Sebelius⁹⁹

On June 28, 2012 the Supreme Court resolved constitutional challenges to two provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 ("ACA" or the "Act"): the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion.¹⁰⁰ The individual mandate requires most Americans maintain a "minimum essential" health insurance coverage.¹⁰¹ For many this requires purchasing insurance.¹⁰² Those who do not comply must pay a penalty to the IRS.¹⁰³ With respect to the individual mandate the Court decided that while it is not a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause it may be upheld as within Congress's power under the Taxing Clause.¹⁰⁴ This section is focused solely on the second provision resolved by the Court, the Medicaid expansion.

Seven members of the Supreme Court agreed that the Medicaid expansion in the Act is unconstitutional.¹⁰⁵ Each of the opinions issued by the Court, Justice Ginsburg and the Dissenters (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito) contains economic and political accountability analysis that are seriously flawed and incomplete. All of the Justices ignored important facts associated with entitlement program spending and the federal government's financial results. None addressed the Appropriations or Statement and Account clauses, both directly applicable Constitutional provisions. Not surprisingly, the Court's remedy is clearly in error.

Information submitted in merit briefs and orally to the Supreme Court included financial information published by the federal government that does not comply with the Appropriations and Statement and Account clauses. In addition, relevant material financial information that was published only after the passage of the ACA but prior to the submission of merit briefs and oral argument was not raised or discussed in either. The fraudulent material submitted by each state to the Court relates to each state's financial results. This information is fraudulent as it does not include the full costs directly related to each state's participation in the Medicaid program. The full cost of the Medicaid program for each state has never been published by any state.

We will begin by summarizing certain facts highlighted by the Justices, the Court's analysis and remedy.

As the Dissenters have noted:

"Medicaid has long been the largest federal program of grants to the States"¹⁰⁶. See Brief for Respondents in No. 11– 400, at 37. In 2010, the Federal Government directed more than \$552 billion in federal funds to the States. See Nat. Assn. of State Budget Officers, *2010 State Expenditure Report: Examining Fiscal 2009–2011 State Spending*, p. 7 (2011) (NASBO Report). Of this, more than \$233 billion went to pre-expansion Medicaid. See *id.*, at 47.¹⁴ *This amount equals nearly 22% of all state expenditures combined.* See *id.*, at 7. The States devote a larger percentage of their budgets to Medicaid than to any other item. *Id.*, at 5. Federal

funds account for anywhere from 50% to 83% of each State's total Medicaid expenditures, see §1396d(b) (2006 ed., Supp. IV); most States receive more than \$1 billion in federal Medicaid funding; and a quarter receive more than \$5 billion, NASBO Report 47. These federal dollars total nearly two thirds—64.6%—of all Medicaid expenditures nationwide.¹⁵ *Id.*, at 46.”

The *Brief of State Petitioners* on Medicaid indicates that:

“To finance that massive expansion, the federal government anticipates that its share of Medicaid spending will increase by \$434 billion by 2020. CBO Estimate, Table 4 (Mar. 20, 2010). It further estimates that state spending will increase by at least \$20 billion over the same timeframe. CBO Estimate, Table 4 n.c (Mar. 20, 2010). Other estimates suggest that both federal and state costs will be significantly higher. Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, *Medicaid Coverage & Spending in Health Reform: National and State-by-State Results for Adults at or Below 133% FPL* 23 (May 2010) (estimating that increased costs could be as high as \$532 billion for federal government and \$43.2 billion for States).”

The dissent (authored by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito) opined that “By 1982 every State had chosen to participate in Medicaid. Federal funds received through the Medicaid program have become a substantial part of state budgets, now constituting over 10 percent of most States’ total revenue. Justice Ginsburg posited that between 2005 and 2008 federal contributions toward the care of beneficiaries averaged 57% and States contributions averaged 43%.¹⁰⁷ Chief Justice Roberts asserted that, for the States, “Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average State’s total budget See Nat. Assn. of State Budget Officers, *Fiscal Year 2010 State Expenditure Report*, p. 11, Table 5 (2011); 42 U. S. C. §1396d(b).”¹⁰⁸ “The Act increases federal funding to cover the States’ costs in expanding Medicaid coverage. But if a State does not comply with the Act’s new coverage requirements, it may lose not only the federal funding for those requirements, but all of its federal Medicaid funds.”¹⁰⁹

“We have repeatedly characterized . . . Spending Clause legislation as ‘much in the nature of a contract.’”¹¹⁰ Furthermore, “Congress may use its spending power to create incentives for States to act in accordance with federal policies. But when ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’ the legislation runs contrary to our system of federalism.”¹¹¹ “In this case, the financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”¹¹² “The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget . . . is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.”¹¹³

Furthermore, “[p]ermitting the Federal Government to force the States to implement a federal program would threaten the political accountability key to our federal system.”¹¹⁴ “When Congress compels the States to do its bidding, it blurs the lines of political accountability.”¹¹⁵ By that, Justice Ginsburg believes, the Court means “voter confusion: Citizens upset by unpopular government action . . . may ascribe to state officials blame more appropriately laid at Congress’ door.”¹¹⁶

In its decision the Court ruled that the constitutional violation and the political accountability issue are fully remedied by precluding the Secretary of Health and Human Services from applying the Act to withdraw existing Medicaid funds from the States for their failure to comply with the requirements set out in the expansion.¹¹⁷

Let us review key economic facts regarding Medicaid not discussed by the parties or the Court. First, since Medicaid’s inception, the federal government has never reported its full costs in either the President’s Budget or the Financial Report. Justice Roberts quoted the impact of the ACA on the

federal government. "In light of the expansion in coverage mandated by the Act, the Federal Government estimates that its Medicaid spending will increase by approximately \$100 billion per year, nearly 40 percent above current levels. Statement of Douglas W. Elmendorf, *CBO's Analysis of the Major Health Care Legislation Enacted in March 2010*, p. 14, Table 2 (Mar.30, 2011)." "The Federal Government estimates that it will pay out approximately \$3.3 trillion between 2010 and 2019 in order to cover the costs of *pre-expansion* Medicaid. *Brief for United States* 10, n. 6."¹¹⁸ Despite this huge increase in spending the litigants and the Court did not review any overall financial data for the federal government.

The federal government published a \$24 trillion estimate of the present value of the future net cost of the program for the first time in the 2010 Financial Report.¹¹⁹ This figure was based on savings assumptions associated with the ACA similar to those used to generate the \$22.8 trillion Medicare figure published simultaneously. However, the assumptions were so unrealistic that the Administration published an alternate more realistic scenario which indicated a cost of \$35.2 trillion.¹²⁰ No alternate figure was published for Medicaid. The only costs recorded by the federal government or any state for Medicaid are current year cash expenditures. Second, since the State portion of Medicaid contributions averaged 43% of total expenditures this means that there is an additional \$18.3 trillion present value obligation. Therefore, Medicaid in total is a \$42.5 trillion program. No State records the full cost of its share of Medicaid costs in its financials.

The government knows that it cannot possibly fund its existing entitlement programs. The Comptroller General stated in 2011 "the federal government continues to face an unsustainable fiscal path."¹²¹ The Citizens Guide to the 2011 Financial Report states "The Nation must bring social insurance expenses and resources into balance before the deficit and debt reach unprecedented heights. Delays will only increase the magnitude of the reforms needed and will place more of the burden on future generations."¹²² "... the federal government faces long-term challenges resulting from large and growing structural deficits that are driven primarily by rising health-care costs and known demographic trends. This unsustainable path must be addressed soon by policymakers. The longer actions are delayed, the more difficult adjustments are likely to become." These words in the 2009 Financial Report of the U.S. Government were written by Gene L. Dodaro, acting comptroller general. It is hard to square these comments with Justice Ginsburg's assertion that "Thus there can be no objection to the ACA's expansion of Medicaid as an 'unfunded mandate.' Quite the contrary, the program is impressively well funded."¹²³

The Court's analysis is focused on the Act's economic impact on the State's income statements as opposed to the financial results of both parties. In commercial joint ventures it is typical for the parties to represent and warrant that they have the financial wherewithal to hold up their end of the bargain. These are often tied to audited financials. However, the states have no need for these because they and their citizens are entitled to rely on the Statement and Account.

The States cannot knowingly accept the full terms of the Medicaid contract if a fundamental assumption or condition on which they rely is materially in error. The ability of the federal government to provide financing is a key determinant whether a State wants to continue taking the money. Federal financial reporting is coercive because it significantly overstates the ability to continue providing funding. The failure to so advise the States through the publication of a truthful and accurate Statement and Account renders acceptance of the "contract" null and void as there could not be any meeting of the minds.

If threatening to withdraw over 10% of a State's budget is a gun to the head then what is underreporting expenditures by over two thirds of total expenditures? Is it reasonable that those

practical Framers that drafted the Statement and Account Clause thought it appropriate for the government to be able to spend at a level three times the amount that it publicly reported?

If the fifty states are committing fraud in publishing their financial statements how can the electorate of these states be the informed voters that our Constitution requires? Furthermore, given the length of time that Medicaid has been in existence and the lack of financial reporting how can the state's politicians accept the federal government's money? There cannot be a meeting of the minds as both sides are significantly under-reporting expenses related to Medicaid.

2.2.1.1 Conclusion on NFIB v. Sebelius

Accounting and financial reporting standards are essential for public accountability and for an efficient and effective functioning of our democratic system of government. Our Declaration of Independence's closing sentence reads "And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor. It is time for Congress to find its Honor but it is unlikely to do so.

Therefore, the nation needs the Supreme Court most when the other two branches of government have clearly failed to fulfill their Constitutional duties. As Chief Justice Roberts has clearly pointed out:

"Proper respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government" requires that we strike down an Act of Congress only if "the lack of constitutional authority to pass [the] act in question is clearly demonstrated." *United States v. Harris*, 106 U. S. 629, 635 (1883). Members of this Court are vested with the authority to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation's elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with them. It is not our job to protect the people from the consequences of their political choices.

Our deference in matters of policy cannot, however, become abdication in matters of law. "The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written." *Marbury v. Madison*, 1 Cranch 137, 176 (1803). Our respect for Congress's policy judgments thus can never extend so far as to disavow restraints on federal power that the Constitution carefully constructed. "The peculiar circumstances of the moment may render a measure more or less wise, but cannot render it more or less constitutional." Chief Justice John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution No. V, Alexandria Gazette, July 5, 1819, in John Marshall's Defense of *McCulloch v. Maryland* 190–191 (G. Gunther ed. 1969). And there can be no question that it is the responsibility of this Court to enforce the limits on federal power by striking down acts of Congress that transgress those limits. *Marbury v. Madison*, *supra*, at 175–176.¹²⁴

2.2.2 King v. Burwell

In *King v. Burwell*, the plaintiff brought a suit challenging the validity of an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") final rule implementing the premium tax credit provision of the ACA. King, the Petitioner, argued that in an apparent effort to fix several problems associated with the lack of participation by the states the IRS issued a rule in May 2012 that extended eligibility for tax credits and subsidies to those individuals who purchase health insurance on both state-run insurance Exchanges and federally-facilitated Exchanges. The Petitioner contended that the IRS's

interpretation was contrary to the language of the statute, which they asserted, authorizes tax credits only for individuals who purchase insurance on state-run Exchanges. Only sixteen states and the District of Columbia had set up Exchanges; thirty-four states rely on federally-facilitated Exchanges. As the district court stated in *King v. Sebelius* “Congress did not expect the states to turn down federal funds and fail to create and run their own Exchanges.”

The D.C. Circuit Court in a related case on the same issue and the Fourth Circuit in *King* had reached opposite conclusions with respect to the IRS Rule. The D.C. Circuit found that the IRS Rule was contrary to the text of the ACA and ordered that it be vacated. The Fourth Circuit found that the ACA was ambiguous with respect to whether an Exchange established by HHS qualified for tax credits and subsidies and applied “Chevron” deference to the IRS’ ruling. *Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resource Defense Council, Inc.* was a case decided in 1984 which addressed the question of judicial deference to an agency’s construction of a statute. It created a two-part inquiry for courts to follow in reviewing agency interpretations of law. Presumably, the Supreme Court took the case, at least in part to resolve the conflict between the Circuit Courts.

2.2.2.1 Supreme Court Should Have Looked at All of the Facts

In order to understand how and why *King v. Burwell* was a critically important first amendment case one has to take a hard look at all of the facts associated with the ACA, the proverbial “big picture” and not just the select subset of facts surrounding the language of the statute and the ACA’s legislative history on which the lower courts, the parties and legal commentators were focused. Most importantly, one has to revisit the facts cited in the Supreme Court’s decision with respect to the Medicaid issue in *NFIB v. Sebelius*. The sections above explains how and why the Supreme Court’s decision regarding the Medicaid issue was erroneous as it was based on an understanding of the facts that was far from complete. As a result each of the opinions issued by the Supreme Court contains economic and political accountability analysis that is seriously flawed and the Court’s remedy was in error.

2.2.2.2 Facts are Clear That There Cannot Have Been a Contract

Federal and state financial reporting, particularly as they relate to Medicare and Medicaid, were relevant in *King v. Burwell*, as it went directly to the issue of whether there could be a meeting of the minds between the federal and state governments.

The parties to the grant contract cannot possibly have agreed to the terms of the ACA as both the state and federal governments have been publishing fraudulent and unconstitutional financial statements. It can be argued that the federal government’s financial disclosures fraudulently induced the states into accepting the grant because those disclosures clearly overstated the Feds ability to continue funding the Medicaid program. Furthermore, it can be argued that the federal government conditioned the grant on the state’s acceptance of its fraudulent financial reporting. This fraudulent disclosure by the federal and state governments has gone on for almost fifty years, in large part because of politicians’ unwillingness to properly account for any entitlement programs including, as applicable, Medicare and Medicaid.

The federal government’s financial accounting disclosures are in conflict with and directly contradict the organic legislation regarding the entitlement programs that Congress has legally enacted and funded with permanent appropriations. State financial disclosures are fraudulent, and have been for

decades, because they clearly violate the antifraud provisions of the nation's securities laws. The fact that federal and state financial reporting has been fraudulent for an extended period of time and continues to this day required a finding by the Supreme Court that the ACA is null and void.

The federal and state governments cannot possibly agree to expand the nation's healthcare programs when they have been fraudulently portraying their financial implications to constituents for decades. The argument that financial reporting by either the federal or state governments is entirely separate from the enactment of the ACA is spurious because of the magnitude of the funds involved with the existing programs and the modifications required by the ACA.

3 Senator Elizabeth Warren and the Federal Reserve's Governors

3.1 Senator Elizabeth Warren Fails to Act

Senator Elizabeth Warren's biography on her website makes the following points about her background and expertise:

"Elizabeth is recognized as one of the nation's top experts on bankruptcy and financial pressures facing the middle class families.....She is widely credited for the original thinking, political courage, and relentless persistence that led to the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.....During her campaign for the Senate, Elizabeth promised to fight for middle class families and to make sure that everyone has a fair shot to get ahead. She called for policies that would level the regulatory playing field for small businesses and ensure that everyone – even large and powerful corporations – pay a fair share in taxes and is held accountable for breaking the law.....Senator Warren was a law professor for more than 30 years, including nearly 20 years as the Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law at Harvard Law School....She taught courses on commercial law, contracts, and bankruptcy and wrote more than a hundred articles and ten books, including three national best-sellers, *A Fighting Chance*, *The Two-Income Trap*, and *All Your Worth*."

Senator Elizabeth Warren wrote a scathing letter to Mary Jo White, Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 2, 2015. In it she charged that the SEC under the Chair's leadership has failed to require admissions of wrongdoing from companies that appear to have violated the law.

"The public relies on the SEC to act as the cop on the beat for an honest marketplace – issuing rules that ensure that investors can make informed decisions and holding rule breakers accountable for their actions. When the SEC falls down on the job, the impact is felt throughout the economy, and it touches every American family.

During your confirmation hearings two years ago, I said, "The SEC needs a strong leader to issue meaningful and final rules under the Dodd-Frank Act and to hold big banks and other powerful interests accountable when they break the law."

In January 2016 a report that was prepared for Senator Warren "*Rigged Justice: 2016 – How Weak Enforcement Lets Corporate Offenders Off Easy*" was released. The report details many companies breaking the law and getting a proverbial slap on the wrist.

Her speech at the Democratic National Convention included the following:

"People feel like the system is rigged against them. And here's the painful part: They're right. The system is rigged. Look around. Oil companies guzzle down billions in subsidies. Billionaires pay lower tax rates than their secretaries. Wall Street CEOs – the same ones who wrecked our economy and destroyed millions of jobs–still strut AROUND Congress, no shame, demanding favors, and acting like we should thank them.

No one is asking for a handout. All we want is a country where everyone pays a fair share, a country where we build opportunities for all of us; a country where everyone plays by the same rules and everyone is held accountable."

The reason why Senator Warren is being singled out for her failure to act should be obvious. Here is an incredibly knowledgeable person that has been all over the SEC about its actions or lack thereof that has turned a blind eye to the fact that the all fifty states (including her own State of Massachusetts which has an estimated \$1.3 trillion legal obligation) are publishing fraudulent and unconstitutional financial statements. To the authors' knowledge she has never focused on or publicly commented on the SEC's finding three states (New Jersey, Illinois and Kansas) guilty of violating the antifraud provisions of the nation's securities laws. In those cases not even a slap on the wrist was administered by the SEC. Where is her outrage about those frauds on the American people or the lack of punishment of public officials?

Primary responsibility for the fraudulent and unconstitutional financial reporting by the federal government lies with the leadership on both sides of the aisle in the House and the Senate. However, given that Senator Warren is arguably one of, if not the most knowledgeable senator about financial matters that is serving in Congress, she needs to take a good hard look in the mirror. She has always been a strong advocate of accountability. The author believes that as a member of Congress she bears direct responsibility for the unlawful state of financial reporting by the federal government and the state governments. She demands that everyone "play by the same rules." As a longstanding teacher she knows when someone warrants an "F" as a grade. To date Senator Warren has earned that grade with respect to the issues of federal and state financial reporting.

3.2 The Federal Reserve's Governors Also Fail to Act

The Federal Reserve sets the nation's monetary policy to promote the objectives of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. These objectives cannot be effectively reached while the federal and state governments publish fraudulent and unconstitutional financial statements. Yet, the most aggressive attempt by a Federal Reserve Chairman to change the federal government's accounting policies could be Chairman Alan Greenspan's semiannual monetary policy report to the Congress delivered before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate over thirteen years ago on February 11, 2003.¹²⁵ An excerpt of his testimony appears below.

"Policies intended to improve the flexibility of the economy seem to fall outside the sphere of traditional monetary and fiscal policy. But decisions on the structure of the tax system and spending programs surely influence flexibility and thus can have major consequences for both the cyclical performance and long-run growth potential of our economy. Accordingly, in view of the major budget issues now confronting the Congress and their potential implications for the economy, I thought it appropriate to devote some of my remarks today to fiscal policy. In that regard, I will not be emphasizing specific spending or revenue programs. Rather, my focus will be on the goals and process determining the budget and on the importance, despite our increasing national security requirements, of regaining discipline in that process. These views are my own and are not necessarily shared by my colleagues at the Federal Reserve.

One notable feature of the budget landscape over the past half century has been the limited movement in the ratio of unified budget outlays to nominal GDP. Over the past five years, that ratio has averaged a bit less than 19 percent, about where it was in the 1960s before it moved up during the 1970s and 1980s. But that pattern of relative stability over the longer term has masked a pronounced rise in the share of spending committed to retirement,

medical, and other entitlement programs. Conversely, the share of spending that is subject to the annual appropriations process, and thus that comes under regular review by the Congress, has been shrinking. Such so-called discretionary spending has fallen from two-thirds of total outlays in the 1960s to one-third last year, with defense outlays accounting for almost all of the decline.

The increase in the share of expenditures that is more or less on automatic pilot has complicated the task of making fiscal policy by effectively necessitating an extension of the budget horizon. The Presidents' budgets through the 1960s and into the 1970s mainly provided information for the upcoming fiscal year. The legislation in 1974 that established a new budget process and created the Congressional Budget Office required that organization to provide five-year budget projections. And by the mid-1990s, CBO's projection horizon had been pushed out to ten years. These longer time periods and the associated budget projections, even granted their imprecision, are useful steps toward allowing the Congress to balance budget priorities sensibly in the context of a cash-based accounting system.¹ But more can be done to clarify those priorities and thereby enhance the discipline on the fiscal process.

A general difficulty concerns the very nature of the unified budget. As a cash accounting system, it was adopted in 1968 to provide a comprehensive measure of the funds that move in and out of federal coffers. With a few modifications, it correctly measures the direct effect of federal transactions on national saving. But a cash accounting system is not designed to track new commitments and their translation into future spending and borrowing. For budgets that are largely discretionary, changes in forward commitments do not enter significantly into budget deliberations, and hence the surplus or deficit in the unified budget is a reasonably accurate indicator of the stance of fiscal policy and its effect on saving. But as longer-term commitments have come to dominate tax and spending decisions, such cash accounting has been rendered progressively less meaningful as the principal indicator of the state of our fiscal affairs.

An accrual-based accounting system geared to the longer horizon could be constructed with a reasonable amount of additional effort. In fact, many of the inputs on the outlay side are already available. However, estimates of revenue accruals are not well developed. These include deferred taxes on retirement accounts that are taxable on withdrawal, accrued taxes on unrealized capital gains, and corporate tax accruals. An accrual system would allow us to keep better track of the government's overall accrued obligations and deferred assets. Future benefit obligations and taxes would be recognized as they are incurred rather than when they are paid out by the government.²

Currently, accrued outlays very likely are much greater than those calculated under the cash-based approach. Under full accrual accounting, the social security program would be showing a substantial deficit this year, rather than the surplus measured under our current cash accounting regimen.³ Indeed, under most reasonable sets of actuarial assumptions, for social security benefits alone past accruals cumulate to a liability that amounts to many trillions of dollars. For the government as a whole, such liabilities are still growing.

Estimating the liabilities implicit in social security is relatively straightforward because that program has many of the characteristics of a private defined-benefit retirement program.

Projections of Medicare outlays, however, are far more uncertain even though the rise in the beneficiary populations is expected to be similar. The likelihood of continued dramatic innovations in medical technology and procedures combined with largely inelastic demand and a subsidized third-party payment system engenders virtually open-ended potential federal outlays unless constrained by law.⁴ Liabilities for Medicare are probably about the same order of magnitude as those for social security, and as is the case for social security, the date is rapidly approaching when those liabilities will be converted into cash outlays.

Accrual-based accounts would lay out more clearly the true costs and benefits of changes to various taxes and outlay programs and facilitate the development of a broad budget strategy. In doing so, these accounts should help shift the national dialogue and consensus toward a more realistic view of the limits of our national resources as we approach the next decade and focus attention on the necessity to make difficult choices from among programs that, on a stand-alone basis, appear very attractive.

Because the baby boomers have not yet started to retire in force and accordingly the ratio of retirees to workers is still relatively low, we are in the midst of a demographic lull. But short of an outsized acceleration of productivity to well beyond the average pace of the past seven years or a major expansion of immigration, the aging of the population now in train will end this state of relative budget tranquility in about a decade's time. It would be wise to address this significant pending adjustment sooner rather than later. As the President's just-released budget put it, "The longer the delay in enacting reforms, the greater the danger, and the more drastic the remedies will have to be."⁵

Accrual-based revenue and outlay projections, tied to a credible set of economic assumptions, tax rates, and programmatic spend-out rates, can provide important evidence on the long-term sustainability of the overall budget and economic regimes under alternative scenarios.⁶ Of course, those projections, useful as they might prove to be, would still be subject to enormous uncertainty. The ability of economists to assess the effects of tax and spending programs is hindered by an incomplete understanding of the forces influencing the economy.

It is not surprising, therefore, that much controversy over basic questions surrounds the current debate over budget policy. Do budget deficits and debt significantly affect interest rates and, hence, economic activity? With political constraints on the size of acceptable deficits, do tax cuts ultimately restrain spending increases, and do spending increases limit tax cuts? To what extent do tax increases inhibit investment and economic growth or, by raising national saving, have the opposite effect? And to what extent does government spending raise the growth of GDP, or is its effect offset by a crowding out of private spending?"

Is this really the best that the Federal Reserve can do in terms of pointing out the fraudulent financial reporting by both the federal and state governments? From this authors' vantage point all of the Federal Reserve's efforts to fulfill its mission are pointless if the federal and state governments continue to mislead the electorate. It is ironic that former Chairman Alan Greenspan recently pointed out that the U.S. is "way underestimating" the national debt. The time to use the bully pulpit is not after one has retired.

But there seems to be another “closer to home” reason why the Federal Reserve’s Governors keep their mouths shut. They can’t very well point out that the federal and state governments are failing to adhere to the Constitution if the Governors don’t want to follow its requirements either!

3.2.1 The Federal Reserve Refuses to Adhere to the Constitution

On July 2, 2013 Louise L. Riseman, Director Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payments Systems Division and Donald V. Hamond, Chief Operating Officer sent a letter to the FASAB commenting on its *Reporting Entity* exposure draft. Selected portions of their letter are replicated below:

“We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board’s (FASAB) proposed Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards entitled Reporting Entity.

...We have no concerns continuing the current general purpose federal financial reports (GPFFR) practice of including substantial information about the Federal Reserve System’s financial interactions with the federal government in the footnotes. Similarly, we have no objections to including within the GPFFR additional information sourced from our audited annual financial statements....We do have concerns, however, if the provisions of the proposed standard were to suggest that the Board or the Reserve Banks should consolidate their financial statements with those of the rest of the federal government. Consolidation of this nature would unnecessarily reduce transparency, undermine the statutorily protected independence of the Federal Reserve System, distort the statements of the U.S. Government, and increase the costs of preparing and auditing the GPFFR.

....We believe that the information we provide to the public demonstrates our ongoing commitment to transparency and should be sufficient for meeting the purposes of the standard without incurring additional costs.

Disclosure of financial information in the GPFFR footnotes, as opposed to consolidation in the federal government’s financials, will provide relevant financial information while avoiding misleading perceptions about the relationship between the federal government and the Federal Reserve System.

...The *Reporting Entity* exposure draft recognizes that the federal government achieves its objectives through a wide range of organizations, which fall at different points on the control spectrum.

....At the other end of the continuum, by statute, the Federal Reserve operates independently with respect to determining and implementing monetary policy, and that function has a much more significant effect on its financial condition and operating results. The Federal Reserve Act provides the Board, the Reserve Banks, and the Federal Open Market Committee with specific separate authorities and responsibilities and is designed to preserve the independence of the Federal Reserve System entities from other government departments and agencies, including the U.S. Treasury. The current FASAB *Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Concepts 2: Entity and Display* recognizes the independence of the monetary policy authority, stating that the Federal Reserve System’s “organization and functions pertaining to monetary policy are traditionally separated from and independent of

the other central government organizations and functions in order to achieve more effective monetary and fiscal policies and economic results. Therefore, the Federal Reserve System would not be considered part of the government-wide reporting entity.” Further, Reserve Banks are not government agencies, and the treatment in the GPFFR should be consistent with their character.

Consolidation of the Federal Reserve System’s financial information in the GPFFR would partially eliminate assets and liabilities stemming from both fiscal and monetary policy operations in a way that would reduce the transparency of the government’s fiscal operations. For example, the Reserve Bank’s holdings of Treasury securities acquired in the conduct of monetary policy would be eliminated along with the U.S. Treasury’s debt liabilities after consolidation, obscuring the federal debt resulting from the federal government’s fiscal operations. The portion of interest expense paid on the Reserve Bank’s holdings of U.S. Treasury securities would also be eliminated. Consolidation would also result in presenting deposits of private financial institutions held at the Reserve Banks as obligations of the federal government, which they are not.

....FASAB’s authority, which is derived from statutory authorities of the OMB, GAO, and the Treasury, does not include authority to impose reporting requirements on the Board and Reserve Banks, given that (1) the Board is an independent entity in the executive branch; (2) neither the Board nor the Reserve Banks have reporting or other relationships to FASAB; and (3) Congress has separately established the financial reporting requirements applicable to the Federal Reserve System and vested final authority over those reports in the Board without directing the Board or the Reserve Banks to issue financial statements in accordance with FASAB requirements.¹²⁶ To the extent requirements to report about the Federal Reserve System would be imposed on another entity, such as the Department of the Treasury, it is unclear how the Treasury can be expected to fulfill this obligation when the requested information pertains to the central bank, not the Treasury, and the central bank does not report to the Treasury.”¹²⁷

In reviewing the comments made in the Federal Reserve’s letter to FASAB there is only one crucial question that needs to be answered. Is the Federal Reserve System funded with “public money?” Given that the answer to this question is clearly that the Federal Reserve System is funded with public money, it has to be consolidated into a proper and complete Statement and Account. Congress’ statutory authority creating the Federal Reserve System and its reporting cannot override the explicit words of the Appropriations and Statement and Account clauses.

If the Federal Reserve believes that it does not have to follow the Constitution the Governors should publish a position paper outlining in detail their legal reasoning why the Federal Reserve is above the law.

4 Process by which the Federal Government Sets GAAP is Unconstitutional

The Statement and Account Clause is found in Article I which defines the powers and limitations of Congress. Congress has the duty to produce the Statement and Account. Nowhere in the Constitution does it indicate that the Executive Branch has any authority in defining the information required to be published in the statement and account. Therefore, it is hard to understand why the FASAB exists except as an unconstitutional political accommodation. Furthermore, it is inconceivable that under our Constitution Congress or the Executive could publish and discuss as relevant to the nation's financial condition figures that materially differ from the required Statement and Account (i.e., The President Budget or the Financial Report).

The United States Congress has unlawfully delegated responsibility for determining and defining the accounting principles and policies to be used by the federal government to the Comptroller General, the highest ranking officer of the General Accountability Office ("GAO"), an agency controlled by Congress. In addition, Congress has abdicated its responsibility for producing the Statement and Account required by the Constitution and handed control over the production of the Statement and Account to the Executive branch's Treasury Department and Office of Management and Budget ("OMB").

4.1 Budget and Accounting Act of 1921

Section 309 of the *Budget and Accounting Act of 1921* indicates that "The Comptroller General shall prescribe the forms, systems, and procedure for administrative appropriation and fund accounting in the several departments and establishments..."

4.2 Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950

The *Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950* modified this language somewhat. Section 112(a) of the *Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950* indicates that:

"The Comptroller General of the United States, after consulting the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of Bureau of the Budget concerning their accounting, financial reporting, and budgetary needs, and considering the needs of the other executive agencies, shall prescribe the principles, standards and related requirements for accounting to be observed by each executive agency, including requirements for suitable integration between the accounting processes of each executive agency and the accounting of the Treasury Department. Requirements prescribed by the Comptroller General shall be designed to permit the executive agencies to carry out their responsibilities under section 113 of this part, while providing a basis for integrated accounting for the Government, full disclosure of the results of the financial operations of each executive agency and the Government as a whole, and financial information and control necessary to enable the Congress and the President to discharge their respective responsibilities. The Comptroller General shall continue to exercise the authority vested in him by... and, to the extent necessary, the authority vested in him by section 309 of the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921. Any such exercise of authority shall be consistent with the provisions of this section."

4.3 31 U.S.C. 3511

Currently, *31 U.S.C. section 3511* states:

“Sec. 3511. Prescribing accounting requirements and developing accounting systems

- (a) The Comptroller General shall prescribe the accounting principles, standards, and requirements that the head of each executive agency shall observe. Before prescribing the principles, standards, and requirements, the Comptroller General shall consult with the Secretary of the Treasury and the President on their accounting, financial reporting, and budgetary needs, and shall consider the needs of the heads of the other executive agencies.
- (b) Requirements prescribed under subsection (a) of this section shall –
 - 1) Provide for suitable integration between the accounting process of each executive agency and the accounting of the Department of the Treasury;
 - 2) Allow the head of each agency to carry out section 3512 of this title; and
 - 3) Provide a method of –
 - A. Integrated accounting of the United States Government;
 - B. Complete disclosure of the results of the financial operations of each agency and the Government,; and
 - C. Financial information and control the President and Congress require to carry out their responsibilities.
- (c) Consistent with subsections (a) and (b) of this section –
 - 1) The authority of the Comptroller general continues under section 121(b) of title 40; and
 - 2) The Comptroller General may prescribe the forms, systems, and procedures that the judicial branch of the Government (except the Supreme Court) shall observe.
- (d) The Comptroller General, the Secretary, and the President shall conduct a continuous program for improving accounting and financial reporting in the Government.”

4.4 Congress Cannot Delegate Law Making Authority to the Comptroller General

Congress cannot delegate law making authority to a delegate of the Legislative branch. Hence, the Comptroller General does not have constitutional authority to set accounting principles and standards for the federal government. From the time that the *Budget and Accounting Act of 1921* was passed the Executive branch has appropriately refused to acknowledge the authority of the Comptroller General to set accounting principles and standards for the federal government

Over the last century federal financial reporting grew increasingly dysfunctional as the Executive and Legislative branches were at odds over proper accounting standards. The Legislature could have solved the impasse by either (1) passing laws dictating accounting principles and standards and then using the power of the purse to ensure that the Executive branch implemented them or (2) by delegating responsibility for promulgating these principles and standards to an Executive branch agency. In the 1950s it tried the first approach but the Executive branch unlawfully refused to follow the laws promulgated by Congress and Congress refused to use the power of the purse to discipline the Executive branch into compliance.

The net result is that the Executive branch has unconstitutionally usurped Congress’ responsibility to publish a Statement and Account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money. The

Executive branch has done this because it recognizes that it cannot control spending priorities unless it also controls financial reporting and, therefore, public opinion.

4.5 The Comptroller General Formed FASAB in 1990

Given the Executive branches lack of cooperation with the Legislative branch Comptroller General Charles Bowsher made a decision in 1990 to form the FASAB in conjunction with the Executive branch. However, the inconvenient truth is that FASAB is an unconstitutional entity that violates separation of powers principles and, therefore, does not have the authority to promulgate accounting principles and standards. Why? Because the foundational premise underlying FASAB is that the Comptroller General has legal authority to set accounting principles and standards for the federal government.

The federal government has known for a very long time that its accounting standards setting process is unlawful under the Constitution. In *Bowsher v. Synar* the Supreme Court made it crystal clear that Congress cannot delegate lawmaking authority to a delegate of the Legislative branch.

4.6 Bowsher v. Synar

In *Bowsher v. Synar* Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. He determined that the Comptroller General was an officer of the Legislative Branch, and as such, he may not be entrusted with executive powers. The Court then went on to conclude that the powers entrusted to the Comptroller General pursuant to the *Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act* were executive in nature. Hence, the Act violates the command of the Constitution that the Congress play no direct role in the execution of the laws.

Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Marshall joined, delivered a concurring opinion which contains important language that directly impacts the provisions delegating authority to the Comptroller General to prescribe accounting principles for the federal government. A substantial part of Justice Stevens' opinion is reprinted below.

"The *Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act* assigns to the Comptroller General the duty to make policy decisions that have the force of law. The Comptroller General's report is, in the current statute, the engine that gives life to the ambitious budget reduction process. It is the Comptroller General's report that "provide[s] for the determination of reductions" and that "contain[s] estimates, determinations, and specifications for all of the items contained in the report" submitted by the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office...It is the Comptroller General's report that the President must follow and that will have conclusive effect. It is, in short, the Comptroller General's report that will have a profound, dramatic, and immediate impact on the Government and on the Nation at large.

Article I of the Constitution specifies the procedures that Congress must follow when it makes policy that binds the Nation: its legislation must be approved by both of its Houses and presented to the President. In holding that an attempt to legislate by means of a "one-House veto" violated the procedural mandate in Article I, we explained:

"We see therefore that the Framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses would serve essential constitutional functions. The President's participation in the legislative process was to protect the

Executive Branch from Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident laws. The division of the Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings. The President's unilateral veto power, in turn, was limited by the power of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress to overrule a veto thereby precluding final arbitrary action of one person...It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action in Art I, sec 1, 7, represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure." *INS V. CHADHA*, 462 U.S., AT 951, 103 S.Ct., at 2784.

If Congress were free to delegate its policymaking authority to one of its components, or to one of its agents, it would be able to evade "the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution." *Id.*, at 959, 103 S.Ct., at 2788¹²⁸ That danger - congressional action that evades constitutional restraints - is not present when Congress delegates lawmaking power to the executive or to an independent agency.¹²⁹

The distinction between the kinds of action that Congress may delegate to its own components and agents and those that require either compliance with Article I procedures or delegation to another branch pursuant to defined standards is reflected in the practices that have developed over the years regarding congressional resolutions. The joint resolution, which is used for "special purposes and...incidental matters," 7 *Deschler's Precedents of the House of Representatives* 334 (1977), makes binding policy and "requires an affirmative vote by both Houses and submission to the President for approval" *id.*, at 333 the full Article I requirements. A concurrent resolution, in contrast, makes no binding policy; it is "a means of expressing fact, principles, opinions, and purposes of the two Houses," *Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives* 176 (1983), and thus does not need to be presented to the President. It is settled, however, that if a resolution is intended to make policy that will bind the Nation and thus is "legislative in its character and effect," S.Rep. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1897)-then the full Article I requirements must be observed. For "the nature or substance of the resolution, and not its form, controls the question of its disposition." *Ibid.*

In my opinion, Congress itself could not exercise the *Gramm-Rudman-Hollings* functions through a concurrent resolution. The fact that the fallback provision in section 274 requires a joint resolution rather than a concurrent resolution indicates that Congress endorsed this view.¹³⁰ I think it equally clear that Congress may not simply delegate those functions to an agent of the Congressional Budget Office. Since I am persuaded that the Comptroller General is also fairly deemed to be an agent of Congress, he too cannot exercise such functions.¹³¹

As a result, to decide this case there is no need to consider the Decision of 1789, the President's removal power, or the abstract nature of "executive powers." Once it is clear that the Comptroller General, whose statutory duties define him as an agent of Congress, has been assigned the task of making policy determinations that will bind the Nation, the question is simply one of congressional process. There can be no doubt that the Comptroller General's statutory duties under *Gramm-Rudman-Hollings* do not follow the constitutionally prescribed procedures for congressional lawmaking.¹³²

In short, even though it is well settled that Congress may delegate legislative power to independent agencies or to the Executive, and thereby divest itself of a portion of its lawmaking power, when it elects to exercise such power itself, it may not authorize a lesser representative of the Legislative Branch to act on its behalf.¹³³ It is for this reason that I believe section 251(b) and section 251(c)(2) of the Act are unconstitutional.¹³⁴

Thus, the critical inquiry in this case concerns not the manner in which executive officials or agencies act, but the manner in which Congress and its agents may act. As we emphasized in *Chadha*, when Congress legislates, when it makes binding policy, it must follow the procedures prescribed in Article I. Neither the unquestioned urgency of the national budget crisis nor the Comptroller General's proud record of professionalism and dedication provides a justification for allowing a congressional agent to set policy that binds the Nation. Rather than turning the task over to its agent, if the Legislative Branch decides to act with conclusive effect, it must do so through a process akin to that specified in the fallback provision—through enactment by both Houses and presentment to the President.

4.7 Testimony of Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States before the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives on the Supreme Court's Ruling in *Bowsher v. Synar*

Following this decision Comptroller General Bowsher testified before a Committee of the House of Representatives regarding the implications of the Supreme Court's decision. He indicated that the decision had serious implications for the way that the GAO and the Comptroller General operate.

Selected quotes from Comptroller General Bowsher's testimony:

"The *1921 Act* also gave the Comptroller General the responsibility of prescribing accounting principles and standards for the federal government."

"We recognize that the Supreme Court's decision in *Bowsher v. Synar* may also affect some of the other functions carried out by GAO. "

It is hard to view this testimony as anything but an acknowledgment that the Comptroller General cannot prescribe accounting principles and standards for the federal government.

U.S. Code section 3511, the statute requiring the Comptroller General to prescribe accounting principles and standards, is the linchpin upon which most federal financial reporting laws and accounting practices depend.

4.8 Analysis of FASAB

Since 1991, GAO has implemented its responsibility under U.S.C. sec 3511 largely through FASAB – a federal advisory committee jointly created by the Comptroller General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget ("Sponsors"). The government states that FASAB was created to bridge the gap in constitutional interpretation between the Legislative and Executive branches. It was created to consider and recommend accounting concepts and standards for the federal government.

The word Advisory was included in the Board's name to signify the retention of legal authority by the Sponsors, whose approval would be required before the Board's standards became effective. The

Board can only recommend standards to the Sponsors. Although the Memorandum of Understanding creating FASAB indicates that the Sponsors have retained their authorities, separately and jointly, to establish and adopt accounting standards for the federal government this authority has never been used since the FASAB's inception. From a practical standpoint the Sponsors have bound themselves together. No accounting principle will be adopted unless all the Sponsors agree. Subsequently, provisions were included in the CFO Act that requires agency financial systems to comply with applicable accounting principles, standards and requirements.

In the 2015 Financial Report Footnote B. Basis of Accounting and Revenue Recognition contains a sub-section "Consolidated Financial Statements" that includes the following:

"The consolidated financial statements of the Government were prepared using GAAP, primarily based on FASAB's Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards (SFFAS)."

This comment is in keeping with Congress' century long practice of attempting to avoid responsibility for federal financial reporting and it clearly overstates FASAB's legal authority. The only thing that FASAB does is make recommendations to its Sponsors. It cannot and does not set accounting principles. However, FASAB's recommendations cannot be legally utilized by the Comptroller General to set accounting principles and standards per the Supreme Court's decision in *Bowsher*. Therefore, the only reasonable conclusion is that FASAB is an unconstitutional entity whose purpose is to help facilitate accounting standards setting practices that Congress knows, or should know, is unconstitutional.

4.9 The Executive Branch Has Poached Congress' Financial Reporting Responsibilities

Under the *1921 Act* the executive branch was given the responsibility for preparing a budget. Currently, OMB prescribes all accounting rules involving the President's Budget. The "official" Statement and Account ("*Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays and Balances*") **presents budget results and the cash-related assets and liabilities of the Federal Government**. Hence, Congress has effectively given authority to the executive branch regarding the Statement and Account financial reporting without explicit legislation. This is unconstitutional.

Since 1921 the GAO has had an extremely difficult time getting executive branch agencies to comply with its directives regarding accounting. Furthermore, Congress amended the *Budget and Accounting Act of 1921* and the *Budget and Procedures Act of 1950* in 1956 to require executive agencies to prepare cost-based budgets in accordance with principles and standards prescribed by the CG. OMB ignored the amendments claiming constitutional objections. The OMB's constitutional objections regarding accounting for Executive departments are a political power play that camouflages an unconstitutional intrusion by the Executive branch into accounting for the government's finances. It is understandable from a political standpoint why the legal battle between Congress and the Executive branch has never been fought. However, this does not mean that the resulting compromise (the creation of FASAB) is constitutional. There is grave danger in this as Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito have expressed as the Dissenters in the Obamacare litigation.

"Structural protections—notably, the restraints imposed by federalism and separation of powers—are less romantic and have less obvious a connection to personal freedom than the

provisions of the Bill of Rights or the Civil War Amendments. Hence they tend to be undervalued or even forgotten by our citizens. It should be the responsibility of the Court to teach otherwise, to remind our people that the Framers considered structural protections of freedom the most important ones, for which reason they alone were embodied in the original Constitution and not left to later amendment. The fragmentation of power produced by the structure of our Government is central to liberty, and when we destroy it, we place liberty at peril.”

Under the Constitution Congress has primary responsibility for money and for publishing the Statement and Account. Therefore, pursuant to the Court’s decision in *Bowsher v. Synar* it cannot outsource the determination of the proper accounting policies for the government to a joint venture with the Executive branch.

4.10 Do Former Comptroller Generals Believe That They Had the Power to Set Accounting Principles and Standards?

The author asked former Comptroller General Charles Bowsher and former Comptroller General David Walker whether they believed that the Comptroller General has the legal authority to set accounting principles and standards for the federal government. One referred the author to the current administration for an answer and the other indicated that the Comptroller General does not have legal authority to set accounting principles and standards for the federal government.

5 Federal Government's Cover-up

The federal government has attempted to cover-up its unconstitutional accounting by having FASAB promulgate accounting principles and standards that justify the accounting treatment it uses. The accounting principles and standards promulgated by FASAB severely understate expenditures and obligations/liabilities of the U.S. Government according to Appropriations law.

5.1 Accounting for Entitlement Programs

The fiction that the FASAB has concocted to effectively eliminate the federal government's enormous legal obligations for entitlement programs for financial reporting purposes is to define a category of transactions in such a manner that the federal government's obligation for those transactions will only be recognized at the last possible moment when funds are being disbursed. The transaction classification that FASAB came up with is called "*Nonexchange Transactions*."

A nonexchange transaction arises when one party to a transaction receives value without directly giving or promising value in return. There is a one-way flow of resources or promises. Please note that there is no federal law that differentiates between exchange and nonexchange transactions for purposes of appropriations of funds for various programs. The classification that FASAB has invented is purely an accounting fiction that has no basis in appropriations law.

The applicable FASAB pronouncements are *Accounting for Liabilities – Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards ("SFFAS") No. 5* which regulates the federal government's accounting for Medicaid and *Accounting for Social Insurance – SFFAS No. 17* which regulates accounting for Social Security (including Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance) and Medicare (including Hospital Insurance (Part A) and Supplementary Medical Insurance (Part B)). Statement No. 5 became effective for periods after September 30, 1996 and Statement No. 17 was effective for periods after September 30, 1999. These standards define legal obligations/liabilities in a completely different way than Appropriation law.

SFFAS No. 5 which was issued in 1995 defines "liability" as a probable future outflow or other sacrifice of resources as a result of past transactions or events. For federal nonexchange transactions, SFFAS indicates that a liability should be recognized for any unpaid amounts due as of the reporting date. This includes amounts due from the federal entity to pay for benefits, goods, or services provided under the terms of the program, as of the federal entity's reporting date, whether or not such amounts have been reported to the federal entity (for example, estimated Medicaid payments due to health providers for service that has been rendered and that will be financed by the federal entity but have not yet been reported to the federal entity).

In reaching its conclusion with respect to proper accounting FASAB indicated that it perceives Medicaid-type legislation and permanent appropriations as follows:

"the obligation may be more a matter of what is perceived as equitable and good public policy than a legally enforceable claim. Although there may be a high probability that a grant, a subsidy, or an income transfer will be made or will continue in future years, the recipients of such grants, subsidies, or transfers do not have a right to receive such payments in the future from the federal government as do those who receive payments in exchange for service they have performed."

The fact that FASAB's point of view directly contradicts Appropriation law is not discussed by FASAB. It is enough for FASAB that estimates of future expenditures are reported in supplementary information. "...[I]t is possible to make meaningful estimates of the future amounts required to continue present policies regarding such programs. These estimates are relevant to certain decisions and should be disclosed or otherwise reported, as discussed further in "Supplementary Stewardship Reporting." In the context of the Board's definition, however, estimates of future nonexchange payments should not be recognized as a current period liability."

SFFAS 17 which was issued in 1999 presents accounting standards for federal social insurance programs. The standards cover the following programs: Social Security (Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance), Medicare (Hospital Insurance [Part A] and Supplementary Medical Insurance [Part B]), Railroad Retirement benefits, Black Lung benefits, and Unemployment Insurance. The Board believes that the annual expenses of such programs should be the benefits paid during the accounting period plus any increase (or less any decrease) in the liability from the end of the prior period to the end of the current period, including claims incurred but not reported. The liability should be social insurance benefits due and payable to or on behalf of beneficiaries at the end of the reporting period, and supplementary stewardship information should be provided as described in the standards. Estimates of future nonexchange payments should not be recognized as a current period liability. Supplementary stewardship information is to be reported to facilitate assessing the program's long-term sustainability and the ability of the program and the nation to raise resources from future program participants to pay for benefits proposed to present participants.

5.2 Where are the Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds?

Some readers might ask where are the Social Security and Medicare trust fund balances on the Financial Report's Balance Sheet. They have been eliminated in consolidation as they are merely IOUs from one government pocket to another.

"When asked about the inability of his trust funds to effect genuine savings, [President Roosevelt] once answered, "Those taxes were never part of the economics. They are politics all the way through. We put those payroll taxes there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral and political right to collect their pensions....With those taxes there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program." ¹³⁵

The above recitations of FASAB's positions make the fraud and related cover-up readily apparent.

6 Process by which GAAP is Set for State Governments is Unconstitutional

The process by which GAAP is set for state and local governments is unconstitutional for several reasons detailed below. The primary reason that the process is unconstitutional is that none of the AICPA, FAF and GASB has been properly delegated legal authority by either the federal or state governments to establish laws that govern the preparation of financial statements by state or local governments. The electorate has a fundamental right to financial information under our Constitution and the determination as to how these financial scorecards are prepared cannot be determined by unelected accounting industry professionals that are not subject to substantial oversight and direction by either the federal or state governments. The arrangements that exist today for GAAP standards setting is “legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form.”¹³⁶

There are a number of insidious aspects to the illegal delegation of GAAP standards setting to a private party by Congress and state governments.

- 1) First and foremost, this delegation has provided Congress and the states with the perfect outcome for each to escape all responsibility for the content of state and local government financial statements. GASB and the FAF are completely independent from Congress and the state legislatures. Yet, Congress and the fifty states have tremendous leverage over GASB. It does not take much imagination to see the leverage that Congressional funding of the GASB or the existence of GASAC provides in setting GASB’s agenda and priorities. And GASAC is filled with people that have significant ties with those in political office. This is the reason why proper accounting for Medicaid will never find its way onto GASB’s agenda.
- 2) Second, Congress’ delegation to the SEC pursuant to Dodd-Frank sec. 978 to make the determination as to whether to fund the GASB coupled with a favorable GAO study (the outcome of which was never in doubt and the details of which can be found in Appendix II) and the clear intent of Congress to fund the GASB puts the SEC in a terrible position to enforce the antifraud provisions against the very accounting rule setting body that it agreed to fund.
- 3) Furthermore, it is incredibly ironic that in the same legislation that authorizes the funding of GASB there is a Congressional proclamation that the accounting support fees collected for GASB shall not be considered public monies of the United States. As will be discussed below this is another pronouncement by Congress that would have no impact in a court of law.

A second reason why the process is unconstitutional is that the Congress’ current funding of GASB provided for under Dodd-Frank Section 978 enables the federal government to force the states to implement a federal program. The following quotes are taken from Supreme Court justices comments in *NFIB v. Sebelius*.

Furthermore, “[p]ermitting the Federal Government to force the States to implement a federal program would threaten the political accountability key to our federal system.”¹³⁷ “When Congress compels the States to do its bidding, it blurs the lines of political accountability.”¹³⁸ By that, Justice Ginsburg believes, the Court means “voter confusion: Citizens upset by unpopular government action . . . may ascribe to state officials blame more appropriately laid at Congress’ door.”¹³⁹

The AICPA has designated two accounting standards setting bodies GASB and FASAB which are both unconstitutional entities for the purposes for which they were created. In addition, certain of the accounting standards that they have promulgated require unconstitutional and fraudulent accounting. Nevertheless, if AICPA members do not follow GAAP as prescribed by GASB or FASAB its members will be disciplined pursuant to the AICPA's Code of Professional Conduct. The combination of these facts, which were well-known when Congress passed the Dodd-Frank legislation enabled Congress to force the nationwide acceptance of GASB's pronouncements as gospel as it relates to accounting standards. The language appearing in Dodd-Frank section 978 Non-interference with States has absolutely no impact on this mechanism of enforcement.

Third, the current arrangement whereby private entities are wielding power in a manner that is unfair to both investors and the electorate can be challenged as violations of several private rights including Due Process, Equal Protection, Right to Financial Information, Political Accountability, Right to Vote and Freedom of Speech. The actions may be brought in federal court under section 1983 of the reconstruction Civil Rights Acts and the Administrative Procedures Act.

The author recommends that readers that are unfamiliar with the AICPA, FAF and GASB read Appendices I and II before proceeding to read this chapter.

6.1 Important Facts Impacting State and Local Government Financial Reporting

There are a number of important facts that need to be highlighted about state and local government financial reporting and the current arrangements in the accounting profession.

- 1) Financial reporting by state and local governments is a key factor for investors and potential investors considering investments in municipal securities. In addition, state and local government financial reporting is a critically important scorecard for the electorate to judge its state and local political leaders. Generally, these facts are acknowledged by the various accounting institutions.
- 2) The primary function of public accountants as relates to state and local governments is to provide assurance services ("audits") with respect to their financial statements that attest to the reasonableness of disclosures, the absence of material misstatements and the adherence to generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"). Public accountants must evaluate these financial statements based on generally accepted auditing standards ("GAAS").
- 3) Notwithstanding the facts that public accountants are paid by state and local governments or related entities for their services, the primary clients of the independent auditor are investors and the electorate.
- 4) If no GAAP standard exists there is no baseline standard against which the public accountant can render an opinion. Without GAAP, the auditors' opinion lacks impact in the marketplace. In addition, and more importantly, the public accountant's ability to charge states or local governments a fee for their services is substantially diminished. THIS IS A IMPORTANT FACT!

- 5) The AICPA is governed by a Council of 265 members that is comprised of members elected by the AICPA membership in each state, representatives of state societies of CPAs, twenty-one at-large members, all members of the Board of Directors of the Institute as well as all past presidents and chairmen of the board of the AICPA.
- 6) The AICPA Board of Directors acts as the executive committee for the governing Council which determines Institute programs and establishes general policies.
- 7) Membership in the AICPA is not obligatory for CPAs.
- 8) Upon joining the AICPA, a member agrees to abide by its Code of Professional Conduct and Bylaws adopted by a vote of the membership. The bylaws provide a structure for enforcement of the Code by the Institute's Ethics Division. When allegations come to the attention of the Ethics Division regarding a violation of the Code, the division investigates the matter, under due process procedures, and depending upon the facts found in the investigation, may take a confidential disciplinary action, settle the matter with suspension or revocation of membership rights, or refer the matter to a panel of the Trial Board Division for a hearing. The bylaws mandate publishing the member's name if he or she is found guilty by a hearing panel, is suspended or expelled by settlement.

The bylaws of 51 state and/or territorial CPA societies provide for their participation in a Joint Ethics Enforcement Program so that, depending upon membership status, actions taken by one or more of these societies or the AICPA are in the names of both the society and AICPA.

State regulatory agencies (Boards of Accountancy) issue practice licenses to CPAs and only those agencies may act to affect those licenses. The AICPA does not license CPAs. Those state regulatory agencies may take disciplinary action affecting practice licenses under statutes, regulations and rulings of the state. Also, the SEC and other Federal government agencies may, under Federal law or regulation, discipline CPAs who practice before these agencies.

- 9) The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct ET Section 203 Accounting Principles states that "A member shall not (1) express an opinion or state affirmatively that the financial statements...are presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles....if such statements....contain any departure from an accounting principle promulgated by bodies designated by council to establish such principles that has a material effect on the statements...taken as a whole.

Council is authorized under Rule 203 to designate bodies to establish accounting principles. Council has designated...the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) with respect to Statements of Governmental Accounting Standards issued in July 1984 and thereafter, as the body to establish financial accounting principles for state and local governmental entities pursuant to Rule 203. Council has also designated the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) with respect to Statements of Federal Accounting Standards adopted and issued March 1993 and

subsequently, as the body to establish accounting principles for federal government entities pursuant to Rule 203....In determining the existence of a departure from an accounting principle as established....by a Statement of Governmental Accounting Standards or a Statement of Federal Accounting Standards encompassed by Rule 203, the division of professional ethics will construe such codification or statements, in the light of any interpretations thereof issued by...GASB or FASAB.

- 10) The Financial Accounting Foundation is a non-stock Delaware corporation that operates exclusively for charitable, educational, scientific and literary purposes within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. It is governed by a Board of Trustees comprising 14-18 members from varied backgrounds – users, preparers, and auditors of financial statements, state and local government officials; academics and regulators. At least three of the Trustees shall be designated as “Governmental Trustees” and shall be individuals who, in the judgment of the Board, have extensive experience as financial officers or as elected officials of state and local governmental entities. The remaining Trustees shall be “at-large Trustees.” Nominations for at-large Trustees, other than the Chairman Trustee, shall be sought by the Foundation from a broad array of groups, as the Board of Trustees, or any designated committee thereof, deems appropriate. The Board of Trustees, or any designated committee thereof, shall have sole authority to nominate all candidates for the office of Chairman Trustee. Candidates for each Governmental Trustee position shall be nominated pursuant to procedures adopted jointly by the Government Finance Officers Association, the National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers, the Council of State Governments, the International City/County Management Association, the National Association of Counties, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Governors’ Association, the National League of Cities, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors.
- 11) The FAF’s stated mission is to establish and improve financial accounting and reporting standards, fostering financial reporting that provides decision-useful information to investors and other users of financial reports. This mission is accomplished through a comprehensive and independent standard-setting process that encourages broad participation, objectively considers all stakeholder views, and is subject to appropriate oversight and accountability.
- 12) The Governmental Accounting Standards Board was organized by the FAF in 1984. The GASB has been delegated the authority to establish standards of financial accounting and reporting for state and local governmental entities. GASB pronouncements are recognized as generally accepted and authoritative.
- 13) The Governmental Accounting Standards Advisory Council is comprised of GASB constituents. The GASAC consults with the GASB on technical issues, project priorities, and other matters likely to concern the GASB.
- 14) The Board of Trustees of FAF shall not direct the GASB to undertake or to omit to undertake any particular project or activity or otherwise affect the exercise by the GASB of their respective authorities, functions, and powers in the establishment and

improvement of financial accounting and reporting standards, and the Board of Trustees shall take care not to impair, in fact or perception, the independence and objectivity of the GASB in the establishment of financial accounting and reporting standards.

- 15) FAF's Board of Trustees shall provide for the appropriate funding and resources for the Foundation, the GASB and GASAC.
- 16) In connection with the exercise of its authority, functions and powers, FAF's Board of Trustees shall provide oversight on an ongoing basis, over the activities of the GASB and their due process practices, policies and procedures.
- 17) FAF's Board of Trustees shall appoint the GASB board without regard to employment or discipline and shall have appropriate qualifications including knowledge of governmental accounting and finance and a concern for the public interest in matters of finance accounting and reporting. The number of GASB's board shall be seven for terms of up to five years. The Chair of GASB shall serve full-time. GASB's Board members shall be compensated as determined by FAF's Board of Trustees.
- 18) FAF's Board of Trustees shall establish a council of not less than twenty persons who, in the judgment of the Board of Trustees, shall be knowledgeable about the issues involving, and impact of, financial accounting and reporting by state and local governmental entities or shall possess an expertise of value to the GASB. This council shall be known as the Governmental Accounting Standards Advisory Council ("GASAC").
- 19) GASAC shall consult with the GASB concerning major technical issues, the GASB's agenda of projects and the assigning of priorities thereto, matters likely to require the GASB's attention, the selection and organization of GASB task forces and other groups, and such other matters as may be requested by the GASB or its Chair.
- 20) Pursuant to the provisions of Section 978(a) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank"), the SEC issued an order instructing FINRA to establish a reasonable accounting support fee (GASB ASF) to adequately fund the annual budget of the GASB and rules and procedures for the equitable allocation, assessment and collection of the GASB ASF from FINRA's members.
- 21) One of GASB's Guiding Principles states the following: "To weigh carefully the views of its constituents in developing standards and concepts so that they will: a) Meet the accountability and decision-making needs of the users of government financial reports, and b) gain general acceptance among state and local preparers and auditors of financial reports.
- 22) GASB does not have enforcement authority except through the laws of some individual states and the control that its regulations exert over auditors who render

opinions on the fairness of financial statements. This control comes from the auditors requirement to adhere to the AICPA's Code of Professional Conduct.

To summarize, none of the AICPA, FAF or GASB Council, trustees, board members or officers has:

- 1) Been elected to their position in a federal or state election,
- 2) Been appointed by the President and has a commission as an officer of the United States government,
- 3) Been appointed to their position as an officer of any state government,
- 4) Sworn an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States or the constitution of any individual state,
- 5) Any regular reporting requirements to the federal or any state government,
- 6) The possibility of being considered an "inferior officer" of the United States Government.

In addition, the GASB's pronouncements with respect to GAAP for state and local governments are not subject to any further regulatory or judicial review with the possible exception that the SEC could determine that any particular accounting rule violated the antifraud provisions of the nation's securities laws.

6.2 Dodd-Frank Section 978 Funding for GASB

This section contains the full text of Section 978 of the *Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act*. Certain provisions are highlighted as they warrant considerable attention. Please note that a significant portion of the GAO study called for in the legislation appears in Appendix II.

Section 978. Funding for Governmental Accounting Standards Board

(a) Amendment to the Securities Act of 1933 - Section 19 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77s), as amended by section 912, is further amended by adding at the end the following:

(g)Funding for the GASB

(1)In general - The Commission may, subject to the limitations imposed by section 15B of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o-4), **require a national securities association registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to establish—**

(A)a reasonable annual accounting support fee to adequately fund the annual budget of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (referred to in this subsection as the GASB); and

(B)rules and procedures, in consultation with the principal organizations representing State governors, legislators, local elected officials, and State and local finance officers, to provide for the equitable allocation, assessment, and collection of the accounting support fee established under subparagraph (A) from the members of the association, and the remittance of all such accounting support fees to the Financial Accounting Foundation.

(2)Annual budget - For purposes of this subsection, the annual budget of the GASB is the annual budget reviewed and approved according to the internal procedures of the Financial Accounting Foundation.

(3)Use of funds - Any fees or funds collected under this subsection shall be used to support the efforts of the GASB to establish standards of financial accounting and reporting recognized as generally accepted accounting principles applicable to State and local governments of the United States.

(4)Limitation on fee - The annual accounting support fees collected under this subsection for a fiscal year shall not exceed the recoverable annual budgeted expenses of the GASB (which may include operating expenses, capital, and accrued items).

(5)Rules of construction –

(A)Fees not public monies - Accounting support fees collected under this subsection and other receipts of the GASB shall not be considered public monies of the United States.

(B)Limitation on authority of the Commission -Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to—

(i)provide the Commission or any national securities association direct or indirect oversight of the budget or technical agenda of the GASB; or

(ii)affect the setting of generally accepted accounting principles by the GASB.

(C)Noninterference with States - Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to impair or limit the authority of a State or local government to establish accounting and financial reporting standards.

.(b)Study of funding for Governmental Accounting Standards Board

(1)Study - The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a study that evaluates—

(A)the role and importance of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board in the municipal securities markets; and

(B)the manner and the level at which the Governmental Accounting Standards Board has been funded.

(2)Consultation - In conducting the study required under paragraph (1), the Comptroller General shall consult with the principal organizations representing State governors, legislators, local elected officials, and State and local finance officers.

(3)Report - Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives a report on the study required under paragraph (1).

6.3 Process Required When Congress Wants to Make Policy That Binds the Nation

As previously cited, in *Bowsher v. Synar* Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Marshall joined, delivered a concurring opinion. Relevant portions of Justice Stevens' opinion are reprinted again below.

“Article I of the Constitution specifies the procedures that Congress must follow when it makes policy that binds the Nation: its legislation must be approved by both of its Houses and presented to the President. In holding that an attempt to legislate by means of a “one-House veto” violated the procedural mandate in Article I, we explained:

“We see therefore that the Framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses would serve essential constitutional functions. The President’s participation in the legislative process was to protect the Executive Branch from Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident laws. The division of the Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings. The President’s unilateral veto power, in turn, was limited by the power of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress to overrule a veto thereby precluding final arbitrary action of one person...It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action in Art I, sec 1, 7, represents the Framers’ decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure.” *INS V. CHADHA*, 462 U.S., AT 951, 103 S.Ct., at 2784.”

The accounting standards setting process for state and local governments does not follow this requirement.

6.4 Structural Protections are Critical for Our Democracy

Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito spoke of the importance of structural protection as the Dissenters in the Obamacare litigation.

“Structural protections—notably, the restraints imposed by federalism and separation of powers—are less romantic and have less obvious a connection to personal freedom than the provisions of the Bill of Rights or the Civil War Amendments. Hence they tend to be undervalued or even forgotten by our citizens. It should be the responsibility of the Court to teach otherwise, to remind our people that the Framers considered structural protections of freedom the most important ones, for which reason they alone were embodied in the original Constitution and not left to later amendment. The fragmentation of power produced by the structure of our Government is central to liberty, and when we destroy it, we place liberty at peril.”

The arrangements for determining GAAP make of mockery of the concept of federalism.

6.5 Dodd-Frank Section 978 Exceeds the Power of the Purse

As discussed previously, Congress’ power of the purse is very broad yet does have limitations. In *South Dakota v. Dole* (1987) the Supreme Court addressed Congress’s use of the spending power to impose conditions on the use of federal grants. “[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution. Thus, objectives not thought to be within Article I’s enumerated legislative fields....may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds.” However, “[t]he spending power is of course not unlimited.” The Court outlined four general restrictions including that the intent of Congress to impose conditions must be

authoritative and unambiguous and that the action in question must not be prohibited by an independent constitutional bar.

Dodd-Frank Section 978 clearly exceeds Congress' authority to delegate law-making authority to a private party. In addition, it can be argued that this law violates the concept of federalism embodied in the Constitution.

6.6 Department of Transportation ET AL. v. Association of American Railroads

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court on March 9, 2015, in which Justices Roberts, Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, much of which appears below. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Congress created the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) in 1970 and gave it priority to use track systems owned by the freight railroads for passenger rail travel. In 2008 Congress gave Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) joint authority to issue "metrics and standards" addressing the performance and scheduling of passenger railroad services, see §207(a), 122 Stat. 4907, including Amtrak's on-time performance and train delays caused by host railroads.

Thereafter, the Association of American Railroads (respondent) sued the Department of Transportation, the FRA, and two officials. Petitioner claimed that the metrics and standards must be invalidated because it is unconstitutional for Congress to allow and direct a private entity like Amtrak to exercise joint authority in their issuance. The petitioners' argument was based on the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and the constitutional provisions regarding separation of powers.

The District Court rejected respondent's claims, but the District of Columbia Circuit reversed as to the separation of powers claim, reasoning in central part that Amtrak is a private corporation and thus cannot constitutionally be granted regulatory power under §207. The Court of Appeals based their decision on the statutory command that Amtrak "is not a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government," 49 U. S. C. §24301(a)(3), and the pronouncement that Amtrak "shall be operated and managed as a for profit corporation," §24301(a)(2).

The United States Supreme Court determined that the Court of Appeals' premise that Amtrak is a private entity was flawed. It found that congressional pronouncements are not dispositive of Amtrak's status as a governmental entity for purposes of separation of powers analysis under the Constitution. The Court determined that Amtrak's ownership, corporate structure, the control exerted over Amtrak's Board of Directors and its priorities and operations, its broad public objectives and financial support all suggest that Amtrak was created by the government, is controlled by the government and operates for its benefit.

6.6.1 Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. Cited as Instructive

Justice Kennedy cited Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U. S. 374, as teaching that, for purposes of Amtrak's status as a federal actor or instrumentality under the Constitution, the practical reality of federal control and supervision prevails over Congress' disclaimer of Amtrak's governmental status.

An excerpt from the Court's decision in the above described case follows:

“On that point this Court’s decision in *Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.*, 513 U.S. 374 (1995), provides necessary instruction. In *Lebron*, Amtrak prohibited an artist from installing a politically controversial display in New York City’s Penn Station. The artist sued Amtrak, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights. In response Amtrak asserted that it was not a governmental entity, explaining that “its charter’s disclaimer of agency status prevent[ed] it from being considered a Government entity.” *Id.*, at 392. The Court rejected this contention, holding “it is not for Congress to make the final determination of Amtrak’s status as a Government entity for purposes of determining the constitutional rights of citizens affected by its actions.” *Ibid.* To hold otherwise would allow the Government “to evade the most solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution by simply resorting to the corporate form.” *Id.*, at 397. Noting that Amtrak “is established and organized under federal law for the very purpose of pursuing federal governmental objectives, under the direction and control of federal governmental appointees,” *id.*, at 398, and that the Government exerts its control over Amtrak “not as a creditor but as a policymaker,” the Court held Amtrak “is an agency or instrumentality of the United States for the purpose of individual rights guaranteed against the Government by the Constitution.” *Id.*, at 394, 399. *Lebron* teaches that, for purposes of Amtrak’s status as a federal actor or instrumentality under the Constitution, the practical reality of federal control and supervision prevails over Congress’ disclaimer of Amtrak’s governmental status. *Lebron* involved a First Amendment question, while in this case the challenge is to Amtrak’s joint authority to issue the metrics and standards. But “[t]he structural principles secured by the separation of powers protect the individual as well.” *Bond v. United States*, 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 10).”

6.6.2 Justice Alito’s Concurring Opinion

Justice Alito’s concurring opinion sheds light on the issues described in this chapter. Hence, the author has quoted liberally from his opinion and has bolded particularly relevant language.

“Liberty requires accountability. When citizens cannot readily identify the source of legislation or regulation that affects their lives, Government officials can wield power without owning up to the consequences. One way the Government can regulate without accountability is by passing off a Government operation as an independent private concern. Given this incentive to regulate without saying so, everyone should pay close attention when Congress “sponsor[s] corporations that it specifically designate[s] not to be agencies or establishments of the United States Government.” *Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation*, 513 U. S. 374, 390 (1995). Recognition that Amtrak is part of the Federal Government raises a host of constitutional questions. II I begin with something that may seem mundane on its face but that has a significant relationship to the principle of accountability. **Under the Constitution, all officers of the United States must take an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution and must receive a commission.** See Art. VI, cl. 3 (“[A]ll executive and judicial Officers . . . shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution”); Art. II, §3, cl. 6 (The President “shall Commission all the Officers of the United States”). There is good reason to think that those who have not sworn an oath cannot exercise significant authority of the United States. See 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 406, 408 (1874) (“[A] Representative . . . does not become a member of the House until he takes the oath of office”); 15 Op. Atty. Gen. 280, 281 (1877) (similar).*

Both the Oath and Commission Clauses confirm an important point: Those who exercise the power of Government are set apart from ordinary citizens. Because they exercise greater power, they are subject to special restraints. There should never be a question whether someone is an officer of the United States because, to be an officer, the person should have sworn an oath and possess a commission. Here, respondent tells the Court that “Amtrak’s board members do not take an oath of office to uphold the Constitution, as do Article II officers vested with rulemaking authority.” Brief for Respondent 47. The Government says not a word in response. Perhaps there is an answer. The rule, however, is clear. Because Amtrak is the Government, ante, at 11, those who run it need to satisfy basic constitutional requirements.

The language from §207 quoted thus far should raise red flags. **In one statute, Congress says Amtrak is not an “agency.” 49 U. S. C. §24301(a)(3). But then Congress commands Amtrak to act like an agency, with effects on private rail carriers.** No wonder the D. C. Circuit ruled as it did. The oddity continues, however. Section 207(d) of the PRIIA also provides that if the FRA and Amtrak cannot agree about what the regulatory standards should say, then “any party involved in the development of those standards may petition the Surface Transportation Board to appoint an arbitrator to assist the parties in resolving their disputes through binding arbitration.” 122 Stat. 4917. The statute says nothing more about this “binding arbitration,” including who the arbitrator should be. Looking to Congress’ use of the word “arbitrator,” respondent argues that because the arbitrator can be a private person, this provision by itself violates the private nondelegation doctrine. The United States, for its part, urges the Court to read the term “arbitrator” to mean “public arbitrator” in the interests of constitutional avoidance.

Rather, the formal reason why the Court does not enforce the nondelegation doctrine with more vigilance is that the other branches of Government have vested powers of their own that can be used in ways that resemble lawmaking. See, e.g., *Arlington v. FCC*, 569 U. S. ___, ___–___, n. 4 (2013) (slip op., at 13–14, n. 4) (explaining that agency rulemakings “are exercises of—indeed, under our constitutional structure they must be exercises of—the ‘executive Power’” (quoting Art. II, §1, cl. 1)). Even so, “the citizen confronting thousands of pages of regulations—promulgated by an agency directed by Congress to regulate, say, ‘in the public interest’—can perhaps be excused for thinking that it is the agency really doing the legislating.” 569 U. S., at ___–___ (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting) (slip op., at 4–5). **When it comes to private entities, however, there is not even a fig leaf of constitutional justification. Private entities are not vested with “legislative Powers.” Art. I, §1. Nor are they vested with the “executive Power,” Art. II, §1, cl. 1, which belongs to the President.** Indeed, it raises “[d]ifficult and fundamental questions” about “the delegation of Executive power” when Congress authorizes citizen suits. *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.*, 528 U. S. 167, 197 (2000) (KENNEDY, J., concurring). A citizen suit to enforce existing law, however, is nothing compared to delegated power to create new law. **By any measure, handing off regulatory power to a private entity is “legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form.”** *Carter v. Carter Coal Co.*, 298 U. S. 238, 311 (1936).

As to the merits of this arbitration provision, I agree with the parties: If the arbitrator can be a private person, this law is unconstitutional. Even the United

States accepts that Congress “cannot delegate regulatory authority to a private entity.” 721 F. 3d, at 670. Indeed, Congress, vested with enumerated “legislative Powers,” Art. I, §1, cannot delegate its “exclusively legislative” authority at all. *Wayman v. Southard*, 10 Wheat. 1, 42–43 (1825) (Marshall, C. J.). The Court has invalidated statutes for that very reason. See *A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States*, 295 U. S. 495 (1935); *Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan*, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); see also *Mistretta v. United States*, 488 U. S. 361, 373, n. 7 (1989) (citing, inter alia, *Industrial Union Dept., AFL–CIO v. American Petroleum Institute*, 448 U. S. 607, 646 (1980)). The principle that Congress cannot delegate away its vested powers exists to protect liberty. Our Constitution, by careful design, prescribes a process for making law, and within that process there are many accountability checkpoints. See *INS v. Chadha*, 462 U. S. 919, 959 (1983). It would dash the whole scheme if Congress could give its power away to an entity that is not constrained by those checkpoints. The Constitution’s deliberative process was viewed by the Framers as a valuable feature, see, e.g., Manning, *Lawmaking Made Easy*, 10 Green Bag 2d 202 (2007) (“[B]icameralism and presentment make lawmaking difficult by design” (citing, inter alia, *The Federalist* No. 62, p. 378 (J. Madison), and No. 63, at 443–444 (A. Hamilton))), not something to be lamented and evaded.

As I read the Government’s briefing, it does not dispute any of this (other than my characterization of the PRIIA as regulatory, which it surely is). Rather than trying to defend a private arbitrator, the Government argues that the Court, for reasons of constitutional avoidance, should read the word “arbitrator” to mean “public arbitrator.” The Government’s argument, however, lurches into a new problem: Constitutional avoidance works only if the statute is susceptible to an alternative reading and that such an alternative reading would itself be constitutional. Here, the Government’s argument that the word “arbitrator” does not mean “private arbitrator” is in some tension with the ordinary meaning of the word. Although Government arbitrators are not unheard of, we usually think of arbitration as a form of “private dispute resolution.” See, e.g., *Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.*, 559 U. S. 662, 685 (2010). Likewise, the appointment of a public arbitrator here would raise serious questions under the Appointments Clause. Unless an “inferior Office[r]” is at issue, Article II of the Constitution demands that the President appoint all “Officers of the United States” with the Senate’s advice and consent. Art. II, §2, cl. 2. This provision ensures that those who exercise the power of the United States are accountable to the President, who himself is accountable to the people. See *Free Enterprise Fund*, 561 U. S., at 497–498 (citing *The Federalist* No. 72, p. 487 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)). The Court has held that someone “who exercis[es] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States” is an “Officer,” *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U. S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam), and further that an officer who acts without supervision must be a principal officer, see *Edmond v. United States*, 520 U. S. 651, 663 (1997) (“[W]e think it evident that ‘inferior officers’ are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate”). While some officers may be principal even if they have a supervisor, it is common ground that an officer without a supervisor must be principal. See *id.*, at 667 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Here, even under the

Government's public-arbitrator theory, it looks like the arbitrator would be making law without supervision—again, it is “binding arbitration.” Nothing suggests that those words mean anything other than what they say. This means that an arbitrator could set the metrics and standards that “shall” become part of a private railroad's contracts with Amtrak whenever “practicable.” As to that “binding” decision, who is the supervisor? Inferior officers can do many things, but nothing final should appear in the Federal Register unless a Presidential appointee has at least signed off on it. See 75 Fed. Reg. 26839 (2010) (placing the metrics and standards in the Federal Register); Edmond, *supra*, at 665.

As explained above, accountability demands that principal officers be appointed by the President. See Art. II, §2, cl. 2. The President, after all, must have “the general administrative control of those executing the laws,” *Myers v. United States*, 272 U. S. 52, 164 (1926), and this principle applies with special force to those who can “exercis[e] significant authority” without direct supervision, *Buckley*, *supra*, at 126; see also *Edmond*, *supra*, at 663. Unsurprisingly then, the United States defends the non-Presidential appointment of Amtrak's president on the ground that the Amtrak president is merely an inferior officer. Given Article II, for the Government to argue anything else would be surrender. This argument, however, is problematic. Granted, a multimember body may head an agency. See *Free Enterprise Fund*, *supra*, at 512–513. But those who head agencies must be principal officers.

6.7 Differentiating Delegation of Licensing Powers to a Private Group

In certain cases courts have been willing to approve the delegation of licensing powers to a private group where public agency or court review is provided. The most well-known example of this involves the National Association of Securities Dealers which was created pursuant to the Maloney Act of 1938¹⁴⁰ as a body, equipped with disciplinary powers over its members, whose determinations are subject to review *de novo* by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which in turn is subject to a lesser degree of review by the courts. The Act so structures the apparatus of securities regulation as to in effect require that all brokers and dealers belong to the NASD. Nonmembers of the group are deprived by statute of the opportunity to participate in important distributions, so that membership is in effect compulsory for persons not members of a stock exchange. The delegation was summarily upheld.¹⁴¹

7 The State Governments' Cover-up

The state government have attempted to cover-up their fraudulent and unconstitutional accounting by having GASB promulgate accounting principles and standards that justify the accounting treatment that the states utilize.

7.1 State Accounting for Medicaid

State accounting for Medicaid is governed by **Statement No. 33 – Accounting and Financial Reporting for Nonexchange Transactions** which GASB promulgated in December 1998 and which took effect for periods beginning after June 15, 2000. The fiction that the GASB has concocted to effectively eliminate states' enormous legal obligations for the Medicaid program for financial reporting purposes is to define a category of transactions for states in such a manner that the state's obligation for those transactions will only be recognized at the last possible moment when funds are literally being disbursed by the states. The transaction classification that GASB came up with is called "Nonexchange Transactions."

In a *nonexchange* transaction, a government gives (or receives) value without directly receiving (or giving) equal value in return. Please note that there is no law at the state level that differentiates between exchange and nonexchange transactions for purposes of state appropriations of funds for various programs. The classification that GASB has invented is purely an accounting fiction that has no basis in appropriations law.

With respect to government-mandated nonexchange transactions the proper accounting prescribed by GASB is as follows: Where providers of resources in government-mandated transactions, (like the federal government) establish eligibility requirements that are required to be met before a transaction occurs, the provider does not have a liability, the recipient (the states) does not have a receivable, and the recognition of expenses or revenues for resources transmitted in advance should be deferred. Essentially, there is no recognition of any costs or liability other than current year cash outlays.

In **Statement 33** GASB has taken the following position in promulgating this accounting standard.

"The Board believes that, [when the provider is a Government], a government appropriation is **not** the equivalent to an authorization to pay an existing liability, such as the approval of a vendor's invoice for payment related to an exchange transaction that has occurred. Rather, an appropriation is *essential* to make the enabling legislation effective for a particular period of time. In these circumstances, the Board believes that a government does not have a liability to transmit resources under a particular program, and a recipient does not have a receivable, unless an appropriation for that program exists and the period to which the appropriation applies has begun. Once those requirements (and all other applicable eligibility requirements) have been met, a provider government should recognize a liability and a qualified recipient should recognize a receivable."

The fact that GASB's belief is contrary to established appropriations law is all that one needs to know to understand why its definition of a "liability" and how it deals with accounting for legal liabilities/obligations that it does not define as a "liability" for financial reporting purposes are fraudulent.

8 Is the Accounting Industry Complicit in a Political Protection Racket?

The purpose of this chapter is to raise the question of whether the federal and state governments, the AICPA, FAF, FASAB and GASB are operating a “*criminal enterprise*” as defined under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO Act or RICO”).¹⁴² Even if the answer to the question is a clear “no,” going through the exercise of considering this outcome reveals just how shady the current arrangements are today.

It can be argued that the fundamental premise underlying this “*association-in-fact*” among the federal and state governments, the AICPA, FAF and GASB is that the parties have operated and will continue to operate a “*Political Protection Racket*.” Generally, a protection racket is a scheme whereby a group provides protection to other groups using behavior that is outside the law.

The presumptive bargain struck for operating this criminal enterprise is that in return for

a) Federal and state governments:

- (1) Permitting the accounting industry to provide federal, state and local government entities assurance services (“audits”),
- (2) Funding the FAF, FASB and GASB and
- (3) Not pointing out that the AICPA has no legal authority to designate any accounting standards setting body for the federal or state governments which has a significant benefit to the AICPA in terms of assisting in growing its membership, and
- (4) Not pointing out that FAF and GASB have no legal authority to set GAAP for state and local governments;

b) The accounting industry will:

- (1) Promulgate generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) that substantially understate spending by the federal, state and local governments, and
- (2) Prosecute AICPA members under its Code of Professional Conduct that do not conform to these GAAP standards; and

c) FASAB and GASB will coordinate their rule-making so as to minimize any possible difficulties associated with differing accounting rules for the federal and state governments.

The end result of this presumptive bargain is that politicians at both the federal and state level will be largely shielded from the negative consequences of their spending.

Since the early 1970s thirty-three states have adopted RICO laws to be able to prosecute similar conduct. The meaning of racketeering activity as set out in 18 U.S.C. sec. 1961 includes securities fraud, bribery, extortion, fraud and robbery among many other acts.

The legal questions associated with any potential RICO prosecution including the issue of immunity are far beyond the scope of this memorandum. Nevertheless, one of the obvious and most interesting aspects of this alleged criminal enterprise is that it is not difficult to see how it is likely to end. When the nation’s finances finally go “off the cliff” and Treasury yields skyrocket Congress and state

politicians will do what it does best, identify a party other than themselves to blame. It is fairly predictable that politicians will find that the AICPA, FAF, FASAB and GASB fill that role perfectly.

While many readers might dismiss the notion of a Political Protection Racket as outrageous, the facts suggest that law enforcement officials at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Justice Department and the states' Attorneys General offices might reach a different conclusion. In an effort to stem reader's initial skepticism please note that the following entities and individuals have been prosecuted under RICO:

- 1) Los Angeles Police Department – In 2000 a federal judge ruled in a Rampart scandal case that plaintiffs could pursue RICO claims against the LAPD. However, a U.S. District judge reversed that decision indicating that the plaintiffs did not have standing because they alleged personal injuries as opposed to the required economic or property damage.
- 2) Key West Police Department – In 1984 several senior officers of the department were arrested on charges that they were running a protection racket for drug smugglers.
- 3) Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judges Michael Conahan and Mark Ciavarella were charged under RICO for wire fraud, mail fraud, tax evasion and money laundering. The judges were accused of taking kickbacks in what was called the “Kids for cash scandal.”
- 4) Michael Milken was indicted on ninety-eight counts of racketeering and fraud relating to allegations of insider trading and other offenses. He pleaded guilty to six lesser felonies of securities fraud and tax evasion. This was one of the first cases brought against an individual with no ties to organized crime.
- 5) RICO suits have been filed against Catholic dioceses to prosecute senior members for abuses committed by those under their authority.

8.1 AICPA Designates Two Unconstitutional Bodies as GAAP Standards Setters

The AICPA has designated two organizations, FASAB and GASB, as GAAP standards setters. These entities have promulgated rules that result in misleading and/or fraudulent financial statements that violate the Constitutional rights of Americans. Nevertheless, both federal agencies and state governments' publish financial statements are “U.S. GAAP compliant.” One can argue that there could be is no greater attempt by Congress or the states at diminishing their accountability, degrading the competitiveness of the electoral process and protecting incumbents than to have the accounting mess that they created be effectively blessed by the leading “independent” accounting entity.

8.2 AICPA Designates FASAB as GAAP Standards Setter for the Feds

The AICPA behavior in originally designating FASAB as the GAAP standards setter for the federal government and maintaining this designation over time is particularly revealing with respect to whether an “association-in-fact” exists between the federal government, FASAB and the AICPA. The history is summarized in this section.

8.2.1 Overview of FASAB's Creation

In October 1990, three officials responsible for federal financial reporting established FASAB (the "Board") as a federal advisory committee. The officials were the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Comptroller General of the United States (the "Sponsors"). The Sponsors created FASAB to develop accrual accounting standards and principles for the United States Government.¹⁴³ Please note that FASAB and Congress have no input into the accounting principles used in creating the President's Budget.

The FASAB was created to bridge the gap in constitutional interpretation between the Legislative and Executive branches. For the first time, the two branches agreed to work together in an agreed framework, with an open, public process, to determine the accounting standards that federal agencies should follow. The Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU")¹⁴⁴ cited the JFMIP and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App) as the basis for establishing the Board.

The reason that the FASAB was created was that the Comptroller General at the time of its creation was unwilling to either launch the required legal battle or use the power of the purse as Madison described in Federalist No. 58 to get the Executive branch to stop poaching Congress' constitutionally mandated responsibilities. The OMB's constitutional objections regarding accounting for Executive departments are a political power play that camouflages an unconstitutional intrusion by the Executive branch into accounting for the government's finances. It is understandable from a political standpoint why the legal battle between Congress and the Executive branch has never been fought. However, this does not mean that the resulting compromise is constitutional.

The word Advisory was included in the Board's name to signify the retention of legal authority by the Sponsors, whose approval would be required before the Board's standards became effective. The Board can only recommend standards to the Sponsors. Although the MOU indicates that the Sponsors have retained their authorities, separately and jointly, to establish and adopt accounting standards for the federal government this authority has never been used since the FASAB's inception. From a practical standpoint the Sponsors have bound themselves together. No accounting principle will be adopted unless all the Sponsors agree. Subsequently, provisions were included in the CFO Act that requires agency financial systems to comply with applicable accounting principles, standards and requirements. The OFFM, an office within OMB, decides upon new principles, standards and requirements for OMB after considering FASAB's recommendations.

8.2.2 FASAB's Board Membership, AICPA's Designation and Social Insurance

The membership of the Board of FASAB initially was a member from each of the Treasury Department, OMB, GAO and the CBO as well as two other members representing civilian and defense agencies and three public members. In 1999, FASAB sought and received designation from the AICPA as the GAAP standards-setter for the federal government (Rule 203 status).¹⁴⁵ The government wanted the AICPA to bless the FASAB in order to have their pronouncements be viewed as GAAP. Approval by the AICPA was deemed critical by the Sponsors as it was viewed as "the Good Housekeeping seal of approval" and had real meaning in the private sector.

One of the AICPA's major concerns was independence.¹⁴⁶ Veto power, however, was retained by FASAB's Sponsors.¹⁴⁷ AICPA said that if veto was ever used it would rescind FASAB's status.¹⁴⁸ At

that time Robert Elliott, Chairman of the AICPA Board of Directors expressed confidence in FASAB's impartiality. "FASAB has committed to replace any members who are not materially independent and the AICPA can rescind its recognition if FASAB does not act independently. This small risk must be balanced against a probable larger gain: a better informed U.S. Government and citizenry."¹⁴⁹

In 2003, in order to persuade the AICPA to continue to designate the FASAB as a promulgator of GAAP, the board was reconstructed and given greater autonomy. The reorganization resulted in four federal government members and six public members. However, as soon as the Board was reconstructed with real outside members the public members demanded that social insurance obligations be recorded in the government's consolidated financial statements. The Sponsors threatened to veto any such proposal and arranged for the balance of power to shift on the Board.

Social Insurance has been the most controversial issue for the Board since its inception. It has been considered and reconsidered. In May 2006 the Board voted 6 to 4 to proceed with an Exposure Draft that included a provision that some part of Social Security beyond the "due and payable" amount would be recognized on the federal balance sheet as a liability. All six public members voted in favor and all four federal members voted against. At the March 2006 Board meeting the Treasury representative, Ed Reid, said that "social insurance was more of a contractual obligation than a recordable liability. Getting a solid majority behind this was essential. He said that he did not think the Board could survive having it go the way it is. He said he thought it would be very dangerous." At the May 2006 meeting the Comptroller General indicated "the last thing in the world that I want is for a veto to be made on a standard...I hope it never happens, but feelings on this are pretty strong."¹⁵⁰

Then one public Board member retired after 10 years and another Board member was not renewed. In subsequent votes the Board deadlocked at 5 to 5. The replacements had previously represented OMB. Once the Board was "re-adjusted" the FASAB killed the Social Insurance project.

Recently, the AICPA completed its second five-year review and Robert Harris Chairman of the AICPA conveyed the results to Tom Allen FASAB Chairman.¹⁵¹ The result of the Council approval means that AICPA members, as preparers and auditors of federal entity financial statements, will continue to recognize accounting standards promulgated by the FASAB as GAAP for federal government financial reporting.

8.2.2.1 FASAB's Fight Over Social Insurance – The Details

The FASAB has promulgated the following principles with respect to the financial reporting of social insurance:

- 1) Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard ("SFFAS") 5 which was issued in 1995 established that social insurance programs were non-exchange transactions. Only due and payable amounts would be recognized as expenses or liabilities in the consolidated financial statements.
- 2) SFFAS 17 which was issued in 1999 required the information presented in the Statement of Social Insurance ("SOSI").

- 3) SFFAS 25 which was issued in 2003 required the SOSI to be reclassified as a basic financial statement.
- 4) SFFAS 28 which was issued in 2005 deferred the effective date for SFFAS 25.
- 5) SFFAS 37 which was issued in 2010 required additional information including a statement of changes in social insurance amounts.

However, it is important to understand the divisions within the Board on the issue and their rationale. This can be accomplished through a review of the Preliminary Views document published after the contentious Board meetings in the summer of 2006.¹⁵²

After the May 2006 Board meeting the FASAB issued a Preliminary Views document to solicit views rather than proceed with an Exposure Draft. The Preliminary Views document outlined both a Primary View and an Alternate View reflecting the split at the Board. As noted above six members believed that an expense is incurred and a liability arises for social insurance programs when participants meet eligibility requirements during their working lives in covered employment, and that some portion of the benefits accumulated at the balance sheet date should be recognized as a liability (Primary View). Three members believed that, consistent with current reporting requirements, an expense is incurred and a liability arises for social insurance programs when the participants have met all eligibility requirements and the benefit is “due and payable” (Alternative View). One member abstained from an expression of views but supported issuance of the preliminary views document so that responses can be considered.

The supporters of the Primary View believed that their proposed recognition and measurement standard would conform to the new definition for liability and expense proposed in the Exposure Draft of a Concepts Statement entitled Definition and Recognition of Elements of Accrual-Basis Financial Statements. Also, the Primary View would link the amounts reported for social insurance on the balance sheet and statement of net cost to the SOSI. Such linkage or “articulation” would illustrate how the amounts reported on these principal financial statements relate to the present values of the cash inflow and outflow over the next 75 years that are presented in the SOSI.

Members supporting the Alternative View saw a fundamental distinction in financial reporting of exchange transactions, which are voluntary market exchanges of goods and services for a price, and non-exchange transactions resulting from decisions made collectively by the Congress and the President to levy taxes and to authorize programs.

The Alternative View is that social insurance programs comprise two separate non-exchange transactions – the compulsory payment of taxes during an individual’s working life and the Government’s payment of benefits after the individual has satisfied all eligibility criteria.¹⁵³ In the Alternative View expenses and liabilities are incurred for social insurance programs when the participants have met all eligibility requirements and the amount of the benefit is “due and payable” to or on behalf of beneficiaries.

They put forth six reasons for excluding any future costs in its financial statements:

- 1) Congress can at any time make any changes it deems fit including termination,
- 2) the Supreme Court has ruled that citizens do not have a contractual right to any benefit,

- 3) recognition would result in a significant mismatch between costs recorded and services provided in any given year,
- 4) recognition would diminish the relative size and importance of other expenses and liabilities,
- 5) recording future benefits as expenses and liabilities may undermine needed reforms, and
- 6) given the un-sustainability of benefits with current financing the amount of benefit payments are uncertain and not reliably estimable.¹⁵⁴

The Alternative View proposed to maintain the recognition and measurement of expense and liability for social insurance programs required in SFFAS 17. That is, the entity would recognize a liability and a related expense for social insurance benefits when all eligibility criteria are met such that an individual beneficiary is entitled to receive a benefit (e.g., a cash payment, goods or services). At that point, those who supported the Alternative View believed the Government has a present obligation and the benefits become “due and payable.” Thus, under the Alternative View the amounts reported on the balance sheet and statement of net cost for social insurance benefits would not change from what was currently reported under SFFAS 17. Those supporting the Alternative View believed their proposed recognition and measurement standard was consistent with the proposed definition for liability and expense currently under consideration in the Elements exposure draft.

The counter-argument for inclusion is straightforward. Recognizing the full costs of the social insurance programs is the only way to have a Statement and Account that reflects the federal government’s economic reality. Congress has legally enacted these programs with permanent appropriations or mandatory authorizing legislation. Finally, almost every politician has publicly stated that these benefits will be paid.

As discussed above the Social Insurance project was terminated after the Board membership changed. The minutes for the September 19-20, 2007 meeting to discuss the Social Insurance project are illustrative of the divisions within the Board:

“Some members said the economic cost is the change in the statement of social insurance (SOSI) amounts during the reporting period. For example, if the net present value (NPV) of the social insurance commitments last year was \$44 trillion and this year it is \$45 trillion, then the economic cost would be \$1 trillion. Others defined it more narrowly as the change in the present value of future benefits attributed to work in covered employment already performed, exclusive of the present value of future benefits attributable to work in covered employment to be performed in the future.” Others had a different view.”¹⁵⁵

8.2.3 Other Examples of FASAB’s Operations

Other examples of how FASAB has operated are informative. As a result of the veto power retained by the Sponsors, the Board has not included certain solutions to an issue because it knew those solutions would lead to a veto. For example, OMB was openly opposed to explicitly disclosing and labeling a Closed Group dollar amount for Social Insurance. As a result that option was not considered for SFFAS 17. Also, the Department of Defense (“DoD”) was able to exercise near veto power with respect to certain specialized defense situations. The Board’s deference was due to the

fact that DoD had many powerful allies in Congress who might be willing to provide exemptions or bring into question the FASAB's role.¹⁵⁶

8.2.4 FASAB Board Membership – Unspoken Requirement

Given the government's experience with truly independent Board members the Sponsors are much more careful as to whom they will allow on FASAB's Board. Generally, they will pick ex-officers of the government who they know have drunk the cool-aid with respect the federal government's accounting. This extra-special requirement is not described in any publication....and the AICPA is well aware of the problem....and looks the other way.

8.3 AICPA's Hammer – The Code of Professional Conduct

The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct prohibits members from expressing an opinion or stating affirmatively that financial statements or other data are in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, if such information departs in any way from accounting principles promulgated by a body designated by the AICPA Council to establish such principles.

8.4 AICPA's Commercial Interests Trump Its Ethical Principles

Even if law enforcement officials do not determine that the AICPA has participated in a criminal enterprise the organization has some real soul-searching to do. Given AICPA's behavior as it relates to continuing to recognize FASAB it is clear that its commercial interests outweigh its ethical principles.

8.4.1 AICPA's Code of Ethics Appear to be “Window Dressing”

Article I - Responsibilities – In carrying out their responsibilities as professionals, members should exercise sensitive professional and moral judgments in all their activities.

Article II – The Public Interest – Members should accept the obligation to act in a way that will serve the public interest, honor the public trust, and demonstrate commitment to professionalism.

Article III – Integrity – To maintain and broaden confidence, members should perform all professional responsibilities with the highest sense of integrity.

Article IV – Objectivity and Independence – A member should maintain objectivity and be free of conflicts of interest in discharging professional responsibilities. A member in public practice should be independent in fact and appearance when providing auditing and other attestation services.

Article V – Due Care – A member should observe the profession's technical and ethical standards, strive continually to improve competence and the quality of services, and discharge professional responsibility to the best of the member's ability.

8.4.2 Ethical Questions for the AICPA to Think About?

Has the AICPA aided and abetted in the publication of financial results that do not comply with the Constitution?

What culpability does the AICPA have for the publication of financial statements for the federal and state governments that do not meet the requirements of the Constitution?

What does it say about the AICPA's integrity that they have arguably assisted in misleading the citizens of the United States with respect to the nation's financial results and financial position?

Has the AICPA designated two unconstitutional entities, FASAB and GASB, as GAAP standard setters?

What public interest has been served by blessing rule making bodies that require the publication of misleading/incomplete financial results?

Given the public disputes at the FASAB between public official representatives and "independent" directors regarding proper accounting for the Nation's social insurance obligations how can the AICPA continue to designate FASAB as the GAAP standards setter?

Is there anything that could lead the AICPA to withdraw its designation?

How can one possibly debate whether the FASAB is an independent Board? It cannot be so by law and the facts that are publicly documented show that it has never acted in an independent manner.

8.5 Close Coordination Between FASAB and GASB

FASAB's website indicates that FASAB hosted the first joint meeting with GASB on August 21, 2008 and that the second and third joint meetings were held on August 27, 2009 and June 24, 2010.

In addition, there is a person that sits on both Boards – FASAB and GASB. This individual was first appointed to FASAB in July 2009 and was appointed to a second term on July 11, 2014. The individual was first appointed to GASB on July 10, 2010 and was reappointed for a second term on July 1, 2015.

8.6 RICO Charges – U.S. Department of Justice Description

The following description of RICO Charges is found on the U.S. Department of Justice website:

"It is unlawful for anyone employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c) (West 1984). The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) was passed by Congress with the declared purpose of seeking to eradicate organized crime in the United States. *Russello v. United States*, 464 U.S. 16, 26-27, 104 S. Ct. 296, 302-303, 78 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1983); *United States v. Turkette*, 452 U.S. 576, 589, 101 S. Ct. 2524, 2532, 69 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1981). A violation of Section 1962(c), requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity. *Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.*, 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3285, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1985).

A more expansive view holds that in order to be found guilty of violating the RICO statute, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that an enterprise existed; (2) that the enterprise affected interstate commerce; (3) that the defendant was associated with or employed by the enterprise; (4) that the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity; and (5) that the defendant conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise through that pattern of racketeering activity through the commission of at least two acts of racketeering activity as set forth in the indictment. *United States v. Phillips*, 664 F. 2d 971, 1011 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981), *cert. denied*, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S. Ct. 1265, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1354 (1982).

An "enterprise" is defined as including any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (West 1984). Many courts have noted that Congress mandated a liberal construction of the RICO statute in order to effectuate its remedial purposes by holding that the term "enterprise" has an expansive statutory definition. *United States v. Delano*, 825 F. Supp. 534, 538-39 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), *aff'd in part, rev'd in part*, 55 F. 3d 720 (2d Cir. 1995), cases cited therein.

"Pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity committed within ten years of each other. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5) (West 1984). Congress intended a fairly flexible concept of a pattern in mind. *H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.*, 492 U.S. 229, 239, 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2900, 106 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1989). The government must show that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. *Id.* Racketeering predicates are related if they have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. *Id.* at 240, 109 S. Ct. at 2901; *Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Florida*, 937 F. 2d 447, 450 (9th Cir. 1991). Furthermore, the degree in which these factors establish a pattern may depend on the degree of proximity, or any similarities in goals or methodology, or the number of repetitions. *United States v. Indelicato*, 865 F. 2d 1370, 1382 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S. Ct. 56, 107 L. Ed. 2d 24 (1989).

Continuity refers either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition. *H.J., Inc.*, 492 U.S. at 241-42, 109 S. Ct. at 2902. A party alleging a RICO violation may demonstrate continuity over a closed period by proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time. *Id.* Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement as Congress was concerned with RICO in long-term criminal conduct. *Id.*

As to the continuity requirement, the government may show that the racketeering acts found to have been committed pose a threat of continued racketeering activity by proving: (1) that the acts are part of a long-term association that exists for criminal purposes, or (2) that they are a regular way of

conducting the defendant's ongoing legitimate business, or (3) that they are a regular way of conducting or participating in an ongoing and legitimate enterprise. *Id.*

When a RICO action is brought before continuity can be established, then liability depends on whether the threat of continuity is demonstrated. *Id.* However, Judge Scalia wrote in his concurring opinion that it would be absurd to say that "at least a few months of racketeering activity. . .is generally for free, as far as RICO is concerned." *Id.* at 254, 109 S. Ct. at 2908. Therefore, if the predicate acts involve a distinct threat of long-term racketeering activity, either implicit or explicit, a RICO pattern is established. *Id.* at 242, 109 S. Ct. at 2902.

The RICO statute expressly states that it is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the subsections of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962. The government need not prove that the defendant agreed with every other conspirator, knew all of the other conspirators, or had full knowledge of all the details of the conspiracy. *Delano*, 825 F. Supp. at 542. All that must be shown is: (1) that the defendant agreed to commit the substantive racketeering offense through agreeing to participate in two racketeering acts; (2) that he knew the general status of the conspiracy; and (3) that he knew the conspiracy extended beyond his individual role. *United States v. Rastelli*, 870 F. 2d 822, 828 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 493 U.S. 982, 110 S. Ct. 515, 107 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1989)."

9 Why the Federal and State Governments Think They Can Get Away with It

There are a number of reasons why the federal and state governments think that they can get away with their fraudulent financial reporting. Most importantly, they believe that the Supreme Court will not determine the meaning of the appropriations and statement and account clauses. A corollary to this thinking is that the issue of financial reporting should be left to the Legislative and Executive branches. The federal government has employed accounting experts to advise them on proper accounting for the federal government so it would be entirely inappropriate for the Supreme Court to weigh in on the topic of proper accounting.

Most government officials believe that Congress has the plenary power to determine whatever financial reporting it deems appropriate for the electorate. In addition, most believe that current financial reporting practices fulfill any Constitutional requirement under the Statement and Account clause. The government publishes the Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays and Balances as well as substantial additional disclosure in its annual Financial Report of the United States Government.

The federal government has been explicit in its annual Financial Report that current policies are unsustainable. This should be more than an adequate warning for the citizenry.

The federal government's arguments against recording any obligations for future payments include that these obligations are so large that they can never be paid. Hence, recording these liabilities might hinder reforms. Finally, because these obligations can't be paid they are not really estimable.

9.1 Belief That the Supreme Court Will Never Hear the Case

Many if not most government officials both current and retired believe that the Supreme Court will never be willing to rule on the meaning of the statement and account clause. The belief is that the Court will duck the issue based on the issue of standing or, assuming that a plaintiff gets by that requirement, the political question doctrine. The author believes that this belief is founded in a hope that the Supreme Court will never address the issue.

At the "Representation Without Accountability" conference held at Fordham Law School on January 23, 2012 Professor Brian T. Fitzpatrick¹⁵⁷ of Vanderbilt Law School addressed the standing and political question doctrine issues. Selected excerpts of his remarks appear below:

"The Constitution permits federal courts to hear only cases and controversies...[which] has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to limit the kinds of disputes that can be brought into the federal judiciary. The notion is that the courts want to make sure that this is a real dispute, not a fake dispute....And the notion of this being a real dispute has been operationalized into three requirements...Number one, whoever brings a lawsuit has to show they have been personally injured by the defendant....They have to show that the relief that they're requesting the court to give them will likely redress the injury that they are suffering or have suffered, and they have to show that the injury that they've suffered is traceable to the defendant's actual conduct.

I think that there are a bunch of people thankfully for whom there aren't any lower court cases or Supreme Court dicta out there that threaten their standing. There's a lot of people who have injuries that are not common to everybody, and they're real concrete in

particularized injuries that I think could bring a suit, would have standing to bring a suit....Number one, those of us who have purchased or are considering purchasing government debt.....So I'm not so pessimistic that the standing obstacle cannot be overcome.

Now, I should say though, that there is another doctrine that's closely related to standing on which I think it's more likely a court would toss out one of these lawsuits, even if you...had purchased government debt and had standing....and this doctrine is called the political question doctrine. And the notion is here that if the lawsuit is something that's a political question, the courts shouldn't get involved. It's something that's best left to the politicians. We don't want to get involved if it's too political. And there's several categories of cases that the Supreme Court has said fall into this political question situation, and I'll list them here for you.

One category is the question in the case is textually or historically committed to the political branches of government. So something the Constitution, the text the Constitution says this is really something that only the Congress or only the President should be able to decide for themselves. This is not something that really you should go to the courts. It's within the discretion of the political branches.

Another category that's too political for the Supreme Court is situations where there's no judicially discoverable or manageable standards. So the Constitution says something, but there's no possible standards the courts can think of to enforce the constitutional provision. There's also a category of cases where deciding the question requires a policy determination that is better left to the political branches. Judges are supposed to do law, politicians are supposed to do policy. Another category is, there's no way to decide the case without disrespecting one of the political branches of government. Another category is there's an unusual need to adhere to a political decision that was already made by one of the branches of government. Or, the last category, there'd be some embarrassment if different departments of the government, the judiciary, Congress, the President, answered a question differently. So these are these kind of general vague categories of cases the Supreme Court said are not justiciable. They're not appropriate for judicial determination.

Now the problem with these categories is they're so vague and broad you can really make an argument with any case falls into them at any time. You really could. Lack of a judicial standard, you know, would it be disrespectful to one of the branches of government? I mean, you could make that argument in every case. These categories are very vague. And that's a problem because if the courts didn't want to hear this lawsuit, they could easily find one of these categories and say, well, maybe it would be disrespectful for us to get involved here, so we're not going to. Be very easy for them to do that.

And so what can we say to the courts to persuade them that they shouldn't do that? That they shouldn't just duck the question and say leave it to the politicians. Well, for one thing it's important for courts to get involved, it's especially important for courts to get involved on questions where we can't trust the political branches to enforce the Constitution themselves. So if you have a dispute between the President and a dispute between the Congress, Congress and President have a disagreement about something, that's the kind of thing that you can leave to the political branches to sort out for themselves because you can trust the voters at the next election to vote for a new President or vote for a new Congress and resolve

the dispute. But what if the two political branches, the Congress and the President are conspiring with one another to keep out the American people? In those situations you only have one other branch of government to turn to. The judiciary. And I think there is a good argument that this is one of these cases, where both the President and the Congress both have the incentive to keep people in the dark about the true liabilities of the country. And those are the situations where we need courts the most. Because we can't just turn to the political branches."

9.1.1 The Issue Should be Left to the Legislative and Executive Branches

The Supreme Court might want to dodge the issue entirely as it did in *United States v. Richardson*. However, this problem is impossible to correct through the normal democratic process because the government's promises to pay which should be reflected as liabilities on its financial statements are assets on the electorate's individual balance sheets. Hence, this is not a problem that the electorate is willing or looking to solve because it will have bad financial implications for them.

The judiciary has sometimes indicated that public access is a matter for executive and legislative discretion. The Court averred in *Houchins v. KQED, Inc.* that "[t]he Constitution itself," in Justice Stewart's words, "is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act." The two reasons typically given to deny an affirmative right to information are that the judiciary lacks easily ascertainable standards for specifying the content of any access guarantee and that alternative methods are available for the public to access the information. However, the Court has already determined the relevant standard which is the antifraud provisions. With respect to the second reason the concept that a citizen/voter can piece together consolidated financial information from the data that is published today is laughable as sophisticated financial executives who pore over the data for years can only get a sense for what these figures would actually be. Furthermore, in addressing the argument denying an affirmative right to financial information the Court must confront the Supremacy Clause and the words of the Appropriations and Statement and Account clauses.

It is the duty of the Judiciary to interpret the legal meaning of the Constitution. If the Court does not acknowledge the right of financial information it is effectively saying that the Constitution does not permit anyone to challenge Congress with respect to its self-proclaimed adherence to a Constitutional requirement. This is so even when Congress' non-adherence benefits its incumbents to the detriment of the electorate. Furthermore, as previously noted, the lack of an interpretation of the Statement and Account Clause has dire implications for several other constitutionally protected rights. In addition, the Court should not invoke the political question doctrine as this would nullify an important check on power that the Framers explicitly made a part of the Constitution. Finally, if the Court refuses to interpret the Clause it will remain susceptible to making errant decisions based on false and incomplete economic data as it did with its ACA decision last summer.

The dissent in *Citizens United* (Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor) believes that Congress' "careful legislative adjustment of the federal election laws...warrants considerable deference,..." and that "we should instead start by acknowledging that "Congress surely has both wisdom and experience in these matters that is far superior to ours." However, "[t]his is not to say that deference would be appropriate if there was a solid basis for believing that a legislative action was motivated by the desire to protect incumbents or that it will degrade the competitiveness of the electoral process."¹⁵⁸ This approach appears warranted for examining financial reporting laws.

Over the last one hundred years Congress has abdicated its financial reporting responsibility. Today, the Executive branch dominates federal financial reporting and this reporting is completely politically motivated. The President's Budget is prepared by OMB without input from Congress. Congress enacted legislation in the 1950s requiring the Executive branch to complete the President's Budget using cost-based accrual accounting.¹⁵⁹ The Executive branch refused to comply with this legislation. The Financial Report is prepared by Treasury and OMB without input from Congress other than through the agreed directives of the FASAB.

An example of the irrelevance of Congressional input today is the treatment of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. After the U.S. government assumed control in 2008 of these two federally chartered institutions the CBO concluded that the institutions had effectively become government entities whose operation should be included in the federal budget. However, OMB felt differently, and the Combined Statement reflected the Budget's approach.¹⁶⁰

The bottom line is that Supreme Court deference is wholly inappropriate to a Legislative branch that has abdicated its financial reporting responsibility in an effort to diminish its political accountability. This effort has significantly degraded the electoral process as citizens must vote without the benefit of financial information required to be published by the Constitution.

There are two other critical facts with respect to financial reporting and political accountability. The first is that the Legislative and Executive branches have a direct conflict of interest in not having expenditures reported correctly as they have been elected by promising to maintain or increase spending levels. Proper financial reporting would lead to spending cutbacks, tax increases and/or recriminations for overspending, all of which are likely to cause voter dissatisfaction and changes at the polls. The second is that Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid have permanent appropriations.¹⁶¹

Using the Court's analysis in *Caperton* it is impossible to conclude that either Congress including the GAO, CBO or the Comptroller General or the Executive branch including the Treasury or OMB is the appropriate body to determine whether Congress or the Executive is complying with the Appropriations and Statement and Account clauses. This conclusion flies in the face of Chief Justice Burger's dictum in *United States v. Richardson* that "it is clear that Congress has plenary power to exact any reporting and accounting it considers appropriate in the public interest." This is so unless one reads the Justice's remarks to be targeted solely to the amount of detail that Congress must publish.

9.1.2 Violation of the Right to Financial Information Should Create Standing

The private right to financial information must give the electorate standing in the courts to challenge the government if it believes that Congress is not providing the required financial information. Otherwise, there is no check on Congress' obligation to publish the Statement and Account. It is noteworthy that in the Richardson case both the majority and the dissent at the Court of Appeals believed that the public was entitled to some form of accounting. Justice Douglas focused on this fact in his dissent when the case reached the Supreme Court. He thought that Chief Justice Burger's interpretation effectively read the Statement and Account Clause out of the Constitution.

Justice Rehnquist has famously characterized the implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5 as “a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.” It would appear that the country would receive similar benefits if the Court were to adopt a similar posture with respect to citizens’ ability to challenge the federal government’s financial reporting. This approach of enshrining a private right of action by citizens will result in the federal government most closely fulfilling its obligations under the Clause.

9.2 Congress Has Plenary Power to Determine the Meaning of the Statement and Account

Many believe that the Statement and Account is subject to the plenary power of Congress and that no court or citizen has any ability to challenge any financial reporting that Congress wishes to undertake. The language below is copied from section 1.1.8.

The Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, Third Edition contains the following passage:

“The second part of article I, section 9, clause 7 requires “a regular statement and account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.” Implementation of this provision, as a logical corollary of the appropriation power, is also wholly within the congressional province, and the courts have so held. *Washington Post Co. v. United States Department of State*, 685 F2d 698, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“the plenary authority of Congress in this area will be respected”), vacated as moot, 464 U.S. 979 (1983); *United States v. Richardson*, 418 U.S. 166, 178 n. 11 (1974)(it is clear that Congress has plenary power to exact any reporting and accounting it considers appropriate in the public interest”); *Harrington v. Bush*, 553 F2d at 195; *Hart’s Case*, 16 Ct. Cl. 459, 484 (1880), aff’d *Hart v. United States*, 118 U.S. 62 (1886)(“[a]uditing and accounting are but parts of a scheme of payment”). See also B-300192, n. 10, Nov. 13, 2002.”

In its 1974 5-4 decision in *United States v. Richardson*,¹⁶² the Court declined to opine on the meaning of the Statement and Account Clause as it found that the plaintiff lacked standing. Chief Justice Burger’s opinion included dictum that appears to have become the gospel for the Court to ignore the provision.

“[I]t is clear that Congress has plenary power to exact any reporting and accounting it considers appropriate in the public interest.”¹⁶³ “Not controlling, but surely not unimportant, are nearly two centuries of acceptance of a reading of cl 7 as vesting in Congress plenary power to spell out the details of precisely when and with what specificity Executive agencies must report the expenditure of appropriated funds and to exempt certain secret activities from comprehensive public reporting.”¹⁶⁴

While these statements are clearly true as they relate to details associated with the nation’s financial reports and most assuredly information related to national security matters, Congress has a Constitutional obligation to report truthful and complete information with respect to total receipts, total expenditures and the resulting surplus or deficit. Justice Douglas focused on this fact in his dissent in *Richardson*. He thought that Chief Justice Burger’s interpretation effectively read the Statement and Account Clause out of the Constitution. Whether Congress is complying with the Statement and Account Clause is a matter for the Supreme Court to decide, not Congress.

Furthermore, the reference to “two centuries of acceptance” is hollow. Over the last two hundred years the Statement and Account Clause requirements have increased as the federal government’s finances have become exponentially more complex. Arguably, a cash-based statement of receipts and

expenditures was acceptable to fulfill the Statement and Account's Clause's required accounting when the government was small. However, once the government's finances grew in complexity and especially after the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified and Congress enacted social insurance programs and the Medicaid program funded with permanent appropriations, Congress was required by the Statement and Account and Appropriations Clauses to begin publishing accrual-based financial statements.

9.3 The Federal Government is Already Publishing the Required Statement and Account

The Combined Statement is described in the "Overview of the Federal Governments Financial Reporting Practices." A portion of that description is copied here.

The Combined Statement is virtually unknown by the general public. It is not referred to by any recent Congress or Administration with respect to the financial condition or results of the U.S. Government. It is not mentioned by any third party analysts that examine the government's finances.

The Transmittal letter of the Commissioner of the Treasury's Bureau of the Fiscal Service dated December 15, 2015 indicates "In accordance with the provisions of Section 114(a) of the Act of September 12, 1950 (31 U.S.C. 3513(a)), I am transmitting herewith the Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays, and Balances of the United States Government for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2015. This statement presents **budget results and the cash-related assets and liabilities of the Federal Government** with supporting details."

David Mosso, who was Chairman of the FASAB for the ten years ending in 2006, made the following remarks about the President's Budget and by implication the Combined Statement at the "Representation Without Accountability" conference held at Fordham Law School in 2012.

"[T]he Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") and the Congressional appropriations committees have been unwilling to change the accounting basis of the federal budget to the accrual basis....The Budget's cash basis accounting, selectively applied, hollows out the fiscal body of the federal government...The accounting underlying the President's Budget....obfuscates federal financial accountability..... [It] understates...the headline numbers that dominate Congressional and public discussion and that form perceptions of the government's financial health. It seems to be an incontrovertible conclusion that the ship of state is being steered with a severely broken compass.....That false picture nurtures financial profligacy....Cash basis accounting in the President's Budget is the spearhead of reckless fiscal policy, whether intentionally reckless or just bumbling along with inadequate and misunderstood information about federal financial health....As an accountability report, the President's Budget woefully shortchanges the American public."¹⁶⁵

9.4 The Information Is Already Available and SCOTUS Will Never Overrule Accounting Experts

On August 28, 2013 Joseph Marren testified at FASAB's Public Hearing regarding its Reporting Entity exposure draft. In the question and answer session after Mr. Marren presented his views was the following exchange with two Board members. The following is an excerpt of that discussion.

MR. GRANOF (Board member): All of the information that you've presented is in the public domain.

MR. MARREN: It is right out of the Financial Report of the United States Government.

MR. GRANOF: Exactly, it's all in the public domain. The empirical evidence, the academic evidence is overwhelming. That when information is available in the public domain, users of financial statements incorporate it into their decisions. The question is this, why don't you believe-- or to put it another way, what decisions do you think will be affected if indeed the government were to consolidate all of this in one financial statement? The related question is what studies have you relied upon to indicate that this notion of the public incorporating all available information is inappropriate?

MR. MARREN: I guess I have several reactions. What jumps to mind is a circumstance where someone in the private sector has published fraudulent financials and is in front of the SEC. What I would tell you is you don't get to ask that question in front of the SEC. The only question is are the financials right or not. That's number one.

The next reaction that I have is related to the Constitution. The bottom line is that unless the Feds put together financial reports that are consistent with the requirements of the Constitution, you are violating all of those rights that I enumerated. If we get to a point where the Supreme Court determines that federal financial reporting is fraudulent and is violating those rights, the government is going to have to put out correct financial statements.

MR. GRANOF: Let me make one comment, and that is to say that the reason that the Federal Reserve is not consolidated, and the reason we don't consolidate Social Security and social insurance, is not because we're unaware of it. It's because a group of accounting experts believe that that constitutes the most appropriate financial reporting.

MR. MARREN: I don't disagree with your statement whatsoever. Unfortunately, I think it is in direct contravention to the Constitution of the United States. The Constitution of the United States is crystal clear. If it's funded with public money, it has to be in the financial statements.

MR. GRANOF: It is in the financial statements. The Constitution does not use the word "balance

sheet”.

MR. MARREN: Hence, that is why I made the point this will get resolved ultimately at the Supreme Court. FASAB is slicing the apple so many ways and so many times in terms of the financial reporting requirements that you're all dreaming up that I think a court of law will come to a different conclusion than you do.

MR. GRANOF: They would overrule accounting experts?

MR. MARREN: Yes, because it does not comply with the Constitution.

9.5 The Federal Government Has Adequately Warned the Public

FASAB seems to believe that statements in the federal governments' Financial Report warning that current policies are unsustainable is adequate warning to the public. The author's reaction to this notion is to consider the following analogous hypothetical: Imagine a publicly traded company in the United States that had been publishing fraudulent financial statements for years but had a warning in its Management Discussion and Analysis section of its annual report indicating that there was trouble ahead for the company.

MR. ALLEN: Let me ask another question. Obviously I'm not going to defend what we've done or not done. Obviously we wouldn't be here if we didn't think we were contributing to the information. That's why most people serve on this board, all people serve on the board. You in the written comments made some comments about the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, or the AICPA, which is the organization that decides whether we can set generally accepted accounting principles.

I think that's consistent with Mike saying if they looked at it, they looked at the process, and they've made that determination we are sufficiently independent to set those standards. You pointed out part of the challenge of them arriving at that point, and you actually quoted the then chairman of the AICPA when that was granted and made a comment that, and I paraphrase because I can't remember exactly the quote, but the paraphrase was that we acknowledge there are potentially some challenges to independence based on this structure. Nevertheless we grant GAAP authority because we believe that is in the best public interest to get this information out.

Whether it's out in the right form by having a separate statement of social insurance versus including it in the balance sheet are issues that this board has debated for probably over half of its existence. We've had at least three major projects and other discussions about how to best account for and treat. As you well know, the opinions around this table vary in how best to treat that information. I guess I would ask you, would you disagree-- you're very critical of the AICPA, and it seemed like what they were doing was being open. Yet, they were saying in the broader public interest for information, we grant that GAAP authority. I'm curious as to somebody who believes in broad, public information, why you would then attack them in that process?

MR. MARREN: I guess I again have multiple reactions to your question. First of all, I indicated in the list of questions that those that aided and abetted in the publication of fraudulent financial statements might have a concern about criminal or civil liability. I think that's on the table. I'm not going to give anybody legal advice, but if in fact the Supreme Court of the United States determines that the federal government is publishing fraudulent financial statements, I suspect it's not in the AICPA's interest to have backed the group that helped promulgate standards that created fraudulent financial statements.

MR. ALLEN: If they don't reach that conclusion--

MR. MARREN: If they don't reach that conclusion, then we just have terrible accounting. One of the things that I think-- we have very smart people here. You can disagree with almost every point that I've made. This is a financial train wreck. For people in the government that are just used to having things go on and on, they will. In the private sector, things actually go bankrupt. There is a bad ending to things, and we are clearly headed there.

MR. ALLEN: I guess one of the things that this board supported though didn't do-- this actually comes from the Treasury Department itself-- is their attempt to try and broadly try and get that message out to all citizens. This is a specific guide to citizens of the United States. It's a guide that you can go online and any of the sponsor agencies probably and find that-- it makes a very clear

statement here within this that we are not on a sustainable path.

Our projections of obligations far exceed our projections of revenue and we need to make some changes. The fact that Congress maybe hasn't acted on that is not, I don't believe, the responsibility of the agencies themselves who published this information or of our board who tries to get that information, financial information, out.

9.6 The Statement of Long-term Projections Fulfills Any Disclosure Requirements

The Statement of Long-Term Projections shows that current policies are unsustainable. This is more than adequate disclosure.

The truth is that the Statement was originally targeted at better disclosure for Social Insurance and Medicaid. However, the government wanted to throw all of the spaghetti against the wall at the same time so that the expenditures related to these programs would be much less obvious.

9.7 Obligations Cannot Be Paid

In the internal fight at FASAB (See section 9.2.2) over accounting for social insurance programs two of the six reasons cited in support of not recognizing any future costs of social insurance in the federal governments' financial statements were:

- 1) Recording future benefits as expenses and liabilities may undermine needed reforms, and
- 2) Given the current un-sustainability of benefits with current financing the amount of benefit payments are uncertain and not reasonably estimable.

9.8 Compassion Argument

The ethical tradeoff that one is confronted with is made clear by the following question. Do you require proper accounting now which will likely result in benefit reductions that may hurt those in need today, or do you allow the current situation to continue and have the nation "go off the cliff" at some point in the future at which time those who need assistance will be largely abandoned completely.

10 FASAB's Insurance Programs Exposure Draft

The relevant portions of the exposure draft that will be addressed appear below. In the inside cover of the "Insurance Programs" exposure draft (hereafter "Exposure Draft") is a summary description of the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board. It appears below.

"The Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board

The Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Comptroller General of the United States, established the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB or "the Board") in October 1990. The FASAB is responsible for promulgating accounting standards for the United States Government. These standards are recognized as generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for the federal government.

An accounting standard is typically formulated initially as a proposal after considering the financial and budgetary information needs of citizens (including the news media, state and local legislators, analysts from private firms, academe, and elsewhere), Congress, federal executives, federal program managers, and other users of federal financial information. The proposed standards are published in an exposure draft for public comment. In some cases, a discussion memorandum, invitation for comment, or preliminary views document may be published before an exposure draft is published on a specific topic. A public hearing is sometimes held to receive oral comments in addition to written comments. The Board considers comments and decides whether to adopt the proposed standard with or without modification. After review by the three officials who sponsor the FASAB, the Board publishes adopted standards in a Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards. The Board follows a similar process for Statements of Federal Financial Accounting Concepts, which guide the Board in developing accounting standards and formulating the framework for federal accounting and reporting."

Commentary on FASAB's Summary Description

FASAB is an unconstitutional entity as described in Chapter 4. In addition, FASAB's process for promulgating accounting standards does not follow constitutional requirements for making policy that binds the nation. Even if FASAB is deemed to be a constitutionally approved entity the above description is materially misleading as FASAB does not set accounting principles and standards. Under the current law, the Comptroller General sets accounting principles and standards. Hence, FASAB's pronouncements represent nothing more than a recommendation to the Comptroller General.

Exposure Draft

This section will describe certain aspects of the exposure draft. In the "Introduction" on page 9 of the Exposure Draft is a section defining the Purpose of the project. The bulk of the description of the Exposure Draft's Purpose appears below:

"Purpose

1. This project was undertaken to ensure that the risk assumed through insurance programs is adequately reported in federal financial reports. The Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards (SFFAS) 5, Accounting for Liabilities of The Federal Government

provides standards applicable to insurance and guarantee (non-loan) programs and includes a requirement to report risk assumed. However, information provided about insurance programs is not comparable or informative. Further review found that it is challenging to determine the financial results and position of insurance programs.

2. In addition, the Board's conceptual framework now provides a definition of liability and describes measurement attributes that were not available when SFFAS 5 was developed. Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Concepts (SFFAC) 5, Definitions of Elements of Accrual-Basis Financial Statements, defines liability as "a present obligation of the federal government to provide assets or services to another entity at a determinable date, when a specified event occurs, or on demand." SFFAC 7, Measurement of the Elements of Accrual-Basis Financial Statements in Periods After Initial Recording, defines attributes of elements to be measured. This proposal seeks to adopt the most current concepts so that the accounting principles for insurance and non-loan guarantee liabilities provide comprehensive guidance for consistent reporting."

In the "Introduction" on page 9 of the Exposure Draft is a section defining Materiality. It appears below:

Materiality

The provisions of this Statement need not be applied to immaterial items. The determination of whether an item is material depends on the degree to which omitting or misstating information about the item makes it probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying on the information would have been changed or influenced by the omission or the misstatement.

In the "Proposed Standards" on page 10 of the Exposure Draft is a section defining Scope. It says in part:

Scope

This Statement establishes three categories of insurance and related guidance: exchange transaction insurance programs other than life insurance, nonexchange transaction insurance programs, and life insurance programs. In addition, there is a section providing government-wide disclosure requirements.

Commentary on Exposure Draft

The exposure draft perpetuates the definition of a liability that is different from the definition of a liability that is used for appropriations purposes. See Chapters 1 and 5 of this memorandum. In addition, the exposure draft perpetuates the notion of Nonexchange Transactions.

A portion of Chapter 5 is replicated below:

The fiction that the FASAB has concocted to effectively eliminate the federal government's enormous legal obligations for entitlement programs for financial reporting purposes is to define a category of transactions in such a manner that the federal government's obligation for those transactions will only be recognized at the last possible moment when funds are being disbursed. The transaction classification that FASAB came up with is called "*Nonexchange Transactions*." A nonexchange

transaction arises when one party to a transaction receives value without directly giving or promising value in return. There is a one-way flow of resources or promises. Please note that there is no federal law that differentiates between exchange and nonexchange transactions for purposes of appropriations of funds for various programs. The classification that FASAB has invented is purely an accounting fiction that has no basis in appropriations law.

11 Reported Financial Status of the Federal Government Pre- and Post-ACA

11.1 Reported Financial Status of Federal Government and Social Insurance Pre-ACA

11.1.1 Overview of Medicare

This section will provide on an overview of Medicare as well as describing the federal government's and its social insurance programs' financial status pre-ACA. Please note that the federal government does not consider Medicaid a social insurance program and, unless otherwise indicated, quotes in this section 11.1 are taken from the 2009 Financial Report of the United States Government ("Financial Report").

Congress passed legislation in 1965 establishing the Medicare and Medicaid programs as Title XVIII and Title XIX, respectively, of the Social Security Act. Until 1977 the Social Security Administration ("SSA") managed the Medicare program and the Social and Rehabilitation Service managed the Medicaid program. In 1977 responsibility for administering the Medicare and Medicaid programs was entrusted to the Health Care Financing Administration, renamed in 2001 the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS").

Medicare was established for the medical care needs of the elderly and it was intended to complement the retirement, survivors, and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Medicare was formally designated "Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled." When Medicare was first implemented it covered most persons aged 65 or over. In 1973 and 2001 additional groups became eligible for benefits.

Medicare originally consisted of two parts: Hospital Insurance ("HI"), also known as Part A, and Supplementary Medical Insurance ("SMI"), which was also known as Part B. Part A helps pay for inpatient hospital, home health, skilled nursing facility, and hospice care. Part A is provided free of premiums to most eligible people. Part B helps pay for physician, outpatient hospital, home health, and other services. All eligible people pay a monthly premium for Part B coverage.

The Medicare+Choice program was established by the Balanced Budget Act ("BBA") of 1997. It was subsequently renamed the Medicare Advantage program. This part was modified by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act ("MMA") of 2003. It expanded beneficiaries' options for participation in private sector healthcare plans. The MMA also established Part D which helps pay for prescription drugs not otherwise covered by Parts A or B. After an initial phase-in period, it provided subsidized access to prescription drug insurance coverage on a voluntary basis, upon payment of premium, for all beneficiaries. There were premium and cost-sharing subsidies for low-income enrollees.

When Medicare began on July 1, 1966, approximately 19 million people enrolled. In 2009, almost 46 million people were enrolled in one or both of Parts A and B, and almost 11 million were participating in a Medicare Advantage plan. Total expenditures in 2009 were \$509 billion.

All financial operations for Medicare are handled through two trust funds, one for HI (Part A) and one for SMI (Parts B and D). These trust funds are credited with all receipts and expenditures for benefits and administrative costs. Congress has enacted permanent appropriations for HI (Part A)

essentially equal to current earmarked tax collections plus trust fund balances. Congress has enacted permanent appropriations from general revenues for all SMI expenditures.

11.1.2 2009 Financial Report of the United States Government

The 2009 Financial Report was published early in 2010 just prior to the passage of the ACA. GAO issued, for the thirteenth year in a row a ‘disclaimer’ of opinion on the accrual-based consolidated financial statements for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2009 and 2008. This means that sufficient information was not available for the auditors to determine whether the reported financial results were reliable.

“Three major impediments continued to prevent the GAO from rendering an opinion on the accrual-based consolidated financial statements: (1) serious financial management problems at the Department of defense (“DOD”) that have prevented DOD’s financial statements from being auditable, (2) the federal government’s inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities, and (3) the federal government’s ineffective process for preparing consolidated financial statements.”

The Financial Report contains a Statement of Social Insurance (“SOSI”) which has been a required statement since 2006. The SOSI does not interrelate with the Financial Report’s accrual-based consolidated financial statements and no liability or expense is recorded in these statements for future benefit payments not yet due. The SOSI compares the actuarial present value of the Government’s estimated expenditures for future scheduled benefits for Social Security, Medicare, and other social insurance programs over a 75-year period to a subset of the revenues that support these programs (e.g., the payroll taxes and revenue from taxation of benefits that support Social Security, and Medicare Part A, but not the general revenues that support Medicare Parts B and D.). Expenditures include scheduled benefit payments and administrative expenses. Scheduled benefits are projected based on the benefit formulas under current law. However, one must note that Social Security and Medicare Part A provide for full benefit payments only to the extent there are sufficient balances in the trust funds. The estimates in the SOSI are based on the economic and demographic assumptions which are summarized in the Financial Report’s footnote on Social Insurance. The net present value cost of Medicaid is not reported in the SOSI because the federal government believes that Medicaid is a “general assistance” program and not a social insurance program like Medicare.

The GAO gave an unqualified audit opinion on the 2009, 2008, and 2007 SOSI indicating that they are presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. “Given the importance of social insurance programs to the federal government’s long-term fiscal outlook, the SOSI is critical to understanding the federal government’s financial condition and fiscal sustainability.” The GAO disclaimed an opinion on the 2006 SOSI and did not express an opinion on the SOSI for 2005.

Exhibit 9 depicts the President’s Budget and **Exhibit 10** depicts the Financial Report for the fiscal years 2000 through 2009. In 2009 the nation’s GDP was approximately \$14.4 trillion and the federal government total revenues were \$2.1 trillion. It is important to note that the only costs for Medicare included in **Exhibits 9 and 10** are actual cash outlays each year. No obligation beyond this is recorded in any financial statement. Future expenditures for social insurance or Medicaid benefit payments are not recorded as liabilities as such benefit payments are deemed non-exchange transactions. The government believes that this accounting is proper as Congress at any time can

make changes that it deems fit to the programs, including termination. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has ruled that citizens do not have a right to expect payment until they have met all eligibility requirements. The government calls this accounting the “Due and Payable” approach.

Exhibit 11 depicts the balance sheet for September 30, 2009. The most significant liabilities reported on the balance sheet are Federal debt securities held by the public and accrued interest and Federal employee and veteran benefits payable. “The Government’s publicly held debt, or debt held by the public, totaled approximately \$7.6 trillion at the end of FY 2009, and was held by the public in the form of Treasury securities, such as bills, notes, and bonds, and accrued interest payable....In addition to debt held by the public, the Government has outstanding nearly \$4.4 trillion in intergovernmental debt, which arises when one part of the Government borrows from another. It represents debt issued by the Treasury and held by Governmental funds, including Social Security (\$2.5 trillion) and Medicare (\$372 billion) trust funds.” Intergovernmental debt is eliminated in the consolidated financial statements and, therefore, does not appear on the balance sheet.

Exhibit 12 depicts the figures reported in the SOSI for the Open group (current and future participants) for Medicare and Social Security for the years 2000 through 2009. The schedule indicates that the net present value costs of Social Security and Medicare as of January 1, 2009 as reported in the SOSI for the Open Group were \$7.7 and \$38.1 trillion, for a total of \$45.8 trillion. The \$8.1 trillion obligation in 2004 reflects the creation of Part D by the MMA. The schedule also indicates that the total net present value cost of Social Security and Medicare has grown by trillions of dollars each year from 2000 through 2009.

11.1.2.1 Adjustments to Consider for Reported SOSI Figures

There are three adjustments that must be considered to the figures appearing in **Exhibit 12**.

11.1.2.1.1 Limitation for Appropriated Funds

The first adjustment is due to the fact that both Social Security and Medicare Part A will run out of appropriated funds in coming years. “In fact, payment of Social Security and Medicare Hospital Insurance (Part A) benefits are limited by law to the balances in the respective trust funds. Consequently, future scheduled benefits are limited to future revenues plus existing trust fund assets.” As discussed in the Supplemental Information section of the 2009 Financial Report, “the Social Security and Medicare Part A trust funds are projected to be exhausted in 2037 and 2017 respectively, at which time they will be unable to pay the full amount of scheduled future benefits.” For Social Security, “[b]y 2037, the trust fund reserves (and thus reserve spending authority) are projected to be exhausted. Even if a trust fund’s assets are exhausted, however, tax income will continue to flow into the fund.” “Present tax rates would be sufficient to pay 76 percent of scheduled benefits after trust fund exhaustion in 2037 and 74 percent of scheduled benefits in 2083.” “Similarly, for Medicare Part A, projected future revenues would be sufficient to pay 81 percent of scheduled benefits in 2017, the year of trust fund exhaustion, and decreasing to 29 percent of scheduled benefits in 2083.” “[U]nder current law, General Fund transfers to the SMI Trust Fund will occur into the indefinite future and will continue to grow with the growth in health care expenditures.”

11.1.2.1.1.1 SOSI and Appropriated Funds

Exhibit 13 summarizes the analysis of funds appropriated and unfunded amounts for the 2009 SOSI figures. There are \$27.1 trillion of obligations that are fully funded (i.e., Congress has appropriated funds) under the law and \$18.7 trillion of obligations that are unfunded (i.e., Congress has not appropriated funds).

11.1.2.1.2 Adjustment for Physician Payments

The second adjustment relates to physician payments under SMI Part B. “SMI Part B projections assume significant reductions in physician payments, as required under current law, which may or may not occur. The Congress has overridden scheduled reductions in physician payments calculated for each of the last 7 years, including 2009, and also for January and February 2010....If scheduled reductions continue to be overridden in the future, actual SMI Part B expenditures could be materially greater than the amounts presented in the 2009 Statement of Social Insurance.” These expenditures are fully funded with permanent appropriations.

“The potential magnitude of the understatement of Part B expenditures due to the physician payment mechanism can be illustrated using two hypothetical examples of changes to current law.....Under current law, the projected 75-year present value of future Part B expenditures is \$23.2 trillion. An alternative scenario indicated that if Congress were to set future physician payment updates at zero percent per year, then absent other provisions to offset these costs, the projected present value would increase to \$23.7 trillion. Similarly, if Congress were to set future physician payment updates equal to the Medicare Economic Index (projected to be 2 to 2.5 percent per year), the present value would be \$25.7 trillion.”

11.1.2.1.3 Permanent Appropriations Do Not End at 75 Years

The third adjustment is tied to the fact that Social Security and Medicare have permanent appropriations which do not stop at 75 years. “The shorter horizon understates financial needs by capturing relatively more of the revenues from current and future workers and not capturing all of the benefits that are scheduled to be paid to them.” Therefore, “Infinite Horizon” obligations for both Medicare and Social Security are published in the Financial Report’s Supplemental Information section. These figures have only been reported since 2004 and appear in **Exhibit 14**. The schedule indicates that the net present value costs of Social Security and Medicare under an Infinite Horizon were \$17.5 and \$89.5 trillion, for a total of \$107.0 trillion. For the 2009 fiscal year these obligations are 7.7 times the size of the nation’s GDP and greater than 50 times the federal governments reported revenues.

11.1.2.1.3.1 SOSI Infinite Horizon and Appropriated Funds

Exhibit 15 summarizes the analysis of funds appropriated and unfunded amounts for social insurance programs under the infinite horizon as of 2009. There are \$55.5 trillion of obligations that are fully funded (i.e. Congress has appropriated funds) under the law and \$51.5 trillion of obligations that are unfunded (i.e. Congress has not appropriated funds).

11.1.2.2 GAO's Conclusion in 2009 Financial Report

The GAO reaches the following conclusion. “[T]he federal government is on an unsustainable long-term fiscal path driven by rising health care costs and known demographic trends. The Statement of Social Insurance, for example, shows that the present value of projected scheduled benefits exceeds earmarked revenues for social insurance programs (e.g., Social Security and Medicare) by about \$46 trillion over the next 75-yr period.” The Citizens Guide of the 2009 Financial Report indicates that “The nation must change course and bring social insurance expenses and resources in balance before the deficit and debt reach unprecedented heights. Delays will only increase the magnitude of the reforms needed and will place more of the burden on future generations.”

11.2 Reported Financial Status of Federal Government and Social Insurance Post-ACA

11.2.1 Medicare Post-ACA

This section 11.2 describes the size and scope of the nation's social insurance programs (Social Security and Medicare) after passage of the ACA. Quotes in this section 11.2 are taken from the 2010 Financial Report of the United States Government published in December 2010.

11.2.2 2010 Financial Report of the United States Government

GAO issued for the fourteenth consecutive year a ‘disclaimer’ of opinion on the accrual-based 2010 consolidated financial statements. This means that sufficient information was not available for the auditors to determine whether the reported financial results were reliable.

Exhibit 16 depicts the President's Budget and **Exhibit 17** depicts the Financial Report for the fiscal years 2001 through 2010. As indicated the nation's GDP in 2010 was approximately \$15.1 trillion and the federal government total revenues were \$2.2 trillion. It is important to again note that the only costs for Medicare included in **Exhibits 16 and 17** are actual cash outlays each year.

Exhibit 18 depicts the balance sheet for September 30, 2010. The Federal debt securities held by the public and accrued interest increased from \$7.6 trillion to \$9.1 trillion during FY 2010 due primarily to the continued need to fund the budget deficit.

“In addition to debt held by the public, the Government has outstanding nearly \$4.6 trillion of intragovernmental debt....including the Social Security (\$2.6 trillion) and Medicare (\$350.5 billion) trust funds. Intragovernmental debt is primarily held in Government trust funds in the form of special nonmarketable securities....Because these amounts are both liabilities of the Treasury and assets of the Government trust funds, they are eliminated as part of the consolidation process for the governmentwide financial statements. When those securities are redeemed, e.g., to pay future Social Security benefits, the Government will need to obtain the resources necessary to reimburse the trust funds.”

GAO also disclaimed an opinion on the 2010 SOSI as its Auditor's Report indicated that:

“Medicare projections in the 2010 [SOSI] were based on full implementation of the provisions of the [ACA], including a significant decrease in projected Medicare costs from the 2009 [SOSI] related to (1) reductions in physician payment rates totaling 30 percent over the next three years and (2) productivity improvements for most other categories of Medicare

providers. However, there are significant uncertainties concerning the achievement of these projected decreases in Medicare costs....

Management has developed an illustrative alternative projection intended to provide additional context regarding the long-term sustainability of the Medicare program and to illustrate the uncertainties in the [SOSI] projections. The present value of future estimated expenditures in excess of future estimated revenue for Medicare, included in the illustrative alternative projection, exceed the \$22.8 trillion estimate in the 2010 [SOSI] by \$12.4 trillion....

As a result, readers are cautioned that amounts in the 2010 [SOSI] and related Notes may not fairly present, in all material respects, the financial condition of the federal government's social insurance programs, in conformity with GAAP. The uncertainties related to the 2010 [SOSI] also affect the projected Medicare and Medicaid costs reported in the Fiscal Projections for the U.S. government, which is presented in Supplemental Information....”

Exhibit 19 depicts the figures reported in the SOSI for the Open group (current and future participants) for Medicare and Social Security for the years 2001 through 2010. The exhibit indicates that the net present value costs of Social Security and Medicare as of January 1, 2010 as reported in the SOSI for the Open Group was approximately \$31 trillion, a decline from the \$46 trillion reported in the 2009 SOSI.

11.2.2.1 Adjustments to Consider for Reported SOSI Figures

There are three adjustments to consider to the figures appearing in **Exhibit 19**.

11.2.2.1.1 Medicare Trustees' Alternative Scenario

The first set of adjustments to consider relates to the uncertainties associated with achieving some of the ACA's projected cost reductions and the publication of an alternative scenario by the Medicare Trustees. These uncertainties are discussed in Note 26. Social Insurance in the 2010 Financial Report.

“The Affordable Care Act improves the financial outlook for Medicare substantially, however, the effects of some of the new law's provisions on Medicare are not known at this time, with the result that the projections are much more uncertain than normal, especially in the longer-range future. For example, the ACA initiative for aggressive research and development has the potential to reduce Medicare costs in the future; however, as specific reforms have not yet been designed, tested, or evaluated, their ability to reduce costs cannot be estimated at this time, and thus no specific savings have been reflected in the projections for the initiative....

Another important example involves lower payment rate updates to cost categories of Medicare providers in 2011 and later. These updates will be adjusted downward by the increase in productivity experienced in the economy overall. Since the provision of health services tends to be labor-intensive and is often customized to match an individuals' specific needs, most categories of health providers have not been able to improve their productivity to the same extent as the economy at large. Over time, the productivity adjustments mean that the prices paid for health services by Medicare will grow about 1.1 percent per year more

slowly than the increase in prices that providers must pay to purchase goods and services they use to provide health care services. Unless providers could reduce their cost per service correspondingly, through productivity improvements, or other steps, they would eventually become unwilling or unable to treat Medicare beneficiaries.

It is possible that providers can improve their productivity, reduce wasteful expenditures, and take other steps to keep their cost growth within the bounds imposed by the Medicare price limitations. Similarly, the implementation of payment and delivery system reforms, facilitated by the ACA research and development program, could help constrain cost growth to a level consistent with the lower Medicare payments. These outcomes are far from certain, however. Many experts doubt the feasibility of such sustained improvements and anticipate that over time the Medicare price constraints would become unworkable and that Congress would likely override them, much as they have done to prevent the reductions in physician payment rates otherwise required by the sustainable growth rate formula in current law.....

The SOSI projections are based on current law. Therefore, the productivity adjustments are assumed to occur in all future years, as required by the ACA. In addition, reductions in Medicare payment rates for physician services, totaling 30 percent over the next three years, are assumed to be implemented as required under current law, despite the virtual certainty that Congress will continue to override these latter reductions. Therefore, it is important to note that the actual future costs for Medicare are likely to exceed those shown by these current-law projections....

The Medicare Board of Trustees, in their annual report to Congress, references an alternative scenario to illustrate the potential understatement of costs under current law. This alternative scenario assumes that the productivity adjustments are gradually phased out over the 15 years starting in 2020 and that the physician fee reductions are overridden. These examples were developed by management for illustrative purposes only; the calculations have not been audited; and the examples do not attempt to portray likely or recommended future outcomes. Thus, these illustrations are useful only as general indicators of the substantial impacts that could result from future legislation affecting the productivity adjustments and physician payments under Medicare and of the broad range of uncertainty associated with such impacts.”

Exhibit 20 depicts a comparison of the Medicare 75-year present values of income and expenditures under current law with those under the alternative scenario.

“As expected, the differences between the current-law projections and the illustrative alternative are substantial for Part A and Part B. All Part A fee-for-service providers are affected by the productivity adjustments, so the current law projections reflect an estimated 1.1 percent reduction in annual Part A cost growth per year. If the productivity adjustments were gradually phased out, as illustrated under the alternative scenario, the present value of Part A expenditures is estimated to be roughly 27 percent higher than the current-law projection. As indicated above, the present value of Part A income is unchanged under the alternative scenario.

The Part B expenditure projections are significantly higher under the alternative scenario than under current law, both because of the assumed gradual phase-out of the productivity

adjustments and the assumption that the scheduled physician fee reductions would be overridden and based on annual increases in the Medicare Economic Index. The productivity adjustments are assumed to affect more than half of Part B expenditures at the time their phase-out is assumed to begin. Similarly, physician fee schedule services are assumed to be roughly 30 percent higher under the alternative scenario than under current law at that time. The combined effect of these two factors results in a present value of Part B expenditures under the alternative scenario that is approximately 59 percent higher than the current-law projection.

The Part D projections are unaffected under the alternative projection because the services are not impacted by the productivity adjustments or the physician fee reductions.”

The government comments further on the Medicare projections in the Supplemental Information section of the 2010 Financial Report.

“The most important cost saving provision in the ACA is a revision in payment rates for parts A and B services other than for physicians’ services. Relative to payment rates made under prior law that were based on the rate at which prices for inputs used to provide Medicare services increase, the ACA reduces those payment rates by the rate at which productive efficiency in the overall economy increases, which is projected to average 1.1 percent per year. The ACA also achieves substantial cost savings by reducing payment rates for private health plans providing Parts A and B services (Part C or Medicare Advantage) to more closely match per beneficiary costs. Partly offsetting these changes was an increase in prescription drug coverage. In addition, the ACA increases Part A revenues by: (a) taxing high-cost employer-provided health care plans and thereby giving employers incentives to increase the share of compensation paid as taxable earnings, and (b) imposing a new 0.9 percent surtax on earnings in excess of \$200,000 (individual tax return filers) or \$250,000 (joint tax return filers) starting in 2013.

“In addition to the growth in the number of beneficiaries per worker, the Medicare Program has the added pressure of expected growth in the use and cost of health care per person that is driven in large part by new technology. Growth in Medicare cost per beneficiary in excess in growth in per capita GDP is referred to as “excess cost growth.” In last year’s Financial Report, excess cost growth was assumed to be about 1 percentage point—that is, Medicare expenditures per beneficiary were assumed to grow, on average, about one percentage point faster than per capita GDP over the long range. An assumption for excess cost growth was smaller than in recent history; excess cost growth averaged 1-1/2 points between 1990 and 2007. The combination of more beneficiaries per worker and 1 percent excess cost growth caused projected Medicare expenditures to grow substantially more rapidly than GDP in the 2009 Financial Report. In this year’s Report, however, long-term excess cost growth is essentially zero because of the productivity adjustments to payment rates called for by the ACA. As a result, the long-term projected Medicare spending share of GDP in this report is driven primarily by the same demographic trends that drive OASDI spending share of GDP.”

11.2.2.1.2 Limitation for Appropriated Funds

The second adjustment is due to the fact that both Social Security and Medicare Part A will run out of appropriated funds in coming years. “The 2010 Medicare Trustees Report projects that, with

enactment of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund will remain solvent until 2029 under current law – 12 years longer than was projected in the 2009 Trustees Report. The projected share of scheduled benefits that can be paid from trust fund income is 85 percent in 2029, declines to about 77 percent in 2050, and then increases to 89 percent in 2084. The Social Security Trust Funds also face a long-run shortfall. Under current law, the OASDI Trust Funds are projected to be exhausted in 2037 and the projected share of scheduled benefits payable from trust fund income is 78 percent in 2037 and 75 percent in 2084. Under current law, General Fund transfers to the SMI Trust Fund will occur into the indefinite future and will continue to grow with the growth in health care expenditures.

11.2.2.1.2.1 2010 SOSI and Appropriated Funds

Exhibit 21 summarizes the analysis of funds appropriated and unfunded amounts in the 2010 SOSI.

11.2.2.1.3 Permanent Appropriations Do Not End at 75 Years

The third adjustment is tied to the fact that Social Security and Medicare have permanent appropriations which do not stop at 75 years. “The shorter horizon understates financial needs by capturing relatively more of the revenues from current and future workers and not capturing all of the benefits that are scheduled to be paid to them.”

11.2.2.1.3.1 SOSI Infinite Horizon and Appropriated Funds

“Infinite Horizon” obligations for both Medicare and Social Security are published in the Financial Report’s Supplemental Information section. These figures have only been reported since 2004 and appear in **Exhibit 22**. The exhibit indicates that the net present value costs of Social Security and Medicare under an Infinite Horizon were \$18.7 and \$59.2 trillion, for a total of \$77.9 trillion, a decrease of over \$29 trillion.

Exhibit 23 summarizes the analysis of permanent appropriations and unfunded amounts for social insurance figures under the infinite horizon for 2010. As of 2010 there are \$55.4 trillion of obligations that are fully funded (i.e. Congress has appropriated funds) under the law and \$22.5 trillion of obligations that are unfunded (i.e. Congress has not appropriated funds).

11.2.2.2 GAO’s Conclusion in 2010 Financial Report

The GAO reaches the following conclusion. “As discussed in the 2010 Financial Report, the federal government is on an unsustainable long-term fiscal path driven on the spending side primarily by rising health care costs and known demographic trends.” The government summarized the impact of the ACA and the nation’s financial future in the Supplemental Information section which contains Fiscal Projections for the U.S. Government – Fiscal Year 2010. “The United States took a potentially significant step towards fiscal sustainability in 2010 by reforming its system of health insurance. The legislated changes for Medicare, Medicaid, and other health coverage hold the prospect of lowering the long-term trend for future health care costs and significantly reducing the long-term fiscal gap. But even with the new law, the projections discussed above indicate that, under current policies and the assumptions used in this report, the debt-to-GDP ratio will continually increase over the next 75-years and beyond, which means current policies are not sustainable. As indicated earlier, the longer policy action to avert these trends is delayed, the larger are the projected revenue

increases and/or spending decreases necessary to reach a target debt-to-GDP ratio. These projections, however, are neither forecast nor predictions. They are presented here to provide a foundation upon which readers can form their own conclusions about fiscal sustainability.”

11.3 Reported Financial Status of Medicaid Pre- & Post-ACA

11.3.1 Overview of Medicaid

This section 11.3 describes the financial size and scope of the nation’s Medicaid program before and after passage of the ACA. Unless otherwise indicated, quotes in this section 11.3 are taken from the 2010 Financial Report of the United States Government.

Medicaid was established in response to the inadequacy of welfare medical care under public assistance. Medicaid is a Federal/State entitlement program that pays for medical assistance for certain individuals and families with low incomes and resources. It is a cooperative venture jointly funded by the Federal and State governments (including the District of Columbia and the Territories, collectively hereafter, the “State(s)”) to assist States in furnishing medical assistance to eligible needy persons. Medicaid is the largest source of funding for medical and health-related services for the poor.

Within guidelines established by Federal statutes, regulations and policies, each State established its own eligibility standards; determined the type, amount, duration, and scope of services; set the rate of payment for services; and administered its own program. State legislatures could change eligibility, services, and/or reimbursement at any time.

Title XXI of the Social Security Act, known as the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (“SCHIP”), is a program initiated by the Balanced Budget Act (“BBA”) of 1997. SCHIP provided more Federal funds for States to expand Medicaid eligibility to include a greater number of low-income children who were uninsured.

Medicaid operates as a vendor payment program. States may pay health care providers directly on a fee-for-service basis, or States may pay for services through various prepayment arrangements, such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs). States could impose nominal deductibles, coinsurance, or copayments on some Medicaid beneficiaries for certain services.

The Federal government pays a share of the medical assistance expenditures under each State’s Medicaid program. That share, known as the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (“FMAP”), is determined annually by a formula that compares a State’s average per capita income level with the national income average. States with a higher per capita income are reimbursed a smaller share of their costs. By law FMAP cannot be lower than 50% or higher than 83%. For children covered through the SCHIP program, the Federal government pays States a higher share which averages about 70%. Matching share requirements are often intended to assure state interest and involvement through financial participation. This approach has been described as “cooperative federalism.”

Medicaid was initially a medical care program for the poor emphasizing dependent children, their mothers, the disabled and the elderly. Over the years eligibility was expanded. More than 56 million persons received health care services through the Medicaid program in 2005.

11.3.2 Medicaid Has Permanent Appropriations

Congress has enacted permanent appropriations for the federal spending required under the Medicaid program. The GAO's Glossary of Budget Terms defines "Appropriated Entitlement" as "An entitlement whose source of funding is an annual appropriation act. However, because the entitlement is created by operation of law, if Congress does not appropriate the money necessary to fund the payments, eligible recipients may have legal recourse. ...Medicaid [is an example] of such [an] appropriated entitlement."

The only cost for Medicaid for the federal government that is included the President's Budget or the Financial Report is actual cash outlays each year. No obligation beyond this is recorded in any financial statement. This is also true for each State, the District of Columbia and the Territories. No obligation beyond actual cash outlays is recorded in any of their published financial statements.

Future expenditures for Medicaid benefit payments are not recorded as liabilities by either the federal government or any State as such benefit payments are deemed non-exchange transactions. The federal government's accounting for Medicaid is governed by SFFAS No. 5 – Accounting for Liabilities. The State government's accounting for Medicaid is governed by Statement No. 33 of the GASB – Accounting and Financial Reporting for Nonexchange Transactions. The GASB has never issued separate guidance for Medicaid despite the fact that for most States it is their largest program.

The federal and state governments believe that this accounting is proper as Congress at any time can make changes that it deems fit to the programs, including termination. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has ruled that citizens do not have a right to expect payment until they have met all eligibility requirements. The government calls this accounting the "Due and Payable" approach.

11.3.3 SCOTUS on Medicaid

It is important to summarize certain economic facts regarding the Medicaid program highlighted by SCOTUS in *NFIB v. Sebelius*. The dissent (authored by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito) opined that "Medicaid has long been the largest federal program of grants to the States," and Ruth Bader Ginsburg posited that, between 2005 and 2008, federal contributions toward the care of beneficiaries averaged 57% while state contributions averaged 43%. Chief Justice John Roberts asserted that "Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average State's total budget..."

"Between 1966 and 1990, annual federal Medicaid spending grew from \$631.6 million to \$42.6 billion; state spending rose to \$41 billion over the same period. Between 1990 and 2010, federal spending increased to \$269.5 billion. (references omitted)"

11.3.4 Revelation Provided by SFFAS No. 36

Beginning with the 2010 Financial Report the federal government implemented Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard ("SFFAS") No. 36, Reporting Comprehensive Long-Term Fiscal Projections of the U.S. Government. This required the federal government for the first time to disclose significantly more financial information about its obligations including Medicaid in a supplemental information section described as "Fiscal Projections for the U.S. Government – Fiscal Year 2010."

“[T]he Government is now required to include a statement presenting for all its activities (a) the present value of projected receipts and non-interest spending under current policy without change...[T]he Government is also required to disclose, the assumptions underlying the projections, the factors influencing trends, and significant changes in the projections from period to period.”

The Supplemental Information section contained the following description of the projections.

“This section...is intended to help readers of the Financial Report of the U.S. Government (FR) assess whether budgetary resources will be sufficient to sustain public services and to meet future obligations as they come due, assuming that the Federal Government’s current policies for spending and taxation are continued. Such an assessment requires prospective information about receipts and spending, the resulting debt, and how these amounts relate to the economy. The assessment is also referred to as reporting on “fiscal sustainability.”

The information in this section is important not only for its financial, but also its social and political, implications. Financial reports should provide information that can help readers assess the likelihood that the Government will be able to continue providing the equivalent level of public services and to assess whether financial burdens without related benefits will be shifted to future taxpayers. Fiscal sustainability reporting should assist the reader in understanding these financial, social, and political implications.

The projections and analysis presented here are mathematical extensions and extrapolations based on an array of assumptions as described below, including the assumption that current Federal policy does not change. These projections cannot be interpreted as forecasts or predictions of the future, in part because they encompass hypothetical future trends or events that are improbable. This is the first year in which this information is included with the other Supplemental Information, and the methods and assumptions used in producing this section are still under development.

Statement of Long Term Fiscal Projections - Table 1...presents projections of the Federal Government’s receipts and non-interest spending. (Footnote 3 “For the purposes of this analysis, spending is defined in terms of outlays.”) Receipt categories include individual income taxes, Social Security, and Medicare payroll taxes, and all other receipts. On the spending side, the projections include both mandatory (entitlement) programs, such as Social Security and Medicare, which provide benefits under standing law, and discretionary programs, such as defense spending, which are funded through annual appropriations. The data in Table 1 are presented as in the Federal budget, which differs in some respects from the presentation of these data in the trustees’ reports for Social Security and Medicare.... The projections for Social Security and Medicare are based on the same economic and demographic assumptions as are used for the 2010 trustees’ reports for these programs. Projections for the other categories are also consistent with the assumptions used for the trustees’ reports. The Federal budget provides the framework used for the projections. In order to produce a more realistic projection of the fiscal outlook under current policy, the projections assume several likely departures from current law, noted below.”

Table 1 which is labeled “Long Range Projections of Federal Receipts and Spending” indicates that the present value cost of Medicaid as of October 1, 2010 for the period from 2011 through 2085 is \$24.2 trillion.

“The projections shown in Table 1 are made over a 75-year time frame, consistent with the time frame featured in the Social Security and Medicare trustees’ reports....[O]ne notable difference introduced in broadening the fiscal perspective to the Government as a whole is that the projections are based on fiscal years starting on October 1, 2010, whereas the trustees’ reports feature projections made on a calendar year basis. This change allows the projections to start with more current numbers, including the actual results from fiscal year 2010....

The projections in Table 1 focus on future cash flows, and do not reflect either the accrual basis or the modified-cash basis of accounting....

Medicaid: The Medicaid program was also affected by the changes legislated in the ACA. Medicaid enrollment will be larger because of health reform, and many newly insured Americans will be covered through Medicaid. To reflect these changes, certain adjustments were made in the model that has been used to project Medicaid in past years for the Financial Report. The model starts with the projections from the 2008 Actuarial Report prepared by the Office of the Actuary, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). As projections in that report only extend until 2018, the model assumes that Medicaid benefits in 2019 and later years grow at the same rate per beneficiary as Medicare benefits grow. Effects of the ACA, as calculated by CMS, were added to the base projections, as were other adjustments, to align base projections with the latest budget data. The Medicaid projections reflect the temporary increase in Medicaid spending due to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) as well as the phase-out of the Medicaid spending authorized by ARRA.”

11.3.4.1 Adjustments to Consider for Reported Medicaid Figure

There are several adjustments that one must consider to the \$24.2 trillion estimate for the net present value cost of Medicaid as of October 1, 2010.

11.3.4.1.1 No Alternative Scenario is Published for Medicaid

First and foremost, one must recall the GAO’s Auditor’s Report for the 2010 Financial Report, mentioned in the previous section, which indicated that “The uncertainties related to the 2010 [SOSI] also affect the projected Medicare and Medicaid costs reported in the Fiscal Projections for the U.S. government, which is presented in Supplemental Information...” The \$24.2 trillion figure was based upon savings assumptions associated with the ACA similar to those used to generate the \$22.8 trillion Medicare net present value cost figure published simultaneously. However, these assumptions were so unrealistic that the government published an alternate, and more realistic, scenario which indicated that Medicare had a net present value cost of \$35.2 trillion. No alternate figure was published for Medicaid.

11.3.4.1.2 Permanent Appropriations Do Not Stop at 75 Years

The second adjustment that must be considered is related to the fact that Medicaid has permanent appropriations which do not stop at 75 years. As noted by the federal government for the social insurance obligations, “The shorter horizon understates financial needs by capturing relatively more of the revenues from current and future workers and not capturing all of the benefits that are scheduled to be paid to them.” Therefore, “Infinite Horizon” obligations for Medicaid are needed but the federal government does not calculate or publish these figures.

11.3.5 State’s Aggregate Obligation for Medicaid is Enormous

In NFIB v. Sebelius Chief Justice Roberts quoted the impact of the ACA on the federal government. “In light of the expansion in coverage mandated by the Act, the Federal Government estimates that its Medicaid spending will increase by approximately \$100 billion per year, nearly 40 percent above current levels. (reference omitted).” The Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid indicates that: “To finance the massive expansion, the federal government anticipates that its share of Medicaid spending will increase by \$434 billion by 2020. (reference omitted). It further estimates that state spending will increase by at least \$20 billion over the same timeframe. (reference omitted). Other estimates suggest that both federal and state costs will be significantly higher. Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Medicaid Coverage & Spending in Health Reform: National and State-by-State Results for Adults at or Below 133% FPL 23 (May 2010)(estimating that increased costs could be as high as \$532 billion for federal government and \$43.2 billion for States).”

Since, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg indicated in NFIB v. Sebelius, the state portion of Medicaid contributions averaged 43 percent of total expenditures, a very low approximation of the aggregate net present value obligation of the States for Medicaid is \$18.3 trillion. The calculation is as follows: \$24.2 trillion divided by 57% (federal portion of Medicaid spending) to estimate the total net present value cost of Medicaid which is \$42.456140 trillion. Once the federal amount is subtracted this yields a figure of \$18.256140 trillion for the aggregate states net present value cost for the program. This estimate is based on the federal obligation being only \$24.2 trillion which as described above is highly unlikely. This also means that the total net present value cost of the Medicaid program is \$42.5 trillion. By way of reference at approximately \$18.3 trillion the aggregate State obligation for Medicaid is almost five times the size of the entire \$3.7 trillion municipal securities market.

11.3.5.1 Medicaid Obligations Exceed \$1 Trillion for Five States

Based on the states spending for the Medicaid program in 2010 there are five states that have a net present value cost obligation that exceeds \$1 trillion – California, New York, Massachusetts, Ohio and Pennsylvania. This obligation appears nowhere in any of these states financial statements. For example, the State of New York’s obligation is approximately \$1.6 trillion.

Exhibit 7 depicts the estimated obligation as of 2010 for all fifty states. Each of these obligations is clearly material to each state’s financial results and financial position.

12 Reported Financial Status of the Federal Government from 2006 to 2015

This section will describe the federal government's including its social insurance programs' and Medicaid's financial status from 2006 through 2015. Please note that the federal government does not consider Medicaid a social insurance program and, unless otherwise indicated, quotes in this section are taken from the 2015 Financial Report of the United States Government.

12.1 The Financial Report of the United States Government

The 2015 Financial Report was published in late February 2016. GAO issued, for the nineteenth year in a row a 'disclaimer' of opinion on the accrual-based consolidated financial statements for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2015 and 2014. This means that sufficient information was not available for the auditors to determine whether the reported financial results were reliable. Gene Dodaro in his "Statement of the Comptroller General of the United States" letter dated February 25, 2016 which was included in the Financial Report stated:

"However, since the federal government began preparing consolidated financial statements 19 years ago, three major impediments continued to prevent us from rendering an opinion on the federal government's accrual-based consolidated financial statements over this period: (1) serious financial management problems at DOD that have prevented its financial statements from being auditable, (2) the federal government's inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities, and (3) the federal government's ineffective process for preparing consolidated financial statements."

Footnote B. Basis of Accounting and Revenue Recognition contains a sub-section "Consolidated Financial Statements" that includes the following:

"The consolidated financial statements of the Government were prepared using GAAP, primarily based on FASAB's Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards (SFFAS)."

12.1.1 Statement of Social Insurance

The Financial Report contains a Statement of Social Insurance ("SOSI") which has been a required statement since 2006. The SOSI does not interrelate with the Financial Report's accrual-based consolidated financial statements and no liability or expense is recorded in these statements for future benefit payments not yet due.

In the Social Insurance sub-section of the Management' Discussion and Analysis section of the 2015 Financial Report is found the following statement:

"The SOSI provides perspective on the Government's long-term estimated exposures and costs for social insurance programs. While these expenditures are not considered Government liabilities, they do have the potential to become expenses and liabilities in the future, based on the continuation of the social insurance programs' provisions contained in current law."

Note 23. Social Insurance contains the following:

“The basis for the projections has changed since last year due to the enactment of the Medicare Access and Children’s health Insurance Program (CHIP) reauthorization Act (MACRA) of 2015. This law repealed the sustainable growth rate (SGR) formula that set physician fee schedule payments, and replaced it with specified payment updates for physicians. In last year’s report, the income, expenditures, and assets for Medicare Part B reflected the *projected baseline* scenario, which assumed an override of the SGR payment provisions and an increase in the physician fee schedule equal to the average of the most recent 10 years of SGR overrides (through March 2015) or 0.6 percent. Since the new legislation has replaced the SGR system with specified payment updates for physicians, the projections in this year’s report are based on the continuation of program provisions contained in current law, with one exception in regard to payment reductions that would result from the projected depletion of the Social Security and Medicare Hospital Insurance (Part A) Trust Funds; under current law, payments would be reduced to levels that could be covered by incoming tax and premium revenues when the Social Security and Medicare Hospital Insurance (Part A) Trust Funds are depleted.

In the U.S. Government Accountability Office Independent Auditor’s Report is found a section “Sustainability Financial Statements” which includes the following (footnotes omitted):

“Significant uncertainties (discussed in Note 23 to the consolidated financial statements), which primarily relate to the achievement of projected reductions in Medicare cost growth, affect the sustainability financial statements.... As a result of these significant uncertainties and material weakness, readers are cautioned that amounts reported in the 2015 Statement of Long-Term Fiscal Projections; the 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, and 2011 Statements of Social Insurance; the 2015 and 2014 Statements of Changes in Social Insurance Amounts; and the related notes to such financial statements may not fairly present, in all material respects, the sustainability information for those years in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.

For 2015, these significant uncertainties primarily relate to the following.

□ Medicare projections in the 2015 Statement of Long-Term Fiscal Projections and the 2015 Statement of Social Insurance were based on benefit formulas under current law and included a significant reduction in Medicare payment rates for productivity improvements relating to most categories of Medicare providers, based on full implementation of the provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as amended (ACA), and physician payment updates specified by the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA).

□ Management has noted that actual future costs for Medicare are likely to exceed those shown by the current law projections presented in the 2015 Statement of Social Insurance due, for example, to the likelihood of modifications to the scheduled reductions in Medicare payment rates for productivity adjustments relating to most categories of Medicare providers and to the specified physician payment updates. The extent to which actual future costs exceed the current law amounts due to changes to the scheduled reductions in Medicare payment rates for productivity adjustments and to specified physician payment updates

depends on both the specific changes that might be legislated and whether such legislation would include further provisions to help offset such costs. Consequently, there are significant uncertainties concerning the achievement of these projected reductions in Medicare payment rates.

□ Management has developed an illustrative alternative projection intended to provide additional context regarding the long-term sustainability of the Medicare program and to illustrate the uncertainties in the Statement of Social Insurance projections. The present value of future estimated expenditures in excess of future estimated revenue for Medicare, included in the illustrative alternative projection in Note 23, exceeds the \$27.9 trillion estimate in the 2015 Statement of Social Insurance by \$8.9 trillion.

□ Management noted that these significant uncertainties about projected reductions in health care cost growth also affect the projected Medicare and Medicaid costs reported in the 2015 Statement of Long-Term Fiscal Projections.

The 2014, 2013, 2012, and 2011 Statements of Social Insurance were affected by significant uncertainties, primarily related to the achievement of projected reductions in Medicare payment rates for productivity improvements. The 2013, 2012, and 2011 Statements of Social Insurance were also affected by uncertainties related to projected reductions in Medicare payment rates for physician services. Specifically, the Medicare projections in the 2013, 2012, and 2011 Statements of Social Insurance were based on benefit formulas in current law and included significant reductions in Medicare payment rates for productivity improvements and physician services. The 2014 Statement of Social Insurance reflected a change from the assumption regarding scheduled reductions in Medicare payment rates for physician services that was used in the 2013, 2012, and 2011 Statements of Social Insurance. Specifically, the 2014 Statement of Social Insurance reflected a projected baseline that assumed that the physician payment rate reductions would not occur and that physician payment rates would annually increase at a rate equal to the average sustainable growth rate (SGR) override that occurred over the 10-year period ending on March 31, 2015. For 2014, 2013, 2012, and 2011, management noted that actual future costs for Medicare were likely to exceed those shown by the current-law projections presented in the 2014, 2013, 2012, and 2011 Statements of Social Insurance due, for example, to the likelihood of modifications to the scheduled reductions in Medicare payment rates for productivity adjustments.”

In the 2015 Financial Report GAO issued disclaimers of opinion on the 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012 and 2011 SOSI. As mentioned previously, GAO had issued a disclaimer of opinion on the 2010 SOSI.

12.1.2 Statement of Long-Term Fiscal Projections

In the 2015 Financial Report in the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section is a sub-section titled “The Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: “Where We Are Headed.” The following statement appears therein:

“Pursuant to federal accounting standards, this FY 2015 *Financial Report* introduces a **Statement of Long-Term Fiscal Projections** as a basic financial statement and a related Note Disclosure (Note 24). This statement, note disclosure, and additional related information had previously appeared collectively in the *Financial Report* as required

Supplementary Information (RSI). The Statement displays the present value of 75-year projections of the federal government's receipts and non-interest spending for FY 2015 and FY 2014 (see Table1). Additional information about these projections may be found in Note 24 and the RSI section of this *Financial Report*.

The author wishes to point out that the single most important informational item reported in the new Statement of Long-Term Fiscal Projections is the net present value cost of the federal government's portion of the Medicaid program. This information has been reported in the RSI since 2010 and it is reported nowhere else by the federal government.

The GAO issued a disclaimer of opinion on the 2015 Statement of Long-Term Fiscal Projections.

12.2 Reported Financial Results for 2006 Through 2015

Exhibit 1 depicts the President's Budget and **Exhibit 2** depicts the Financial Report for the fiscal years 2006 through 2015. As indicated the nation's GDP in 2015 was approximately \$18.1 trillion and the federal government total revenues were \$3.3 trillion. It is important to again note that the only costs for social insurance and Medicaid included in **Exhibits 1 and 2** are actual cash outlays each year.

Exhibit 24 shows the reconciliation from the Net Operating Cost in the Financial Report to the Budget Deficit in the President's Budget for the years 2006 through 2015. It is important to note that this is the only exhibit in which dollars are in billions not trillions.

Exhibit 25 depicts the balance sheet for September 30, 2015. The Federal debt securities held by the public and accrued interest increased from \$12.8 trillion to \$13.2 trillion during FY 2015 due primarily to the continued need to fund the budget deficit.

"In addition to debt held by the public, the Government has about \$5.1 trillion of intragovernmental debt....including the Social Security (\$2.8 trillion) and Medicare (\$261.6 billion) trust funds. Intragovernmental debt is primarily held in Government trust funds in the form of special nonmarketable securities....Because these amounts are both liabilities of the Treasury and assets of the Government trust funds, they are eliminated as part of the consolidation process for the governmentwide financial statements. When those securities are redeemed, e.g., to pay future Social Security benefits, the Government will need to obtain the resources necessary to reimburse the trust funds."

Exhibit 26 depicts the figures reported in the SOSI for the Open group (current and future participants) for Medicare and Social Security for the years 2006 through 2015. The exhibit indicates that the net present value costs of Social Security and Medicare as of January 1, 2015 as reported in the SOSI for the Open Group was approximately \$41.4 trillion, a decline from the \$41.8 trillion reported in the 2014 SOSI. As noted previously, Medicaid is not reported in the SOSI because the government believes that it is a "general assistance" program and not a social insurance program.

12.2.1 Adjustments to Consider for Reported SOSI Figures

There are three adjustments to consider to the figures appearing in **Exhibit 26**.

12.2.1.1 Medicare Trustees Alternative Scenario

The first set of adjustments to consider relates to the uncertainties associated with achieving some of the ACA's projected cost reductions and the publication of an alternative scenario by the Medicare Trustees. These uncertainties are discussed in Note 23. Social Insurance in the 2015 Financial Report (footnote omitted).

"The financial projections for the Medicare program reflect substantial, but very uncertain, cost savings deriving from provisions of the ACA and the specified physician updates put in place by the MACRA. However, it is important to note that the improved results for HI and SMI Part B since 2010 depend in part on the long-range feasibility of the various cost-saving measures in the ACA—most importantly, the reductions in the annual payment rate updates for most categories of Medicare providers by the growth in economy-wide productivity. Under the ACA, the rate of increase of Medicare payment rates is equal to the prior law rate of increase (equal to the rate of increase in the prices of inputs used to produce Medicare services) less the rate of increase of total economy multifactor productivity. Without fundamental change in the current delivery system, these productivity-related adjustments to Medicare payment rates would probably not be viable indefinitely. However, this outcome is achievable if health care providers are able to realize productivity improvements at a faster rate than experienced historically. On the other hand, if the health sector cannot transition to more efficient models of care delivery and achieve productivity increases commensurate with economy-wide productivity, and if the provider reimbursement rates paid by commercial insurers continue to follow the same negotiated process used to date, then the availability and quality of health care received by Medicare beneficiaries would, under current law, fall over time relative to that received by those with private health insurance.

A transformation of health care in the United States, affecting both the means of delivery and the method of paying for care, is also a possibility. The ACA takes important steps in this direction by initiating programs of research into innovative payment and service delivery models, such as accountable care organizations, patient-centered medical homes, improvement in care coordination for individuals with multiple chronic health conditions, improvement in coordination of post-acute care, payment bundling, pay for performance, and assistance for individuals in making informed health choices. Such changes have the potential to reduce health care costs as well as cost growth rates and could, as a result, help lower Medicare cost growth rates to levels compatible with the lower price updates payable under current law.

The ability of new delivery and payment methods to significantly lower cost growth rates is uncertain at this time, since specific changes have not yet been designed, tested, or evaluated. Preliminary indications are that some of these delivery reforms have had modest levels of success in lowering costs, but at this time it is too early to tell if these reductions in spending will continue, or if they will grow to the magnitude needed to align with the statutory Medicare price updates. The ability of health care providers to sustain the price reductions for those providers impacted by the productivity adjustments and the specified updates to physician payments will be challenging, as the best available evidence indicates that most providers cannot improve their productivity to this degree for a prolonged period given the labor-intensive nature of these services and that physician costs will grow at a

faster rate than the specified updates. As a result, actual Medicare expenditures are highly uncertain for reasons apart from the inherent difficulty in projecting health care cost growth over time.

The reduction in provider payment updates, if implemented for all future years as required under current law, could have secondary impacts on provider participation, beneficiary access to care; quality of services; and other factors. These possible impacts are very speculative and at present there is no consensus among experts as to their potential scope. Further research and analysis will help to better inform this issue and may enable the development of specific projections of secondary effects under current law in the future.

The SOSI projections are based on current law, with one exception in regard to payment reductions that would result from the projected depletion of the Medicare Hospital Insurance (Part A) Trust Fund; under current law, payments would be reduced to levels that could be covered by incoming tax and premium revenues when the Medicare Hospital Insurance (Part A) Trust Funds are depleted.

The extent to which actual future Part A and Part B costs exceed the projected amounts due to changes to the productivity adjustments and specified physician updates depends on what specific changes might be legislated and whether Congress would pass further provisions to help offset such costs. However, absent an unprecedented change in health care delivery systems and payment mechanisms, the prices paid by Medicare for health services will fall increasingly short of the cost of providing such services. If this issue is not addressed by subsequent legislation, it is likely that access to, and quality of, physicians' services would deteriorate over time for beneficiaries. By the end of the long-range projection period, Medicare prices for many services would be less than half of their level without consideration of the productivity price reductions and physician payments would be 30 percent lower than they would have been under the SGR. Before such an outcome would occur, lawmakers would likely intervene to prevent the withdrawal of providers from the Medicare market and the severe problems with beneficiary access to care that would result. Overriding the productivity adjustments and specified physician updates, as lawmakers have done repeatedly in the case of physician payment rates, would lead to substantially higher costs for Medicare in the long range than those projected in this report.

To help illustrate and quantify the potential magnitude of the cost understatement, the Trustees asked the Office of the Actuary at CMS to prepare an illustrative Medicare Trust Fund projection under a hypothetical alternative that assumes that, starting in 2020, the economy-wide productivity adjustments gradually phase down to 0.4 percent, and starting in 2024, physician payments transition from a payment update of 0.0 percent to an increase of 2.3 percent. In addition, the illustrative alternative also assumes that requirements for the Independent Payment Advisory Board would not be implemented. This alternative was developed for illustrative purposes only; the calculations have not been audited; no endorsement of the policies underlying the illustrative alternative by the Trustees, CMS, or the Office of the Actuary should be inferred; and the examples do not attempt to portray likely or recommended future outcomes. Thus, the illustrations are useful only as general indicators of the substantial impacts that could result from future legislation affecting the productivity adjustments and physician updates under Medicare and of the broad range of uncertainty associated with such impacts. The table below contains a comparison of the

Medicare 75-year present values of estimated future income and estimated future expenditures under current law with those under the illustrative alternative scenario.

Exhibit 27 depicts an analysis of the excess of expenditures over income for Medicare under the alternative scenario for 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015. The \$36.8 trillion net present value cost for Medicaid under the alternative scenario is \$8.9 trillion larger than the \$27.9 trillion figure reported in the 2015 SOSI.

The quote below relates to 2015 amounts in **Exhibit 27**.

“The difference between the current law and illustrative alternative projections is substantial for Parts A and B. All Part A fee-for-service providers and roughly half of Part B fee-for-service providers are affected by the productivity adjustments, so the current-law projections reflect an estimated 1.1 percent reduction in annual cost growth each year for these providers. If the productivity adjustments were gradually phased out and physician updates transitioned to the Medicare Economic Index update of 2.3 percent, as illustrated under the alternative scenario, the estimated present value of Part A and Part B expenditures would be higher than the current law projections by roughly 22 percent and 23 percent, respectively. As indicated above, the present value of Part A income is basically unaffected under the alternative scenario.

The Part D values are similar under each projection because the services are not affected by the productivity adjustments or the physician updates. The very minor impact is the result of a slight change in the discount rates that are used to calculate the present values.

The extent to which actual future Part A and Part B costs exceed the projected amounts due to changes to the productivity adjustments and physician updates depends on what specific changes might be legislated and whether Congress would pass further provisions to help offset such costs. As noted, these examples reflect only hypothetical changes to provider payment rates.”

12.2.1.2 Limitation for Appropriated Funds

The second adjustment is due to the fact that both Social Security and Medicare Part A will run out of appropriated funds in coming years.

A footnote on page 5 of “A Citizen’s Guide to the 2015 Financial Report of the United States Government follows:

“The 2015 Medicare Trustees Report projects that the Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund will remain solvent until 2030 (unchanged from last year’s report). Under current law, tax revenue would be sufficient to pay 86 percent of estimated HI cost in 2030 and 84 percent by 2089. As for Social Security, under current law, the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Trust Fund reserves, considered on a theoretical combined basis, are projected to be depleted in 2034 (one year later than shown in last year’s Financial Report), at which time the projected share of scheduled benefits payable from trust fund income is 79 percent, declining to 73 percent in 2089. The Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund alone was expected to deplete by the end of 2016, at which time 81 percent of scheduled benefits would be payable. However, the impending depletion of the DI Trust Fund was circumvented by

the passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, which reallocated a portion of the payroll tax rate from the Old Age Survivors Insurance Trust Fund to the DI Trust Fund. This reallocation is expected to ensure full payment of disability benefits into 2022. The projections assume full Social Security and Medicare benefits are paid after the corresponding trust funds are exhausted. See <http://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/index.html> pp 3, 10, 11”

On page 28 in the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section is the following language (footnotes omitted):

“Costs as a percent of GDP of both Medicare and Social Security, which are analyzed annually in the Medicare and Social Security Trustees’ Reports, are projected to increase substantially through 2035 because: (1) the number of beneficiaries rises rapidly as the baby-boom generation retires and (2) the lower birth rates that have persisted since the baby boom cause slower growth in the labor force and GDP. According to the Medicare Trustees’ Report, spending on Medicare is projected to rise from its current level of approximately 3.5 percent of GDP to 5.6 percent in 2040 and to 6.0 percent in 2089. The Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund is now expected to remain solvent until 2030, (unchanged from last year’s report). Under current law, scheduled HI tax revenue would be sufficient to pay 86 percent of HI costs after depletion in 2030 and then gradually increasing to 84 percent by 2089.

As for Social Security, combined spending is projected to increase gradually from its current level of 4.9 percent of GDP to about 6.0 percent by 2035, declining to 5.9 percent by 2050 and rises to 6.2 percent by 2089. The Social Security Trustees’ Report indicates that annual OASDI income, considered on a theoretical basis, including interest on trust fund assets, will exceed annual cost and trust fund assets will increase every year until 2020, at which time it will be necessary to begin drawing down on trust fund assets to cover part of expenditures until asset reserves become depleted in 2034 (one year later than indicated in last year’s Report). Continuing tax income would be sufficient to pay 79 percent of scheduled benefits in 2034 and 73 percent of scheduled benefits in 2089. The Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund alone was expected to deplete much sooner, by the end of 2016. However, the impending depletion of the DI Trust Fund was circumvented by the passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, which reallocated a portion of the payroll tax rate from the Old Age Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund to the DI Trust Fund. This reallocation is expected to ensure full payment of disability benefits into 2022. The projections assume that full Social Security and Medicare benefits are paid after the corresponding trust fund assets are depleted.”

12.2.1.2.1 SOSI and Appropriated Funds

Exhibit 28 contains analysis of appropriated funds and unfunded amounts for each year from 2006 to 2015. For 2015 Medicare had \$25.0 trillion of net present value costs that were fully funded with appropriations.

12.2.1.3 Permanent Appropriations Do Not End at 75 Years

The third adjustment is tied to the fact that Social Security and Medicare have permanent appropriations which do not stop at 75 years. The following passage is found on page 199 of the Financial Report:

“The 75-year horizon represented in Table 5 (Author’s Note: Table not shown in this memorandum) is consistent with the primary focus of the Social Security and Medicare Trustees’ Reports. For the OASDI Program, for example, an additional \$13.4 trillion in present value will be needed above currently scheduled taxes to pay for scheduled benefits (\$10.7 trillion from the trust fund perspective). Yet, a 75-year projection can be a misleading indicator of all future financial flows. For example, when calculating unfunded obligations, a 75-year horizon includes revenue from some future workers but only a fraction of their future benefits. In order to provide a more complete estimate of the long-run unfunded obligations of the programs, estimates can be extended to the infinite horizon. The open-group infinite horizon net obligation is the present value of all expected future program outlays less the present value of all expected future program tax and premium revenues. Such a measure is provided in Table 6 (Author’s Note: Table Not Shown in this Memorandum) for the three trust funds represented in Table 5.

From the budget or governmentwide perspective, the values in line 1 plus the values in line 4 of Table 6 represent the value of resources needed to finance each of the programs into the infinite future. The sums are shown in the last line of the table (also equivalent to adding the values in the second and fifth lines). The total resources needed for all the programs sums to \$72.0 trillion in present value terms. This need can be satisfied only through increased borrowing, higher taxes, reduced program spending, or some combination.

The second line shows the value of the trust fund at the beginning of 2015. For the HI and OASDI Programs this represents, from the trust fund perspective, the extent to which the programs are funded. From that perspective, when the trust fund is subtracted, an additional \$25.7 trillion is needed to sustain the OASDI program into the infinite future, while an additional \$0.01 trillion is needed to sustain the HI program. However, looking just at present values ignores timing differences in the underlying projected cash flows; the HI Trust Fund is projected to remain solvent only until 2030. As described above, from the trust fund perspective, the SMI Program is fully funded, from a governmentwide basis, the substantial gap that exists between premiums, state transfer revenue, and program expenditures in the SMI Program (\$28.2 trillion and \$14.9 trillion for Parts B and D, respectively) represents future general revenue obligations of the federal budget.

In comparison to the analogous 75-year number in Table 5, extending the calculations beyond 2089, captures the full lifetime benefits, plus taxes and premiums of all current and future participants. The shorter horizon understates the total financial needs by capturing relatively more of the revenues from current and future workers and not capturing all of the benefits that are scheduled to be paid to them.

12.2.1.3.1 SOSI Infinite Horizon and Appropriated Funds

The Infinite Horizon data for the period from 2006 through 2015 appear in **Exhibit 29**. It indicates that in 2015 the net present value costs of Social Security and Medicare under an Infinite Horizon were \$28.5 and \$43.5 trillion, for a total of \$72.0 trillion

“Infinite Horizon” obligations for both Medicare and Social Security for 2015 are published in Table 6 on page 200 of the Financial Report. These figures have only been reported by the federal

government since 2004. Since 2004 each year's Financial Report contains a table analyzing that year's Infinite Horizon data.

Exhibit 30 and **Exhibit 31** summarize the analysis of appropriations and unfunded amounts for Social Security and Medicare under the infinite horizon for each year from 2006 through 2015. As of 2015 there are \$2.8 trillion of obligations that are fully funded (i.e. Congress has appropriated funds) for Social Security and there are \$43.5 trillion of obligations that are fully funded for Medicare.

In addition, **Exhibit 30** and **Exhibit 31** indicate that there are \$25.7 trillion of unfunded obligations for Social Security and there are no unfunded obligations for Medicare.

12.3 Statements of Long-Term Fiscal Projections

The Financial Statements section of the Financial Report contains a sub-section "Sustainability Financial Statements which is described, in part, as follows:

"The sustainability financial statements comprise the Statement of Long-Term Fiscal Projections, covering all federal government programs, and the Statement of Social Insurance and the Statement of Changes in Social Insurance Amounts, covering social insurance programs (Social Security, Medicare, Railroad Retirement, and Black Lung programs). The sustainability financial statements are designed to illustrate the relationship between projected receipts and expenditures if current policy is continued over a 75 year time horizon. For this purpose, the projections assume that scheduled social insurance benefit payments would continue after related trust funds are projected to be exhausted, contrary to current law, and that debt could continue to rise indefinitely without severe economic consequences. The sustainability financial statements are intended to help citizens understand current policy and the importance and magnitude of policy reforms necessary to make it sustainable."

Immediately following this general description is a sub-section "Statements of Long-Term Fiscal Projections" which is described as follows:

"The new statement of Long-Term Fiscal Projections in 2015 is intended to assist readers of the government's financial statements in assessing the financial condition of the federal government and how the government's financial condition has changed (improved or deteriorated) during the year and may change in the future. It is also intended to assist readers in assessing whether future budgetary resources of the Government will likely be sufficient to sustain public services and to meet obligations as they come due, assuming that current policy for federal government public services and taxation is continued without change.

The Statements of Long-Term Fiscal Projections display the present value of 75-year projections by major category of the Federal Government's receipts and non-interest spending. These projections show the extent to which future receipts of the Government exceed or fall short of the Government's non-interest spending. The projections are presented both in terms of present value dollars and in terms of present value dollars as a percent of present value Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Unaudited fiscal year 2014 projections from last year's Financial Report are included for comparison. The projections are on the basis of policies currently in place and are neither forecasts nor predictions. These projections are

consistent with the projections for Social Security and Medicare presented in the Statements of Social Insurance and are based on the same economic and demographic assumptions as underlie the Statements of Social Insurance. Note 24, Long-Term Fiscal Projections, further explains the methods used to prepare these projections and provides additional information such as the fiscal gap. Unaudited required supplementary information further assesses the sustainability of current fiscal policy and provides results based on alternative assumptions to those used in the basic statement.

As discussed further in Note 24, a sustainable policy is one where the ratio of debt held by the public to GDP (the debt-to-GDP ratio) is stable or declining over the long term. GDP measures the size of the Nation's economy in terms of the total value of all final goods and services that are produced in a year. Considering financial results relative to GDP is a useful indicator of the economy's capacity to sustain the Government's many programs."

12.4 GAO's Conclusion in 2015 Financial Report

In the U.S. Government Accountability Office Independent Auditor's Report is a section labeled "Long-Term Fiscal Challenges" which contains the following (footnotes omitted):

"While the near-term outlook has improved, the comprehensive long-term fiscal projections presented in the Statement of Long-Term Fiscal Projections, and related information in Note 24 and in the unaudited Required Supplementary Information section of the 2015 Financial Report show that absent policy changes, the federal government continues to face an unsustainable long-term fiscal path. In the near term, the projections in the 2015 Financial Report show the primary deficit continuing to decline from the recent historic highs. However, these projections do not reflect recent legislation enacted subsequent to September 30, 2015, which, in order to achieve certain national priorities and goals, causes deficits to increase in the near term. Over the long term, the imbalance between spending and revenue that is built into current law and policy is projected to lead to continued growth of debt held by the public as a share of gross domestic product (GDP). This situation—in which debt grows faster than GDP—means the current federal fiscal path is unsustainable.

Under these projections, spending for the major health and retirement programs will increase in coming decades more rapidly than GDP as more members of the baby boom generation become eligible for benefits. These projections, with regard to Social Security and Medicare, are based on the same assumptions underlying the information presented in the Statement of Social Insurance and assume that the provisions enacted in the ACA designed to slow the growth of Medicare costs are sustained and remain effective throughout the projection period. They also reflect the effects of the MACRA, which, among other things, revised the methodology for determining physician payment rates.¹⁸ If, however, the Medicare cost containment measures and physician payment rate methodology are not sustained over the long term—concerns expressed by the Trustees of the Medicare trust funds, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) Chief Actuary, the Congressional Budget Office, and others—spending on federal health care programs will grow more rapidly than assumed in the projections.

12.5 Net Present Value Cost of Medicaid Reported 2010 to 2015

Beginning with the 2010 Financial Report the federal government implemented Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard (“SFFAS”) No. 36, Reporting Comprehensive Long-Term Fiscal Projections of the U.S. Government. (Author’s Note: Statement is not shown in this memorandum) This required the federal government for the first time to disclose significantly more financial information about its obligations including Medicaid in a supplemental information section described as “Fiscal Projections for the U.S. Government – Fiscal Year 2010.”

“[T]he Government is now required to include a statement presenting for all its activities (a) the present value of projected receipts and non-interest spending under current policy without change...[T]he Government is also required to disclose, the assumptions underlying the projections, the factors influencing trends, and significant changes in the projections from period to period.”

Footnote 24. Long-Term Fiscal Projections in the 2015 Financial Report contains the following excerpted descriptions of the assumptions used in the projections (footnotes omitted):

“The projections and analysis presented here are extrapolations based on an array of assumptions described in detail below. A fundamental assumption is that current Federal policy will not change. This assumption is made so as to inform the question of whether current fiscal policy is sustainable and, if it is not sustainable, the magnitude of needed reforms to make fiscal policy sustainable. The projections are therefore neither forecasts nor predictions. If policy changes are implemented, perhaps in response to projections like those presented here, then actual financial outcomes will of course be different than those projected. The methods and assumptions underlying the projections are subject to continuing refinement.

The projections focus on future cash flows, and do not reflect either the accrual basis or the modified-cash basis of accounting. These cash-based projections reflect receipts or spending at the time cash is received or when a payment is made by the Government. In contrast, accrual-based projections would reflect amounts in the time period in which income is earned or when an expense or obligation is incurred. The cash basis accounting underlying the long-term fiscal projections is consistent with methods used to prepare the Statements of Social Insurance (SOSI) and the generally cash-based Federal budget.

The basic financial statement, Long-Term Fiscal Projections for the U.S. Government, displays the present value of 75 year projections for various categories of the Federal Government’s receipts and non-interest spending. Unaudited fiscal year 2014 projections from last year’s Financial Report are included for comparison. The projections for fiscal years 2015 and 2014 are expressed in present value dollars and as a percentage of the present value of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as of September 30, 2015 and September 30, 2014, respectively.”

“As is true for prior fiscal year projections, the assumptions for GDP, interest rates, and other economic factors underlying this year’s projections are the same assumptions that underlie the most recent Social Security and Medicare trustees’ report projections. The use of discount factors consistent with the Social Security trustees’ rate allows for consistent

present value calculations over 75 years between the Statements of Long-Term Fiscal Projections and the Statements of Social Insurance.”

“Medicaid: The Medicaid spending projections start with the projections from the 2014 *Actuarial Report on the Financial Outlook for Medicaid* prepared by the Office of the Actuary, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). These projections are based on recent trends in Medicaid spending, the demographic, economic, and health cost growth assumptions in the 2014 Medicare Trustees’ Report, and projections of the effect of the *Affordable Care Act* (ACA) on Medicaid enrollment. The projections, which end in 2023, are adjusted to accord with the actual Medicaid expenditures in fiscal year 2015. After 2023, the projections assume no further expansion in State Medicaid coverage under the ACA, with the number of Medicaid beneficiaries expected to grow at the same rate as total population, and Medicaid costs per beneficiary assumed to grow at the same rate as Medicare benefits per beneficiary, as is generally consistent with the experience since 1987. Between 1987 and 2014, the average annual growth rate of outlays per beneficiary for Medicaid and Medicare were within 0.4 percentage point of each other. Projections of Medicaid spending are subject to added uncertainty related to: (1) assumed reductions in health care cost growth discussed above in the context of Medicare, and (2) the projected size of the Medicaid enrolled population, which depends on a variety of factors, including the future extent of the ACA Medicaid expansion.

The Statement of Long-Term Fiscal Projections for the U.S. Government displays figures for Medicaid for 2015 and 2014 of \$27.3 trillion and \$26.0 trillion, respectively. **Exhibit 32** displays the reported net present value cost of the Federal Government’s portion of Medicaid from 2010 through 2015.

12.5.1 Adjustments to Consider for Medicaid’s Net Present Value Cost

There are two adjustments that one must consider to the \$27.3 trillion estimate for the net present value cost of Medicaid as of September 30, 2015.

First and foremost, one must recall the quote in section 12.1.1 of this memorandum taken from the GAO’s Auditor’s Report for the 2015 Financial Report which indicated that:

“Management noted that these significant uncertainties about projected reductions in health care cost growth also affect the projected Medicare and Medicaid costs reported in the 2015 Statement of Long-Term Fiscal Projections.”

The \$27.3 trillion figure was based upon savings assumptions associated with the ACA similar to those used to generate the \$27.9 trillion Medicare net present value cost figure published simultaneously. However, these assumptions were so unrealistic that the government published an alternate, and more realistic, scenario which indicated that Medicare had a net present value cost of \$36.8 trillion. No alternate figure was published for Medicaid.

The second adjustment that must be considered is related to the fact that Medicaid has permanent appropriations which do not stop at 75 years. As noted by the federal government for the social insurance obligations, “The shorter horizon understates financial needs by capturing relatively more of the revenues from current and future workers and not capturing all of the benefits that are

scheduled to be paid to them.” Therefore, “Infinite Horizon” obligations for Medicaid are needed but the federal government does not calculate or publish these figures.

12.6 Medicaid Obligations Exceed \$1 Trillion for Four States

In order to calculate the states net present value obligation in 2015 we utilize the totals in columns 2 and 4 on **Exhibit 8**. Federal spending in 2015 of \$317,302 divided by total spending of \$512,315 produces a percentage of 61.934942%. If we divide the \$27.3 trillion figure published by the federal government for its portion of Medicaid by this percentage the result is \$44.078510 trillion. Subtracting the federal figure of \$27.3 trillion indicates that the states net present value obligation for Medicaid is \$16.778510 trillion.

Based on the states spending for the Medicaid program in 2015 there are four states that have a net present value cost obligation that exceeds \$1 trillion – California, Ohio, New York and Texas. This obligation appears nowhere in any of these states financial statements. For example, the State of New York’s obligation is approximately \$1.4 trillion.

Exhibit 8 depicts the estimated obligation in 2015 for all fifty states. Each of these obligations is clearly material to each state’s financial results and financial position.

13 Feds Actual Financial Results and Financial Position - A Closer Approximation

This Chapter will provide an estimate of the financial results of the Federal government for the last decade as well as two estimates of its financial position as of September 30, 2015. It is important to note that the author will attempt to adjust state Statement of Net Cost and the Balance Sheet for the impact of correctly accounting for the Social Insurance programs and Medicaid. No attempt is made to consolidate the Federal Reserve System, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into the government's reported results.

The first estimate of the federal government's financial position will be based solely on amounts calculated from figures published by the Federal government. The second estimate will make some reasonable assumptions to estimate amounts that the Federal government should have published even under their remarkably lacking financial reporting....but have not published.

13.1 The President's Budget

The simplest way to think about our government's recent financial results is to add up all the expenditures and revenues over the last decade and divide the total expenditures by total revenues. This produces a "dollar spent per dollar of revenue" figure which everyone that manages a household can understand.

Exhibit 1 displays The President's Budget for the years 2006 through 2015. Over the last decade, under budget accounting, the federal government has outlays of \$33.13 trillion while recording receipts of \$25.57 trillion. Thus, the Federal government has spent \$1.30 for every \$1 of revenue it has received.

Please note that the budget deficit does not include the multi-trillion dollar annual increases in the present value of our Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid obligations. Everyone that has a credit card knows that the amount that you spent in any year is equal to the amount that you paid the credit card company plus or minus the increase or decrease in your year-end balance. The government conveniently ignores the second half of the calculation.

13.2 The Financial Report of the United States Government

Exhibit 2 displays The Financial Report for the years 2006 through 2015. Over the last decade, under the Federal Government's accrual accounting used in the Financial Report it has spent \$35.38 trillion while recording revenues of \$25.57 trillion. Thus, the Federal government has spent \$1.38 for every \$1 of revenue it has received.

13.3 Analysis of Medicare Appropriations - SOSI, Alternative Scenario and Infinite Horizon

Exhibit 33 displays Medicare appropriations for the amounts reported in SOSI, the amounts reported in the alternative scenario and the amounts reported under the Infinite Horizon. The time frame analyzed is from 2006 through 2015.

As of 2015 Medicare has appropriations of \$25 trillion for the amounts recorded in SOSI. Meanwhile, it has \$29.2 trillion of appropriations for the amounts recorded in the illustrative alternative

scenario for Medicare published for 2015. Finally, under the Infinite Horizon Medicare has \$43.5 trillion in appropriations.

For purposes of the first estimate described in the opening paragraphs of this Chapter 13 we will use the \$43.5 trillion figure for Medicare for balance sheet purposes as of September 30, 2015. In addition, we will utilize the change in Medicare amounts over the Infinite Horizon from 2005 through 2015 for purposes of calculating the impact on the Statements of Net Cost for that time frame.

13.4 Analysis of Social Insurance and Medicaid Appropriations

Exhibit 3 depicts Social Insurance and Medicaid obligations that are fully funded with appropriations from 2006 through 2015. The Social Security figures are taken from **Exhibit 30**. The Medicare amounts are based on the Infinite Horizon and are taken from **Exhibit 31** and the Medicaid figures are taken from **Exhibit 32**.

Please note that the Medicare obligations are understated because the Federal Government does not publish Infinite Horizon figures for the Alternate Scenario. In addition, the Medicaid obligations are significantly understated as the federal government has not published 1) Alternative Scenario, 2) Infinite Horizon or 3) Alternative Scenario Infinite Horizon figures for Medicaid for any period.

13.4.1 An Adjustment to Consider - The Discount Rate is Too High

Using a discount rate that is too high has the effect of substantially lowering the net present value cost of the Social Insurance and Medicaid programs. The rate used by the government has been 5.7% or lately, 5.6%. Both are substantially higher than the highest 30-year rate recorded in the last decade.

The discount rate assumption used in the long-term, as opposed to the varying rates used in the first ten years, looks too high based on the last decades' 30-year Treasury rates as reported by the United States Department of the Treasury in its "Daily Yield Curve Rates" schedule posted on its web site. Please note that the Financial Reports do not display the discount rates used in all years.

The discount rates depicted in the 2006 Financial Report that were used to discount all of the obligations associated with the SOSI were 4.9% for 2006, 5.9% for 2010 and 5.7% for 2020 and all later years.

The discount rates depicted in the 2009 Financial Report that were used to discount all of the obligations associated with the SOSI were 3.0% for 2009, 4.0% for 2010 and 5.7% for 2020 and all later years.

The discount rates depicted in the 2010 Financial Report that were used to discount all of the obligations associated with the SOSI and Medicaid were 3.4% for 2010 and 5.7% for 2020 and all later years.

The discount rates depicted in the 2015 Financial Report that were used to discount all of the obligations associated with the SOSI and Medicaid were 2.2% for 2015, 5.3% for 2020 and 5.6% for 2030 and all later years.

The highest rates for the 30-year Treasury for each individual year with the date listed appear below.

2006	5/12/2006	5.29%
2007	6/12/2007	5.35%
2008	6/13/2008	4.79%
2009	6/10/2009	4.76%
2010	4/5/2010	4.85%
2011	2/8/2011	4.76%
2013	12/31/2013	3.96%
2014	1/3/2014	3.93%
2015	6/26/2015	3.25%
2016	1/5/2016	3.01%

13.5 Net Operating Cost Adjusted for Changes in Legal Obligations with Appropriations

Exhibit 4 displays The Financial Report's Net Operating Cost figures adjusted to account for the annual changes in the net present value cost of the Social Insurance and Medicaid obligations that are fully funded with appropriations. These adjusted figures come much closer to reflecting the federal government's economic reality.

Over the last decade, after adjusting the Federal Government's accrual accounting used in the Financial Report to include the net change in the present value cost of legal obligations with appropriations it has spent \$62.89 trillion while recording revenues of \$25.57 trillion. Thus, the Federal government has spent \$2.46 for every \$1 of revenue it has received.

Just to be clear about the size of the problem, over the last decade, using reported figures that are understated, incomplete estimates, the federal government spent almost \$63 trillion while it took in a little less than \$26 trillion. The government pretends that obligated money is not spent until the future arrives; a legally correct accounting must accrue for those future payments.

13.6 The Financial Report's Adjusted Balance Sheet

Exhibit 5 shows that the federal government's legal obligations are almost \$92 trillion, which is far above the carefully defined debt-ceiling limit of \$18.1 trillion (currently suspended until March 2017) and are over five times the size of the gross domestic product and almost twenty-eight times the size of the government's revenues in fiscal 2015.

13.7 The Second Estimate – Economic Reality is Much Worse!

In this section we will do some "horseback arithmetic" to calculate the Federal Government's economic reality (i.e., how much worse the balance sheet is than the first estimate). It is not practical

to estimate the impact on an annual basis for the 2006 to 2015 time frame on the Financial Report's Net Operating Cost.

As noted above the Medicare obligations are understated in the first estimate because the Federal Government does not publish Infinite Horizon figures for the Alternate Scenario. In addition, the Medicaid obligations are significantly understated as the federal government has not published 1) Alternative Scenario, 2) Infinite Horizon or 3) Alternative Scenario Infinite Horizon figures for Medicaid for any period.

13.7.1 Fully Funded Infinite Horizon Amounts for the Alternative Scenario for Medicare

Exhibit 33 indicates that for 2015 the amount reported for the Alternative Scenario that has appropriations is \$29.2 trillion and the amount reported in SOSI with appropriations is \$25.0 trillion. The Alternative Scenario figure is 16.8% higher than the fully funded amount reported in SOSI. In addition, **Exhibit 33** indicates that the amount reported under the Infinite Horizon is \$43.5 trillion. This figure is 74% higher than the amount reported in SOSI. If we use the 74% figure to gross up the \$29.2 trillion amount for the Alternative Scenario, the result is a net present value cost for fully funded Infinite Horizon amounts for the Alternative Scenario of \$50.8 trillion, an increase of \$7.3 trillion over the fully funded Infinite Horizon figure.

13.7.2 Fully Funded Infinite Horizon Amounts for the Alternative Scenario for Medicaid

In order to estimate the Infinite Horizon for the Alternative Scenario for Medicaid we will first gross up the Medicaid figure reported in **Exhibit 3** by 16.8% (the same as the Medicare figure above) to estimate the Alternative Scenario amount that is fully funded. This yields a figure of \$31.9 trillion. This figure is then grossed up by 74% to estimate the Infinite Horizon amount. It yields a figure of \$55.5 trillion. This exceeds the reported fully funded Medicaid figure of \$27.3 trillion by \$28.2 trillion.

13.7.3 States' Aggregate Medicaid Obligation is \$34.1 Trillion

Based on the estimate of the federal government's net present value cost obligation for Medicaid of \$55.5 trillion we calculate the net present value cost of the entire program by dividing this figure by the federal governments' percentage of total spending in 2015. We utilize the totals in columns 2 and 4 of Exhibit 6. Federal spending of \$317,302 divided by total spending of \$512,315 produces a percentage of 61.934942%. Dividing \$55.5 trillion by this figure produces a result of \$89.610158 trillion. Subtracting the federal amount of \$55.5 trillion indicates that the states' aggregate net present value cost obligation for Medicaid is \$34.110158 trillion.

13.7.4 Second Estimate – Financial Report's Adjusted Balance Sheet

Based on the two revised estimates for fully funded Medicare and Medicaid amounts the Federal Government's legal obligations for SOSI and Medicaid are estimated to be \$35.5 trillion higher than the \$73.6 trillion for 2015 reported on **Exhibit 3**. The Federal Government's Total Net Obligation on **Exhibit 5** would be \$127.3 trillion.

Appendices

I. Overview of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

a. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants – FAQs

The AICPA's website page answering Frequently Asked Questions about the AICPA include the following excerpts:

What is the AICPA?

The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is the national professional organization for Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) in the United States.

What is the AICPA's Mission and how is it carried out?

The AICPA's mission is powering the success of global business, CPAs, CGMAs (author's note: This acronym means Chartered Global Management Accountant) and specialty credentials by providing the most relevant knowledge, resources and advocacy, and protecting the evolving public interest. In fulfilling its mission, the AICPA works with state CPA organizations and gives priority to those areas where public reliance on CPA skills is most significant.

When was the AICPA founded?

The AICPA was founded in 1887 and upon its creation, established accountancy as a profession distinguished by rigorous educational requirements, high professional standards, a strict code of professional ethics, licensing status and a commitment to serving the public interest.

Who leads the AICPA?

The AICPA Board of Directors acts as the executive committee for the governing Council which determines Institute programs and establishes general policies. The Council is made up of elected and appointed members from each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and Guam. The Board oversees management and organizes the various volunteer committees which report to it.

How many members are there?

The AICPA has more than 412,000 members in 144 countries, including CPAs in business and industry, public accounting, government, education, student affiliates and international associates.

Who determines GAAP?

Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are uniform minimum standards of, and guidelines to, financial accounting and reporting. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) are authorized to establish these principles.

b. FAQs - Become a CPA

The AICPA's website page FAQs – Become a CPA answering frequently asked questions about becoming a CPA. It includes the following excerpts:

1. Does the AICPA license CPAs?

No. The licensing authority and requirements for CPAs falls under the jurisdiction of the Board of Accountancy for the state, district, or country in which a CPA practices. In adherence to the AICPA mission, the Institute seeks the highest possible level of uniform certification and licensing standards while promoting and protecting the CPA designation. The national organization representing the state boards is the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy ([NASBA](#)).

2. What are the requirements for becoming a CPA?

The requirements, which are set by each state board of accountancy, include: completing a program of study in accounting at a college or university, passing the Uniform CPA Exam, and obtaining a specific amount of professional work experience in public accounting (the required amount and type of experience varies according to licensing jurisdiction). You can learn more about your state requirements and find your state board's contact information on the AICPA's website for college students and CPA candidates in the [state requirements section](#).

Who disciplines CPAs when something goes wrong? Can the AICPA revoke the license of a CPA?

Upon joining the AICPA, a member agrees to abide by its [Code of Professional Conduct](#) and [Bylaws](#) adopted by a vote of the membership. The bylaws provide a structure for enforcement of the Code by the Institute's [Professional Ethics Division](#). When allegations come to the attention of the Ethics Division regarding a violation of the Code, the division investigates the matter, under due process procedures, and depending upon the facts found in the investigation, may take a confidential disciplinary action, settle the matter with suspension or revocation of membership rights, or refer the matter to a panel of the Trial Board Division for a hearing. The bylaws mandate publishing the member's name if he or she is found guilty by a hearing panel, is suspended or expelled by settlement.

The bylaws of 51 state and/or territorial CPA societies provide for their participation in a Joint Ethics Enforcement Program so that, depending upon membership status, actions taken by one or more of these societies or the AICPA are in the names of both the society and AICPA.

State regulatory agencies (Boards of Accountancy) issue practice licenses to CPAs and only those agencies may act to affect those licenses. The AICPA does not license CPAs. Those state regulatory agencies may take disciplinary action affecting practice licenses under statutes, regulations and rulings of the state. Also, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other Federal government agencies may, under Federal law or regulation, discipline CPAs who practice before these agencies.

c. AICPA Governing Body, Its Composition and Powers

The AICPA web site describes its governing body as follows:

Council is the governing body of the AICPA and is comprised of approximately 265 members and representatives from every state and U.S. Territory. Council meets twice a year, in May and October, and Regional Council meetings are held every year in March.

The AICPA bylaws indicate that the Council shall be composed of:

3.3.1.1 Members of the Institute directly elected by the membership in each state in accordance with sections **6.1.1 through 6.1.6**;

3.3.1.2 Representatives of the recognized state societies of certified public accountants selected in accordance with **section 6.2**;

3.3.1.3 Twenty-one members-at-large selected in accordance with **section 6.3**;

3.3.1.4 All members of the Board of Directors of the Institute;

3.3.1.5 All past presidents of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants who served prior to December 31, 1973, and are members of the Institute;

3.3.1.6 All past chairmen of the board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants who are members of the Institute.

The bylaws also indicate that the Council shall have the following powers and is required to report its actions to the membership of the AICPA.

3.3.2 Powers

The Council may exercise all powers requisite for the purposes of the Institute, not inconsistent with these bylaws or with duly enacted resolutions of the membership, including but not limited to the authority to prescribe the policies and procedures of the Institute and to enact resolutions binding upon the Board of Directors, the officers, committees, and staff.

3.3.3 Reports to Membership

The actions of the Council shall be reported to the membership at least annually.

d. AICPA Code of Professional Conduct – Rule 203

All members of the AICPA must follow its Code of Professional Conduct and Bylaws dated June 1, 2013.

ET Section 203**Accounting Principles**

.01 Rule 203 – Accounting principles A member shall not (1) express an opinion or state affirmatively that the financial statements or other financial data of any entity are presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or (2) state that he or she is not aware of any material modifications that should be made to such statements or data in order for them to be in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, if such statements or data contain any departure from an accounting principle promulgated by bodies designated by council to establish such principles that has a material effect on the statements or data taken as a whole. If, however, the statements or data contain such a departure and a member can demonstrate that due to unusual circumstances the financial statements or data would otherwise have been misleading, the member can comply with the rule by describing the departure, its approximate effects, if practicable, and the reasons why compliance with the principle would result in a misleading statement.

.03 203-2 – Status of FASB, GASB and FASAB interpretations Council is authorized under Rule 203 [sec. 203 par. .01] to designate bodies to establish accounting principles. Council has designated the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as such a body and has resolved that FASB *Accounting Standards Codification*TM (ASC) constitutes accounting principles as contemplated in Rule 203 [sec. 203 par. .01]. Council has also designated the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), with respect to Statements of Governmental Accounting Standards issued in July 1984 and thereafter, as the body to establish financial accounting principles for state and local governmental entities pursuant to Rule 203 [sec. 203 par. .01]. Council has also designated the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB), with respect to Statements of Federal Accounting Standards adopted and issued in March 1993 and subsequently, as the body to establish accounting principles for federal government entities pursuant to Rule 203 [sec. 203 par. .01].

In determining the existence of a departure from an accounting principle as established in FASB ASC and encompassed by Rule 203 [sec. 203 par. .01], or the existence of a departure from an accounting principle established by a Statement of Governmental Accounting Standards or a Statement of Federal Accounting Standards encompassed by Rule 203 [sec. 203 par. .01], the division of professional ethics will construe such codification or statements, in the light of any interpretations thereof issued by FASB, GASB or FASAB.

II. Overview of the Financial Accounting Foundation and Governmental Accounting Standards Board

a. “Facts About FAF” from its website:

Organized in 1972, the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) is the independent, private-sector organization with responsibility for:

Establishing and improving financial accounting and reporting standards;

Educating constituents about those standards;

Selecting the members of the standard-setting Boards and Advisory Councils;

The oversight, administration, and finances of its standard-setting Boards, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), and their Advisory Councils; and

Protecting the independence and integrity of the standard-setting process.

The Foundation is a non-stock Delaware corporation that operates exclusively for charitable, educational, scientific, and literary purposes within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Foundation, FASB, and GASB are located in Norwalk, CT.

b. FAF Mission

To establish and improve financial accounting and reporting standards, fostering financial reporting that provides decision-useful information to investors and other users of financial reports. This mission is accomplished through a comprehensive and independent standard-setting process that encourages broad participation, objectively considers all stakeholder views, and is subject to appropriate oversight and accountability.

c. FAF Organizations

Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)

Established by the FAF in 1973, the FASB has been delegated the authority to establish standards of financial accounting and reporting for private-sector entities, including business and not-for-profit organizations. FASB standards are recognized as generally accepted and authoritative.

Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB)

Organized by the FAF in 1984, the GASB has been delegated the authority to establish standards of financial accounting and reporting for state and local governmental entities. GASB pronouncements are recognized as generally accepted and authoritative.

Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council (FASAC)

Comprised of FASB constituents, the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council consults with the FASB on technical issues, project priorities, and other matters likely to concern the FASB.

Governmental Accounting Standards Advisory Council (GASAC)

Comprised of GASB constituents, the Governmental Accounting Standards Advisory Council

consults with the GASB on technical issues, project priorities, and other matters likely to concern the GASB.

Private Company Council (PCC)

The PCC determines alternatives to existing nongovernmental U.S. GAAP to address the needs of users of private company financial statements, based on criteria mutually agreed upon by the PCC and the FASB. Before being incorporated into U.S. GAAP, PCC recommendations will be subject to a FASB endorsement process. The PCC also serves as the primary advisory body to the FASB on the appropriate treatment for private companies for items under active consideration on the FASB's technical agenda.

d. FAF Governance

About the FAF Trustees

The FAF Board of Trustees comprises 14-18 members from varied backgrounds—users, preparers, and auditors of financial statements; state and local government officials; academics; and regulators. The FAF directs the effective, efficient, and appropriate stewardship of the FASB and GASB in carrying out their missions; selects and appoints FASB and GASB members and their advisory councils; oversees the Boards' activities and due process; and promotes and protects the independence of the Boards.

e. By-Laws of the Financial Accounting Foundation

Selected excerpts of the By-laws appear below:

CHAPTER A, ARTICLE I - BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Section 1. Authority, Functions, and Powers.

(a) The business and affairs of the Financial Accounting Foundation (the "Foundation") shall be managed by or under the direction of its Board of Trustees (the "Board of Trustees"), which shall have and may exercise all authority and powers, and perform all functions of the Foundation and do such lawful acts and things as are not, by the Certificate of Incorporation (as may be amended or restated from time to time, the "Certificate of Incorporation") or by or pursuant to these By-Laws, directed or required to be exercised or performed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (the "FASB"), or by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (the "GASB"), or the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council (the "FASAC") in its advisory capacity, or by the Governmental Accounting Standards Advisory Council (the "GASAC") in its advisory capacity.

(b) In carrying out its authority, functions, powers, and oversight responsibilities under this Article, the Board of Trustees shall not direct the FASB or the GASB to undertake or to omit to undertake any particular project or activity or otherwise affect the exercise by the FASB or the GASB of their respective authorities, functions, and powers in the establishment and improvement of financial accounting and reporting standards, and the Board of Trustees shall take care not to impair, in fact or perception, the independence and objectivity of the FASB or the GASB in the establishment and improvement of financial accounting and reporting standards.

(c) Subject to the foregoing:

i. The Board of Trustees shall provide for the appropriate funding and resources for the Foundation, the FASB, the GASB, the FASAC, and the GASAC.

ii. The Board of Trustees shall oversee the strategic planning, promotion and positioning of the Foundation, the FASB and the GASB in the evolution of financial accounting and reporting standards for the private and public sectors.

iii. The Board of Trustees shall perform reviews of, and have power of approval over, the annual budgets of the Foundation, the FASB and the GASB as prepared and presented to it by the President of the Foundation, the Chair of the FASB and the Chair of the GASB, respectively, and shall review the financial statements of the Foundation, as prepared and presented to it by the President of the Foundation.

Section 2. Oversight.

(a) In connection with the exercise of its authority, functions, and powers under *Section 1* of this Article, the Board of Trustees, among other things, shall provide oversight, on an ongoing basis, over the activities of the FASB, the GASB and their due process practices, policies and procedures, including, but not limited to, agenda setting, solicitation and consideration of public comments; post-issuance evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of FASB and GASB standards and standard-setting activities; the performance of the FASB and the GASB within the context of their mission statements; and such other activities and matters as the Board of Trustees, in its discretion, may determine.

Section 4. Qualifications.

(a) Of the number of Trustees comprising the full Board of Trustees from time to time, at least three (3) shall be designated as “Governmental Trustees” and shall be individuals who, in the judgment of the Board of Trustees, have extensive experience as financial officers or as elected officials of state or local governmental entities, and the remaining Trustees shall be designated as “at-large Trustees” and shall be individuals with business, investment, capital markets, accounting, accounting and business education, financial, government, regulatory, investor advocate or other experience who, in the judgment of the Board of Trustees, can contribute to advancing the purposes of the Foundation. The responsibilities of a Trustee shall be personal to each person elected as a Trustee, and no Trustee shall have any power of substitution or delegation of authority as a Trustee.

Section 5. Nominations.

(a) Nominations for at-large Trustees, other than the Chairman Trustee, shall be sought by the Foundation from a broad array of groups, as the Board of Trustees, or any designated committee thereof, deems appropriate. Such groups may include domestic and international investor, accounting, and business organizations; financial and capital markets participants; accounting and business academicians; consumer groups; regulatory organizations; and other interested entities and persons. The Trustees may also nominate candidates for at-Large Trustees. The Board of Trustees, or any designated committee thereof, shall have sole authority to nominate all candidates for the office of Chairman Trustee, and any nominee for such office may, but need not, be a member of the Board of Trustees at the time nominated.

(b) Subject to the provisions of this *Section 5*, candidates for each Governmental Trustee position shall be nominated pursuant to procedures adopted jointly by the Government Finance Officers Association, the National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers, the Council of State Governments, the International City/County Management Association, the National Association of Counties, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Governors' Association, the National League of Cities, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors (such associations being hereinafter referred to collectively as the “Governmental Organizations”); provided that, if

requested by the Foundation, the Governmental Organizations shall be obligated, as a condition to their continuing rights under this *Section 5*, to consult with the Foundation on attributes, skills and specific experiences desired by the Foundation of candidates for any particular Governmental Trustee office, and to review the credentials of, and consider as potential nominees in their nominating processes, candidates identified to such Governmental Organizations by the Foundation.

CHAPTER A, ARTICLE IV - GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD

Section 1. Governmental Accounting Standards Board. The Board of Trustees shall appoint a board, which shall be known as the Governmental Accounting Standards Board ("GASB"), whose members shall be appointed without regard to employment or discipline and shall have the qualifications provided in *Section 2* of this Article. The GASB shall have and may exercise all authority, functions, and powers of the Foundation and the Board of Trustees in respect of the establishment and improvement of standards of financial accounting and reporting, including the conduct of all activities related thereto not reserved to the Board of Trustees or others in the Certificate of Incorporation or in these By-Laws, in respect of activities and transactions of state and local governmental entities, which authority, functions, and powers shall be exercised by the GASB in conformity with these By-Laws.

Section 2. Number and Qualifications of Members. The number of members that shall constitute a full Governmental Accounting Standards Board shall be seven (7). Each member of the GASB shall, in the judgment of the Board of Trustees, have knowledge of governmental accounting and finance and a concern for the public interest in matters of financial accounting and reporting. Members of the GASB shall receive compensation as determined by the Board of Trustees. The Chair of the GASB shall serve full time. Unless all members of the GASB shall be appointed to serve as full-time GASB members, such other members of the GASB shall serve on either a full-time or part-time basis as the Board of Trustees from time to time shall determine, and if part time, may be in the employ of other organizations while serving on the GASB, subject to such policies as the Board of Trustees may from time to time approve.

Section 5. Statements of the GASB; Voting; Quorum. The GASB is hereby authorized to issue Statements of Governmental Accounting Standards, as hereinafter described in this Article. The Rules of Procedure prescribed by the GASB shall set forth and provide for procedures with respect to the establishing of project plans of the GASB and issuing of Statements. Such rules shall provide that the GASB prepare short – and long – range project plans, including the agenda of projects and their priorities, which plans and all modifications thereto shall be approved by at least a majority of the GASB's members. The GASB's Statements shall relate to accounting and presenting financial information by state and local governmental entities.

The GASB shall not issue any Statement of Governmental Accounting Standards, or any Exposure Draft of any such Statement, without the approval of at least a majority of its members, except in the case of vacancy, disability of any duration or character preventing any member from voting, or in the event that any member, at any time prior to the vote, disqualifies himself or herself from voting for reasons related to a policy of the Board of Trustees adopted pursuant to *Section 4* of this Article, in any of which events the approval of not less than a majority (but in no event less than three) of the remaining members of the GASB shall be sufficient.

CHAPTER A, ARTICLE V - GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVISORY COUNCIL

Section 1. Governmental Accounting Standards Advisory Council. The Board of Trustees shall establish a council of not less than twenty persons who, in the judgment of the Board of Trustees, shall be knowledgeable about the issues involving, and impact of, financial accounting and reporting by state and local governmental entities or shall possess an expertise of value to the GASB, which council shall be known as the Governmental Accounting Standards Advisory Council (the "GASAC"). The membership of the GASAC shall broadly represent varied professional and occupational backgrounds with no profession or occupation dominating. As a means of involving the public in the governmental accounting standard-setting process, the Board of Trustees, in initially appointing the members of the GASAC, shall invite the following organizations to nominate an individual to serve on the GASAC: American Accounting Association; American Institute of Certified Public Accountants; Association of Government Accountants; Association of School Business Officials; Council of State Governments; Financial Accounting Foundation; Government Finance Officers Association; Healthcare Financial Management Association; International City/County Management Association; National Association of College and University Business Officers; National Association of Counties; National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers; National Conference of State Legislatures; National Governors' Association; National League of Cities; United States Conference of Mayors; and United States Government Accountability Office. In addition, in initially appointing the members of the GASAC, the Board of Trustees shall seek an individual knowledgeable in the municipal bond rating process, an individual knowledgeable in underwriting government securities offerings, and a user of the financial reports of state and local governmental entities (such as a bank or insurance company investment officer).

Section 3. Functions of the GASAC. The GASAC shall consult with the GASB concerning major technical issues, the GASB's agenda of projects and the assigning of priorities thereto, matters likely to require the GASB's attention, the selection and organization of GASB task forces and other groups, and such other matters as may be requested by the GASB or its Chair. Members of the GASAC are expected to provide comments in respect of Exposure Drafts of Statements of Governmental Accounting Standards, discussion documents, proposed Technical Bulletins and other documents proposed for issuance by the GASB, as well as comments and other expressions of views on such other matters as may be referred to the GASAC or its members from time to time by the Chair of the GASAC or by the GASB or its Chair. Members of the GASAC are also expected to consider and provide comments on broader policy questions, such as whether an issue needs addressing, criteria for adding projects to the GASB's technical agenda, relative priorities of agenda projects, whether stakeholder views are being appropriately balanced, cost/benefit relationships, and due process considerations.

CHAPTER B, ARTICLE VII - FINANCES

Section 1. Funds. The funds necessary to conduct the business of the Foundation may be provided through business operations of the Foundation, funding provided through federal, state and/or local legislation, or as otherwise determined by the Board of Trustees, subject to the applicable provisions of the Certificate of Incorporation.

f. The FAF, FASB and GASB Have Developed a Strategic Plan

The Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF), the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), working jointly, have developed a strategic plan to articulate the long-range vision and mission of each of the groups and the organization collectively. This plan represents an evolution and a refinement of previous plans and mission statements developed by the groups. The language and content will be familiar to those who have followed the work of the FAF, the FASB, and the GASB.

The strategic plan affirms the discrete, individual roles of the groups comprising the FAF, while describing the overarching vision and mission that we share. The plan recognizes that the FASB and the GASB are solely responsible for developing and establishing financial accounting and reporting standards. The plan also recognizes that the role of the FAF management team is to provide strategic counsel and services that support the mission, activities, and independence of the FASB and the GASB. The FAF Trustees are responsible for overall governance of the FAF, oversight of the FASB and the GASB, and for protecting the independence of the standard-setting process, while also respecting that independence.

Together, the FASB, the GASB, and the FAF management, according to their specific roles, work to achieve their collective objective of developing the highest-quality financial accounting standards—standards that promote financial reporting that provides investors, lenders, taxpayers, public officials, and other users of financial statements with a clear understanding of the financial performance and position of companies—both public and private; not-for-profit organizations; and state and local governments. The plan recognizes that a second critical element of our collective mission is to foster better understanding among stakeholders—those who use, prepare, and audit financial statements—as to how those standards should be applied and implemented.

The strategic plan also describes four goals that, if achieved, will enable the FASB, the GASB, the FAF Trustees, and the FAF management to realize our collective vision and fulfill our collective mission:

Practicing and promoting continued excellence in standard setting

Demonstrating a commitment to leadership in standard setting

Building and maintaining trust with stakeholders

Promoting public discourse on current and future financial reporting issues

g. The FAF's and GASB's Funding

The FAF's Budget for the Year Ending December 31, 2015 ("FAF Budget") contains the following language regarding funding under the heading "FAF Budget Organization:"

"The FAF presently obtains funding from subscription and publication revenues, accounting support fees under Sarbanes-Oxley to fund the annual recoverable expenses of the FASB, and accounting support fees under Section 978 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank") to fund the annual recoverable expenses of the GASB."

The Total Budget Summary on page 4 of the FAF Budget indicates that FASB budget revenues are \$49.4 million with Accounting Support Fees – FASB comprising 48.3%, Accounting support fees – GASB comprising 14.9%, contributed services comprising 0.5% and Subscriptions and Publications comprising 36.3%.

The FAF's Budget for the Year Ending December 31, 2015 contains the following under "Budget Notes:"

Accounting Support Fees – GASB

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 978(a) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an order instructing the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) to establish (a) a reasonable annual accounting support fee (GASB ASF) to adequately fund the annual budget of the GASB and (b) rules and procedures to provide for the equitable allocation, assessment and collection of the GASB ASF from FINRA's members.

h. FAF's Comment Letter to FASAB Regarding Reporting Entity Exposure Draft

A revealing description of FAF and its funding is contained in a comment letter to FASAB regarding the Reporting Entity exposure draft written by Jeffrey W. Rubin, Vice President and General Counsel for FAF. The letter appears below in its entirety.

"We are writing in response to the invitation by the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board ("FASAB") to comment on the FASAB's exposure draft (the "Exposure Draft") relating to its proposed Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards entitled *Reporting Entity*. The purpose of the Exposure Draft is to provide principles to guide preparers of financial statements at the government-wide and component reporting entity levels in determining what organizations should be included in the reporting entity's general purpose federal financial reports ("GPFFRs") for financial accountability purposes. The FASAB developed the Exposure Draft to improve guidance for identifying organizations to include in the GPFFRs, and thereby to assist in meeting federal financial reporting objectives.

The Exposure Draft sets forth three basic inclusion principles for determining whether an organization should be included in the government-wide GPFFR.¹⁶⁶ As described in greater detail below, we recommend that the inclusion principles be revised to either eliminate or modify the scope of the inclusion principle relating to an organization that is "in the Budget" – that is, an organization with an account or accounts listed in the *Budget of the United States Government: Analytical Perspectives – Supplemental Materials* schedule entitled "*Federal Programs by Agency and Account*." Our view with respect to this matter is based on the particular circumstances of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (the "FASB"), one of the standard-setting bodies within the Financial Accounting Foundation (the "FAF"), and similarly situated organizations.

"Although the FASB has an account listed in the Budget, we believe that the inclusion principle requiring the FASB to be included in the government-wide GPFFR solely because it is in the Budget would be inconsistent with the general concepts relating to inclusion set forth in the Exposure Draft, and would potentially undermine the integrity and utility of the GPFFRs. We do not believe that the objectives of the Exposure Draft would be met if organizations that do not receive taxpayer funds, and are not owned or operationally controlled by the federal government, are included in the GPFFR.

Background

The FAF is a Delaware nonprofit non-stock corporation, incorporated in 1972, which was created for the purpose of providing a corporate structure for the FASB, the body whose financial accounting and reporting standards for nongovernmental entities have been recognized as authoritative by the American Institute of CPAs (“AICPA”) and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The structure of the FAF and the FASB reflects the view that a standard-setter should be independent from preparers of financial statements, from accounting and auditing firms, and from political or governmental influence. This independence is necessary to assure that the interests of the users of financial statements remain paramount, and has been critical to the integrity of our financial and capital markets.

Prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), concern was expressed that the objectivity and independence of the FAF and the FASB could be affected if their funding was dependent upon groups having interests in the standard-setting process. Although the FAF derived some revenues from sales and licensing of its publication, the FAF’s principal revenues resulted from voluntary contributions. This concern was addressed in Section 109 of SOX, which provided that, going forward, the FASB would receive its funding from mandatory accounting support fees assessed on public companies.¹⁶⁷ Section 109 of SOX states that “[a]ccounting support fees and other receipts of ... such standard-setting body shall not be considered public monies of the United States.” Moreover, the Rules of Construction set forth in Section 109 provide that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to render [the FASB] subject to procedures in Congress to authorize or appropriate public funds....”¹⁶⁸

In addition to not being dependent upon governmental appropriations, neither the FAF nor the FASB is subject to the operational control of the federal government. The FAF is governed by a Board of Trustees consisting of from 14 to 18 members, none of whom is a federal government employee. A Trustee’s term is generally five years, and new FAF Trustees are appointed by the FAF’s Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees, in turn, appoints the members of the FASB. Although the FASB has a cooperative working relationship with the SEC and with other federal governmental organizations, and governmental representatives regularly attend meetings of the FASB’s advisory committees and consult with the FASB with respect to standards and initiatives, the SEC does not operationally control the FAF or the FASB.¹⁶⁹

For reasons the FAF does not fully understand, the Office of Management and Budget (the “OMB”) has included the FASB in the Budget.¹⁷⁰ The line item in the Budget with respect to the FASB refers to mandatory appropriations and mandatory outlays; as we believe is clear from the language in Section 109 of SOX, however, the FASB does not receive any appropriations or any outlays from the federal budget.¹⁷¹

The Exposure Draft

As noted above, the FASAB issued the Exposure Draft to provide principles to guide preparers of financial statements at the government-wide and component reporting entity levels in determining what organizations should be included in the reporting entity’s GPFFR for financial accountability purposes. The Executive Summary of the Exposure Draft sets forth the principal conceptual underpinning of the Exposure Draft, stating that the government-wide GPFFR should include all organizations:

1. budgeted for by elected officials of the federal government,
2. owned by the federal government, or
3. controlled by the federal government with risk of loss or expectation of benefits.¹⁷²

When any of these conditions exists, the FASAB believes that information regarding the organization is necessary to provide accountability.

Having stated the above three conditions, the Exposure Draft goes on to set forth (in paragraph 21) three principles for inclusion in the government-wide GPFFR. The first inclusion principle refers to an organization that is “in the Budget,” which is defined in paragraph 22 as an organization with an account or accounts listed in the Budget.¹⁷³ The Exposure Draft creates an exception with respect to a non-federal organization receiving federal financial assistance. Any non-federal organization receiving federal financial assistance is to be evaluated on the basis of the two additional inclusion principles (the “majority ownership interest” principle and the “control with risk of loss or expectation of benefit” principle). However, the Exposure Draft does not define the term “non-federal organization,” and the term “federal financial assistance” is tied to the definition of the term in the Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996, such as grants, loans, etc., which the FASB does not receive.¹⁷⁴

In discussing the basis for its conclusion that an organization with an account included in the Budget should be included in the government-wide GPFFR, the Exposure Draft states (in paragraph A12) that the:

“Identification of an organization in the President’s Budget is the clearest evidence that an organization should be included in the government-wide report. Absent budgetary actions – originating with the President’s Budget and leading to appropriations – federal organizations would be unable to conduct operations. Financial reporting objectives – budgetary integrity, operating performance, stewardship, and systems and controls – could not be met if Organizations identified in the budget were not included in the financial reports. Therefore, the most efficient means to identify organizations for inclusion in the GPFFR is by their participation in the budget process as evidenced by being listed in the [Budget].”

The Exposure Draft appears to take the view that inclusion in the Budget is equivalent to the first condition referred to above, that an organization is “budgeted for by elected officials of the federal government.” However, as the circumstances of the FASB indicate, there may be accounts included in the Budget which do not receive federal appropriations, for which elected officials are not accountable, and in which the federal government has no ownership interest and little or no operational control. Accordingly, a rule that inclusion in the Budget requires an organization’s financial information to be included in the GPFFRs may not reflect an appropriate consideration of the nature of organizations included in the Budget.¹⁷⁵ An inclusion principle that would require an entity in the Budget to be included in the GPFFRs therefore appears to be at odds with the concepts underlying the Exposure Draft, including the acknowledgement that an absence of federal funding, operational control or supervision should not result in an entity being within the scope of the GPFFRs.

We therefore recommend that the FASAB revise the proposed statement to eliminate the principle that inclusion of an organization in the Budget results in the organization being included in the GPFFRs.¹⁷⁶ As an alternative, the FASAB could expand the proposed exception to the Budget criterion beyond the scope of entities that receive federal financial assistance under the Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996 to refer as well to organizations that are not under federal governmental operational control or supervision, and which do not receive federal funds. Either such revision would avoid an anomalous result of including wholly independent entities within the GPFFRs, undermining their integrity and utility.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the FASAB’s proposal, and would be pleased to respond to any questions the FASAB or its staff may have.”¹⁷⁷

i. Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB)

The following descriptions of the GASB appear in different sections of its Rules of Procedure:

“The GASB is an independent body created in 1984 pursuant to agreement among the Foundation; the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA); the Council of State Governments; the Government Finance Officers Association; the International City/County Management Association; the National Association of Counties; the National Association of State Auditors, Controllers and Treasurers; the National Conference of State Legislatures; the National League of Cities; the National Governors Association; and the U.S. Conference of Mayors to serve an important public interest and is charged with a responsibility of significance to the citizenry of the United States. It is the designated organization for establishing and improving standards of the financial accounting and reporting of state and local governmental entities. Those standards govern the preparation of financial reports.”

“The Foundation’s Restated Certificate of Incorporation delegates to the GASB all authority, functions, and powers of the Foundation and its Board of Trustees in respect of standards of financial accounting and reporting of state and local governmental entities. As a result, the GASB’s responsibilities include establishing and improving standards of financial accounting and reporting of state and local governmental entities by defining, issuing, and promoting such standards and by issuing other communications with regard to governmental financial accounting and reporting. It also includes conducting and commissioning research (including surveys, statistical compilations, and other studies) and sponsoring meetings, conferences, hearings, and seminars in respect of financial accounting and reporting of state and local governmental entities.

The GASB is recognized as the authoritative body for establishing and improving financial accounting and reporting standards of state and local governmental entities. In May 1986, the AICPA designated the GASB (with respect to standards issued in July 1984 and subsequently) as the body to establish accounting principles for state and local governmental entities pursuant to Rule 203 of the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct. The authoritative nature of GASB pronouncements also is or may be recognized in the statutes, charters, and/or constitutions of state and local governments.

The seven members constituting a full GASB are appointed by the Foundation’s Board of Trustees for terms of up to five years. A member may serve a maximum total of 10 years. The GASB Chairman serves full time. Unless all members of the GASB are appointed to serve full time, the other members of the GASB serve either full time or part time as the Trustees shall determine, and if part time, may be in the employ of other organizations while serving on the GASB. GASB members are required to have, in the judgment of the Trustees, knowledge of governmental accounting and finance and a concern for the public interest in matters of financial accounting and reporting.

The Foundation’s Trustees have adopted policies in respect of personal investments and other personal activities of GASB members and staff that are designed to prevent potential conflicts of interest. In addition, because of the limitations imposed by the employment of part-time GASB members by other organizations, such part-time members are required by the Trustees to periodically inform the Foundation’s Personnel Policies Committee of the detailed nature of their activities and any changes in their employment status.”

j. The Governmental Accounting Standards Advisory Council

The following description of the GASAC appears in the Rules of Procedure:

“The GASAC has an integral advisory role in the GASB’s process of establishing and improving concepts and standards of financial accounting and reporting of state and local governmental entities. As an organization of knowledgeable and experienced individuals, the GASAC works closely with the GASB in an advisory capacity and strives to ensure that the views of its members are consistently and effectively communicated to the GASB on a timely basis.

To assure that a diversity of views will be represented, the GASAC consists of not fewer than 20 persons appointed by the Foundation’s Board of Trustees. GASAC members are required to be, in the judgment of the Trustees, knowledgeable about the issues involving, and the impact of, financial accounting and reporting by state and local governmental entities, or to possess an expertise of value to the GASB.

The GASAC’s membership broadly represents varied professional and occupational backgrounds with no profession or occupation dominating. As an additional means of involving the public in the GASB’s standards-setting process, the Board of Trustees invites organizations representing issuers, auditors, and users of state and local governmental financial reports to nominate an individual to serve on the GASAC. The GASAC also includes individuals knowledgeable in particular aspects of government and the governmental financing process.

Members of the GASAC, other than its Chairman, are appointed for two-year terms expiring on December 31 in the second calendar year of their election, generally may be reappointed for up to two additional consecutive terms, and serve without remuneration. Vacancies in unexpired terms may be filled by the Trustees as deemed desirable by them, and will be filled whenever necessary to maintain the membership of the GASAC at not fewer than 20. Membership on the GASAC is personal to members, and functions of members or attendance at meetings may not be delegated to others.

The By-Laws of the Foundation charge the GASAC with responsibility for consulting with the GASB or its Chairman as to major technical issues, the GASB’s agenda of projects and the priorities of the projects, matters likely to require the GASB’s attention, the selection and organization of GASB task forces and other groups, and such other matters as may be requested by the GASB or its Chairman, and for assisting the Trustees in raising funds for the GASB and the GASAC.

In fulfilling that responsibility, GASAC members are expected to provide input in respect of Exposure Drafts of Statements of Governmental Accounting Standards and Interpretations, discussion documents, proposed Technical Bulletins, and other documents proposed for issuance by the GASB, as well as input on such other matters as may be referred to them or the GASAC from time to time by the GASAC Chairman or by the GASB or its Chairman. Members of the GASAC also are expected to be alert to publicly expressed views and concerns regarding existing governmental financial accounting and reporting concepts and standards (including implementation issues and the effect of subsequent events and circumstances) and to advise the GASAC and the GASB as to the desirability of the GASB’s reviewing or reexamining those standards. Additionally, members of the GASAC are expected to communicate their individual perceptions of potential effects of proposed or effective pronouncements and to provide comments on broader policy questions, such as whether constituent views are being appropriately balanced, cost/benefit relationships, and

due process considerations. GASAC members are encouraged to consult with one another and with others and to speak and write publicly on issues with respect to the work of the GASAC and the GASB.

To facilitate the work of the GASAC, its Chairman also may organize and appoint committees of GASAC members as deemed appropriate.”

k. The Mission, Uses and Users, How the Mission is Accomplished, Guiding Principles and Due Process of the GASB

i. Mission Statement

The mission of the GASB is to establish and improve standards of state and local governmental accounting and financial reporting that will:

- Result in useful information for users of financial reports, and
- Guide and educate the public, including issuers, auditors, and users of those financial reports.

The mission is accomplished through a comprehensive and independent process that encourages broad participation, objectively considers all stakeholder views, and is subject to oversight by the Financial Accounting Foundation’s Board of Trustees.

ii. Uses and Users of Governmental Accounting and Financial Reporting

Accounting and financial reporting standards are essential to the efficient and effective functioning of our democratic system of government:

- Financial reporting plays a major role in fulfilling government’s duty to be publicly accountable.
- Financial reporting by state and local governments is used to assess that accountability and to make economic, social, and political decisions.

The primary users of state and local government financial reports are those:

- To whom government is primarily accountable—its citizens
- Who directly represent the citizens—legislative and oversight bodies
- Who finance government or who participate in the financing process— taxpayers, other governments, investors, creditors, underwriters, and analysts.

Government administrators are also users of financial reports; whether they are considered primary users depends on whether they have ready access to internal information.

iii. How the Mission Is Accomplished

To accomplish its mission, the GASB acts to:

- Issue high-quality standards that improve the usefulness of financial reports based on the needs of financial report users and on the underlying concepts set out in the GASB’s conceptual framework
- Keep standards current to reflect changes in the governmental environment
- Provide guidance on implementation of standards
- Consider significant areas of accounting and financial reporting that can be improved through the standards-setting process

- Improve the common understanding of the nature and purposes of information contained in financial reports.

The GASB develops and uses concepts to guide its work of establishing standards. Those concepts provide a frame of reference, or conceptual framework, for resolving accounting and financial reporting issues.

The GASB's work on both standards and concepts is based on research conducted by the GASB's technical staff and others. The GASB actively solicits and considers the views of its various constituencies on all accounting and financial reporting issues. The GASB's activities are open to public participation and observation under the "due process" mandated by these Rules of Procedure.

iv. Guiding Principles

In establishing standards and concepts, the GASB exercises its judgment after research, due process, and careful deliberation. It is guided by these principles:

- To be objective and neutral in its decision making and to ensure, as much as possible, that the information resulting from its standards is a faithful representation of the effects of state and local government activities. Objective and neutral mean freedom from bias, precluding the GASB from placing any particular interest above the interests of the many who rely on the information contained in financial reports.
- To weigh carefully the views of its constituents in developing standards and concepts so that they will:
 - a. Meet the accountability and decision-making needs of the users of government financial reports, and
 - b. Gain general acceptance among state and local government preparers and auditors of financial reports.
- To establish standards only when the expected benefits exceed the perceived costs. The GASB strives to determine that proposed standards (including disclosure requirements) fill a significant need and that the costs they impose, compared with possible alternatives, are justified when compared to the overall public benefit.
- To consider the applicability of its standards to the separately issued general purpose financial statements of governmentally owned special entities. The GASB is aware of the unique and distinguishing characteristics of the government environment, which may require different standards from those used by similar private-sector entities. However, it specifically evaluates similarities of special entities and of their activities and transactions in both the public and private sectors, and the need, in certain instances, for comparability with the private sector.
- To bring about needed changes in ways that balance the desire to minimize disruption of accounting and financial reporting processes with the need for information in financial reports to communicate effectively to users. The GASB establishes reasonable effective dates and transition provisions when new standards are introduced.
- To review the effects of past decisions and interpret, amend, or replace standards when appropriate.

v. Due Process

The GASB is committed to following an open, orderly process for standards setting. The procedures followed by the GASB, as more fully discussed below, are designed to permit timely, thorough, and open study of accounting and financial reporting issues. These procedures are designed to encourage broad public participation in the GASB's standards-setting process by creating channels for the

communication of all points of view and expressions of opinion at all stages of the process. Considering the expressed opinions of those concerned with or affected by governmental accounting and financial reporting is fundamental to the operation of the GASB. Of particular importance to the GASB is the receipt of thoughtful, reasoned, and timely input during the GASB's research, discussion, and deliberative processes. The GASB recognizes that acceptance of its conclusions is enhanced by demonstrating that the input received in due process is considered carefully.

1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act: Role of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board in the Municipal Securities Market and Its Past Funding

In a letter addressed to Senators Tim, Johnson and Richard Shelby and Stephen Bachus and Barney Frank, Chairman and Ranking member of the Committee on Financial services, House of Representatives, dated January 18, 2011 two officers of the United States Government Accountability Office, Paula M. Rascona, Director – Financial Management and Assurance and Orice Williams Brown, Director – Financial Markets and Community Investments, formally transmitted the documents used for an oral briefing that the officers gave to the addressees offices in January 12-13, 2011, in response to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform and Consumer Protection Act.¹⁷⁸ The entire transmittal letter and a substantial portion of the presentation documents used for the oral briefing are duplicated below.

i. Transmittal Letter

Subject: Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act: Role of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board in the Municipal Securities Markets and Its Past Funding

This letter formally transmits the documents used for an oral briefing we gave to your offices on January 12-13, 2011, in response to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.¹ See enclosure 1 for a copy of our briefing slides. GAO was directed to study the role and importance of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) in the municipal securities markets as well as the manner and level at which GASB has been funded. GASB establishes standards of accounting and financial reporting for U.S. state and local governments. Established in 1984 as an operating component of the Financial Accounting Foundation (the Foundation), GASB is recognized by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants as the body that sets generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for state and local governments.

In conducting this study, GAO was to consult with the principal organizations representing state governors, legislators, local elected officials, and state and local finance officers. Specifically, in accordance with the mandate and discussions with your offices, our objectives were to address the following key questions: (1) What are key stakeholder views on the role and relevance of GASB in the municipal securities markets? and (2) What is the manner and the level at which GASB has been funded?

To address these objectives, we:

- Reviewed academic studies and other documentation derived from numerous sources, including GASB itself.
- Consulted with key stakeholders through structured interviews, a roundtable discussion held at GAO headquarters, teleconferences, and meetings. As required by the mandate, these consultations included organizations representing state governors, legislators, local elected officials, and state and local finance officers. To ensure that we obtained the perspectives of a broad base of knowledgeable and interested stakeholders, we also consulted with users of state and local governments' financial statements, such as

- investors, rating agencies, and bond insurers; auditors; and other participants in the municipal securities markets, including GASB and the Foundation.
- Obtained and reviewed audited financial statements of the Foundation and other financial data specific to GASB.

As further elaborated in the attached briefing slides, stakeholders expressed a range of views on the role and relevance of GASB in the municipal securities markets. This discussion was framed around the following topics: the use of GASB's accounting principles, benefits and limitations of GAAP reporting, GAAP use after the credit crisis, and GASB's continuing role in the municipal securities markets. For example, while some stakeholders indicated that GASB's responses to the evolving needs of the securities markets have been appropriate, others indicated that GASB could do more to alleviate the burden that the cost and complexity of preparing GAAP-basis financial statements places on governments. With regard to the manner and level at which GASB has been funded, our briefing slides include an overview of the Foundation's financial responsibilities with regard to GASB as well as information on GASB expenses and sources of funding for 2006 through 2009. In our consultations with stakeholders on GASB funding issues, they expressed a range of views. For example, while most stakeholders agreed that GASB needed a steady, sustainable stream of funding, several stakeholders were concerned with the level and nature of GASB's expenditures as well as a perceived lack of transparency associated with its budget process.

We conducted our work from September 2010 to January 2011 in accordance with all sections of GAO's Quality Assurance Framework that are relevant to our objectives. The framework requires that we plan and perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations in our work. We believe that the information and data obtained, and the analysis conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings and conclusions. See enclosure 2 for further details on our scope and methodology. See enclosure 3 for a list of organizations that participated in our study. Enclosure 4 provides an overview of academic research on the impact of GAAP on municipal securities markets. Enclosure 5 provides a schedule of GASB's program expenses from 2006 through 2009. Enclosure 6 provides GAO contact information and acknowledges contributors to this report.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Financial Accounting Foundation, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Financial Accounting Foundation, the Chairman of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board, and the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. We are also sending copies to the roundtable participants, the stakeholders with whom we consulted, and other interested parties. This report will also be available at no charge on our Web site at <http://www.gao.gov>. Should you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please contact either of us at rasconap@gao.gov or (202) 512-9816 or williamso@gao.gov or (202) 512-8678. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.

ii. Oral Presentation Documents

Briefing for offices of the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
United States Senate
Committee on Financial Services
House of Representatives
January 12 and 13, 2011

- The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act included a requirement for GAO to study the role and importance of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) in the municipal securities markets and the manner and level at which GASB has been funded.
- GASB establishes standards of accounting and financial reporting for U.S. state and local governmental entities. Established in 1984 as an operating component of the Financial Accounting Foundation (the Foundation), GASB is recognized by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants as the body that sets generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for state and local governments.
- The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB)¹⁷⁹ reported that there were over 10 million trades of municipal securities in the secondary market amounting to approximately \$3.8 trillion in 2009.

Issuers of municipal securities include states, counties, cities and towns, school districts, and special government districts, such as public benefit corporations and authorities, public employee retirement systems, governmental utilities, public hospitals and other public health care providers, and public colleges and universities.

In accordance with the mandate and discussions with committee offices, our study addressed the following key questions:

Objective 1: What are key stakeholder¹⁸⁰ views on the role and relevance of GASB in the municipal securities markets?

Objective 2: What is the manner and the level at which GASB has been funded?

Objective 1: To obtain key stakeholder views on the role and relevance of GASB in the municipal securities markets, we:

- Consulted with key stakeholders through structured interviews and a roundtable discussion held at GAO headquarters. The roundtable discussion was organized around the following four general topics:

Topic 1: Use of GASB's accounting principles

Topic 2: Benefits and limitations of GAAP reporting

Topic 3: GAAP use after the credit crisis

Topic 4: GASB's continuing role in the municipal securities markets

- Reviewed academic studies that analyzed the impact of financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP on municipal securities markets.

Objective 2: To describe the manner and level at which GASB has been funded, we:

- Obtained and reviewed audited financial statements of the Foundation, which included certain key financial data of GASB.
- Interviewed officials from GASB to obtain and discuss unaudited financial data specific to GASB, including separate operating financial data and the percentage of the Foundation's allocation of common costs to GASB.
- Provided key facts related to GASB funding to Foundation officials for their confirmation.
- Consulted with key stakeholders through teleconferences and meetings.

For both objectives:

- As required by the mandate, we consulted with the principal organizations representing state governors, legislators, local elected officials, and state and local finance officers.

- To obtain the perspectives of a broad base of knowledgeable and interested stakeholders, we also consulted with users of state and local governments' financial statements, such as investors, rating agencies, and bond insurers; auditors; and other participants in the municipal securities markets, including GASB and the Financial Accounting Foundation.

The summary of views included in this report captures the collective discussion of roundtable participants and the comments made by stakeholders in numerous interviews and consultations. The views summarized are not attributable to any individual or organization and do not necessarily represent the views of any single organization, including GAO.

Enclosure 2 includes details on our scope and methodology. Enclosure 3 provides a list of organizations that participated in our study.

We conducted our work from September 2010 to January 2011 in accordance with all sections of GAO's Quality Assurance Framework that are relevant to our objectives. The framework requires that we plan and perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations in our work. We believe that the information and data obtained, and the analysis conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings and conclusions.

GASB's mission is to establish and improve standards of state and local governmental accounting and financial reporting that will result in useful information for users of financial reports, and guide and educate the public, including issuers, auditors, and users of those financial reports.

- GAAP encompasses the conventions, rules, and procedures necessary to define accepted accounting practice at a particular time. It includes not only broad guidelines for general application, but also detailed practices and procedures. Those conventions, rules, and procedures provide a standard by which to measure financial presentations.
- An independent auditor's report may contain an opinion as to whether the financial statements present fairly an entity's financial position in conformity with GAAP.
- Audited financial statements are used by a variety of stakeholders in the municipal securities markets. See figure 1 for a description of the key steps in the issuance of a municipal security and the stakeholders that typically use issuers' audited financial statements in their review of a security.

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Topic 1: Use of GASB's accounting principles

Publicly traded companies are required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to prepare and issue financial statements based on GAAP; however, municipal issuers are not subject to this requirement. State requirements regarding the use of GAAP by local governments vary, but institutional investors and rating agencies generally agreed that most municipal issuers use GAAP.

- While all state governments use GAAP for state-level financial reporting, GAAP use by local governmental entities varies. Some states require, either by state law or regulation, that the local governmental entities within those states use GAAP. Other states, however, do not require GAAP use by their local governments.

- We identified no definitive studies quantifying the use of GAAP by municipal issuers. However, representatives of several institutional investors and rating agencies agreed that most of the issuers whose securities they evaluate use GAAP.

- In states where GAAP use is not required for local governments, local governments preparing GAAP-basis financial statements tend to be

- larger, or
- more frequent debt issuers.

Topic 2: Benefits and limitations of GAAP reporting

Stakeholders viewed GAAP-basis financial statements as highly useful for assessing the quality of municipal securities.

- Several analysts, issuers, and other stakeholders stated that GAAP-basis financial statements are comprehensive.¹⁸¹ These views included:

- GAAP-basis financial statements provide a fuller, more transparent picture of a government's financial position than those prepared in accordance with other bases of accounting.
- GAAP-basis financial statements provide important information on topics such as pensions, post-employment benefit plans, and derivatives.
- The statistical reporting section in GAAP-basis financial statements provides helpful longer-term trend information, and the management discussion and analysis section and enhanced disclosures in the notes sections provide context on an issuer's financial position.
- Stakeholders generally agreed that use of GAAP's reporting framework provides consistency and facilitates comparability of financial information across different municipal issuers and securities.
- A few analysts stated that they might bypass a security from an issuer that does not have GAAP-basis financial statements because of the greater amount of analysis required to understand its financial position.

Analysts generally agreed that, while GAAP-basis financial statements are important, they are not the only source of information they use to assess the quality of municipal securities, nor does the use of GAAP necessarily equate to a high-quality security.

- For example, several analysts stated that they value budgets for forward-looking financial information.
- A few representatives of rating agencies and bond insurers pointed out that, unlike other market participants, they are able to ask issuers for any additional information they need to conduct a credit assessment. Therefore, the lack of GAAP-basis financial statements does not necessarily lead to a higher credit risk determination.
- A few stakeholders commented that analysts and investors should take caution to not confuse GAAP-basis reporting with a good financial position or good credit quality.

Several stakeholders believed that GAAP-basis financial statements are associated with lower borrowing costs, although others stated that it is difficult to attribute lower costs to the use of GAAP alone.

- Several issuers stated that they do not know exactly how GAAP impacts their borrowing costs, but they hope or believe their costs are lower as a result of using GAAP.
- A few stakeholders, including issuers and investors, stated that many factors impact borrowing costs, such as strong financial management, income tax revenues, and use of bond insurance, and that isolating the impact of GAAP use on borrowing costs is difficult.
- Enclosure 4 discusses the key findings and limitations of several studies that evaluate the impact of GAAP-basis financial statements on the municipal securities markets, including borrowing costs.

Stakeholders stated that GAAP-basis financial statements are complex and expensive to prepare, particularly for small, infrequent issuers.

- A few stakeholders told us that preparing GAAP-basis financial statements requires issuers to hire or outsource accounting professionals with an advanced skill set. This can be cost-prohibitive for many small issuers with limited resources, particularly those that do not issue debt on a regular basis.

-A rating agency analyst and several issuers stated that governments, if given the option of whether to use GAAP or another basis of accounting, must weigh the cost of preparing GAAP-basis financial statements against potential benefits, such as potentially reduced borrowing costs.

Stakeholders generally agreed that governments are not always timely in issuing audited financial statements, making them less useful to analysts and other users, although a few stakeholders maintained that other publicly available information compensates for the lack of timeliness.

• Issuers and analysts explained that the delay in completing GAAP-basis financial statements is due to:

- the complex and comprehensive nature of GAAP;
- the complexity of state and local governments;
- limited staff time and resources; and
- higher priority placed by elected officials on the preparation of the annual budget.

A National Association of State Comptrollers survey found that states completed their Fiscal Year 2009 audited financial statements in an average of 206 days, or nearly 7 months, from the end of their fiscal year. Seven states took over 9 months to issue their financial statements.¹⁸²

- Untimely financial statements may require analysts to rely on outdated information or to try to obtain additional, unaudited information from issuers.
- Issuers noted that they are aware of the timeliness issue, and some are taking steps to address the problem. For example, the National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers, and Treasurers (NASACT) has established a working group to identify states' top obstacles and opportunities with regard to issuing faster annual financial reports.

Unlike corporations, state and local governments also often post annual budgets, board meeting agendas, and meeting minutes online; and public hearings are frequently accessible online or through the news media. Such publicly available information may mitigate the lack of timeliness to some extent, according to two issuers.

Topic 3: GAAP use after the credit crisis

According to a study by a rating agency and discussions with bond insurers, the percentage of newly issued securities with insurance has decreased from over 50 percent in 2005 to less than 10 percent of newly issued securities in 2010.¹⁸³ As the use of bond insurance has decreased, analysts and investors may be more reliant on GAAP-basis financial statements to determine the quality of municipal securities.

- A few analysts said that, rather than focusing strictly on the bond insurer's rating in cases where issuers purchase insurance, they have always evaluated the credit quality of the underlying bond they are considering. In conducting this analysis, GAAP-basis financial statements have been important to them.
- Several analysts said the decrease in the availability of bond insurance forces analysts and investors to look more carefully at the credit quality of issuers. As such, they will likely place more importance now on the issuer's financial statements and other disclosures.

Topic 4: GASB's continuing role in the municipal securities markets

Stakeholders discussed several issues related to GASB's ongoing standards setting and outreach efforts.

- A few stakeholders noted that GASB has improved the quantity and quality of its education materials and has worked hard to teach stakeholders more about financial statements and GAAP.

- A few stakeholders also indicated that GASB-issued standards have made government accounting more complex and expensive and that GASB could do more to facilitate discussion about the relationship between the costs and benefits of GAAP-basis financial reporting. Others commented on the complexity of Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) standards and noted that complex financial reporting is a reflection of the complexity of the organization being reported on.¹⁸⁴
- According to a GASB official, drivers of new standards or revisions to existing standards included user needs, internal research, and conformance with global or FASB standards.
- One issuer said that slowing down the rate at which GASB changes its standards so that smaller governments and other issuers can keep up would be helpful. Recently, GASB has issued new accounting standards almost every year.
- One issuer recommended that preparers and users of financial information conduct additional discussions on the costs and benefits of GAAP compliance.

Overview of GASB Funding

The Financial Accounting Foundation, the parent organization of GASB and FASB, is a private-sector non-stock corporation qualified as a tax exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. The Foundation's mission is to establish and improve financial accounting and reporting standards to foster financial reporting that provides decision-useful information to users of financial reports.

Through its Board of Trustees and its executive management, the Foundation oversees FASB and GASB, including the standards boards' procedures for due process and maintaining independence.

Under the bylaws of the Foundation, the Governmental Accounting Standards Advisory Council, a standing advisory committee of GASB, is responsible for providing technical and other support to GASB, including consulting with GASB on a variety of matters, such as major technical issues and providing input on GASB's agenda of projects and assigning of priorities.

The Foundation is responsible for the oversight, administration, and finances for GASB and FASB. The Foundation currently receives its funding from subscription and publications revenues, accounting support fees for FASB pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and voluntary contributions in support of GASB.¹⁸⁵

- For each of the 4 years that we reviewed, the Foundation's independent auditors, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP, issued unqualified "clean" opinions for the Foundation's financial statements.
- The GASB and FASB Chairmen are responsible for preparing annual budgets, with advice of their respective members, for review and approval by the Foundation's Board of Trustees.
- Establishment of the FASB annual accounting support fees through the Foundation's annual budget process is subject to review by SEC.

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act granted SEC the authority to require a registered national securities association to establish

- a reasonable annual support fee to adequately fund GASB, and
- rules and procedures to provide for the equitable assessment and collection of the support fee from the members of the national securities association.¹⁸⁶

As of January 4, 2011, SEC had not acted on this authority.

According to the Foundation's annual reports, in 1981, the Foundation established a Reserve Fund, which is currently intended to

- provide the Foundation, FASB, and GASB with sufficient reserves to fund expenditures not funded by accounting support fees or subscription and publication revenues;
- operate the Foundation, FASB, and GASB during any temporary or permanent funding transition periods; and
- fund any other unforeseen contingencies.

The Foundation's Trustees have adopted a policy establishing a targeted year-end Reserve Fund balance equal to 1 year of budgeted expenses for the entire organization, including the Foundation, FASB, and GASB, plus a working capital reserve equal to one quarter of the net operating expenses for the entire organization. Reserve Fund investments are unrestricted assets of the Foundation. Reserve Fund year-end balances for 2006 through 2009 were \$51.9 million, \$54.6 million, \$51.0 million, and \$54.4 million, respectively.

Foundation officials have said that they have had to use Foundation funds from the Reserve Fund to compensate for annual shortfalls in GASB's funding. The officials said that in recent years additions to the Reserve Fund have primarily resulted from (1) revenue from the sale of subscriptions and publications that exceeded operational needs and (2) investment income.

As described in the notes to the Foundation's audited financial statements, the Foundation presents its Statements of Activities based on the concept that standard setting is the sole program of the Foundation. Accordingly, these statements set forth separately the revenue, cost of sales, and certain program expenses of FASB and GASB, as deemed appropriate by management.

Table 1 provides information on GASB's voluntary monetary contributions and related program expenses as reported in the Foundation's Statements of Activities and related notes, along with unaudited information provided by Foundation officials on allocated support expenses. The allocation reflects additional Foundation services for accounting and finance, human resources, facilities management, technology and information systems, legal, development, and general administrative operating assistance.

The Foundation's audited financial statements reported net subscription and publication revenues for FASB and GASB related product offerings of \$10.7 million, \$9.1 million, \$10.2 million, and \$8.2 million for 2006 through 2009, respectively. According to Foundation officials, the Foundation has used these revenues to fund the GASB funding shortfall indicated in table 1.

Sources of GASB Voluntary Monetary Contributions

As shown in figure 2, contributions from state governments are the largest single source of voluntary monetary contributions, and have remained steady in each of the 4 years.

- Combined contributions from state governments totaled \$1 million in each of the past 4 years. According to an official of the National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers, and Treasurers (NASACT), the amount is not based on a written or contractual agreement.
- The total contribution is remitted by NASACT, which handles the administrative responsibilities of determining annual assessments for each state, invoicing and collecting the amounts, and remitting quarterly payments of \$250,000 to the Foundation. Assessments are calculated for each state based on a fixed amount per state and a variable amount calculated based on the state's population.
- According to a NASACT official, while all states and the District of Columbia are assessed a portion of the total remittance, contributions are voluntary and not all states contribute to GASB every year.

According to GASB officials, the Foundation's trustees have explored various options to obtain stable sources of funding for GASB over the past several years. Three of the larger voluntary sources of contributions have been (1) annual municipal government support, (2) the Municipal Bond Fee Assessment Program (a voluntary 3-year trial program that collected fees from participating issuers and concluded in 2007), and (3) direct solicitation and grant funding. The officials provided the following information on these funding options and stated none of these options has succeeded in providing a long-term, permanent, and sufficient funding source to GASB:

- A municipal government support campaign directed at the largest city and county governments, which peaked at nearly \$150,000 in 2006, declined to less than \$40,000 in 2009.
- Collections from the Municipal Bond Fee Assessment Program declined from a high of nearly \$450,000 in 2006 to residual collections of \$12,000 in 2009.
- Private funding by a not-for-profit organization, which totaled over \$1 million over a 7-year period, ended in 2006.

III. Additional Historical Background

i. Historic Review

a. Constitutional Convention

The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union (hereafter the “Articles” or the “Articles of Confederation”) was the first written constitution for the U.S. Government. It was created by the delegates from the states in the Second Continental Congress. It was drafted in 1776-77 and became the working constitution in 1777. It was not formally ratified until 1781.

The new states preferred to think of themselves as separate republics in an alliance of convenience. The Articles of Confederation described “a firm league of friendship.” Article II made it clear that the individual states were not subject to the United States: Each state retained its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which was not expressly delegated to the United States. One of the major problems with the Articles was the requirement that all thirteen states had to approve any changes.

There was no president, executive agencies, judiciary or tax base. The lack of a tax base meant that the government was unable to pay off state and national debts. The states and the Continental Congress both incurred large debts during the War, and repaying those debts was a major issue. The government was funded by money from the states when nine states voted to do so. As a result funds were contributed sporadically and Congress printed money in large amounts which had the effect of depreciating its value.

In May 1779 John Jay, president of the Continental Congress requested \$45 million from the states saying that taxes were “the price of liberty, the peace, and the safety of yourselves and posterity.” He argued that Americans should avoid having it said “that America had no sooner become independent than she became insolvent” or that “her infant glories and growing fame were obscured and tarnished by broken contracts and violated faith.” The states did not respond with any of the money requested from them. Between 1781 and 1784, less than \$1.5 million came into the Treasury although the states were asked for \$2 million in the single year 1783.¹⁸⁷

Congress under the Articles did not have the power to regulate either foreign trade or interstate commerce and, as a result, all the states maintained control over their trade policies. By 1787 states had started attacking private contracts and interstate commerce.

At the Annapolis Convention in 1786 Alexander Hamilton led a group of federalists that believed in a strong central government that petitioned Congress to call a constitutional convention in Philadelphia in May 1787 to revise the Articles. It should be noted that Hamilton estimated that as of 1790 that the Confederation government owed approximately \$52 million to its creditors.¹⁸⁸ The inability to repay its debt was one of the principal reasons for calls for a stronger national government.¹⁸⁹

The Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia between May 25 and September 17, 1787. The debates of the Convention indicated that there was widespread agreement that, in the words of Roger Sherman, “money matters” were “the most important of all”; or, as Madison put it, the “compleat power of taxation [was] the highest prerogative of supremacy . . . proposed to be vested in

the National Govt.”¹⁹⁰ Throughout the Convention, delegates focused on the “purse strings” or the “purse”.¹⁹¹ —Every discussion was based on the premise that the protection of the people’s money is a legislative function.¹⁹²

The Framers were vitally concerned about ensuring democratic control and accountability over the revenue and appropriations powers. In addition, one of the most challenging issues during the convention concerned the apportionment of seats in the legislative branch. States with small populations preferred the existing practice under the Articles of Confederation which was equal representation of the states. The more populous states, such as Virginia and Massachusetts, preferred that legislative representation reflect a state’s population. In addition the debates demonstrate that the Framers viewed fixing responsibility for taxing and spending was critical to the success of the new constitution. In this regard, no delegate argued that the President or any combination of Executive officers should possess the power to tax or spend. All believed that a democratically accountable Legislature should have this power.

In June 1787, the draft of the Constitution allowed either house to originate taxation and appropriations measures. During the debates on June 13, Elbridge Gerry, of Massachusetts, “[m]oved to restrain the Senatorial branch from originating money bills.”¹⁹³ He reasoned that “[t]he other branch was more immediately the representatives of the people, and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold the purse-strings.”¹⁹⁴ Gerry’s motion was defeated, by a margin of three states in favor and eight opposed.¹⁹⁵

When the Convention reached an impasse between the large and small states regarding the apportionment of seats in the House and Senate the delegates appointed a special committee to consider the question of apportionment.¹⁹⁶ The Committee of Eleven presented its report to the Convention on July 5, 1787.¹⁹⁷

The Committee of Eleven proposed the Great Compromise.¹⁹⁸ The Great Compromise established a bicameral legislature with proportional representation in the House of Representatives and equal representation of the states in the Senate. In order to appease the larger states for accepting equal representation of all states in the Senate, the power of originating taxation and appropriations measures was vested in the House of Representatives and the Senate was prohibited from either originating or amending such legislation (described as strong version of the Origination Clause). However, this agreement did not hold.

George Mason, of Virginia suggested that “[t]he consideration which weighed with the Committee was that the [first] branch would be the immediate representatives of the people, the [second] would not.”¹⁹⁹ In light of this, “[s]hould the latter have the power of giving away the peoples [sic] money, they might soon forget the Source from whence they received it” and “[w]e might soon have an aristocracy.”²⁰⁰

Benjamin Franklin agreed saying “it was always of importance that the people should know who had disposed of their money, & how it had been disposed of.”²⁰¹ Franklin added that “those who feel, can best judge” and “[t]his end would . . . be best attained, if money affairs were to be confined to the immediate representatives of the people.”²⁰²

On July 16, 1787, the delegates adopted the Great Compromise. The resolution incorporated the strong version of the Origination Clause and passed by a vote of five to four, with one state

delegation abstaining.²⁰³ On July 26, 1787, the delegates charged a “Committee of Detail” with preparing a new working draft that would reflect and incorporate the various resolutions and amendments adopted up to that point.²⁰⁴

On August 6, John Rutledge, of South Carolina, delivered the Report of the Committee of Detail.²⁰⁵ Article IV, section 5 of the working draft included a strong version of the Origination Clause.

The Convention considered this provision on August 8, 1787. At that time, Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, moved to strike the provision from the draft. He argued that “[i]f the Senate can be trusted with the many great powers proposed, it surely may be trusted with that of originating money bills.”²⁰⁶

George Mason objected strongly to the motion. Mason argued that “[t]o strike out the section, was to unhinge the compromise of which it made a part.”²⁰⁷ Mason was referring to the equal suffrage of all states, regardless of population, in the Senate. Characterizing the Senate as a bastion of “[a]ristocracy,” Mason believed that “[t]he purse strings should never be put into its hands.”²⁰⁸

The delegates voted in favor of Pinckney’s motion by a margin of seven states in favor and four states against.²⁰⁹ This vote had the effect of striking the Origination Clause and put the Great Compromise in doubt. For several representatives’ control over taxation and appropriations was so important that, without it, they were willing to revisit the decision to provide equal representation in the Senate.

On August 9, 1787, Edmund Randolph, of Virginia gave the Convention notice that he would seek reconsideration of the vote at a later time. On August 11, 1787, he moved for reconsideration.²¹⁰

Randolph’s motion to reconsider passed by a vote of nine states in favor to one state opposed, with one state abstaining. Two days later, on August 13, 1787, the Federal Convention took up reconsideration of the Origination Clause. At this juncture, the linkage between the issues of origination and equal representation was obvious.

Randolph moved to limit the clause to “revenue raising” bills.²¹¹ This amendment served to eliminate the objection that the term “money bills” was overly broad so as to potentially bring within the restriction “all bills under which money might incidentally arise.”²¹²

George Mason spoke strongly in favor of vesting the House of Representatives with control over the power of taxation and spending. Mason’s argument largely focused on the character of the Senate as distanced from and unaccountable to the voting citizens. This was so because as constituted “the Senate did not represent the *people*, but the *States* in their political character.”²¹³ Accordingly, “[i]t was improper therefore that it should tax the people.”²¹⁴ He concluded that “in all events he would contend that the purse strings should be in the hands of the Representatives of the people.”²¹⁵

Gerry stated “Taxation and representation are strongly associated in the minds of the people, and they will not agree that any but their immediate representatives shall meddle with their purses.”²¹⁶ He warned that “acceptance of the plan will inevitably fail, if the Senate be not restrained from originating Money bills.”²¹⁷

The vote in favor of restoring the origination restriction was defeated and the Origination Clause was to be stricken.²¹⁸

On August 15, 1787, Caleb Strong moved to amend to include a weaker version of the Origination Clause that the delegates had rejected. Strong's amendment provided that:

Each House shall possess the right of originating all Bills, except Bills for raising money for the purposes of revenue or for appropriating the same and for the fixing of salaries of the Officers of Government which shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as in other cases.²¹⁹

The delegates postponed debate on the amendment without comment, by a vote of six to five.²²⁰

On August 31, 1787, the delegates created the Committee of Eleven, consisting of a delegate from each state, to consider "such parts of the Constitution as have been postponed, and such parts of reports as have not been acted on."²²¹ On September 5 the Committee proposed a weaker version of the original Origination Clause—the House of Representatives would have the power to originate revenue measures, but the Senate would enjoy full powers of amendment to such legislation. The provision was reworked over the next several days into "but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as in other bills"²²² and was agreed to by the delegates.

The Federal Convention delegates signed the Constitution on September 17, 1787. Significantly, Randolph, Mason, and Gerry—all supporters of a strong version of the Origination Clause—refused to sign the draft.

"The Statement and Account Clause was first proposed in the final week of the Constitutional Convention, when George Mason moved on 14 September 1787 that a clause be adopted requiring "that an Account of the public expenditures should be annually published."²²³ George Mason's timing for his proposal was not accidental. Mason's fervor for the strong version of the Origination Clause, his lack of success in achieving its inclusion and his views on the need for direct accountability to the people on tax and spending matters all clearly impacted his desire for the Clause. The fact that the provision was adopted given that all at the Convention knew Mason's strongly held views on accountability needs to be taken into consideration when considering the meaning of the Clause. The important change to Mason's proposal that added all receipts to the Clause clearly reflects a desire to have the Statement and Account be complete and encompass the Government's entire economic reality.

In the initial debate on Mason's proposal, Gouveneur Morris urged that such accounting would be "impossible in many cases." And Rufus King remarked that it would be "impracticable" to account for "every minute shilling."²²⁴ James Madison then proposed an amendment to require an accounting "from time to time" rather than annually. The debate surrounding the adoption of Madison's amendment is important. Farrand gives a brief account of the debate at the Convention, taken from Madison's notes. Madison thought that the substitution of "from time to time" for "annually" would ensure frequent publication and "leave enough to the discretion of the Legislature."²²⁵ Madison's notes from the Convention do not elaborate on the concept of legislative discretion, except to say that if too much is required, "the difficulty will beget a habit of doing nothing."²²⁶

The rationale behind Madison's amendment came more fully to light in the debate in the Virginia ratifying convention. On 12 June 1788 Madison stated that under the Constitution as proposed, congressional proceedings were to be "occasionally published," and that this requirement included all receipts and expenditures of public money.²²⁷ He praised this as a security not enjoyed under the

then existing system of government. Then, in a sentence reflecting on the degree of discretion to be allowed under Clause 7, he stated: "That part which authorizes the government to withhold from the public knowledge what in their judgment may require secrecy, is imitated from the confederation—that very system the gentleman advocates."²²⁸ Madison's language strongly indicates that he believed that the Statement and Account Clause, following his amendment, would allow government authorities ample discretion to withhold some expenditure items which require secrecy.

Any ambiguity in Madison's statement is removed by a more lengthy debate that occurred five days later on 17 June 1788 between Madison and George Mason. Arguing against Madison's "from time to time" provision, Mason criticized it as too loose an expression. He then summarized the arguments made by proponents of the provision:

The reasons urged in favor of this ambiguous expression, was [sic], that there might be some matters which might require secrecy. In matters relative to military operations, and foreign negotiations, secrecy was necessary sometimes. But he did not conceive that the receipts and expenditures of the public money ought ever to be concealed. The people, he affirmed, had a right to know the expenditures of their money.²²⁹

Mason's statement clarifies several points concerning the Framers' intent. First, it appears that Madison's comment on government discretion to maintain the secrecy of some expenditures, far from being an isolated statement, was representative of his fellow proponents of the "from time to time" provision. Second, as to what items might legitimately require secrecy, the debates contain prominent mention of military operations and foreign negotiations. Finally, we learn that opponents of the "from time to time" provision, exemplified by Mason, favored secrecy only for the operations and negotiations themselves, not for receipts and expenditures of public money connected with them. But the Statement and Account Clause, as adopted and ratified, incorporates the view not of Mason, but rather of his opponents, who desired discretionary secrecy for the expenditures as well as the related operations.

In reply to Mason's argument, Madison did not pursue the point on the need for secrecy, but argued that publication from time to time would provide more satisfactory and fuller reports to the public and would be of sufficient frequency. He added that he believed that "this provision went farther than the constitution of any state in the union, or perhaps in the world."²³⁰ The remainder of the exchange between Madison and Mason was brief, and did not touch on secrecy of expenditures.²³¹

In addition to the statements of Madison and Mason, there is only one other statement from the Virginia ratifying convention expressing a view on the secret expenditure issue. This is a statement of Patrick Henry on 15 June 1788, apparently expressing a fear of the effect of the "from time to time" provision: "By that paper the national wealth is to be disposed of under the veil of secrecy; for the publication from time to time will amount to nothing, and they may conceal what they may think requires secrecy. How different it is in your own government!"²³² Though perhaps more exaggerated than Mason's language, Henry's statement further confirms the interpretation of the Madison-Mason debate.

Viewed as a whole, the debates in the Constitutional Convention and the Virginia ratifying convention convey a very strong impression that the Framers of the Statement and Account Clause intended it to allow discretion to Congress and the President to preserve secrecy for expenditures related to military operations and foreign negotiations.

Madison mentions the legislature specifically, but not exclusively.²³³ That the President shares in this discretion is suggested by one of the Federalist Essays of John Jay, who had gained diplomatic experience in the service of the Continental Congress during the Revolution and of the Confederation afterwards. Commenting on the newly proposed Constitution, he observed:

It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties of whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are sometimes requisite. There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehension of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or friendly motives, and there doubtless are many of both descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the president, but who would not confide in that of the senate, and still less in that of a large popular assembly. The convention have done well therefore in so disposing of the power of making treaties, that although the president must in forming them act by the advice and consent of the senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such manner as prudence may suggest.²³⁴

The establishment of secret funding practices soon after the Constitutional Convention indicates a contemporaneous understanding that the Framers of Clause 7 did not intend it to require disclosure of expenditures for secret military and foreign diplomacy matters. It is difficult to imagine stronger contemporaneous evidence of the Framers' intent, when one considers that the contingent fund was initially requested by President Washington, who presided over the Constitutional Convention in 1787, and that a further secret funding measure was enacted under Madison, who in his earlier role as "Father of the Constitution" had introduced the "from time to time" amendment."²³⁵

b. Federalist Papers

In *Federalist No. 48*, Madison argued that the legislative power was by far the most extensive, in part because "the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people."²³⁶

In *Federalist No. 58*, Madison, responding to a concern that the equality of representation in the Senate might allow a minority to frustrate the majority's will of a majority, stated:

"The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose the supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word, hold the purse—that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government. This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.

To those causes we are to ascribe the continual triumph of the British House of Commons over the other branches of the government, whenever the engine of a money bill has been employed."²³⁷

Alexander Hamilton, in *Federalist No. 66*, stated that "[t]he exclusive privilege of originating money bills will belong to the House of Representatives,"²³⁸ as an argument against concerns that the Senate would have too much power given its lack of proportional representation.

Hamilton in Federalist No. 72 noted that the executive's functions included "the application and disbursement of the public moneys in conformity to the general appropriations of the legislature."²³⁹

In *Federalist No. 78*, Hamilton argued for an independent judiciary and mentioned the appropriations power of Congress:

"Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The executive not only dispenses the honors but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse" ²⁴⁰

c. Contemporaneous Statements

In an early session of Congress, Madison stated "The constitution . . . places the power in the House of originating money bills."²⁴¹ He explained that "[t]he principal reason why the constitution had made this distinction was, because they were chosen by the People, and supposed to be best acquainted with their interests, and ability [to pay taxes]."²⁴²

In New York, Chancellor Livingston reminded his hearers on June 27, 1788 "to keep in mind, as an important idea, that the accounts of the general government are "from time to time" to be submitted to the public inspection...Will not the representatives consider it essential to their popularity to gratify their constituents with full and frequent statements of the public accounts. There can be no doubt of it."²⁴³

d. Immediate Financial Reporting

By the second session of the 1st Congress, the Treasurer of the United States was providing quarterly accounts of public expenditures.²⁴⁴ As early as 1791, the House provided by resolution²⁴⁵:

RESOLVED: that it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to lay before the House of Representatives...an accurate statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public moneys...in which statement shall also be distinguished the expenditures which fall under each head of appropriation, and shall show the sums, if any, which remain unexpended, and to be accounted for the next statement of each and every of such appropriations.

The earliest statements and accounts of public expenditures were not more specific than each "head of appropriation."²⁴⁶

Early State of the Union Messages reveal that presidents routinely reported national budgets-as well as statements and accounts of receipts and expenditures.²⁴⁷ President Washington concluded his first State of the Union Message by stating, "I have directed the proper officers to lay before you, respectively, such papers and estimates as regard the affairs particularly recommended to your consideration, and necessary to convey to you that information of the state of the union which it is my duty to afford."²⁴⁸

e. U.S. v. Richardson

William Richardson was a citizen who in 1967 made an effort to discover the size of the CIA's "black budget" by writing a letter to the US Government Printing Office. He requested a copy of the CIA budget "published by the Government in compliance with Article I section 9 clause 7."²⁴⁹ Richardson was rebuffed by the US Treasury and started a court action. He argued that the CIA Act was repugnant to the Constitution since it operates to falsify the regular Statement and Account of all public money. After three years Richardson's case was dismissed by Pittsburgh Federal Judge, Joseph P. Wilson who decided that Richardson did not have standing.

Richardson appealed and in 1971, succeeded in having his case heard before a full bench of the United States Court of Appeals in Philadelphia. In the Circuit Court all parties conceded that there is no prior decision which directly controlled the outcome of the case. The nine federal judges ruled in a 6-3 decision in 1972 that Richardson did have legal standing since the Court reasoned that a responsible and intelligent taxpayer and citizen of course wants to know how his tax money is spent because without this information he cannot intelligently follow the actions of the Congress or the Executive, nor could he properly fulfill his obligations as a member of the electorate. The Circuit Court majority and dissent both found that the intent behind the clause was that the citizenry should receive some form of accounting from the government.²⁵⁰

The Federal Government appealed to the Supreme Court and in July 1974, the nine Supreme Court Justices ruled in a 5-4 decision, that Richardson did not have standing. The Court held that Richardson's suit was nothing more than a generalized political grievance that needed to be dealt with through the political process. The Supreme Court concluded that it did not need to examine the merits of Richardson's case.

Justice Douglas in his dissent in United States v. Richardson²⁵¹ had numerous comments that illuminate the meaning of the Statement and Account Clause.

"The mandate runs to the Congress and to the agencies it creates to make a regular Statement and Account... The beneficiary-as is abundantly clear from the constitutional history-is the public." "The Framers of the Constitution deemed financial information essential if the electorate was to exercise any control over its representatives and meet their new responsibilities as citizens of the Republic"²⁵² "From the history of the clause it is apparent that the Framers inserted it in the Constitution to give the public knowledge of the way public funds are expended."²⁵³ "The sovereign in this Nation is the People, not the bureaucracy. The statement of accounts of public expenditures goes to the heart of the problem of sovereignty. If taxpayers may not ask that rudimentary question, their sovereignty becomes an empty symbol and a secret bureaucracy is allowed to run our affairs."²⁵⁴ "Secrecy was the evil at which Article I, Sec 9 Cl 7 was aimed."²⁵⁵

Judge Max Rosenn, the Circuit Judge in the Richardson case stated that

"[t]he debates at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 and the state ratifying conventions reveal that...the citizenry should receive some form of accounting from the Government....Article II, section 3 requires the President "from time to time to give Congress Information on the State of the Union," and presumably the Framers could have utilized the same informal procedure with regard to the accounting if they had so wished. Instead, they chose to have the statement "published," indicating that they wanted it to be more

permanent and widely-circulated than the President's message. The connotation must be that the statement was for the benefit and education of the public as well as coordinate branches of government."²⁵⁶

Judge Rosenn believed that the constitutional obligation to account to the public was supported by the Congressional enactment of 31 U.S.C. section 66b(a)²⁵⁷ which provides:

The Secretary of the Treasury shall prepare such reports for the information of the President, the Congress, and the public as will present the results of the financial operations of the Government...(emphasis supplied)

In furtherance of this general duty, Congress enacted 31 U.S.C. sections 1027-1030 which provide for various specific reports, including the Combined Statement of Receipts and expenditures provided for in Section 1029.

Thus, Judge Rosenn reasoned that Congress' own language indicates that the Secretary's duty to present financial reports runs not only to the President and the Congress, but also to the public at large. If these reports are misleading and inadequate, there is no reason why Richardson, as a taxpayer, should not be able to require the appropriate executive officer to perform his obligations.

Judge Rosenn also stated "The right of the taxpayer to receive reasonably complete reports of governmental expenditures is within the "zone of interest(s) protected...by the statute...in question" and one for which he may suffer a cognizable injury."²⁵⁸

Judge Adams, the Circuit Judge who authored a dissenting opinion that was joined by Judges Aldisert and Hunter wrote that:

"The argument that the duty to report the accounting runs to the public is based on a comparison of Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 with Article II, Section 3. The language of Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 mandates that "a regular Statement and Account***shall be published***", whereas Article II, Section 3 requires that the President "shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the State of the Union**". Thus, the impact of the distinction between "shall be published" and "shall from time to time give to the Congress" becomes apparent. Furthermore, the Articles of Confederation, drafted by many of the same persons as the Constitution, required only that Congress inform the states of its indebtedness, as opposed to the requirement of publication of the receipt and expenditures of all public money."²⁵⁹

St. George Tucker's comments are also instructive with respect to the Statement and Account Clause.²⁶⁰ "These provisions form a salutary check, not only upon the extravagance, and profusion, in which the executive department might otherwise indulge itself, and its adherents and dependents; but also against misappropriation, which a rapacious, ambitious or otherwise untruthful executive might be disposed to make."²⁶¹

Justice Joseph Story averred that "[t]he object is . . . to secure regularity, punctuality, and fidelity, in the disbursements of the public money . . . Congress is made the guardian of this treasure; and to make their responsibility complete and perfect, a regular account of the receipts and expenditures is required to be published, that the people may know, what money is expended, for what purposes, and by what authority."²⁶²

One of the key issues that has never been determined by the Supreme Court is what information is required by the Clause. Is limited financial reporting that includes a discrete number of consolidated figures all that is needed or are complete consolidated financial statements required?

f. Appropriations Clause

The Appropriations Clause has been described as the single most important curb in the Constitution on Presidential power.²⁶³ Control of government expenditures is among Congress' most important and immutable rights. It is also among Congress' indispensable duties. It means that no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress. The Constitution gives Congress the so-called "power of the purse" by providing that only it can appropriate money from the Treasury.²⁶⁴

The "Appropriations" required by the Constitution are not only legislative specifications of money amounts, but also legislative specifications of the powers, activities and purposes-what we may call, simply, "objects"-for which appropriated funds may be used. As Alexander Hamilton explained, "no money can be expended, but for an object, to an extent, and out of a fund, which the laws have prescribed." The "extent" or amount of funding modifies and shapes the "object" funded.²⁶⁵

There are two governing principles²⁶⁶ of the power of the purse:

Principle of the Public Fisc: All funds belonging to the United States-received from whatever source, however obtained, and whether in the form of cash, intangible property, or physical assets-are public monies, subject to public control and accountability. This principle implies that all monies received by the United States are in "the Treasury," to use the language of the Constitution.

Principle of Appropriations Control: All expenditures from the public fisc must be made pursuant to a constitutional "Appropriation made by Law."

Together, the two principles prescribe that there may be no spending in the name of the United States except pursuant to legislative appropriation.

Two framework statutes originally enacted in the 19th and early 20th centuries-the Miscellaneous Receipts statute²⁶⁷ and the Anti-Deficiency Act²⁶⁸ are especially important in ascertaining Congress' historical understanding and application of the appropriations requirement. Although the Anti-Deficiency Act as such was not enacted until the early 20th century, the rule against deficiencies was contained in several 19th century statutes.

1. The Miscellaneous Receipts Statute²⁶⁹

The Act of March 3, 1849 provided that all funds "received from customs, from the sale of public lands, and from all miscellaneous sources, for the use of the United States, shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States. As now codified in section 3302 of title 31 of the United States Code ("Money and Finance"), the statute provides that any "official or agent of the Government receiving money for the Government from any source shall deposit the money into the Treasury."

Pursuant to the requirements of the Miscellaneous Receipts statute, all funds belonging to the United States-received "for the use of the United States" or "for the Government" -are part of the

public fisc. All such funds must be deposited into the federal Treasury, from there to be appropriated by law.

2. The Anti-Deficiency Act²⁷⁰

The Act defines the scope of public expenditure. The two major provisions of this Act-the rule against deficiencies and the rule against voluntary service-were enacted in response to federal agencies incurring “coercive” deficiencies and thereby circumventing amount limitations in appropriations legislation.

Congress may create permanent, substantive law through an appropriations bill only if it is clear about its intentions.²⁷¹ This type of authorizing legislation controls mandatory spending. A distinctive feature of these authorizing laws is that they provide agencies with the authority or requirement to spend money without first requiring Appropriations Committees to enact funding. Mandatory spending includes Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid. Mandatory spending programs continue indefinitely.²⁷²

Several commentators have made the point that Congress renders meaningless the principles of the public fisc and of appropriations control if it creates spending authority without amount or time limitations and fails to subject such authority to periodic legislative review.²⁷³ However, the Supreme Court has been clear that Congress has the power to enact such legislation. In these decisions the Court has not ruled on is the impact that permanent appropriations or mandatory authorizing legislation has on the reporting requirements under the Statement and Account Clause. Presumably, such legislation raises the bar with respect to proper reporting. Given the fact that cash outlays associated with permanent appropriations and mandatory authorizing legislation comprises more than 50% of outlays and the total obligations for social insurance plus Medicaid exceed \$100 trillion it is hard to imagine that the Supreme Court would rule that cash-based reporting achieves the appropriate level of disclosure required by the Constitution.

The complementary nature of the Appropriations and Statement and Account requirements is indicated not only by their placement and wording but also by their broader functions. Without statement and account review, executive agencies could evade the object and amount limitations of appropriations.²⁷⁴ Hence, the appropriations requirement implements not only the idea of “no taxation without representation,” but also the foundational premise of a federal government which is limited to constitutionally authorized activities.²⁷⁵ If there could be “public Money” that is not deposited in “the Treasury” prior to expenditure, then the scope of these complementary constitutional provisions would differ. As a matter of textual coherence, the two phrases should be regarded as synonymous.

In addition, although Congress holds the purse-strings, it may not exercise this power in a manner inconsistent with the direct commands of the Constitution.²⁷⁶

g. Tax and Spending Clause

There are several places in the Constitution that limit Congress’ power to tax and spend including the General Welfare Clause, the Uniformity Clause, the Apportionment of Direct Taxes, and other restrictions on spending.

The Supreme Court has indicated that there are five restrictions on spending: an exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of the general welfare, conditions imposed on the use of federal funds must be reasonably related to the articulated goal; the intent of Congress to impose conditions must be authoritative and unambiguous; and the action in questions must not be prohibited by an independent constitutional bar.²⁷⁷ A fifth restriction indicates that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion.

ii. Federal Financial Reporting

a. Legislative History

1. Taft Commission and Prior Reform Efforts

Starting in the 1880s there were a series of investigations including the Cockrell Committee, Dockery-Cockrell Commission, Roosevelt's Keep Commission and the Taft Commission on Economy and Efficiency ("Taft Commission"), that dealt with the issue of how to improve Federal administration. These investigations were prompted by the increasing size and scope of the nation's business. The Dockery-Cockrell Commission, for example, had, in the 1890s, reiterated Congress' preeminent role in financial management based on the Constitution. Prior to the Taft Commission the results of these efforts were limited.

The Taft Commission was created in June 1910 with the purpose to investigate the business and methods of the Government. The Taft Commission is notable because it proposed that a budget for the U.S. Government be established. Subsequently, President Taft submitted the first consolidated budget. Congress ignored this budget but the Commission's recommendation ultimately led to the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 described below. Many citizens were in favor of these changes as they believed that it would lead to better government.

2. Impact of Woodrow Wilson

Woodrow Wilson, the President from 1913 to 1921, thought that separation of powers was the product of an outmoded theory of politics. In particular, he had no use for separated powers. "No living thing can have its organs offset against each other as checks, and live," he declared. "There can be no successful government without leadership or without the intimate, almost instinctive, coordination of the organs of life and action."²⁷⁸ His views stand in sharp contrast to the importance of separation of powers as described by James Madison in Federalist No. 51.²⁷⁹

Although a longtime advocate of the budget system, he vetoed the bill ultimately passed in 1921, described below, rather than submit to its limitation of his removal power of the Comptroller General.

3. Sixteenth Amendment

The Sixteenth Amendment was ratified by the 36th state on February 13, 1913. Eight months later, in October the Congress enacted a new federal income tax law. By the end of WWI the federal government's revenue generating sources had changed dramatically. Prior to the war, tariffs and excise taxes supplied more than 90% of Federal revenues. After the war income taxes generated 58%.

4. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921²⁸⁰

There was no unified Executive budget prior to the Act. Agency requests were simply packaged by the Treasury Department and transmitted to Congress without change. Following ten years of political maneuvering and debate after the Taft Commission first proposed a budget President Harding signed the Act in 1921. Thereafter, requests from Executive agencies were funneled into the Bureau of the Budget (“BOB”), which functioned as a central clearinghouse.

The Act built on efforts to develop a new budget process and involved trade-offs with the Legislature and the Executive. The Act created the BOB, the forerunner of the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), and established presidential authority over the budget formulation process. As a counterweight to the enhancements of Executive power in the budget process, Congress established the General Accounting Office (“GAO”), now known as the General Accountability Office. The statute transferred to GAO auditing, accounting and claims functions previously carried out by the Department of the Treasury. The office was designed to be “independent of the executive departments,” which were placed under its audit and review powers.²⁸¹

By the early 20th century it had become apparent that the removal power of the President had curtailed the effectiveness of Treasury officials monitoring executive compliance with appropriations limitations. By transferring the auditing function to an independent officer not answerable to the President and removable by legislation only for cause Congress sought better to ensure Executive compliance with spending legislation.

A major feature of the Act was that it gave the GAO power to “prescribe the forms, systems, and procedure for administrative appropriation and fund accounting in the several departments and establishments...”²⁸² The Act specified that control of agency accounting systems and the pre-audit were also responsibilities of the GAO. The Act directed the Comptroller General to prescribe accounting principles and standards in executive agencies.²⁸³ Later legislation enacted exceptions to GAO’s jurisdiction over executive branch and independent agencies including: (1) the CIA, (2) foreign operations and money market policies of the Federal Reserve²⁸⁴ and (3) the President may proscribe GAO access to certain foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations. To enforce access to information the Comptroller General has power to sue a non-complying agency.

By law, the Comptroller General cooperates with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the OMB in developing for use by all federal agencies standardized systems, terminology, definitions, classifications, and codes for federal fiscal, budgetary and program related data and information.

More federal agencies ignored GAO’s guidance than complied in the years after the Act was passed.²⁸⁵

5. Brownlow Committee

The Executive branch’s perspective on the issue of which branch was in charge of determining accounting policies was articulated by the President’s Committee on Administrative Management (the Brownlow Committee) during FDR’s administration and reiterated by the later Hoover Commissions. The Brownlow Committee in 1937 called for a stronger BOB to help the President centralize fiscal management. It recognized that effective fiscal management required a good accounting system to control spending. Since the President’s duty was to faithfully execute the law including appropriations laws the committee reasoned that accounting was an Executive function.

The committee therefore advocated separating the GAO's accounting and audit functions. Specifically, it recommended the authority to prescribe and supervise accounting systems, forms and procedures in the Federal establishments should be transferred to and vested in the Secretary of the Treasury. This would limit the GAO to post audit functions. The Brownlow's assertion of accounting as an exclusive executive function was unacceptable to Congress.

6. Executive Reorganization Plan of 1939

The Bureau of the Budget was moved from Treasury into the Executive Office of the President pursuant to this Act. This further increased the Executive's power over the budget. The Executive Office of the President had originally been proposed by the Taft Commission and again by President Harding.

7. First Hoover Commission

The Hoover Commission, officially named the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government was appointed in 1947 by President Truman. It took its name from former President Herbert Hoover who was appointed by Truman to chair it. In 1949 it made 273 recommendations of which over 100 were implemented in legislation over ensuing years. It recommended the use of accrual accounting by the federal government.

8. Joint Financial Management Improvement Program

The Joint Financial Management Improvement Program ("JFMIP") is a program authorized by the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950²⁸⁶ to improve financial management practices. It was originally set up in 1948 by the Comptroller General, the Director of the OMB and the Secretary of the Treasury. It is a joint and cooperative action undertaken by the Treasury Department, GAO, OMB and the Office of Personnel Management. The program name was originally the Joint Program for Improving Accounting in the Federal Government but it was changed in 1959.

9. Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950²⁸⁷

The recommendations of the First Hoover Commission led to the passage of the Act. It was signed into law by President Truman in September 1950. The Act listed the accounting policies, principles and standards that were to be used by government agencies. After the Act, agencies had to use accrual accounting and cost-based budgeting. They also had to uniformly classify their accounting structures and keep up with an inventory of physical inventory.

The Act directed the Comptroller General to prescribe the principles, standards and related requirements for accounting to be observed by Executive agencies after consulting with the Secretary of the Treasury and the President. The use of accrual accounting, cost-based budgeting, consistent classification, simplification of allotment structure, and adequate control of property is required to establish and maintain adequate systems of accounting and internal control. Furthermore, accrual accounting enhances the ability of agencies to execute cost-based budgeting.²⁸⁸

In response to the legislation, the GAO issued accounting standards in its Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance to Federal Agencies (Title 2). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the GAO reported to Congress that federal agencies had responded poorly to their guidance.

The Act governed the way all government agencies submitted and maintained financial information, including the Executive branch. This brought up a constitutional question as to whether Congress could pass a piece of legislation that governed the Executive branch. Some OMB officials asserted that the GAO standard setting provision was unconstitutional because it authorized a legislative agency to define accounting standards for executive agencies. As a result of the constitutional question of whether the legislative branch can issue standards for the Executive branch the GAO, OMB and Treasury never reached agreement.

10. Second Hoover Commission

The second Hoover Commission was created by Congress in 1953 during the Eisenhower administration. It sent its report to Congress in 1955. It recommended the continued use of performance budgeting, in addition to agencies formulating and administering their budgets on a cost basis. The usefulness of formulating and administering budgets on a cost basis was recognized in 1956 amendments described below but it continues to be largely ignored.

11. Amendments to 1921 and 1950 Acts²⁸⁹

Amendments to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 and the Budget and Procedures Act of 1950 were passed on August 1, 1956.

The Congress provided the following amendments to the 1921 Act:

Sec. 1

(b) The requests of the departments and establishments for appropriations shall, in such manner and at such times as may be determined by the President, be developed from cost-based budgets.

(c) For purposes of administration and operation, such cost-based budgets shall be used by all departments and establishments and their subordinate units. Administrative subdivisions of appropriations or funds shall be made on the basis of such cost-based budgets.”

Amendments to the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 were as follows:

Sec. 113 of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

(c) As soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this subsection, the head of each executive agency shall, in accordance with principles and standards prescribed by the Comptroller General, cause the accounts of such agency to be maintained on an accrual basis to show the resources, liabilities, and costs of operations of such agency with a view to facilitating the preparation of cost-based budgets as required by section 216 of the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, as amended.

12. President's Commission on Budget Concepts

The President's Commission on Budget Concepts was established early in 1967 by President Johnson. Its task was to review the budget concepts and models of presentation then in use and to recommend appropriate changes. Its report was issued in October 1967 and it recommended accrual accounting and that the annual budget be presented on an accrued expenditure basis. This was endorsed by two administrations but not implemented.

13. Executive Reorganization Plan of 1970

Under President Nixon, a second Executive reorganization plan was passed. The Bureau of the Budget was renamed OMB. All functions assigned to the BOB were now delegated to the Director of the OMB. Most importantly, all Executive departments, agencies and other bureaucratic units had to funnel their budget requests through OMB and the President. If these had to depend on OMB and the President they would more likely follow the President's wishes. This further strengthened the Executive branches control over the budget.

Meanwhile in Congress, the budget was not treated as a single entity but as thirteen separate bills. Its budgetary process was uncoordinated and confusing.

14. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 ²⁹⁰

This law was enacted for two reasons: 1) Congress realized that it had no means to develop an overall budget plan and 2) there existed no framework for Congress to establish its own spending priorities before work began on specific spending and revenue bills. The Act created House and Senate Budget Committees and established the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO"). The Act also moved the government's fiscal year end from June 30 to September 30.

15. Arthur Andersen & Company Study²⁹¹

In the 1970s Arthur Andersen & Company ("AA") studied the government's financial reporting. In 1975 AA issued a report and proposed that the government prepare consolidated financial statements on an accrual basis for all entities in the Government and all programs which may require future taxes for present liabilities. AA reasoned that both Hoover Commissions had recommended accrual accounting, and this had led to the passage of Public Law 84-863. This law, supplemented by related Treasury Regulations, specifies that Government agencies must prepare business-type, accrual-basis financial reports. These laws and regulations were in existence since 1956 but had only been partially implemented.

AA recommended discounting the outlays and receipts of a number of transfer programs including social security, civil service retirement and disability, veterans' benefits, and military retirement. Changes in present values were recommended to be included in the budget.²⁹²

16. Prototype Consolidated Financial Statements

The first prototype Financial Report was produced by AA for 1973 and 1974. In 1975, the Treasury Department began issuing annual prototype government-wide financial statements on an accrual basis.

17. Reaction by CBO to AA Report

In response to the AA study the CBO prepared a Technical Analysis Paper "Federal Financial Reporting: Accrual Accounting and the Budget" (1977) that reflected the CBO's reaction. Essentially, it argued that if the AA recommendations were implemented the unified budget would be useless. It described accrual accounting as undefined in the law and that Congress had left that responsibility to the Comptroller General.²⁹³ Furthermore, it attacked the AA recommendations regarding the discounting of transfer payment liabilities and the depreciation of assets. It reasoned that if transfer payments are discounted then everything in the budget should be as well.

18. Title 2 of the GAO Policy and Procedure Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies

In 1984 GAO required audited agency statements on an accrual basis. Title 2 of the GAO Policy and Procedure Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies was revised to require Federal agencies to prepare consolidated financial statements using the accrual basis of accounting.

19. Managing the Cost of Government: Building An Effective Financial Management Structure

In February 1985 then Comptroller General, Chuck Bowsher, put forth a detailed recommendation for a completely revised integrated approach for financial reporting for the Federal Government.²⁹⁴ The GAO called for accrual-based consolidated financial statements and recording social insurance obligations in all budgeting and financial reports. Arthur Andersen supported the GAO's stance. OMB budget officials reacted very negatively.

20. Balanced Budget and Emergency Control Act of 1985

This law, commonly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, instituted rules designed to cut the budget deficit which at that time was the largest in history. The rules required automatic spending cuts if the deficit exceeded a set of fixed deficit targets.

21. Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (the "CFO Act")

The CFO Act required for the first time in history that federal agencies prepare annual financial statements and that these statements be independently audited. It required compliance with applicable accounting principles, standards, requirements and internal control standards. However, the Act did not define the source or nature of the applicable standards. At this point in time, OMB officials still held to their point of view that the GAO standard setting provision of the 1950 Act was unconstitutional because it authorized a legislative agency to define accounting standards for Executive agencies. The Act also established an Office of Federal Financial Management (OFFM) headed by a controller within OMB.²⁹⁵

22. The Government Management Reform Act of 1994

The Act requires that the head of each Executive agency submit audited financial statements to the Director of the OMB. The Act also requires the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the OMB to submit to the President and the Congress annual Government-wide financial statements (now known as "The Financial Report of the United States Government" or the "Financial Report") that contain the results of operations of the Executive branch.²⁹⁶

23. *Flemming v. Nestor*²⁹⁷

In this 1960 Supreme Court decision Nestor's denial of benefits was upheld even though he had contributed to the program for 19 years and was already receiving benefits. Under a 1954 law, Social Security benefits were denied to persons deported for, among other things, having been a member of the Communist party. Accordingly, Mr. Nestor's benefits were terminated. He appealed the termination arguing, among other claims, that promised Social Security benefits were a contract and that Congress could not renege on that contract. In its ruling, the Court rejected this argument and established the principle that entitlement to Social Security benefits is not a contractual right.

b. Accounting in the Private Sector²⁹⁸

Prior to the late 1800s there was little need for financial statements. Beginning in the 1820s the number of corporations expanded rapidly with the growth of railroads. This increased the demand for financial information. In addition, with the separation of management and ownership in corporations, there arose a need for an independent party to review the financial statements. Moreover, there was an expectation that the independent review would discover whether managers were violating their fiduciary duties to the owners.

The American Association of Public Accountants (AAPA) was incorporated in 1887. The AAPA was reorganized as the American Institute of Accountants (AIA). In 1921, the American Society of Certified Public Accountants (ASCPA) was established and became a rival. The ASCPA merged with the AIA in 1937. In 1957, the AIA became the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).

During the nineteenth century, the federal government generally allowed accounting to regulate itself. Then, in 1913, Congress established the Federal Reserve System and, one year later, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). From this date forward, federal agencies have had an increasing impact on accounting.

The government's first major attempt at the formalization of authoritative reporting standards was in 1917 with the Federal Reserve Board's publication of Uniform Accounting. In 1918, the bulletin was reissued as Approved Methods for the Preparation of Balance Sheet Statements.

The impetus for stricter financial reporting was provided by the collapse of the securities market in 1929 and the revelation of massive fraud in a company listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). In 1933, the NYSE announced that companies applying for a listing on the exchange must have their financial statements audited by an independent public accountant. The scope of these audits had to follow the revised guidelines set forth by the Federal Reserve in 1929.

The Securities Act of 1933 conferred upon the FTC the authority to prescribe the accounting methods for companies. Under this act, accountants could be held liable for losses that resulted from material omissions or misstatements in registration statements they had certified. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 transferred the authority to prescribe the accounting methods to the newly established Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and required that financial statements filed with the SEC be certified by an independent accountant.

In 1938, the SEC delegated much of the authority to prescribe accounting practices to the AIA and its Committee on Accounting Procedures (CAP). In 1939, CAP issued the first of fifty-one Accounting Research Bulletins. In 1959, the AICPA replaced the CAP with the Accounting Principles Board (APB). The APB was designed to issue accounting opinions after it had considered previous research studies, and in 1962, the APB issued the first of thirty-one opinions. Although the SEC had delegated much of its standard setting authority to the AICPA, the commission exercised its right to approve all standards.

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) was established in 1973 to replace the APB. This board is independent of the AICPA and issued its first statement in 1973.

The SEC and the FASB, as well as its predecessors, have for many years indicated a preference for accrual-based accounting.²⁹⁹

c. Have Reporting Requirements Changed?

The U.S. Department of the Treasury was created by an Act of Congress on September 2, 1789. The Congress directed the Treasury to provide for the collection, safeguarding, and disbursement of public money, and to maintain a system of account for the government's collections and payments. Although the collection and control of money is critical to any government, the federal financial infrastructure remained very small for more than 100 years. The Register of the Treasury originally carried out the account-keeping functions. Individual departments and independent agencies conducted most disbursing functions without Treasury oversight. By modern standards the administration of federal finances was extremely loose, but then the federal government was much smaller than it is today, and its duties were far more limited. Other than during the few major wars, the government did not collect or spend very much money, and so the need to centralize or modernize its payment, collection, or accounting systems did not exist.

The first major financial management reform took place just after World War I. In late 1919, Treasury Secretary Carter Glass created the forerunners of the current fiscal operations bureaus, Financial Management Service ("FMS") and the Bureau of Public Debt, by approving the positions of the Commissioner of Accounts and deposits and the Commissioner of the Public Debt.

In the last 100 years Congress has created the Federal Reserve System, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, each a multi-trillion dollar enterprise. Yet, the Federal government's balance sheet does not consolidate these or other material controlled entities.³⁰⁰

Over the last two hundred years the Statement and Account Clause requirements have increased as the federal government's finances have become exponentially more complex. This is true even if one assumes that there was no Congressional legislation on the matter. Arguably, a cash-based statement of receipts and expenditures was acceptable to fulfill the Statement and Account's Clause's required accountability when the government was small. However, once the government's finances grew in complexity and especially after the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified and Congress enacted social insurance programs that created substantial future obligations, the federal government should have begun publishing accrual-based financial statements to meet its Constitutional responsibility.

IV. Other Publications by the Author

Joseph H. Marren - Conference Transcripts, Presentations and Video; FASAB Testimony, Presentation and Video and Articles

A video of the “Representation Without Accountability” conference at Fordham Law as well as a transcript, all presentations and the conference brochure can be found at <http://law.fordham.edu/accountability>.

Subsequent to the conference Mr. Marren wrote articles published in Barron’s magazine, Jurist (www.jurist.org), the web-site for the University of Pittsburgh’s School of Law and the Fordham Corporate Law Forum. These include:

- 1) “*Perpetuating Fraudulent Federal Financial Reporting*” published in the Fordham Corporate Law Forum on August 11, 2014 describes how recently proposed legislation in the House of Representatives is pernicious as it is based on the unconstitutional notion that the Comptroller General has the legal authority to prescribe accounting standards and principles for the federal government.
- 2) “*No Accounting for Government Cost*” published in Barrons magazine on January 4, 2014 describes how and why financial reporting by the federal government is fraudulent and violates the Constitution.
- 3) “*Importance of Statement and Account Clause Cannot be Overlooked*” published in Jurist on October 23, 2012 describes the profound and unrecognized implications to recent Supreme Court decisions involving the antifraud provisions of the nation’s securities laws. This article describes how these decisions are likely to ultimately force the Supreme Court to declare that federal financial reporting violates the Statement and Account clause of the United States Constitution, subverts the right to vote and the right to free speech and eliminates required political accountability.
- 4) “*The Statement and Account Clause and Citizens United – Parts I, II, III and IV*” were published in Jurist on January 9, February 3, February 26 and March 13, 2013. Part I explains why the Statement and Account is political speech that is indispensable to decision-making in our democracy. The laws that have been enacted by Congress that have led to the publication of a false Statement and Account must be viewed in essentially the same manner as the Federal Election Commission’s rules that were declared unconstitutional in Citizens United. Part II reviews the history of financial reporting to appreciate the extent of Congress’ abdication of its constitutional responsibility and the unconstitutional takeover of financial reporting by the executive branch. Part III explores the history of FASAB and the Financial Report of the United States Government in an effort to make clear that the Supreme Court should not show deference to Congress with respect to financial reporting laws. Part IV addresses the issue of whether the AICPA has violated the U.S. Constitution and its ethical principles in designating FASAB as the GAAP standards setter for the federal government.
- 5) “*The Statement and Account Clause and Caperton – Parts I and II*” were published in Jurist on April 8 and April 18, 2013. Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. Congress should not be able to unilaterally determine whether it is complying with the Statement and Account clause. The Court indicated that no person is permitted to be a judge in his own case. Part II reviews the psychological factors that have led Congress to publish fraudulent financial statements. This analysis suggests that there are insurmountable barriers to fixing this problem through the normal legislative or election processes.
- 6) “*ACA Medicaid Decision is Judicial Malpractice*” was published on September 5, 2012 in Jurist. It was co-authored with Elizabeth M. Marren. The Supreme Court agreed that the Medicaid expansion in the ACA was unconstitutional. However, each of the opinions issued contain economic and political accountability analysis that is seriously flawed. All justices

ignored important facts, and none addressed a directly applicable constitutional provision, the Statement and Account clause. Not surprisingly, the Court's remedy is clearly in error.

- 7) *"Financial Reporting Renders Health Care Reform Unconstitutional"* was published in Jurist on March 10, 2012. The article describes how one of the key questions in the then upcoming Affordable Care Act case is whether the requirement that states expand Medicaid eligibility or risk losing federal funds is unduly coercive. Federal financial reporting is coercive as it relates to Medicaid because it significantly overstates the federal government's ability to continue providing funding.
- 8) *"ACA is Null and Void"* was written by "Fordham Publius" and published in the Fordham Corporate Law Forum in February 2015. The article consisted of ten parts.

Part I – King v. Burwell is a First Amendment Case

The prevailing legal wisdom is that King v. Burwell is a case about statutory construction. However, there are much larger issues at stake. The article will describe the facts, circumstances and law that should lead the Supreme Court to decide the case unanimously. The article will also explain how the Administration misjudged the states willingness to set up Health Insurance Exchanges.

Part II – Fraudulent State & Federal Financial Reporting - Summary of Arguments

Part II lays out the arguments describing how and why state and federal financial statements are fraudulent and violate the antifraud provisions of the nation's securities laws and/or the Statement and Account and Appropriations Clauses.

Part III – Federal Government's Fraudulent Financial Reporting

Part III reviews the details of the federal government's fraudulent financial reporting. The fraud is primarily based on the creation of a different definition of a "liability" for financial reporting purposes than for Appropriations law purposes. However, it also entails creating accounting rules that require that legal obligations for Appropriations law purposes that are not a "liability" as defined for financial reporting purposes shall not be recorded in the government's financial statements.

Part IV – Federal Government's Cover-up

Part IV reviews the federal government's extensive efforts to cover-up its fraud.

Part V – State Governments' Fraudulent Financial Reporting and Cover-up

Part V reviews the details of the state governments' fraudulent financial reporting as well as their efforts to cover-up the fraud.

Part VI – The Financial Status of the Nation and Social Insurance Pre-ACA

This Part provides an overview of Medicare and describes the financial status of the nation and social insurance pre-enactment of the ACA. Seven schedules are attached to Part VI.

Part VII – The Financial Status of the Nation and Social Insurance Post-ACA

This Part provides a description of the financial status of the nation and Medicare post-enactment of the ACA. Eight schedules are attached to Part VII.

Part VIII – The Financial Status of Medicaid Pre- & Post-ACA

Part VIII describes the size and scope of the nation's Medicaid program before and after passage of the ACA.

Part IX – Right of Free Speech and Right to Financial Information Have Been Violated

Part IX describes how the right of free speech and the right to financial information have been violated. It reviews important history prior to the Constitutional Convention that has been left out of legal discussions regarding the Statement and Account Clause and the Appropriations Clauses.

Part X – Conclusion

Part X describes the perpetual fraud on the Supreme Court that exists today, how the Administration misjudged the states willingness to set up exchanges and why the facts in the case dictate that the Supreme Court should rule unanimously in *King v. Burwell* that the ACA is null and void. One schedule is attached to Part X.

Mr. Marren also submitted a memorandum to FASAB in July 2013 which commented upon the Board's proposed Reporting Entity exposure draft and he testified at the FASAB public hearing on August 28, 2013. The memorandum and a video and transcript of the author's testimony are available at the Fordham Corporate Law Forum web site. (<http://fordhamcorporatecenter.org/2013/10/07/reporting-entity-proposal-is-unconstitutional-and-violates-the-antifraud-provisions-2/>). Many of the author's articles published in Jurist can also be found at the Fordham Corporate Law Forum web site.

Other Suggested Reading

For independent corroboration of the veracity of the analysis contained in this memorandum please read David Mosso's analysis presented at the Representation Without Accountability conference. See <http://fordhamcorporatecenter.org/files/2012/01/David-Mosso-Conference-Remarks-1.23.122.pdf>. Also, please read Wall Street Journal op-ed pieces "Why \$16 Trillion Only Hints at the True U.S. Debt" written by Chris Cox and Bill Archer and published on November 26, 2012; "Medicare by the Scary Numbers" written by John C. Goodman and Laurence J. Kotlikoff and published on June 24, 2013; and "Heading Off the Entitlement Meltdown" written by Rob Portman and published on July 22, 2014.

END NOTES

- ¹ Art. VI, sec 3 “Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken to support this Constitution.”
- ² Jacob Soll, “The Reckoning” xii, (2014).
- ³ Jacob Soll, *The Reckoning* (2014) page 5
- ⁴ Art. VI, sec 3 “Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken to support this Constitution.”
- ⁵ *Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius*, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2576 (2012)(Roberts, C.J.).
- ⁶ *Carter v. Carter Coal Co.*, 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
- ⁷ RICO was enacted by section 901(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (Pub.L. 91–452, 84 Stat. 922, enacted October 15, 1970), and is codified at 18 U.S.C. ch. 96 as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968.
- ⁸ FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICE: A BUREAU OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, Overview: Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays, and Balances of the United States Government (Combined Statement): Publications & Guidance: Financial Management Service, <http://www.fms.treas.gov/annualreport/overview.html>.
- ⁹ U.S. Office of Management and Budget, President's 2014 Fiscal Year Budget, (2013).
- ¹⁰ U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, 2012 Financial Report of the United States Government, (2012).
- ¹¹ FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICE: A BUREAU OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, Overview: Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays, and Balances of the United States Government (Combined Statement): Publications & Guidance: Financial Management Service, <http://www.fms.treas.gov/annualreport/overview.html>.
- ¹² *United States v. Richardson*, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
- ¹³ U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, 2012 Financial Report of the United States Government, (2012).
- ¹⁴ <http://fordhamcorporatecenter.org/2012/01/24/representation-without-accountability-2/>
- ¹⁵ <http://fordhamcorporatecenter.org/2012/01/24/representation-without-accountability-2/>
- ¹⁶ Under U.S. GAAP, most U.S. Government revenues are recognized on a ‘modified cash’ basis, or when they become measurable.
- ¹⁷ U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, 2012 Financial Report of the United States Government, (2012).
- ¹⁸ U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, 2012 Financial Report of the United States Government, (2012).
- ¹⁹ THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt, ed. 1910).
- ²⁰ THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt, ed. 1910).
- ²¹ 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
- ²² 319 F.Supp.2d 69 (D.D.C. 2004).
- ²³ The six acts are: the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. sec 77a-77aa (1994); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. sec 78a-78ll (1994); the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. sec 79-79z(6) (1994); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. sec 77aaa-77bbb (1994); the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. sec 80a(1)-80(a)(64) (1994); and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. sec 80b(1)-80b(21) (1994).
- ²⁴ Louis D. Brandeis, *Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It* 92 (1914).
- ²⁵ *Matrixx Initiatives et al., v. Siracusano et al*, 563 U.S. (2011).
- ²⁶ 485 U.S. 224, 231-232 (1988)
- ²⁷ 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)
- ²⁸ 15 U.S.C. sec 78j(b).
- ²⁹ 17 CFR sec 240.10b-5(b).
- ³⁰ Basic, 485 U.S., at 238. Under the private Securities Litigation reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), when a plaintiff's claim is based on an alleged misrepresentation or omissions of a material fact, “the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, [and] the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading,” 15 U.S.C. sec 78u-4(b)(1)
- ³¹ *Id.*, at 231-232 (quoting *TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.*, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976))
- ³² 485 U.S., at 231 (quoting *TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.*, 426 U.S., at 448-449).
- ³³ 17 CFR sec 240.10b-5(b); see also Basic, 485 U.S., at 239, n. 17 (“Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5”)
- ³⁴ *Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., ET AL., Petitioners v. James Siracusano ET AL.* 563 U.S. (2011)
- ³⁵ 426 U.S. at 449.
- ³⁶ *Cione v. Gorr*, 843 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (N.D. Ohio 1994). See also *Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co.*, 336 F. Supp. 655, 657 (E.D. pa. 1971) (“It may be that a sophisticated analyst, with knowledge of the corporate world, would ultimately deduce from the proxy material [the material information]. However, our concern is not the sophisticated analyst, but the reasonable stockholder...”).
- ³⁷ See *Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co.*, 129 F3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 1997).
- ³⁸ See *United Paperworkers*, 985 F.2d at 1199 (“[E]ven information actually sent to shareholders need not be considered part of the total mix reasonably available to them if ‘the true’ is ‘buried’ in unrelated discussions.”)
- ³⁹ *Werner v. Werner*, 267 F.3d 288, 297 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting *Kas v. Fin. Gen. Bankshares, Inc.*, 796 F.2d 508, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
- ⁴⁰ *TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.*, 426 U.S. at 450 (quoting *Johns Hopkins U. v. Hutton*, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970)).
- ⁴¹ 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
- ⁴² *United States v. Richardson*, 418 U.S. 166, 178 n.11 (1974)(Burger, C.J.).
- ⁴³ *Id.*
- ⁴⁴ Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 14, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
- ⁴⁵ 15 U.S.C. sec 78m(j) (2006)
- ⁴⁶ *Fed. Election Commission v. Akins*, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
- ⁴⁷ *United States v. Hayes*, 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
- ⁴⁸ *Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius*, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2576 (2012)(Roberts, C.J.).

⁴⁹ Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2576 (2012)(Roberts, C.J.).

⁵⁰ F. Andrew Hessick, *Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights*, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 275, 287 (2008). See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., *Individual Rights and the Powers of Government*, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 343, 351 (1993) (discussing private rights endowed by the Constitution and the interests those rights protect). Professor Bandes and then-Professor Nichol argue that all constitutional provisions should be cognizable. See Bandes, *supra* note 3, at 284-85; Gene R. Nichol, Jr., *Rethinking Standing*, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 68, 86 (1984).

⁵¹ 9 The Writings of James Madison 103 (Gaillard Hunt, ed. 1910)

⁵² 14 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 384 (Mem ed. 1903)

⁵³ "John Adams, Dissertation on Canon and Feudal Law, 1765, From: Our Sacred Honor, Bennett, 253.

⁵⁴ Joseph Marren, *The Statement and Account Clause and Citizens United*, JURIST - Sidebar, Jan. 9, 2013, <http://jurist.org/sidebar/2013/01/joseph-marren-citizens-part1.php>

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⁵⁶ Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11.

⁵⁷ James E. Pfander, *Triangulating Standing*, 53 St. Louis U. L.J. 829, 835 (2009)

⁵⁸ Id.

⁵⁹ Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1784, 141 L. Ed. 2d 10 (1998)

⁶⁰ N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 120 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1992).

⁶¹ Erwin Chemerinsky, *Protecting the Spending Power*, 4 Chap. L. Rev. 89, 100 (2001).

⁶²

⁶³ Budget and Accounting-Amendment, Pub. L. No. 863 (1921), available at <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/600/pl84-863.pdf>.

⁶⁴ CBO's Budgetary Treatment of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

⁶⁵ Kate Stith, *Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings*, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 593, 607 n. 91-92 (1988); Permanent appropriations operate automatically to provide funding each year, without action by Congress. The major entitlement programs have permanent appropriations. Examples include social security, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and federal retirement payments, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202, 1204, 1205, 1275, 1315, 1331 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Some entitlement programs must be annually funded, including Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1982), and various veterans benefits, 38 U.S.C. §§ 314, 503, 521 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), but these appropriations are treated as mandatory by Congress, like liquidating appropriations for contract authority.

⁶⁶ Stith, Kate, "Congress' Power of the Purse" (1988). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1267.

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1267.

⁶⁷ Joseph Marren & Elizabeth Marren, *ACA Medicaid Decision is Judicial Malpractice*, JURIST - Sidebar, Sept. 5, 2012,

<http://jurist.org/sidebar/2012/09/marren-marren-medicare-malpractice.php>

⁶⁸ S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 97 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1987).

⁶⁹ S. Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. at 2794.

⁷⁰ Id.

⁷¹ U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 2011 FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 32 (2011).

⁷² Id. at xiii.

⁷³ Joseph Marren, *The Statement and Account Clause and Caperton: Part I*, JURIST - Sidebar, Apr. 8, 2013,

<http://jurist.org/sidebar/2013/04/joseph-marren-sa-caperton-part1.php>

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⁷⁵ 273 U.S. 510.

⁷⁶ THE FEDERALIST No. 10, p. 59 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)(J. Madison).

⁷⁷ 273 U.S. at 520.

⁷⁸ Id. at 522.

⁷⁹ Id. at 535.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Withrow, 421 U.S., at 47.

⁸² 409 U.S. 57 (1972).

⁸³ 409 U.S., at 60.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973).

⁸⁶ Withrow, 421 U.S., at 47.

⁸⁷ Charles T. Munger, *Poor Charlie's Almanack: The Wit and Wisdom of Charles T. Munger*, 390-446 (Peter D. Kaufman 2005).

⁸⁸ Id. at 401.

⁸⁹ THE FEDERALIST No. 72 at 257 (Alexander Hamilton (1788).

⁹⁰ See "Setting Recusal Standards after Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company

⁹¹ Id. at 407.

⁹² Id. at 409.

⁹³ Id. at 431-32.

⁹⁴ Id. at 435.

⁹⁵ Federal Accounting Standard Advisory Board, *Accounting for Social Insurance, Revised*, at 8 (2006).

⁹⁶ Id. at 434.

⁹⁷ Id. at 438.

⁹⁸ Munger, *Poor Charlie's Almanack: The Wit and Wisdom of Charles T. Munger*, 425 (Peter D. Kaufman 2005).

⁹⁹ Joseph Marren & Elizabeth Marren, *ACA Medicaid Decision is Judicial Malpractice*, JURIST - Sidebar, Sept. 5, 2012, <http://jurist.org/sidebar/2012/09/marren-marren-medicaid-malpractice.php>

¹⁰⁰ Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2576 (2012)(Roberts, C.J.).

¹⁰¹ *Id.* at 2571.

¹⁰² *Id.*

¹⁰³ *Id.*

¹⁰⁴ *Id.* at 2572-73.

¹⁰⁵ *Id.* at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).

¹⁰⁶ *Id.* at 2663.

¹⁰⁷ *Id.* at 2632 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

¹⁰⁸ *Id.* at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.).

¹⁰⁹ *Id.* at 2572.

¹¹⁰ *Id.* at 2602 (Roberts, C.J.)(quoting *Barnes v. Gorman*, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002)).

¹¹¹ *Id.*

¹¹² *Id.* at 2604.

¹¹³ *Id.* at 2605.

¹¹⁴ *Id.* at 2602 (Roberts, C.J.).

¹¹⁵ *Id.* at 2660 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).

¹¹⁶ *Id.* at 2633 n.17 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

¹¹⁷ *Id.* at 2575 (2012).

¹¹⁸ Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2576 (2012)(Roberts, C.J.).

¹¹⁹ U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 2010 FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 140 tbl.1 (2010).

¹²⁰ *Id.* at 130-31, 222, 224, 226-28. See also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 2011 FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 134 (2011).

¹²¹ U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 2011 FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 32 (2011).

¹²² *Id.* at xiii.

¹²³ Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2632 n.15 (2012)(Ginsberg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

¹²⁴ Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2576 (2012)(Roberts, C.J.).

¹²⁵ Chairman Greenspan presented identical testimony before the Committee on Financial services, U.S. House of Representatives, on February 12, 2003.

¹²⁶ The Federal Reserve Act requires the Board to order an annual independent audit of the financial statements of the Board and the twelve Reserve Banks. 12 USC 248b (1999).

¹²⁷ Comment Letter from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to Wendy Payne, Executive Director, Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, July 2, 2013.

¹²⁸ Even scholars who would have sustained the one-House veto appear to agree with this ultimate conclusion. See Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, The Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw.U.L.Rev. 1064, 1090 (1981)("It is not a case where the Congress has delegated authority to one of its components to take affirmative steps to impose regulations upon private interests-an action which would, I assume, be unconstitutional"). Cf. *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 286, 96 S.Ct. 612, 728, 46 L.Ed.2d 659(1976)(WHITE, J., dissenting)(expressing the opinion that a one-House veto of agency regulations would be unobjectionable, but adding that it "would be considerably different if Congress itself purported to adopt and propound regulations by the action of both Houses").

¹²⁹ As I have emphasized, in this case, the Comptroller General is assigned functions that require him to make policy determinations that bind the Nation. I note only that this analysis need not call into question the Comptroller General's performance of numerous existing functions that may not rise to this level. See ante, at 734-735, n. 9.

¹³⁰ The fact that Congress specified a joint resolution as the fallback provision has another significance as well. For it reveals the congressional intent that, if the Comptroller General could not exercise the prescribed functions, Congress wished to perform them itself, rather than delegating them, for instance, to an independent agency or to an Executive Branch official. This choice shows that Congress intended that the important functions of the Act be no further from itself than the Comptroller General.

¹³¹ In considering analogous problems, our state courts have consistently recognized the importance of strict adherence to constitutionally mandated procedures in the legislative process. See, e.g., *State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary*, 606 P.2d 769, 773, 777 (Alaska 1980)("Of course, when the legislature wishes to act in an advisory capacity it may act by resolution. However, when it means to take action having a binding effect on those outside the legislature it may do so only by following the enactment procedures. Other state courts have so held with virtual unanimity...The fact that it can delegate legislative power to others who are not bound by Article II does not mean that it can delegate power to itself and, in the process, escape from the constraints under which it must operate"); *People v. Tremaine*, 252 N.Y. 27, 44, 168 N.E. 817, 822 (1929)("If the power to approve the segregation of lump sum appropriations may be delegated to any one, even to one or two members of the Legislature, it necessarily follows that the power to segregate such appropriations may also be conferred by the committee chairmen. Such a delegation of legislative power would be abhor[r]ent to all our notions of legislation on the matter of appropriations").

¹³² I have previously noted my concern about the need for a "due process of lawmaking" even when Congress has acted with bicameralism and presentment. See *Fullilove v. Klutznick*, 448 U.S. 448, 549, and n. 24, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 2811, and n. 24, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980)(STEVENS, J., dissenting); *Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks*, 430 U.S. 73, 98, and n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 911, 916, and n. 11, 51 L.Ed. 173 (1977)(STEVENS, J., dissenting). When a legislature's agent is given powers to act without even the formalities of the legislative process, these concerns are especially prominent.

¹³³ See also Watson, *Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive*, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 983, 1067, n. 430 (1975) (“A delegation which disperses power is not necessarily constitutionally equivalent to one which concentrates power in the hands of the delegating agency”); Ginnane, 66 Harv. L. Rev., at 595 (“It is a non sequitur to say that, since a statute can delegate a power to someone not bound by the procedure described in the Constitution for Congress’ exercise of the power, it can therefore ‘delegate’ the power to Congress free of constitutional restrictions on the manner of its exercise”).

¹³⁴ Justice BLACKMUN suggests that Congress may delegate legislative power to one of its own agents as long as it does not retain “tight control” over that agent. Post, at 779, n. 1. His suggestion is not faithful to the rationale of *Chadha* because no component of Congress, not even one of its Houses, is subject to the “tight control” of the entire Congress. For instance, the Congressional Research Service, whose primary function is to respond to congressional research requests, 2 U.S.C. sec 166, apparently would not fall within Justice BLACKMUN’S “tight control” test because Congress has guaranteed the Service “complete research independence and the maximum practicable administrative independence consistent with these objectives.” Sec 166(b)(2). I take it, however, that few would doubt the unconstitutionality of assigning the functions at issue in this case to the Congressional Research Service. Moreover, *Chadha* surely forecloses the suggestion that because delegation of legislative power to an independent agency is acceptable, such power may also be delegated to a component or an agent of Congress. Finally, with respect to Justice BLACKMUN’S emphasis on Presidential appointment of the Comptroller General, post, at 778-779, n. 1, as I have previously pointed out, other obvious congressional agents, such as the Librarian of Congress, the Architect of the Capitol, and the Public Printer are also appointed by the President. See n. 9, *supra*.

¹³⁵ Peter G. Peterson, *Running on Empty* 111 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2004).

¹³⁶ *Carter v. Carter Coal Co.*, 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).

¹³⁷ *Id.* at 2602 (Roberts, C.J.).

¹³⁸ *Id.* at 2660 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).

¹³⁹ *Id.* at 2633 n.17 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

¹⁴⁰ 15 U.S.C. sec 78o-3 (1970). See generally *Nassau Sec. Serv. v. SEC*, 348 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1965); Rutter, *The National Association of Securities Dealers*, 7 Vill. L. Rev. 611 (1962).

¹⁴¹ *R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC*, 198 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 855 (1952).

¹⁴² RICO was enacted by section 901(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (Pub.L. 91–452, 84 Stat. 922, enacted October 15, 1970), and is codified at 18 U.S.C. ch. 96 as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968.

¹⁴³ Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, *FASAB Facts* (2009).

¹⁴⁴ Memorandum of Understanding Among the Gov’t Accountability Office, the Dep’t. of the Treasury, and the OMB on the Federal Gov’t Accounting Standards and a Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (Revised October 2009).

¹⁴⁵ James Patton & David Mosso, *Is the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board Independent? Can the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board Be More Independent?*, *Journal of Government Financial Management*, Fall 2009, at 61.

¹⁴⁶ *Id.*

¹⁴⁷ *Id.*

¹⁴⁸ *Id.*

¹⁴⁹ *Financial Reporting - AICPA Recognizes FASAB as GAAP Standard Setter*, *Journal of Accountancy*, Mar. 2000, at 1.

¹⁵⁰ James Patton & David Mosso, *Is the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board Independent? Can the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board Be More Independent?*, *Journal of Government Financial Management*, Fall 2009.

¹⁵¹ Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, *FASAB News Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board* (June/July 2010).

¹⁵² Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, *Accounting for Social Insurance (Revised) Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards Preliminary Views* (Oct. 2006).

¹⁵³ *Id.* at 8.

¹⁵⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵⁵ Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, *FASAB News Issue 105*, at 5 (September/October 2007).

¹⁵⁶ James Patton & David Mosso, *Is the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board Independent? Can the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board Be More Independent?*, *Journal of Government Financial Management*, Fall 2009.

¹⁵⁷ Brian Fitzpatrick’s research at Vanderbilt focuses on class action litigation, federal courts, judicial selection and constitutional law. Professor Fitzpatrick joined Vanderbilt’s law faculty in 2007 after serving as the John M. Olin Fellow at New York University School of Law. He graduated first in his class from Harvard Law School and went on to clerk for Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and Justice Antonin Scalia on the U.S. Supreme Court. After his clerkships, Professor Fitzpatrick practiced commercial and appellate litigation for several years at Sidley Austin in Washington, D.C., and served as Special Counsel for Supreme Court Nominations to U.S. Senator John Cornyn. Before earning his law degree, Professor Fitzpatrick graduated summa cum laude with a bachelor’s of science in chemical engineering from the University of Notre Dame. He has received the Hall-Hartman Outstanding Professor Award, which recognizes excellence in classroom teaching, for his Civil Procedure course.

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¹⁵⁹ Budget and Accounting-Amendment, Pub. L. No. 863 (1921), available at <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/600/pl84-863.pdf>.

¹⁶⁰ CBO’s Budgetary Treatment of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

¹⁶¹ Kate Stith, *Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings*, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 593, 607 n. 91-92 (1988); Permanent appropriations operate automatically to provide funding each year, without action by Congress. The major entitlement programs have permanent appropriations. Examples include social security, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and federal retirement payments, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202, 1204, 1205, 1275, 1315, 1331 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Some entitlement programs must be annually funded, including Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1982), and various veterans benefits, 38 U.S.C. §§ 314, 503, 521 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), but these appropriations are treated as mandatory by Congress, like liquidating appropriations for contract authority.

¹⁶² 418 U.S. 166 (1974).

¹⁶³ United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 n.11 (1974)(Burger, C.J.).

¹⁶⁴ *Id.*

¹⁶⁵ <http://fordhamcorporatecenter.org/2012/01/24/representation-without-accountability-2/>

¹⁶⁶ The Exposure Draft would also require certain other organizations to be included in the government-wide GPFFR if excluding them would be misleading.

¹⁶⁷ These fees are not assessed and collected by the federal government, but are assessed and collected by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") pursuant to a contractual arrangement between the FAF and the PCAOB.

¹⁶⁸ The independence of the FASB budget was critical to Congress. See 148 CONG. REC. S7355 (Jul. 25, 2002)(statement of Sen. Enzi): "We did something marvelous for the FASB. We made sure of its independence. One way we made sure of its independence, besides citing in the law, was to make sure FASB has independent funding. They will not have to come to Congress with a budget. And they will not have to go to corporate America for funding. They will get independent funding to be able to do the job they need to do. That will inhibit us from trying to change what they are doing in setting accounting standards."

¹⁶⁹ Although pursuant to Section 109 of SOX, the SEC is required to determine annually that the FASB accounting support fee is within the parameters prescribed by Congress, the SEC does not have authority, and is not required, to approve the FASB budget.

¹⁷⁰ The Budget of the U.S. Government: Analytical Perspectives-Supplemental Materials schedule entitled "Federal programs by Agency and Account" (Schedule 32-1); referring to the FASB as the "Standard Setting Body" (Account 527-00-5377)).

¹⁷¹ It should be noted that notwithstanding the explicit statutory language providing that the accounting support fees do not constitute public monies or public funds, the OMB has determined that the FASB is subject to sequestration.

¹⁷² The Exposure Draft also provides guidance regarding the circumstances when consolidated financial statements would be appropriate for an organization in the GPFFRs ("consolidation entities"), or when disclosure would be appropriate ("disclosure organizations").

¹⁷³ Although the Exposure Draft refers to inclusion in the Budget as a "principle," it appears to us to be more in the nature of a rule, requiring an entity to be included in the GPFFR if it is in the Budget.

¹⁷⁴ It seems anomalous to us that the FASB may not be entitled to rely on this exception (and therefore may be required to be included in the GPFFRs) precisely because it does not receive any form of federal financial assistance.

¹⁷⁵ We assume that, even were the FASB to be included in the GPFFRs, it would not be deemed to be a consolidation entity. As the Exposure Draft states, "Consolidation is not appropriate for organizations operating with a high degree of autonomy. Some organizations that meet the principles for inclusion are insulated from political influence and intended to be non-taxpayer funded. Presenting information about these discrete organizations in consolidated financial statements would obscure the operating results and financial position of the reporting entity." We also believe, though, that the FASB should not be considered to be a "disclosure organization," on the basis that the absence of any governmental ownership, or any operational governmental control, should not result in the FASB being within the scope of the GPFFRs in any manner. As the Exposure Draft states, "The Board recognizes that in rare instances it also may be misleading to include an organization that is administratively assigned to a reporting entity based on [inclusion] principles. In such cases, the organization may be excluded." If there is no federal funds, there would be no justification for including the entity within the scope of the GPFFRs; indeed, to do so would be misleading. The proposed "misleading to include" criteria do not clearly reflect this consideration, and the Exposure Draft states without support that instances when organizations can be excluded are "rare."

¹⁷⁶ We defer to the FASAB as to how an elimination of the "in the Budget" principle should be reflected. For example, the FASAB may determine that inclusion in the Budget is merely one of several factors to be considered in evaluating whether an organization should be included in the GPFFRs.

¹⁷⁷ The Exposure Draft includes twelve specific questions to which commentators are requested to respond. The comments set forth in this letter are intended to respond principally to questions Q1(a), (b) and, (d).

¹⁷⁸ Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec978(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1925 (July 21, 2010).

¹⁷⁹ MSRB was established by Congress to promote a fair and efficient municipal securities market. MSRB makes rules regulating securities firms (but not issuers) in the municipal securities market. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is charged with oversight of MSRB.

¹⁸⁰ In this report, we use the term "stakeholder" to mean a person or group with an interest in GASB and its impact on the municipal securities market.

¹⁸¹ For purposes of this work, the term "analysts" refers collectively to institutional or retail investors, rating agencies, and bond insurers-entities that employ professional staff who analyze the credit quality of municipal bonds-that we interviewed or participated in our roundtable. "Issuers" refers to those state and local governments and associations representing state and local governments and their finance officers that we interviewed or who participated in our roundtable. Where appropriate, we attribute the comments to subgroups.

¹⁸² National Association of State Controllers, Time to Complete the States' CAFRs, Fiscal Years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. Received from the National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers, and Treasurers via e-mail on November 19, 2010.

¹⁸³ Standard & Poor's, For the U.S. Bond Insurance Market, There May Be No Turning Back, January 20, 2010.

¹⁸⁴ FASB, organized in 1973, establishes standards of accounting and reporting for private sector entities, including businesses and not-for-profit organizations. Like GASB, FASB is an operating component of the Foundation.

¹⁸⁵ In accordance with section 109 of the Act, FASB is funded by an annual accounting support fee allocated among securities issuers based on each issuer's proportional market capitalization.

¹⁸⁶ If SEC exercised this authority, SEC said it would require the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a registered national securities association under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, to establish the accounting support fee.

¹⁸⁷ Walter Stahr, *John Jay* 105-108 (Hambledon 2005).

¹⁸⁸ Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, *The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity*, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1207, 1253 (2009)

¹⁸⁹ *Id.*

¹⁹⁰ *Id.* at 1252-53.

¹⁹¹ *Id.* at 1253.

¹⁹² *Id.*

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- ¹⁹³ Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., *Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: Universal Service, the Power to Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine*, 80 Ind. L.J. 239, 250 (2005)
- ¹⁹⁴ *Id.*
- ¹⁹⁵ *Id.* at 251.
- ¹⁹⁶ *Id.*
- ¹⁹⁷ *Id.*
- ¹⁹⁸ *Id.*
- ¹⁹⁹ *Id.* at 252.
- ²⁰⁰ *Id.*
- ²⁰¹ *Id.*
- ²⁰² *Id.*
- ²⁰³ *Id.* at 253.
- ²⁰⁴ *Id.*
- ²⁰⁵ *Id.*
- ²⁰⁶ *Id.*
- ²⁰⁷ *Id.*
- ²⁰⁸ *Id.*
- ²⁰⁹ *Id.* at 254.
- ²¹⁰ *Id.*
- ²¹¹ *Id.*
- ²¹² *Id.*
- ²¹³ *Id.*
- ²¹⁴ *Id.* at 255.
- ²¹⁵ *Id.*
- ²¹⁶ *Id.*
- ²¹⁷ *Id.*
- ²¹⁸ *Id.*
- ²¹⁹ *Id.* at 256.
- ²²⁰ *Id.*
- ²²¹ *Id.*
- ²²² *Id.*
- ²²³ *Halperin v. Cent. Intelligence Agency*, 629 F.2d 144, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
- ²²⁴ *Id.*
- ²²⁵ *Id.*
- ²²⁶ *Id.*
- ²²⁷ *Id.*
- ²²⁸ *Id.*
- ²²⁹ *Id.*
- ²³⁰ *Id.* at 156.
- ²³¹ *Id.*
- ²³² *Id.*
- ²³³ *Id.*
- ²³⁴ *Id.*
- ²³⁵ *Id.* at 159.
- ²³⁶ The Federalist No. 48, at 278 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
- ²³⁷ *Id.* No. 58, at 327 (James Madison).
- ²³⁸ The Federalist No. 66, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
- ²³⁹ *Id.* No. 72, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton).
- ²⁴⁰ *Id.* No. 78, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton).
- ²⁴¹ Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., *Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: Universal Service, the Power to Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine*, 80 Ind. L.J. 239, 258 (2005)
- ²⁴² *Id.*
- ²⁴³ *U. S. v. Richardson*, 418 U.S. 166, 199-200, 94 S. Ct. 2940, 2958, 41 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1974)
- ²⁴⁴ 1 Annal of Congress 1031, 1061, 1141.
- ²⁴⁵ 2 Annals of Congress 302.
- ²⁴⁶ *Halperin v. Cent. Intelligence Agency*, 629 F.2d 144, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
- ²⁴⁷ See, e.g., Fourth Annual Message of Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 8, 1804), reprinted in 1 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 77 (“Accounts of the receipts and expenditures of the last year, with estimates for the ensuing one, will as usual be laid before you”).
- ²⁴⁸ First Annual Message of George Washington (Jan. 8, 1790), reprinted in 1 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES, supra note 62, at 4.
- ²⁴⁹ *Id.* at 168.
- ²⁵⁰ *Richardson v. United States*, 465 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1972) rev'd, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S. Ct. 2940, 41 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1974).
- ²⁵¹ *United States v. Richardson*, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). (Douglas, J., dissenting).
- ²⁵² *Id.* At 166, 198.
- ²⁵³ *Id.* at 200.

- ²⁵⁴ Id. at 201.
- ²⁵⁵ Id. At 202.
- ²⁵⁶ Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1972) rev'd, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1974).
- ²⁵⁷ 31 U.S.C. 3513(a)
- ²⁵⁸ Id.
- ²⁵⁹ Compare U.S. Const, Art I, Sec. 9, cl. 7 with Articles of Confederation, Art. IX, p 5 (requiring Congress to account to the states for "sums of money***borrowed or emitted").
- ²⁶⁰ 3 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (The University of Chicago Press 2000), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/print_documents/a1_9_7s3.html.
- ²⁶¹ Id.
- ²⁶² 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1342 (The University of Chicago Press 2000), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_9_7s4.html.
- ²⁶³ See Stith, Kate, "Congress' Power of the Purse" (1988). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1267. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1267; See also Office of the General Counsel – Principles of Federal Appropriations Law Second Edition Volume I July 1991 and Louis Fisher, The Authorization-Appropriation Process Congress: Formal Rules and Informal Practices, 29 Cath U.L. Rev.51, 53-59 (1979).
- ²⁶⁴ See Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 290-91 (1850); Hart's Case, 16 Ct. Cl. 459, 484 (1881) ("[A]bsolute control of money of the United States is in Congress, and Congress is responsible for its exercise of this great power only to the people."), aff'd, 118 U.S. 62 (1886); cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department...")
- ²⁶⁵ Stith, Kate, "Congress' Power of the Purse" (1988). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1267. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1267.
- ²⁶⁶ Id.
- ²⁶⁷ 31 U.S.C.A. § 3302 (b).
- ²⁶⁸ 31 U.S.C. § 1341-51.
- ²⁶⁹ Stith, Kate, "Congress' Power of the Purse" (1988). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1267. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1267.
- ²⁷⁰ Stith, Kate, "Congress' Power of the Purse" (1988). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1267. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1267.
- ²⁷¹ Stith, Kate, "Congress' Power of the Purse" (1988). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1267. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1267.
- ²⁷² Kate Stith, *Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings*, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 593, 607 n. 91-92 (1988); Permanent appropriations operate automatically to provide funding each year, without action by Congress. The major entitlement programs have permanent appropriations. Examples include social security, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and federal retirement payments, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202, 1204, 1205, 1275, 1315, 1331 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Some entitlement programs must be annually funded, including Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1982), and various veterans benefits, 38 U.S.C. §§ 314, 503, 521 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), but these appropriations are treated as mandatory by Congress, like liquidating appropriations for contract authority.
- ²⁷³ Id.
- ²⁷⁴ See 19 ANNALS PF CONG. 1330-31 (1809) ([U]nless the House examine if the amount of appropriation is exceeded by the expenditure; or if it be misapplied, that is, if money appropriated for one object be expended for another; unless we do this sir, our control over the public purse is a mere name-an empty shadow.") (statement of Rep. J. Randolph); see also L. Wilmerding, supra note 4, at 199 passim("the Effort to Control After Expenditure").
- ²⁷⁵ Id.
- ²⁷⁶ See *United States v. Lovett*, 328 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1946) (Congress cannot enact bills of attainder through appropriation legislation); see also 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 507 (1960); 41 Op. Att'y Gen 230 (1955); 4 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 731 (1980) (all stating that Constitution prohibits Congress from exercising appropriations power in a manner that violates other constitutional requirements); cf. *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (per curiam) (even where Congress has plenary legislative authority, it cannot exercise that authority so as to offend some other constitutional restriction).
- ²⁷⁷ *S. Dakota v. Dole*, 483 U.S. 203, 207-09 (1987); *Nevada v. Skinner*, 884 F 2nd 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1989) cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1112.
- ²⁷⁸ Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981; orig. ed., 1885), pp. 27, 215.
- ²⁷⁹ The Federalist No. 51, at xxx James Madison)(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
- ²⁸⁰ 31 U.S.C.A. 41
- ²⁸¹ 31 U.S.C. §702(a)
- ²⁸² 31 U.S.C.A. § 3511
- ²⁸³ Id.
- ²⁸⁴ 31 U.S.C. 714(b)
- ²⁸⁵ Cornelius E. Tierney, Edward F. Kearney, & Roldan Fernandez, *Audit Federal Financial Controls: Sooner Rather Than Later?*, AGA CPAG Research Series: Report No. 1, Mar. 2005, at 5.
- ²⁸⁶ 31 U.S.C. 65
- ²⁸⁷ 31 U.S.C.A. 65; 31 U.S.C. §§3511-3515, 3521
- ²⁸⁸ 31 U.S.C. 8351

²⁸⁹ United States. Cong. *Budget and Accounting-Amendment*. 84th Cong., 2nd sess. <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/600/pl84-863.pdf>.

²⁹⁰ 31 U.S.C.A. §1301

²⁹¹ See Arthur Anderson & Co., *Sound Financial Reporting in the Public Sector: a Prerequisite to Fiscal Responsibility* (Sept. 1975); See also Arthur Andersen & Co., *Sound Fiscal Management in the Public Sector* (Oct. 1976).

²⁹² At the time of AA's recommendation the Government computed two estimates of future liabilities for Social Security. These estimates were based on a present-value approach, taking into consideration future contributions and benefits which have been established by present laws. Beginning in 1972, benefits are automatically adjusted for changes in the consumer price index. The first estimate, usually referred to as the Official Actuarial Concept, indicates that the excess of benefits to be paid to present and future participants (defined years thereafter as the Open Group) over anticipated receipts for the next seventy-five years on a present value basis is \$1.312 trillion as of June 30, 1974. The second estimate, usually referred to as the Full-reserve Actuarial Concept, estimates that the excess of benefits to be paid to present participants over contributions by present participants (defined years thereafter as the Closed Group) on a present value basis is \$2.460 trillion as of June 30, 1974.

²⁹³ Congressional Budget Office, *Federal Financial Reporting: Accrual Accounting and the Budget* (1977).

²⁹⁴ U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/AFMD-85-35-A, *Managing the Cost of Government: Building an Effective Financial Management Structure* (1985).

²⁹⁵ § 307. Adoption of Capital Accounting Standards. PL 101-576, 1990 HR 5687

²⁹⁶ § 3515. Financial statements of agencies, PL 103-356, 1994 S 2170

²⁹⁷ "Social Security Online History Pages." The United States Social Security Administration. Web. 02 Sept. 2011.

<<http://www.ssa.gov/history/nestor.html>>.

²⁹⁸ "Accounting: Historical Perspectives: Encyclopedia of Business and Finance." *ENotes - Literature Study Guides, Lesson Plans, and More*. Web. 04 Sept. 2011. <<http://www.enotes.com/business-finance-encyclopedia/accounting-historical-perspectives>>.

²⁹⁹ See 17 C.F.R. 210.4-01(a)91)(2002) and Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises, Financial Accounting Standards Board, *Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1*, paragraph 44.

³⁰⁰ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *2012 Financial Report of the United States Government*, x (2012).

The President's Budget

Under Budget Accounting the Federal Government has Spent \$1.30 for every \$1.00 of Revenue

(Trillions of Dollars)

Fiscal Year Ended 9/30	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
GDP (Quarterly-Current Dollars per BEA)	\$13.9	\$14.6	\$14.8	\$14.4	\$15.1	\$15.6	\$16.2	\$16.7	\$17.5	\$18.1
President's Budget										
Revenues	\$2.4	\$2.6	\$2.5	\$2.1	\$2.2	\$2.3	\$2.5	\$2.8	\$3.0	\$3.3
Outlays	2.7	2.7	3.0	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.7
Budget Deficit	(\$0.2)	(\$0.2)	(\$0.5)	(\$1.4)	(\$1.3)	(\$1.3)	(\$1.1)	(\$0.7)	(\$0.5)	(\$0.4)

The Financial Report of the United States Government Statements of Net Cost

Under Accrual Accounting the Federal Government has Spent \$1.38 for every \$1.00 of Revenue

(Trillions of Dollars)

Fiscal Year Ended 9/30	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
GDP (Quarterly-Current Dollars per BEA)	\$13.9	\$14.6	\$14.8	\$14.4	\$15.1	\$15.6	\$16.2	\$16.7	\$17.5	\$18.1
President's Budget										
Revenues	\$2.4	\$2.6	\$2.5	\$2.1	\$2.2	\$2.3	\$2.5	\$2.8	\$3.0	\$3.3
Outlays	2.7	2.7	3.0	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.7
Budget Deficit	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.5)	(1.4)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.1)	(0.7)	(0.5)	(0.4)
Additional Accrued Expenses Recorded in Financial Report	0.2	0.1	0.6	(0.2)	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.1
Net Operating Cost	(\$0.4)	(\$0.3)	(\$1.0)	(\$1.3)	(\$2.1)	(\$1.3)	(\$1.3)	(\$0.8)	(\$0.8)	(\$0.5)

Exhibit 2

Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid Amounts that are Fully Funded with Appropriations

Social Security Appropriations Limited to Amounts in the Trust Fund

Medicare Amounts Based on the Infinite Horizon Assumption

Medicaid Amount Based on the Figures Appearing in the Statement of Long-Term Fiscal Projections and
Required Supplementary Information

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Social Security	\$1.9	\$2.0	\$2.2	\$2.4	\$2.5	\$2.6	\$2.7	\$2.7	\$2.8	\$2.8
Medicare										
Part A	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
SMI -Part B	26.2	26.8	34.0	37.2	31.6	22.4	23.7	25.1	31.5	28.3
SMI - Part D	16.0	17.1	17.2	15.6	21.0	16.2	14.3	14.4	14.2	14.9
Total Medicare	42.5	44.2	51.5	53.1	52.9	38.9	38.3	39.8	46.0	43.5
Net SOSI Obligation with Appropriations	44.3	46.2	53.7	55.5	55.4	41.5	41.0	42.5	48.7	46.3
Medicaid					24.2	24.0	26.1	25.2	26.0	27.3
Total SOSI & Medicaid Obligations with Appropriations	\$44.3	\$46.2	\$53.7	\$55.5	\$79.6	\$65.5	\$67.1	\$67.7	\$74.7	\$73.6
Increase (Decrease) in Net Obligations	(\$1.7)	\$1.9	\$7.5	\$1.8	\$24.1	(\$14.1)	\$1.6	\$0.7	\$7.0	(\$1.2)

Exhibit 3

The Financial Report of the United States Government Adjusted Statements of Net Cost

Includes the Increase or Decrease in the Net Present Value Cost Of Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid to the Extent that they are Fully Funded with Appropriations

(Trillions of Dollars)

Fiscal Year Ended 9/30	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
GDP (Quarterly-Current Dollars per BEA)	\$13.9	\$14.6	\$14.8	\$14.4	\$15.1	\$15.6	\$16.2	\$16.7	\$17.5	\$18.1
President's Budget										
Revenues	\$2.4	\$2.6	\$2.5	\$2.1	\$2.2	\$2.3	\$2.4	\$2.8	\$3.0	\$3.2
Outlays	2.7	2.7	3.0	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.7
Budget Surplus (Deficit)	(\$0.2)	(\$0.2)	(\$0.5)	(\$1.4)	(\$1.3)	(\$1.3)	(\$1.1)	(\$0.7)	(\$0.5)	(\$0.4)
Plus: Expenses Recorded in Financial Report	0.2	0.1	0.6	(0.2)	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.1
Financial Report – Net Operating Cost	(0.4)	(0.3)	(1.0)	(1.2)	(2.1)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.5)
Increase (Decrease) in NPV Cost										
Social Security	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
Medicare	(1.9)	1.7	7.3	1.6	(0.2)	(14.0)	(0.6)	1.5	6.2	(2.5)
Medicaid					24.2	(0.2)	2.1	(0.9)	0.8	1.3
Net Change	(1.7)	1.9	7.5	1.8	24.1	(14.1)	1.6	0.7	7.0	(1.2)
Adjusted Net Operating Cost	\$1.3	(\$2.2)	(\$8.5)	(\$3.0)	(\$26.2)	\$12.8	(\$2.9)	(\$1.5)	(\$7.8)	\$0.7

Exhibit 4

The Financial Report of the United States Government Adjusted Balance Sheet Reported Net Liability is about 5.1x the Size of the Nation's GDP

as of September 30, 2015

(Trillions of Dollars)

Assets	
Cash	\$0.3
Receivables	1.3
Inventories	0.3
Property, plant & equipment	0.9
Other	0.4
Total Assets	\$3.2

Liabilities	
Federal debt securities held by the public and accrued interest	(\$13.2)
Federal employee and veteran benefits payable	(6.7)
Other	(1.6)
Total Liabilities	(21.5)
Net Liability (Net Position)	(\$18.2)
Net Present Value Cost of Social Insurance and Medicaid obligations funded with Appropriations	(73.6)
Total Net Obligations	\$91.8

Exhibit 5

REVISED Ballpark Estimate of Each State's Net Present Value Cost Obligation for Medicaid Based on the 2015 State Expenditure Report Examining Fiscal 2013 -2015 State Spending

Published by National Association of State Budget Officers
Table 28 Medicaid Expenditures

2015 State Expenditure Report Estimated Published Figures for Fiscal 2015					Calculation of Each State's Estimated Obligation			
(\$ in millions)	General Fund	Federal Funds	Other State Funds	Total	Col. 1 + Col. 3 Adjusted Total State Spending	% of Total State Spending	Aggregate State Net Present Value Cost	State Net Present Value Cost Obligation for Medicaid
	Col. 1	Col. 2	Col. 3	Col. 4	Col. 5	Col. 6	Col. 7	Col. 8
California	\$16,599	\$52,658	\$5,699	\$74,956	\$22,298	11.43%	\$34,110,158	\$3,900,193
Ohio	14,861	7,541	1,925	24,327	16,786	8.61%	34,110,158	2,936,077
New York	11,161	29,393	5,114	45,668	16,275	8.35%	34,110,158	2,846,697
Texas	11,381	22,197	3,983	37,561	15,364	7.88%	34,110,158	2,687,351
Pennsylvania	8,298	12,996	2,849	24,143	11,147	5.72%	34,110,158	1,949,747
Florida	5,294	13,799	4,487	23,580	9,781	5.02%	34,110,158	1,710,817
Illinois	4,445	9,921	3,235	17,601	7,680	3.94%	34,110,158	1,343,326
Massachusetts	7,120	6,704	171	13,995	7,291	3.74%	34,110,158	1,275,285

Exhibit 6

**2015 State Expenditure Report
Estimated Published Figures for
Fiscal 2015**

Calculation of Each State's Estimated Obligation

(\$ in millions)	General Fund	Federal Funds	Other State Funds	Total	Col. 1 + Col. 3 Adjusted Total State Spending	% of Total State Spending	Aggregate State Net Present Value Cost	State Net Present Value Cost Obligation for Medicaid
	Col. 1	Col. 2	Col. 3	Col. 4	Col. 5	Col. 6	Col. 7	Col. 8
North Carolina	\$3,594	\$8,752	\$1,435	\$13,781	\$5,029	2.58%	\$34,110,158	\$879,634
New Jersey	3,869	8,912	1,068	13,849	4,937	2.53%	34,110,158	863,542
Michigan ⁽³⁾	2,797	12,494	2,029	17,320	4,826	2.47%	34,110,158	844,126
Minnesota	4,533	6,187	164	10,884	4,697	2.41%	34,110,158	821,563
Missouri	1,778	4,511	2,419	8,708	4,197	2.15%	34,110,158	734,107
Virginia	4,114	4,123	0	8,237	4,114	2.11%	34,110,158	719,589
Wisconsin	2,650	4,969	1,259	8,878	3,909	2.00%	34,110,158	683,732
Maryland	2,922	5,688	951	9,561	3,873	1.99%	34,110,158	677,435
Tennessee	3,316	6,673	370	10,359	3,686	1.89%	34,110,158	644,726
Connecticut	3,496	3,483	0	6,979	3,496	1.79%	34,110,158	611,493
Georgia	3,052	5,943	329	9,324	3,381	1.73%	34,110,158	591,378
Colorado	2,312	4,557	735	7,604	3,047	1.56%	34,110,158	532,958
Arizona	2,279	8,040	602	10,921	2,881	1.48%	34,110,158	503,922
Louisiana	1,610	4,588	1,216	7,414	2,826	1.45%	34,110,158	494,302
Indiana	2,009	6,476	677	9,162	2,686	1.38%	34,110,158	469,814
Washington	2,008	5,285	180	7,473	2,188	1.12%	34,110,158	382,708

Exhibit 6
(continued)

**2015 State Expenditure Report
Estimated Published Figures for
Fiscal 2015**

Calculation of Each State's Estimated Obligation

(\$ in millions)	General Fund	Federal Funds	Other State Funds	Total	Col. 1 + Col. 3 Adjusted Total State Spending	% of Total State Spending	Aggregate State Net Present Value Cost	State Net Present Value Cost Obligation for Medicaid
	Col. 1	Col. 2	Col. 3	Col. 4	Col. 5	Col. 6	Col. 7	Col. 8
Oklahoma	\$1,417	\$2,930	\$717	\$5,064	\$2,134	1.09%	\$34,110,158	\$373,263
Kentucky	1,501	7,517	504	9,522	2,005	1.03%	34,110,158	350,699
Oregon	728	6,683	1,260	8,671	1,988	1.02%	34,110,158	347,726
Iowa	1,268	2,846	691	4,805	1,959	1.00%	34,110,158	342,653
Alabama	685	4,155	1,192	6,032	1,877	0.96%	34,110,158	328,310
Kansas	1,281	1,689	578	3,548	1,859	0.95%	34,110,158	325,162
South Carolina	1,023	4,359	640	6,022	1,663	0.85%	34,110,158	290,879
Arkansas	898	4,568	593	6,059	1,491	0.76%	34,110,158	260,794
Mississippi	640	3,633	635	4,908	1,275	0.65%	34,110,158	223,013
New Mexico	862	4,036	238	5,136	1,100	0.56%	34,110,158	192,403
Rhode Island	1,067	1,482	30	2,579	1,097	0.56%	34,110,158	191,879
Maine	753	1,510	270	2,533	1,023	0.52%	34,110,158	178,935
West Virginia	520	2,610	400	3,530	920	0.47%	34,110,158	160,919
Hawaii	888	1,160	0	2,048	888	0.46%	34,110,158	155,322
Nebraska	850	968	37	1,855	887	0.45%	34,110,158	155,147
Utah	400	1,614	467	2,481	867	0.44%	34,110,158	151,649

Exhibit 6
(continued)

**2015 State Expenditure Report
Estimated Published Figures for
Fiscal 2015**

Calculation of Each State's Estimated Obligation

(\$ in millions)	General Fund	Federal Funds	Other State Funds	Total	Col. 1 + Col. 3 Adjusted Total State Spending	% of Total State Spending	Aggregate State Net Present Value Cost	State Net Present Value Cost Obligation for Medicaid
	Col. 1	Col. 2	Col. 3	Col. 4	Col. 5	Col. 6	Col. 7	Col. 8
Idaho	\$475	\$1,304	\$250	\$2,029	\$725	0.37%	\$34,110,158	\$126,811
New Hampshire	548	917	166	1,631	714	0.37%	34,110,158	124,887
Alaska	694	951	5	1,650	699	0.36%	34,110,158	122,264
Delaware	668	1,193	14	1,875	682	0.35%	34,110,158	119,290
Nevada	564	2,225	114	2,903	678	0.35%	34,110,158	118,590
Vermont	283	824	335	1,442	618	0.32%	34,110,158	108,096
North Dakota	441	697	7	1,145	448	0.23%	34,110,158	78,361
South Dakota	364	484	0	848	364	0.19%	34,110,158	63,668
Montana	271	748	91	1,110	362	0.19%	34,110,158	63,318
Wyoming	272	309	23	604	295	0.15%	34,110,158	51,599
	\$144,859	\$317,302	\$50,154	\$512,315	\$195,013	100.00%		\$34,110,158

Ballpark Estimate of Each State's Net Present Value Cost Obligation for Medicaid Based on the 2010 State Expenditure Report Examining Fiscal 2009 -2011 State Spending

Published by National Association of State Budget Officers
Table 28 Medicaid Expenditures

2010 State Expenditure Report Actual Published Figures for Fiscal 2010					Calculation of Each State's Estimated Obligation					
(\$ in millions)	General Fund	Federal Funds	Other State Funds	Total	Col. 1 + Col. 3 Adjusted Total State Spending	Estimated Adjust- ments	Estimated Adjusted Total State Spending	% of Total State Spending	Aggregate State Net Present Value Cost	State Net Present Value Cost Obligation for Medicaid
	Col. 1	Col. 2	Col. 3	Col. 4	Col. 5	Col. 6	Col. 7	Col. 8	Col. 9	Col. 10
California	\$10,319	\$27,968	\$738	\$39,025	\$11,057		\$11,057	8.81%	\$18,256,140	\$1,609,124
New York	6,296	26,057	4,672	37,025	10,968		10,968	8.74%	18,256,140	1,596,172
Massachusetts	9,462	0	0	9,462	9,462		9,462	7.54%	18,256,140	1,377,004
Ohio	8,611	3,024	658	12,293	9,269		9,269	7.39%	18,256,140	1,348,916
Pennsylvania	5,697	12,678	1,776	20,151	7,473		7,473	5.96%	18,256,140	1,087,545
Texas	6,701	16,086	86	22,873	6,787		6,787	5.41%	18,256,140	987,711
Florida	2,823	11,984	3,817	18,624	6,640		6,640	5.29%	18,256,140	966,318
Illinois	3,327	8,397	2,571	14,295	5,898		5,898	4.70%	18,256,140	858,335

Exhibit 7

2010 State Expenditure Report Actual Published Figures for Fiscal 2010					Calculation of Each State's Estimated Obligation					
(\$ in millions)	General Fund	Federal Funds	Other State Funds	Total	Col. 1 + Col. 3 Adjusted Total State Spending	Estimated Adjust- ments	Estimated Adjusted Total State Spending	% of Total State Spending	Aggregate State Net Present Value Cost	State Net Present Value Cost Obligation for Medicaid
	Col. 1	Col. 2	Col. 3	Col. 4	Col. 5	Col. 6	Col. 7	Col. 8	Col. 9	Col. 10
New Jersey	\$3,925	\$6,120	\$130	\$10,175	\$4,055		\$4,055	3.23%	\$18,256,140	\$590,124
Washington	3,754	3,870	108	7,732	3,862		3,862	3.08%	18,256,140	562,036
North Carolina	2,319	8,113	1,364	11,796	3,683		3,683	2.94%	18,256,140	535,987
Michigan	1,451	8,435	1,683	11,569	3,134		3,134	2.50%	18,256,140	456,091
Minnesota	2,745	4,748	67	7,560	2,812		2,812	2.24%	18,256,140	409,230
Virginia	2,590	3,963	1	6,554	2,591		2,591	2.07%	18,256,140	377,068
Missouri	1,422	6,196	1,168	8,786	2,590		2,590	2.06%	18,256,140	376,922
Maryland	1,997	4,185	557	6,739	2,554		2,554	2.04%	18,256,140	371,683
Colorado	1,120	2,533	1,115	4,768	2,235		2,235	1.78%	18,256,140	325,259
Connecticut	3,855	0	1,145	5,000	5,000	(\$2,768)	2,232	1.78%	18,256,140	324,823
Wisconsin	1,367	4,742	759	6,868	2,126		2,126	1.69%	18,256,140	309,397
Arizona	1,187	5,608	868	7,663	2,055		2,055	1.64%	18,256,140	299,064
Georgia	1,663	5,832	389	7,884	2,052		2,052	1.64%	18,256,140	298,627
Tennessee	1,632	6,227	322	8,181	1,954		1,954	1.56%	18,256,140	284,365
Indiana	1,186	4,554	432	6,172	1,618		1,618	1.29%	18,256,140	235,467
Alabama	315	3,957	1,037	5,309	1,352		1,352	1.08%	18,256,140	196,756

Exhibit 7
(continued)

2010 State Expenditure Report Actual Published Figures for Fiscal 2010					Calculation of Each State's Estimated Obligation					
(\$ in millions)	General Fund	Federal Funds	Other State Funds	Total	Col. 1 + Col. 3 Adjusted Total State Spending	Estimated Adjust- ments	Estimated Adjusted Total State Spending	% of Total State Spending	Aggregate State Net Present Value Cost	State Net Present Value Cost Obligation for Medicaid
	Col. 1	Col. 2	Col. 3	Col. 4	Col. 5	Col. 6	Col. 7	Col. 8	Col. 9	Col. 10
Louisiana	\$798	\$5,634	\$484	\$6,916	\$1,282		\$1,282	1.02%	\$18,256,140	\$186,569
Oregon	808	3,037	404	4,249	1,212		1,212	0.97%	18,256,140	176,382
Kentucky	811	4,499	383	5,693	1,194		1,194	0.95%	18,256,140	173,763
Iowa	602	2,165	522	3,289	1,124		1,124	0.90%	18,256,140	163,576
Oklahoma	739	2,586	360	3,685	1,099		1,099	0.88%	18,256,140	159,937
South Carolina	529	3,521	546	4,596	1,075		1,075	0.86%	18,256,140	156,445
Mississippi	139	3,199	849	4,187	988		988	0.79%	18,256,140	143,784
Kansas	713	1,860	70	2,643	783		783	0.62%	18,256,140	113,950
Arkansas	602	3,209	179	3,990	781		781	0.62%	18,256,140	113,659
Rhode Island	715	1,234	7	1,956	722		722	0.58%	18,256,140	105,073
New Mexico	567	2,683	113	3,363	680		680	0.54%	18,256,140	98,960
Nevada	465	944	107	1,516	572		572	0.46%	18,256,140	83,243
New Hampshire	385	797	180	1,362	565		565	0.45%	18,256,140	82,224
Maine	383	1,801	175	2,359	558		558	0.44%	18,256,140	81,206
Nebraska	532	1,095	22	1,649	554		554	0.44%	18,256,140	80,624

Exhibit 7
(continued)

2010 State Expenditure Report Actual Published Figures for Fiscal 2010					Calculation of Each State's Estimated Obligation					
(\$ in millions)	General Fund	Federal Funds	Other State Funds	Total	Col. 1 + Col. 3 Adjusted Total State Spending	Estimated Adjust- ments	Estimated Adjusted Total State Spending	% of Total State Spending	Aggregate State Net Present Value Cost ⁽⁴⁾	State Net Present Value Cost Obligation for Medicaid
	Col. 1	Col. 2	Col. 3	Col. 4	Col. 5	Col. 6	Col. 7	Col. 8	Col. 9	Col. 10
Hawaii	\$499	\$957	\$0	\$1,456	\$499		\$499	0.40%	\$18,256,140	\$72,619
Delaware	481	777	0	1,258	481		481	0.38%	18,256,140	70,000
West Virginia	252	2,100	211	2,563	463		463	0.37%	18,256,140	67,380
Utah	229	1,370	185	1,784	414		414	0.33%	18,256,140	60,249
Idaho	288	1,069	111	1,468	399		399	0.32%	18,256,140	58,066
Vermont	147	834	229	1,210	376		376	0.30%	18,256,140	54,719
Alaska	341	823	7	1,171	348		348	0.28%	18,256,140	50,644
South Dakota	225	604	0	829	225		225	0.18%	18,256,140	32,744
Montana	137	728	65	930	202		202	0.16%	18,256,140	29,397
Wyoming	196	363	0	559	196		196	0.16%	18,256,140	28,524
North Dakota	193	467	2	662	195		195	0.16%	18,256,140	28,378
	\$97,540	\$233,633	\$30,674	\$361,847	\$128,214	(\$2,768)	\$125,446	100.00%		\$18,256,140

Ballpark Estimate of Each State's Net Present Value Cost Obligation for Medicaid Based on the 2015 State Expenditure Report Examining Fiscal 2013 -2015 State Spending

Published by National Association of State Budget Officers
Table 28 Medicaid Expenditures

2015 State Expenditure Report Estimated Published Figures for Fiscal 2015					Calculation of Each State's Estimated Obligation			
(\$ in millions)	General Fund	Federal Funds	Other State Funds	Total	Col. 1 + Col 3 Adjusted Total State Spending	% of Total State Spending	Aggregate State Net Present Value Cost	State Net Present Value Cost Obligation for Medicaid
	Col. 1	Col. 2	Col. 3	Col. 4	Col. 5	Col. 6	Col. 7	Col. 8
California	\$16,599	\$52,658	\$5,699	\$74,956	\$22,298	11.43%	\$16,778,510	\$1,918,473
Ohio	14,861	7,541	1,925	24,327	16,786	8.61%	16,778,510	1,444,232
New York	11,161	29,393	5,114	45,668	16,275	8.35%	16,778,510	1,400,267
Texas	11,381	22,197	3,983	37,561	15,364	7.88%	16,778,510	1,321,886
Pennsylvania	8,298	12,996	2,849	24,143	11,147	5.72%	16,778,510	959,065
Florida	5,294	13,799	4,487	23,580	9,781	5.02%	16,778,510	841,537
Illinois	4,445	9,921	3,235	17,601	7,680	3.94%	16,778,510	660,771
Massachusetts	7,120	6,704	171	13,995	7,291	3.74%	16,778,510	627,302

Exhibit 8

**2015 State Expenditure Report
Estimated Published Figures for
Fiscal 2015**

Calculation of Each State's Estimated Obligation

(\$ in millions)	General Fund	Federal Funds	Other State Funds	Total	Col. 1 + Col 3 Adjusted Total State Spending	% of Total State Spending	Aggregate State Net Present Value Cost	State Net Present Value Cost Obligation for Medicaid
	Col. 1	Col. 2	Col. 3	Col. 4	Col. 5	Col. 6	Col. 7	Col. 8
North Carolina	\$3,594	\$8,752	\$1,435	\$13,781	\$5,029	2.58%	\$16,778,510	\$432,685
New Jersey	3,869	8,912	1,068	13,849	4,937	2.53%	16,778,510	424,769
Michigan	2,797	12,494	2,029	17,320	4,826	2.47%	16,778,510	415,219
Minnesota	4,533	6,187	164	10,884	4,697	2.41%	16,778,510	404,120
Missouri	1,778	4,511	2,419	8,708	4,197	2.15%	16,778,510	361,101
Virginia	4,114	4,123	0	8,237	4,114	2.11%	16,778,510	353,960
Wisconsin	2,650	4,969	1,259	8,878	3,909	2.00%	16,778,510	336,322
Maryland	2,922	5,688	951	9,561	3,873	1.99%	16,778,510	333,225
Tennessee	3,316	6,673	370	10,359	3,686	1.89%	16,778,510	317,136
Connecticut	3,496	3,483	0	6,979	3,496	1.79%	16,778,510	300,789
Georgia	3,052	5,943	329	9,324	3,381	1.73%	16,778,510	290,894
Colorado	2,312	4,557	735	7,604	3,047	1.56%	16,778,510	262,158
Arizona	2,279	8,040	602	10,921	2,881	1.48%	16,778,510	247,875
Louisiana	1,610	4,588	1,216	7,414	2,826	1.45%	16,778,510	243,143
Indiana	2,009	6,476	677	9,162	2,686	1.38%	16,778,510	231,098
Washington	2,008	5,285	180	7,473	2,188	1.12%	16,778,510	188,251

Exhibit 8
(continued)

**2015 State Expenditure Report
Estimated Published Figures for
Fiscal 2015**

Calculation of Each State's Estimated Obligation

(\$ in millions)	General Fund	Federal Funds	Other State Funds	Total	Col. 1 + Col 3 Adjusted Total State Spending	% of Total State Spending	Aggregate State Net Present Value Cost	State Net Present Value Cost Obligation for Medicaid
	Col. 1	Col. 2	Col. 3	Col. 4	Col. 5	Col. 6	Col. 7	Col. 8
Oklahoma	\$1,417	\$2,930	\$717	\$5,064	\$2,134	1.09%	\$16,778,510	\$183,605
Kentucky	1,501	7,517	504	9,522	2,005	1.03%	16,778,510	172,506
Oregon	728	6,683	1,260	8,671	1,988	1.02%	16,778,510	171,043
Iowa	1,268	2,846	691	4,805	1,959	1.00%	16,778,510	168,548
Alabama	685	4,155	1,192	6,032	1,877	0.96%	16,778,510	161,493
Kansas	1,281	1,689	578	3,548	1,859	0.95%	16,778,510	159,944
South Carolina	1,023	4,359	640	6,022	1,663	0.85%	16,778,510	143,081
Arkansas	898	4,568	593	6,059	1,491	0.76%	16,778,510	128,283
Mississippi	640	3,633	635	4,908	1,275	0.65%	16,778,510	109,698
New Mexico	862	4,036	238	5,136	1,100	0.56%	16,778,510	94,642
Rhode Island	1,067	1,482	30	2,579	1,097	0.56%	16,778,510	94,384
Maine	753	1,510	270	2,533	1,023	0.52%	16,778,510	88,017
West Virginia	520	2,610	400	3,530	920	0.47%	16,778,510	79,155
Hawaii	888	1,160	0	2,048	888	0.46%	16,778,510	76,402
Nebraska	850	968	37	1,855	887	0.45%	16,778,510	76,316
Utah	400	1,614	467	2,481	867	0.44%	16,778,510	74,595

Exhibit 8
(continued)

**2015 State Expenditure Report
Estimated Published Figures for
Fiscal 2015**

Calculation of Each State's Estimated Obligation

(\$ in millions)	General Fund	Federal Funds	Other State Funds	Total	Col. 1 + Col 3 Adjusted Total State Spending	% of Total State Spending	Aggregate State Net Present Value Cost	State Net Present Value Cost Obligation for Medicaid
	Col. 1	Col. 2	Col. 3	Col. 4	Col. 5	Col. 6	Col. 7	Col. 8
Idaho	\$475	\$1,304	\$250	\$2,029	\$725	0.37%	\$16,778,510	\$62,377
New Hampshire	548	917	166	1,631	714	0.37%	16,778,510	61,431
Alaska	694	951	5	1,650	699	0.36%	16,778,510	60,140
Delaware	668	1,193	14	1,875	682	0.35%	16,778,510	58,678
Nevada	564	2,225	114	2,903	678	0.35%	16,778,510	58,334
Vermont	283	824	335	1,442	618	0.32%	16,778,510	53,171
North Dakota	441	697	7	1,145	448	0.23%	16,778,510	38,545
South Dakota	364	484	0	848	364	0.19%	16,778,510	31,318
Montana	271	748	91	1,110	362	0.19%	16,778,510	31,146
Wyoming	272	309	23	604	295	0.15%	16,778,510	25,381
	\$144,859	\$317,302	\$50,154	\$512,315	\$195,013	100.00%		\$16,778,510

The President's Budget

2000 to 2009

(Trillions of Dollars)

Fiscal Year Ended 9/30	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
GDP (Quarterly-Current Dollars per BEA)	\$10.4	\$10.6	\$11.0	\$11.6	\$12.4	\$13.2	\$13.9	\$14.6	\$14.8	\$14.4
President's Budget										
Revenues	\$2.0	\$2.0	\$1.9	\$1.8	\$1.9	\$2.2	\$2.4	\$2.6	\$2.5	\$2.1
Outlays	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.7	3.0	3.5
Budget Surplus (Deficit)	\$0.2	\$0.1	(\$0.2)	(\$0.4)	(\$0.4)	(\$0.3)	(\$0.2)	(\$0.2)	(\$0.5)	(\$1.4)

The Financial Report of the United States Government

Statements of Net Cost

(Trillions of Dollars)

Fiscal Year Ended 9/30	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
GDP (Quarterly-Current Dollars per BEA)	\$10.4	\$10.6	\$11.0	\$11.6	\$12.4	\$13.2	\$13.9	\$14.6	\$14.8	\$14.4
President's Budget										
Revenues	\$2.0	\$2.0	\$1.9	\$1.8	\$1.9	\$2.2	\$2.4	\$2.6	\$2.5	\$2.1
Outlays	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.7	3.0	3.5
Budget Surplus (Deficit)	\$0.2	\$0.1	(\$0.2)	(\$0.4)	(\$0.4)	(\$0.3)	(\$0.2)	(\$0.2)	(\$0.5)	(\$1.4)
Additional Accrued Expenses Recorded in Financial Report	0.2	0.6	0.2	(0.1)	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.6	(0.2)
Net Operating Cost	\$0.0	(\$0.5)	(\$0.4)	(\$0.3)	(\$0.6)	(\$0.8)	(\$0.4)	(\$0.3)	(\$1.0)	(\$1.2)

Exhibit 10

The Financial Report of the United States Government Balance Sheet

as of September 30, 2009

(Trillions of Dollars)

Assets	
Cash	\$0.4
Receivables	0.6
Inventories	0.3
Property, plant & equipment	0.8
Other	0.6
Total Assets	\$2.7

Liabilities	
Federal debt securities held by the public and accrued interest	(\$7.6)
Federal employee and veteran benefits payable	(5.3)
Other	(1.3)
Total Liabilities	(14.1)
Net Liability (Net Position)	(\$11.5)

The Financial Report of the United States Government Statement's of Social Insurance

Present Value of Obligations as of January 1 of each year and
Increase in Present Value from the Prior January 1 Valuation
Open Group

(Trillions of Dollars)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Social Security	\$3.8	\$4.2	\$4.6	\$4.9	\$5.2	\$5.7	\$6.5	\$6.8	\$6.6	\$7.7
Medicare										
Part A	2.7	4.7	5.1	6.2	8.5	8.8	11.3	12.3	12.7	13.8
Part B	6.5	8.1	8.1	9.7	11.4	12.4	13.1	13.4	15.7	17.2
Part D					8.1	8.7	7.9	8.4	7.9	7.2
Total Medicare	9.2	12.8	13.3	15.8	28.1	29.9	32.3	34.1	36.3	38.1
Total Net Obligation Per SOSI	13.0	17.0	17.8	20.7	33.3	35.6	38.8	40.8	42.9	45.8
Increase in Net Obligation (a)		\$4.0	\$0.8	\$2.9	\$12.5	\$2.3	\$3.2	\$2.1	\$2.0	\$2.9

Exhibit 12

Analysis of Appropriations and Unfunded Amounts for Social Insurance Figures Recorded in the 2009 SOSI

	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Social Security	\$2.4	\$5.3	\$7.7
Medicare			
Part A	0.3	13.4	13.8
SMI			
Part B	17.2	0.0	17.2
Part D	7.2	0.0	7.2
Total Medicare	24.7	13.4	38.1
Grand Totals	\$27.1	\$18.7	\$45.8

The Financial Report of the United States Government Present Value and Increase in Present Value of Social Insurance Obligations – Infinite Horizon

(Trillions of Dollars)

Fiscal Year Ended 9/30	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Social Security	11.9	12.8	15.2	15.7	15.9	17.5
Medicare						
Part A	\$22.1	\$24.3	\$28.4	\$30.5	\$34.7	\$36.7
Part B	23.2	25.8	26.2	26.8	34.0	37.2
Part D	16.5	18.3	16.0	17.1	17.2	15.6
Subtotal	61.8	68.4	70.6	74.4	85.9	89.5
	\$73.7	\$81.2	\$85.8	\$90.1	\$101.8	\$107.0
Increase in Present Value		\$7.5	\$4.6	\$4.3	\$11.7	\$5.2

***Analysis of Appropriations and
Unfunded Amounts for Social Security and
Medicare Figures Reported Under the
Infinite Horizon Assumption for 2009***

	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Social Security	2.4	15.1	17.5
Medicare			
Part A	0.3	36.4	36.7
SMI			
Part B	37.2	0.0	37.2
Part D	15.6	0.0	15.6
Total Medicare	\$55.5	\$51.5	\$107.0

The President's Budget

2001 to 2010

(Trillions of Dollars)

Fiscal Year Ended 9/30	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
GDP (Quarterly-Current Dollars per BEA)	\$10.6	\$11.0	\$11.6	\$12.4	\$13.2	\$13.9	\$14.6	\$14.8	\$14.4	\$15.1
President's Budget										
Revenues	\$2.0	\$1.9	\$1.8	\$1.9	\$2.2	\$2.4	\$2.6	\$2.5	\$2.1	\$2.2
Outlays	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.7	3.0	3.5	3.5
Budget Surplus (Deficit)	\$0.1	(\$0.2)	(\$0.4)	(\$0.4)	(\$0.3)	(\$0.2)	(\$0.2)	(\$0.5)	(\$1.4)	(\$1.3)

The Financial Report of the United States Government

Statements of Net Cost

(Trillions of Dollars)

Fiscal Year Ended 9/30	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
GDP (Quarterly-Current Dollars per BEA)	\$10.6	\$11.0	\$11.6	\$12.4	\$13.2	\$13.9	\$14.6	\$14.8	\$14.4	\$15.1
President's Budget										
Revenues	\$2.0	\$1.9	\$1.8	\$1.9	\$2.2	\$2.4	\$2.6	\$2.5	\$2.1	\$2.2
Outlays	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.7	3.0	3.5	3.5
Budget Surplus (Deficit)	\$0.1	(\$0.2)	(\$0.4)	(\$0.4)	(\$0.3)	(\$0.2)	(\$0.2)	(\$0.5)	(\$1.4)	(\$1.3)
Additional Accrued Expenses Recorded in Financial Report	0.6	0.2	(0.1)	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.6	(0.2)	0.8
Net Operating Cost	(\$0.5)	(\$0.4)	(\$0.3)	(\$0.6)	(\$0.8)	(\$0.4)	(\$0.3)	(\$1.0)	(\$1.2)	(\$2.1)

Exhibit 17

The Financial Report of the United States Government Balance Sheet

as of September 30, 2010

(Trillions of Dollars)

Assets	
Cash	\$0.4
Receivables	0.8
Inventories	0.3
Property, plant & equipment	0.8
Other	0.6
Total Assets	\$2.9

Liabilities	
Federal debt securities held by the public and accrued interest	(\$9.1)
Federal employee and veteran benefits payable	(5.7)
Other	(1.6)
Total Liabilities	(16.4)
Net Liability (Net Position)	(\$13.5)

Exhibit 18

The Financial Report of the United States Government Statement's of Social Insurance

Present Value of Obligations as of January 1 of each year and
Increase in Present Value from the Prior January 1 Valuation
Open Group

(Trillions of Dollars)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Social Security	\$4.2	\$4.6	\$4.9	\$5.2	\$5.7	\$6.5	\$6.8	\$6.6	\$7.7	\$7.9
Medicare										
Part A	4.7	5.1	6.2	8.5	8.8	11.3	12.3	12.7	13.8	2.7
Part B	8.1	8.1	9.7	11.4	12.4	13.1	13.4	15.7	17.2	12.9
Part D				8.1	8.7	7.9	8.4	7.9	7.2	7.2
Total Medicare	12.8	13.3	15.8	28.1	29.9	32.3	34.1	36.3	38.1	22.8
Total Net Obligation Per SOSI	17.0	17.8	20.7	33.3	35.6	38.8	40.8	42.9	45.8	30.8
Increase in Net Obligation (a)	\$4.0	\$0.8	\$2.9	\$12.5	\$2.3	\$3.2	\$2.1	\$2.0	\$2.9	(\$15.0)

The Financial Report of the United States Government

Comparison of Medicare Amounts Reported in 2010 SOSI To Managements' Illustrative Alternative Scenario

<i>(in billions) (Unaudited)</i>	2010 Consolidated SOSI	Illustrative Alternative Scenario ^{1,2}
Income		
Part A	\$14,408	\$14,408
Part B ³	4,836	7,684
Part D ⁴	2,486	2,486
Total Income	\$21,730	\$24,578
Expenditures		
Part A	\$17,091	\$21,745
Part B	17,737	28,284
Part D	9,715	9,715
Total Expenditures	\$44,543	\$59,744
Part A	\$2,683	\$7,337
Part B	12,901	20,600
Part D	7,229	7,229
Excess of Expenditures over Income	\$22,813	\$35,166

1. These amounts are not presented in the 2010 Trustees' Report

2. At the request of the Trustees, the Office of the Actuary at CMS has prepared an illustrative set of Medicare Trust Fund projections that differ from current law. No endorsement of the illustrative alternative to current law by the Trustees, CMS, or the Office of the Actuary should be inferred.

3. Excludes \$12,901 billion and \$20,600 of General revenue Contributions from the 2010 Consolidated SOSI projection and the Illustrative Alternative Scenario's projection, respectively, i.e., to reflect Part B income on a consolidated Government-wide basis.

4. Excludes \$7,229 billion of General Revenue Contributions from both the 2010 Consolidated SOSI projection and the Illustrative Alternative Scenario's projection, respectively, i.e., to reflect Part D income on a consolidated Government-wide basis.

Analysis of Appropriations and Unfunded Amounts for Social Insurance Figures Recorded in the 2010 SOSI

	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Social Security	\$2.5	\$5.4	\$7.9
Medicare			
Part A	0.3	2.4	2.7
SMI			
Part B	12.9	0.0	12.9
Part D	7.2	0.0	7.2
Total Medicare	20.4	2.4	22.8
Grand Totals	\$23.0	\$7.8	\$30.8

The Financial Report of the United States Government Present Value and Increase in Present Value of Social Insurance Obligations – Infinite Horizon

(Trillions of Dollars)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Social Security	11.9	12.8	15.2	15.7	15.9	17.5	18.7
Part A	\$22.1	\$24.3	\$28.4	\$30.5	\$34.7	\$36.7	\$6.6
Part B	23.2	25.8	26.2	26.8	34.0	37.2	31.1
Part D	16.5	18.3	16.0	17.1	17.2	15.6	21.0
Subtotal	61.8	68.4	70.6	74.4	85.9	89.5	59.2
	\$73.7	\$81.2	\$85.8	\$90.1	\$101.8	\$107.0	\$77.9
Increase in Present Value		\$7.5	\$4.6	\$4.3	\$11.7	\$5.2	(\$29.1)

Analysis of Appropriations and Unfunded Amounts for Medicare Figures Reported Under the Infinite Horizon Assumption for 2010

	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	
Social Security	\$2.5	\$16.2	\$18.7
Medicare			
Part A	0.3	6.3	6.6
SMI			
Part B	31.6	0.0	31.6
Part D	21.0	0.0	21.0
Total Medicare	\$55.4	\$22.5	\$77.9

Reconciliation from Net Operating Cost to Budget Deficit

(Billions of Dollars)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Net Operating Cost	(\$449.5)	(\$275.5)	(\$1,009.1)	(\$1,253.7)	(\$2,080.3)	(\$1,312.6)	(\$1,316.3)	(\$805.1)	(\$791.3)	(519.7)
Change In										
Federal Employee and Veterans Benefits Pay	187.2	90.1	549.8	(35.2)	503.1	71.9	481.8	264.3	134.3	46.7
Environmental and Disposal Liabilities	45.4	36.8					(2.2)	(41.7)	18.4	(15.6)
Property Upward/ (Downward) Credit Reform Subsidy Re-estimates, Net								(23.1)	22.9	(26.8)
Other Liabilities									7.3	38.6
Other, Net	(10.0)	(11.6)	4.5	(128.1)	283.1	(57.9)	(252.7)	(84.8)	105.0	(4.6)
Subtotal-Net Difference	201.8	112.7	554.3	(163.3)	786.2	14.0	226.9	124.8	307.9	80.8
Budget Deficit	(\$247.7)	(\$162.8)	(\$454.8)	(\$1,417.0)	(\$1,294.1)	(\$1,298.6)	(\$1,089.4)	(\$680.3)	(\$483.4)	(\$438.9)

Reported Net Liability is about the Size of the Nation's GDP Balance Sheet

as of September 30, 2015

(Trillions of Dollars)

Assets	
Cash	\$0.3
Receivables	1.3
Inventories	0.3
Property, plant & equipment	0.9
Other	0.4
Total Assets	\$3.2

Liabilities	
Federal debt securities held by the public and accrued interest	(\$13.2)
Federal employee and veteran benefits payable	(6.7)
Other	(1.6)
Total Liabilities	(21.5)
Net Liability (Net Position)	(\$18.2)

Exhibit 25

The Financial Report of the United States Government Statement's of Social Insurance

Present Value of Obligations as of January 1 of each year and
Increase in Present Value from the Prior January 1 Valuation
Open Group

(Trillions of Dollars)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Present Value of Social Insurance Programs										
Social Security	\$6.5	\$6.8	\$6.6	\$7.7	\$7.9	\$9.2	\$11.3	\$12.3	\$13.3	\$13.4
Medicare										
Part A	11.3	12.3	12.7	13.8	2.7	3.3	5.6	4.8	3.8	3.2
Part B	13.1	13.4	15.7	17.2	12.9	13.9	14.8	15.7	17.9	17.5
Part D	7.9	8.4	7.9	7.2	7.2	7.5	6.8	6.9	6.8	7.3
Subtotal	32.3	34.1	36.3	38.1	22.8	24.6	27.2	27.3	28.5	27.9
Total Social Insurance Obligations	\$38.8	\$40.8	\$42.9	\$45.8	\$30.8	\$33.7	\$38.5	\$39.6	\$41.8	\$41.4
Increase in Net Obligation	\$3.2	\$2.1	\$2.0	\$2.9	(\$15.0)	\$3.0	\$4.7	\$1.1	\$2.2	(\$0.4)

Analysis of Illustrative Scenarios and Related Appropriations 2010 - 2015

(Trillions of Dollars)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Excess of Expenditures Over Income						
Part A	\$7.3	\$8.5	\$9.9	\$9.2	\$8.3	\$7.9
SMI -Part B	20.6	21.0	20.6	20.1	20.0	21.5
SMI -Part D	7.2	7.5	6.8	6.9	6.9	7.4
	\$35.2	\$37.0	\$37.2	\$36.2	\$35.2	\$36.8
Increase in Present Value Cost						
		\$1.8	\$0.2	(\$1.0)	(\$1.0)	\$1.6
Appropriations						
Part A	\$0.3	\$0.3	\$0.3	\$0.3	\$0.3	\$0.3
SMI -Part B	20.6	21.0	20.6	20.1	20.0	21.5
SMI -Part D	7.2	7.5	6.8	6.9	6.9	7.4
	\$28.1	\$28.8	\$27.7	\$27.3	\$27.2	\$29.2

Exhibit 27

Analysis of Appropriations and Unfunded Amounts for Medicare Figures Reported in SOSI

2006	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.3	\$11.0	\$11.3
SMI – Part B	13.1	0.0	13.1
SMI – Part D	7.9	0.0	7.9
Medicare Total	21.3	11.0	32.3

2007	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.3	\$12.0	\$12.3
SMI – Part B	13.4	0.0	13.4
SMI – Part D	8.4	0.0	8.4
Medicare Total	22.1	12.0	34.1

2008	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.3	\$12.4	\$12.7
SMI – Part B	15.7	0.0	15.7
SMI – Part D	7.9	0.0	7.9
Medicare Total	23.9	12.4	36.3

2009	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.3	\$13.4	\$13.8
SMI – Part B	17.2	0.0	17.2
SMI – Part D	7.2	0.0	7.2
Medicare Total	24.7	13.4	38.1

2010	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.3	\$2.4	\$2.7
SMI – Part B	12.9	0.0	12.9
SMI – Part D	7.2	0.0	7.2
Medicare Total	20.4	2.4	22.8

Analysis of Appropriations and Unfunded Amounts for Medicare Figures Reported in SOSI

2011	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.3	\$3.0	\$3.3
SMI – Part B	13.9	0.0	13.9
SMI – Part D	7.5	0.0	7.5
Medicare Total	21.6	3.0	24.6

2012	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.2	\$5.3	\$5.6
SMI – Part B	14.8	0.0	14.8
SMI – Part D	6.8	0.0	6.8
Medicare Total	21.8	5.3	27.2

2013	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.2	\$4.6	\$4.8
SMI – Part B	15.7	0.0	15.7
SMI – Part D	6.9	0.0	6.9
Medicare Total	22.7	4.6	27.3

2014	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.2	\$3.6	\$3.8
SMI – Part B	17.9	0.0	17.9
SMI – Part D	6.8	0.0	6.8
Medicare Total	24.9	3.6	28.5

2015	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.2	\$3.0	\$3.2
SMI – Part B	17.5	0.0	17.5
SMI – Part D	7.3	0.0	7.3
Medicare Total	25.0	3.0	27.9

Exhibit 28
(continued)

The Financial Report of the United States Government Present Value and Increase in Present Value of Social Insurance Obligations – Infinite Horizon

(Trillions of Dollars)

Fiscal Year Ended 9/30	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Social Security	\$15.2	\$15.7	\$15.9	\$17.5	\$18.7	\$12.4	\$23.2	\$25.8	\$27.7	\$28.5
Medicare										
Part A	28.4	30.5	34.7	36.7	6.6	0.2	5.1	3.7	2.1	0.3
Part B	26.2	26.8	34.0	37.2	31.6	22.4	23.7	25.1	31.5	28.3
Part D	16.0	17.1	17.2	15.6	21.0	16.2	14.3	14.4	14.2	14.9
Subtotal	70.6	74.4	85.9	89.5	59.2	38.8	43.1	43.2	47.8	43.5
Social Security and Medicare	85.8	90.1	101.8	107.0	77.9	51.2	66.3	69.0	75.5	72.0
Increase in Present Value	\$4.6	\$4.3	\$11.7	\$5.2	(\$29.1)	(\$26.7)	\$15.1	\$2.7	\$6.5	(\$3.5)

Exhibit 29

Analysis of Appropriations for Social Security – Infinite Horizon

Appropriated Amounts Unchanged From Amounts Identified in the Analysis of SOSI Figures

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Social Security Infinite Horizon	\$15.2	\$15.7	\$15.9	\$17.5	\$18.7	\$12.4	\$23.2	\$25.8	\$27.7	\$28.5
Appropriated Funds	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.8
Unfunded Obligations	13.3	13.7	13.7	15.1	16.2	9.8	20.5	23.1	24.9	25.7

Analysis of Appropriations and Unfunded Amounts for Medicare Figures Reported Under the Infinite Horizon Assumption

2006	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.3	\$28.1	\$28.4
SMI – Part B	26.2	0.0	26.2
SMI – Part D	16.0	0.0	16.0
Medicare Total	42.5	28.1	70.6

2007	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.3	\$30.2	\$30.5
SMI – Part B	26.8	0.0	26.8
SMI – Part D	17.1	0.0	17.1
Medicare Total	44.2	30.2	74.4

2008	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.3	\$34.4	\$34.7
SMI – Part B	34.0	0.0	34.0
SMI – Part D	17.2	0.0	17.2
Medicare Total	51.5	34.4	85.9

2009	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.3	\$36.4	\$36.7
SMI – Part B	37.2	0.0	37.2
SMI – Part D	15.6	0.0	15.6
Medicare Total	53.1	36.4	89.5

2010	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.3	\$6.3	\$6.6
SMI – Part B	31.6	0.0	31.6
SMI – Part D	21.0	0.0	21.0
Medicare Total	52.9	6.3	59.2

Exhibit 31

Analysis of Appropriations and Unfunded Amounts for Medicare Figures Reported Under the Infinite Horizon Assumption

2011	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.3	\$-0.1	\$0.2
SMI – Part B	22.4	0.0	22.4
SMI – Part D	16.2	0.0	16.2
Medicare Total	38.9	-0.1	38.8

2012	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.3	\$4.8	\$5.1
SMI – Part B	23.7	0.0	23.7
SMI – Part D	14.3	0.0	14.3
Medicare Total	38.3	4.8	43.1

2013	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.3	\$3.4	\$3.7
SMI – Part B	25.1	0.0	25.1
SMI – Part D	14.4	0.0	14.4
Medicare Total	39.8	3.4	43.2

2014	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.3	\$1.8	\$2.1
SMI – Part B	31.5	0.0	31.5
SMI – Part D	14.2	0.0	14.2
Medicare Total	46.0	1.8	47.8

2015	Funds Appropriated	Unfunded Amounts	SOSI Obligation Reported
Medicare			
Part A	\$0.3	\$0.0	\$0.3
SMI – Part B	28.3	0.0	28.3
SMI – Part D	14.9	0.0	14.9
Medicare Total	43.5	0.0	43.5

Exhibit 31
(continued)

Statement of Long-Term Fiscal Projections and Required Supplementary Information - Federal Government's Portion of Net Present Value Cost of Medicaid

(All Figures in Trillions of Dollars)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Medicaid's Net Present Value Cost	\$24.2	\$24.0	\$26.1	\$25.2	\$26.0	\$27.3
Increase in Net Present Value Cost	\$24.2	(\$0.2)	\$2.1	(\$0.9)	\$0.8	\$1.3

Analysis of Medicare Amounts Reported in SOSI, Alternative Scenario and Infinite Horizon that have Appropriations

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Amounts Reported in SOSI										
Part A	\$0.3	\$0.3	\$0.3	\$0.3	\$0.3	\$0.3	\$0.2	\$0.2	\$0.2	\$0.2
Part B	13.1	13.4	15.7	17.2	12.9	13.9	14.8	15.7	17.9	17.5
Part D	7.9	8.4	7.9	7.2	7.2	7.5	6.8	6.9	6.8	7.3
Total Medicare in SOSI	21.3	22.1	23.9	24.7	20.4	21.6	21.8	22.7	24.9	25.0
Amounts Reported in Alternate Scenario										
Part A					0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Part B					20.6	21.1	20.6	20.1	20.0	21.5
Part D					7.2	7.5	6.8	6.9	6.9	7.4
Total Medicare – Alternate Scenario					28.1	28.8	27.7	27.3	27.2	29.2
Amounts Reported Under Infinite Horizon										
Part A	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Part B	26.2	26.8	34.0	37.2	31.6	22.4	23.7	25.1	31.5	28.3
Part D	16.0	17.1	17.2	15.6	21.0	16.2	14.3	14.4	14.2	14.9
Total Medicare – Infinite Horizon	42.5	44.2	51.5	53.1	52.9	38.9	38.3	39.8	46.0	43.5
Change in Infinite Horizon	\$1.9	(\$1.7)	(\$7.3)	(\$1.6)	\$0.2	\$14.0	\$0.6	(\$1.5)	(\$6.2)	\$2.5

Exhibit 33